Illinois Institute of Technology
LIBRARY
Chicago, Ill.

MID-AMERICA

An Historical Quarterly

The Catholic Theological Union LIBRARY Chicago, Ill.

VOLUME XLII

1960

977.7305
I 29I
v.42

S.S. CORDIS JESU.

PUBLISHED BY
THE INSTITUTE OF JESUIT HISTORY
LOYOLA UNIVERSITY
CHICAGO

CONTENTS OF VOLUME XLII

ARTICLES

FRANCIS PARKMAN ON THE NATURE OF MAN. *Richard A. Thompson* 3

THE COMMITTEE OF MEXICAN BONDHOLDERS AND EUROPEAN INTERVENTION IN 1861. *Philip J. Sheridan* . . . 18

THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE MIDDLE AGES. *H. Wayne Morgan* 30

SEARCH FOR FORTUNE ALONG THE MISSISSIPPI. *Dorothy J. Ernst* 44

CATHOLICISM AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, 1865-1900. *Vincent P. De Santis* 67

THE PHILIPPINES AND THE ROYAL PHILIPPINE COMPANY. *James F. Cloghessy* 80

THE MAKING OF AN INSURGENT. *Richard Lowitt* 105

ROGER BARLOW: FIRST ENGLISH TRAVELER IN THE PAMPAS. *S. Samuel Trifilo* 116

NEGRO COLONIZATION: THE CLIMATE OF OPINION SURROUNDING LINCOLN, 1860-1865. *Robert H. Zoellner* . . 131

ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF GERMAN INTERVENTION IN THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR, 1936-1939. *Eugene H. Korth, S.J.* . . . 151

TARASCON'S DREAM OF AN AMERICAN COMMERCIAL EMPIRE IN THE WEST. *Doyce B. Nunis, Jr.* 170

NEW ORLEANS COURTS UNDER MILITARY OCCUPATION, 1861-1865. *Elisabeth Joan Doyle* 185

ALFRED M. LANDON AND THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN OF 1936. *Donald R. McCoy* 195

JOHN A. LOGAN AND THE ELECTION OF 1864 IN ILLINOIS. *James P. Jones* 219

THE LOYOLA LEO XIII SYMPOSIUM. *Edward T. Gargan* 231

BOOK REVIEWS 53, 121, 244

NOTES AND COMMENTS 60, 127, 251

INDEX 253

25,128

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2011 with funding from
CARLI: Consortium of Academic and Research Libraries in Illinois

http://www.archive.org/details/midamericahistor42unse

MID-AMERICA

An Historical Review

VOLUME 42, NUMBER 1 JANUARY 1960

MID-AMERICA

An Historical Review

JANUARY 1960

VOLUME 42 NUMBER 1

CONTENTS

FRANCIS PARKMAN ON THE NATURE OF MAN . . . . *Richard A. Thompson* 3

THE COMMITTEE OF MEXICAN BONDHOLDERS AND EUROPEAN INTERVENTION IN 1861 . *Philip J. Sheridan* 18

THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE MIDDLE AGES . . . . . *H. Wayne Morgan* 30

SEARCH FOR FORTUNE ALONG THE MISSISSIPPI . . . . . *Dorothy J. Ernst* 44

BOOK REVIEWS 53

NOTES AND COMMENTS 60

MANAGING EDITOR

JEROME V. JACOBSEN, *Chicago*

EDITORIAL STAFF

WILLIAM STETSON MERRILL
J. MANUEL ESPINOSA
W. EUGENE SHIELS
RAPHAEL HAMILTON
PAUL KINIERY
PAUL S. LIETZ

Published quarterly by Loyola University (The Institute of Jesuit History) at 50 cents a copy. Annual subscription, $2.00; in foreign countries, $2.50.

Entered as second class matter, August 7, 1929, at the post office at Chicago, Illinois, under the Act of March 3, 1879. Additional entry as second class matter at the post office at Effingham, Illinois. Printed in the United States.

Subscription and change of address notices and all communications should be addressed to the Managing Editor at the publication and editorial offices at Loyola University, 6525 Sheridan Road, Chicago 26, Illinois.

MID-AMERICA

An Historical Review

JANUARY 1960

VOLUME 42 NUMBER 1

Francis Parkman on the Nature of Man

Francis Parkman stands at the front rank of America's Nineteenth Century historians. New facts may be added to the existing knowledge of the titanic Anglo-French struggle for North America which he recorded. Certainly new interpretations of greater significance for later generations are yet to appear. None of this, however, alters the unusual durability of the Parkman histories. Few studies of the human record have promised to stand the test of time as well as the works of this brilliant New England scholar.

The magnificent volumes of Parkman's work are naturally the result of a painstaking accumulation of evidence. Even more, of course, these studies are the product of their author's incisive mind. So significant, indeed, is Parkman's role in American scholarship that both the casual and the serious student of American history have almost as much interest in the development of Parkman's thinking as they have in his actual histories.

Of particular interest is the problem of Parkman's ideas on the nature of man. Concepts of human nature are important because they form basic assumptions which do a great deal to determine the social, political, economic, and religious ideas of all men. To understand Parkman's own view of human nature is, therefore, to have a more complete grasp of the significance of his historical scholarship.[1]

[1] For the only summary of the history of the idea of "Human Nature in American Thought," see the two excellent articles by Merle Curti. These are, "The Age of Reason and Morality, 1750–1860," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXVIII (September, 1953), 354–375; and "The Retreat From Reason in the Age of Science," *Ibid.*, LXVIII (December, 1953), 492–510. For an application of the human nature analysis to the thought of one man, see also Curti's "Woodrow Wilson's Concept of Human Nature," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, I (May, 1957), 1–19.

There is, for example, much in Parkman's voluminous writing which appears to justify the belief that he was staunchly anti-democratic. Certainly it is true that he was highly critical of a great deal of the American society in which he lived. It is possible, however, that an examination of Parkman's ideas of human nature will force an alteration or a modification of the impression that he was anti-democratic. At the very least, the study will provide a deeper understanding of those views.

Parkman's non-historical writings[2] reveal at once that he made a basic distinction between a fundamental nature common to all men and the diversities of character resulting from the impact of environment. This view, which he held in common with many men of the Nineteenth Century, was set forth clearly in a passage of his one novel, *Vassall Morton.*

> Take a savage from his woods or his prairies, and, school him as you will, the ingrained savage will still declare itself. Take the most polished of mankind, turn him into the wilderness, and forthwith the dormant savage begins to appear. Hunt him with enemies, gnaw him with hunger, beat him with wind and rain, and observe the result; how the delicate tissues of civilization are blown away, how rude passions start into life, how his bodily cravings grow clamorous and importunate, how he grows reckless of his own blood and the blood of others.[3]

Thus Francis Parkman vividly asserted his belief that all men have the same basic nature in which the character of the savage is present in all men in some degree. To him the true difference between the savage who had been educated and the man of civilized culture was no more than an equation of the distance each had traveled from actual savagery. Because he was more recently removed from the primitive stage, the educated savage would revert to man's fundamental nature more readily than a cultured person in whom the "war-like instinct" was neither extinguished nor repressed, but simply refined and civilized.[4]

This view of the effect of culture on man pointedly demonstrated Parkman's belief that environment was a more important force than heredity in establishing the character which emerged

---

[2] Complete bibliographies of the non-historical works of Parkman (upon which this article is based) will be found in Wilbur L. Schramm, (ed.), *Francis Parkman, Representative Selections,* New York, 1938; and in Mason Wade, *Francis Parkman: Heroic Historian,* New York, 1942.

[3] *Vassall Morton,* Boston, 1856, 244. All works cited are by Parkman unless otherwise noted.

[4] "The Weak Side of Our Armies," *Boston Daily Advertiser,* June 30, 1863.

from man's basic nature. He emphasized his environmentalist position still further in a review of a book on the Indian tribes of the Pacific Coast. Parkman declared himself at loss to understand the degraded character of the tribes of Central California in view of the great abundance of their environment.[5] Had he believed in the greater importance of heredity, he would have encountered no difficulty.

It is not surprising, therefore, to discover that Parkman described the fighting qualities of the soldiers of the Civil War in terms of the sections of the nation from which they came. Southerners were naturally militant because their society encouraged warlike qualities in its men. The martial spirit was more abundant in men from the Northwest than in those from the Northeast because of the less advanced and more imperfect culture of the former region.[6]

Environment determined even the calibre of political leadership. Admitting that it was hard to find the source of the "conditions of human greatness," Parkman nevertheless remained convinced that greatness would never emerge where it was not wanted. A nation which asserted its belief in the idea of democratic equality by choosing men of indifferent character for office could never produce great leaders.[7]

A distinctly American character was also the result of a unique environment. Exploitation of the continent had made Americans a *parvenue* nation with all attendant "faults and follies." Rising too rapidly, Americans lacked modesty and dignity. Their preoccupation with material gain cramped the growth of a higher form of individual and national character. Although often feeling deeply about the issues which concern a democratic state, Parkman contended that Americans generally displayed little patience with demands for their sustained attention to anything but their daily business. The result was that politics in the United States were characterized by an apathetic good nature.[8]

"Rising in the world" was an American national disease natural to a people who were unhappy unless in pursuit of something. The

---

5 Review of Bancroft's *Native Races of the Pacific States* in the *North American Review*, CXX (January, 1875), 41.

6 "The Weak Side of Our Armies."

7 "The Failure of Universal Suffrage," *North American Review*, CXXVII (July-August, 1878), 15.

8 "Our Nation's Ordeal," *Boston Daily Advertiser*, September 4, 1861; "The Tale of the Ripe Scholar," *Nation*, IX (December 23, 1869), 560; "The Failure of Universal Suffrage," 11.

Civil War proved that the war spirit still existed among the people but it was being steadily undermined by pre-occupation with trade. Parkman protested that commercial honor was being confused with true honor. He was convinced that Americans were growing more proud of a good bargain than of manhood while things vital to the true worth and nobility of man were coming to be regarded as mere sham.[9]

Parkman held the domination of material interests also responsible for the lag in American scholarship. Except where they bore directly upon material considerations, the arts and sciences were regarded as agreeable but non-essential decorations. A lack of "high interest or ruling idea" gave the United States a widespread but superficial culture which expressed itself in a popular literature often frivolous and corrupt. Only in the writing of history had Americans demonstrated scholarship and literary skill—a fact which Parkman found curious in a people given so completely to living in the present and the future.[10]

Despite the importance which Parkman attached to the environment in establishing the character of man, there were inequalities among men which he asserted were hereditary. A society of complete equality of opportunity would promptly show a great diversity of individual reactions to similar environmental stimuli. Inherent diversities were, however, distinctions of degree rather than of type. The idea of inherent differences among men did not, therefore, contradict Parkman's belief that all men had a fundamental, war-like and savage nature modified only by the environment. All human nature was composed of the same essential elements but these were mixed by heredity in such different proportions and subjected to such different controlling factors in the environment that the result was contrasts among men which were as significant as similarities.[11]

The idea that man's character developed from a basic human nature through its contact with the environment was a distinct characteristic of the thought of the Age of Reason. John Locke contributed to the Enlightenment, among other things, a new view of human nature which held that man was not born damned but rather with a set of innate capacities which could be developed

---

9 *Vassal Morton*, 32, 36–37; "The Weak Side of Our Armies."

10 "The Tale of the Ripe Scholar," 559; "Our Nation's Ordeal"; Review of Read's *Historical Inquery Concerning Henry Hudson*, in the *Atlantic Monthly*, XIX (June, 1867), 764.

11 *Vassall Morton*, 372; "The Failure of Universal Suffrage," 6.

through sensory experience. Thus, as would be true of men in any period who regarded the environment as significant in man's development, the men of the Enlightenment placed great faith in the power of education to improve human society.[12]

Certainly Parkman had such a faith. Thus he could comment that "If one cannot learn to be enthusiastic in regard to the actualities of human nature, he can console himself by a boundless faith in its possibilities." He also insisted that, if the average man was allowed to believe there was no one better than himself, he would never rise above his own level. But Parkman's conviction that education could improve the character of man did not mean he thought that basic human nature could be changed. Rather there was a better side in man's nature which was sound and rational. Education could alter the balance of the characteristics of human nature to emphasize the most desirable without changing the basic nature of man.[13]

While Parkman included organized processes and institutions in his definition of education, he insisted that education had a more comprehensive meaning which involved all influences rising from "proper" surroundings. Too many people associated education with "school houses, school masters, lyceums, public libraries, colleges and diplomas." Vital education came from the "currents of life itself." All of man's experiences were a part of Parkman's idea of the educational process. He was explicit in the assertion that suffering and conflict would temper the mind, light the way to truth and strengthen the spirit. Even physical courage might be developed through mental habits.[14]

Francis Parkman did acknowledge the importance of formal education but he took a dim view of most institutionalized processes as he then knew them. Because the best minds of his time traditionally went into the ministry, secular scholarship was at a low level while the arts and sciences were left largely to those who could do nothing else. The result was that, when cultural nationalism began to demand original scholarship, the "mountain" of American

---

12 Curti, "The Age of Reason and Morality, 1750–1860," 358–359.

13 *Vassall Morton,* 86; "The Failure of Universal Suffrage," 12–13, 16; "Our Best Classes and the National Politics," *Boston Daily Advertiser,* July 21, 1863.

14 "Why Our Army is not the Best in the World," *Boston Daily Advertiser,* October 14, 1862; "Aristocrats and Democrats," *Ibid.,* July 14, 1863; *Vassall Morton,* 209, 236.

educational institutions was "convulsed to deliver a mouse" of feeble academic effort.[15]

Parkman even joined the anti-intellectual critics of formal education in his assertion that the older brand of scholarship failed to meet the demands of the feverish activity of that day. The self-made man, his wealth and accomplishments, filled the public eye. The education offered by American colleges and the status of scholarship then current seemed to justify amply the deprecation of learning by the anti-intellectuals. Parkman never tired of insisting that the colleges must get into the main stream of life. On one occasion he went so far as to remark that if scholars had more contact with the American wilderness "it would be well for their bodies and their immortal souls."[16]

With this remark Parkman appears to be anticipating, not the romantic flight from reason, but the James-Dewey concept of the mind as the "capacity of the organism" in which the organism could adapt itself to changing situations through "problem solving." The nature of Parkman's belief in the potentialities of man is reflected in his concepts of the desirable aims of education. He insisted that education must not seek to cram a miscellany of facts into the mind. Education should attempt the development of the mind's powers of observation, of comparison and analysis, and of reasoning. Education should further strengthen and instruct the moral sense of man, leading him to knowledge of himself and so to personal modesty. A large body of persons thus educated would form a powerful bulwark against the demagogues that infested the democracy.[17]

Inasmuch as Parkman's ideas of education reflected his belief in man's capacity for growth and development, it is not surprising that Darwinian ideas of evolution also appear in Parkman's thought at many points. For the individual, he insisted, conflict and adversity were essential for the development of true manhood. Adversity was necessary for the operation of natural selection, without which man would degenerate. Continuous good fortune, he insisted, would weaken and pervert any person. Conflicts of mind and spirit were as desirable as physical struggle, yet in discussing the elements which temper the nature of man, Parkman expressed

---

15 "The Tale of the Ripe Scholar," 558–559.

16 *Ibid.*, 559; "Exploring the Magalloway," *Harper's Magazine*, XXIX (November, 1864), 736.

17 Curti, "Retreat from Reason in the Age of Science," 497; "The Tale of the Ripe Scholar," 560.

himself entirely in terms of physical combat and stated explicitly that physical action was essential to the attainment of high manly character.[18]

It followed naturally, therefore, that Parkman regarded the Civil War as a great regenerating influence upon an American manhood which he believed had sunk to a low ebb during the preceding decade. The desirability of physical conflict was further suggested in his observation that "a lofty purpose may turn timidity into heroism." The virtue of physical struggle was also reflected in the very structure of Parkman's novel, *Vassall Morton.* The villainous Vinal is depicted as having a relatively weak bodily constitution while Morton, so obviously heroic, is physically strong and delights in muscular exertion.[19]

Parkman's emphasis on physical conflict was doubtless a reflection of his own long and painful illness which meant so much confinement for this lover of the out-of-doors. His struggle between a desire to die and an urge to live appeared to convince him that there was a close inter-relation of body and spirit. Vassal Morton's fictional imprisonment seems to have symbolized Parkman's own confinement, and the struggles of the two men, one real and the other imagined, were really the same. Parkman's belief in the interaction of mind and body is suggested, then, in Morton's contemplated suicide which he rejected by an instinctive and higher appeal to his "better nature." Certainly this attitude was characteristic of the rationalist psychology of the early Nineteenth Century which also presupposed a duality of mind and body. Base impulses arose from the body but, with proper training of the mind, the use of reason and the will could correct and improve both the individual and society as a whole.[20]

According to Parkman, the ability of every man was subject to a "universal law of growth and achievement." Thus the man who knew himself and who set goals which he pursued would be a success. The man who ignored his own nature was doomed to failure. But while he saw that men have limitations, Parkman insisted that "men make more limits for themselves than nature

---

18 "Our Nation's Ordeal," "The Woman Question," *North American Review*, CXXIX (October, 1879), 304; *Vassall Morton*, 208.

19 "Conservativism," *Boston Daily Advertiser*, October 17, 1862; *Vassall Morton*, 143, 185.

20 *Vassall Morton*, 200; Curti, "Retreat From Reason in the Age of Science," 492. For an account of Parkman's illness, see his autobiographical letter written to Dr. George Ellis in 1868 and reprinted in Schramm, *Francis Parkman*, 3–14.

makes for them." Obviously man might, through education which provided self-kuowledge, greatly extend his limits.[21]

While Parkman found a sound and rational "better half" in people, it was evident to him that this side of man's nature was too often obscured in the continuing battle of principles which was ever waged within each being. It was precisely man's failures in this battle which led so many people into an undignified scramble for the material spoils of politics.[22]

This scramble for gain led Parkman to conclude that human nature had not changed much since man first appeared on earth. It has been noted that, although he was an environmentalist, Parkman did not claim that exterior conditions could alter the essential nature of man. Changes in environment might shift the emphasis in man's character, but they could not make man into something entirely new. Man ever acted in his own interest, but interests differed among men. Material gain attracted only a part of the population. The "better sort" of men remained aloof from politics because the rewards they sought were not found there and they found the scramble itself repulsive. Parkman picked no quarrel with man's inclination to act in self-interest. He did believe, however, that education would show men that their own interests were identical with those of the community.[23]

Parkman was also explicit in expressing his views of the differences between the nature of men and the nature of women. He drew an analogy between the two sexes and the two electrical properties of the magnet. In both instances, he declared, each element required its opposite in order to function and thus was drawn to the other. The degree to which a man or a woman was emphatically masculine or feminine determined the strength of the individual's need for the other sex. This need, felt by both men and women, was intellectual as well as physical. The force of this common demand could bring about a wide area of understanding between sexes but, however well-developed such understanding might become, there would always be some aspects of the nature of one sex which members of the other could never fully comprehend.

---

21 "The Woman Question," 309–310; *Vassall Morton*, 216–217.

22 "The Failure of Universal Suffrage," 12–13; *Vassall Morton*, 216-217; "Our Best Classes and the National Politics."

23 "Our Best Classes and the National Politics"; "The Failure of Universal Suffrage," 8–9.

Despite some definite advantages which the United States offered to women, Parkman found there were also shortcomings in the American environment. These handicaps were in the nature of

> An overstrained and morbid activity, an incessant tension of nerves, bred partly by climate, but incomparably more by the peculiar social conditions of the country where all kinds of competition, spurred by all kinds of stimulus, keep mind and body always on the stretch.[24]

Thus the conflict and adversity which Parkman found so essential for the development of men was actually harmful to women. The masculine preoccupation with material and practical pursuits and the male concern with ambitions and rivalries made men much more ignorant of the beauties of life than women. It was, therefore, the role of women, with their more delicate sensibilities and greater passivity of temperament, to set the moral standards of society and provide moral leadership. Parkman found proof that this was the peculiar duty of women in the admittedly unjust double standards of censure for moral lapses, since the more severe condemnation was always reserved for the female transgressor.

Parkman was sure that at least half the weakness of woman sprang from the "sensitiveness of her bodily organization." Physically, the differences between men and women were "ordained by God and Nature" and man, who did not make these differences, could not unmake them. Women were more delicate than men, both physically and mentally and, in women, the relations between body and mind were more intimate and subtle.

But if the relationships between woman's inherent physical nature and her mind had an intimacy peculiar to her sex it is a bit surprising to find Parkman denying that female mental qualities were inherited. If he was aware of the apparent contradiction in these two points, he gave no indication of it.

A possible explanation is suggested in Parkman's declaration that he believed men and women stood at about the same level of intellectual ability but that their ideas were inevitably expressed in different ways. This suggests that, while differences between men and women were inherent, within the frame of these differences development of both sexes remained largely a matter of environment. Thus a woman might develop intellectually as much as a man, but her growth would assume a somewhat different character

---

[24] "The Woman Question," 311.

because of the closer association of the woman's mind with her inherited bodily condition.

A distinction existed in Parkman's mind between man's "resolution and the "will" of woman. The former, he held, was subject to reason while the latter was not. Feminine nature had an "impetuous" quality which caused Parkman to declare that "It's not a woman's province to be reasonable."

The differences between men and women resulted, therefore, from the influences of both heredity and environment. The relation of women to men was varied by differences of race, mode of life, and degree of civilization. Parkman agreed that woman's position had improved and that further improvement might be expected. At the same time he insisted that, no matter how much liberty an advanced society might provide for its women, they must always exist under restrictions not imposed on the male. Women could not hope to live without these social laws. Unless there was a radical alteration in human nature—for which Parkman found not the slightest promise—women could not be emancipated equally with men. It was not, he insisted, a matter of mere "custom, habit, or public opinion," but the existence of an "all-pervading force" found in the men of all societies, in all times, which would insist upon this distinction for women.[25]

The implication of this reasoning was, of course, that the special nature of women was due more to the special nature of men than to any other factor. Parkman thus stood squarely on one of the major inconsistencies of the thinking of the men of the Enlightenment. Certainly the idea of the inferior status of women was out of tune with the general view of human nature in the Age of Reason. This held that all mankind had capacities which, given proper training, could realize better individuls and a better world of reason. Jefferson was drawn into the inconsistency on the status of women but Franklin was not. Although Franklin was certainly a man of the Enlightenment, in that climate of opinion his feminism was a minority view which was forced to wait for the impetus of the Transcendentalist element of the Romantic movement.

Parkman stood somewhere between Jefferson and Franklin. Observing that universal suffrage could function only with a high level of material prosperity and with the lengthy development of a tradi-

[25] For this section on the nature of women, the entire article, "The Woman Question," is pertinent. Significant passages are also found in *Vassall Morton*, 44, 84–85.

tion of self-government, he conceded that women could learn politics. But he argued, women should not be granted the vote because only men had received adequate training. The process of preparing women would require generations. Even with the training that men had received, there were still far too many unqualified voters without adding to their number.[26]

The entire span of Parkman's life was encompassed in a period in which a frank discussion of sex was taboo. Yet in *Vassall Morton,* published in 1856, he managed to describe some of his concepts of the sexual drive. Morton felt the awakening of such a desire in the form of a sharpening of all his senses to the extent that it seemed almost a malady—a malady which the author declared "will sometimes visit those of the ruder sex whom it attacks with virulence." Parkman was also aware of the problem of what would now be called sublimation, for he related that, within Morton, his chivalrous instincts struggled with the "urgency of a vigorous blood." The same good qualities which caused Morton to fight his physical desires also taught him to let his energy escape in constant bodily exercise rather "than in any less commendable recreations."[27]

Later in life Parkman abandoned even these thinly veiled circumlocutions for direct statement. He listed, as some of the major drives in men, the forces of hunger, thirst, self-preservation, avarice, malice and envy. Aside from the added force of religion, however, he contended that most of the nobler desires and energies drew their impulse from the impact of sex. The sex urge, Parkman insisted, was due to basic intellectual differences between men and women as much as it was due to physical attraction. In a very modern vein he noted that, while there was much variation as to the degree of power which the sex drive had in individuals, the whole human race was subject to it and to its ramifications. Other forces might supersede it in certain individuals at specific times, but none of the other drives exhibited the character of universality which could be claimed for sex. No other desire or motivating element was so prolific of results—both for evil and for good.[28]

Parkman's views of human nature were also revealed in his concept of class. He insisted that all ideas of human equality were fallacious and that all societies constructed upon such ideas were

---

[26] Curti, "The Age of Reason and Morality," 370–373; "The Failure of Universal Suffrage," 8; "The Woman Question," 318.
[27] *Vassall Morton,* 134.
[28] "The Woman Question," 305–306.

unstable. For him, the "best class" was the "cultivated class" on which wealth had no direct bearing. He admitted that many of the so-called "Brahmin caste" were in the "best class," but it is significant that he did not include all of them. At another point Parkman described the "best class" as those "who by education and association have gained a more liberal development than falls to the general share." This rather consistent tendency to regard the "best class" as the product of the educational environment rather than of wealth or heredity—although he doubtless would have pointed out limitations of native ability—was a fairly early conclusion in his thinking.[29]

Being himself a member of the "Brahmin caste," and also well-educated both by the formal process and through extensive travel, it is evident that Parkman's concept of the "better classes" painted a picture of the situation in which he found himself. There is a very strong odor of class snobbishness in his earlier work. Later in life his self-image of social superiority faded a bit but never entirely disappeared. His picture of the "better class," therefore, never really changed.[30]

Parkman believed that there were two kinds of inequality, one of which was fictitious and the other real and natural. Fictitious inequalities included such things as rank, title, privilege, and wealth while natural inequalities existed in the factors of character, ability and culture. Those who had superior endowments of the second group of qualities formed the "best class." This concept of "real" inequality is also seen in Parkman's view that the record of man's progress was the history of the leading minds among men. Without these minds, even material progress would have been imperfect. A single great mind might develop ideas which millions of poorer minds, however aggregated, could never conceive.[31]

Although Parkman was quite obviously devoted to the "great man" concept of history,[32] there is no reason to ascribe this to the influence of Carlyle. It should be kept in mind that men as diverse in frame of reference as Jefferson and Hamilton both expected that, in the natural order of things, leadership in society would fall to an aristocracy of talent and ability. Such a view is common, in all

---

[29] "Our Best Classes and the National Politics"; "The Weak Side of Our Armies"; *Vassall Morton*, 372.

[30] For the most recent scholarship on Parkman and his social environment see the sympathetically critical Wade, *Francis Parkman*.

[31] "The Failure of Universal Suffrage," 4–5.

[32] Wade, *Francis Parkman*, 448–452.

ages and places, to those who are convinced that they possess the requisite talent and ability.

Parkman's definition of the "better class" could, however, be colored by his other prejudices. A case in point was his different attitudes towards the Indians and the Acadians, the latter being the French settlers forcibly removed by the British from Nova Scotia in 1775. In writing of the American Indians, Parkman noted with considerable approval that most of them showed conspicuous respect for native superiority as well as a willingness to be subject to it. Yet in discussing the influence of the learned Jesuit priests—of whom he strongly disapproved—over the Acadians after the French and Indian War, Parkman was severely critical. He declared that the largely illiterate Acadians had become enfeebled by mental subjection to their priests. This had been true for so long that these people could no longer think for themselves. The result was that the Acadian needed their priests not only for their spiritual problems, but to guide them in their daily lives. Parkman's different views of the "best" leadership in these two societies was prompted by a marked anti-Catholic bias. This is borne out in his frank statement that having experienced both, he much preferred the society of the Sioux tepee to that of an Italian monastery.[33]

In commenting upon the differences in the nature of peoples, Parkman had little to say on the subject of "race" as a designation of classes of people distinguished according to defined physical types. He often used the word "race" to mean a cultural or national group, but more frequently he applied it in the species sense to refer to the "human race." He did, however, make extensive comments on one ethnic group that would fall within the modern anthropoligist's understanding of a distinct race. These were the American Indians.

Speaking of the Iroquois, but indicating that his ideas had more general application, Parkman claimed that the Indian was less sensitive to pain than the white man but that this also made the Indian less given to passion than the "higher races" of men. This was, he asserted, a matter of training. The fact that these fierce and warlike people lived peaceably in villages without the coercion of superiors he explained in terms of developed character and habit.

---

33 "Manners and Customs of Primitive Indian Tribes," *North American Review*, CI (July, 1865), 51; "The Acadian Tragedy," *Harper's Magazine*, LXIX (November, 1884), 878; *The Journals of Francis Parkman*, New York, 1947, 1:101, quoted by editor Mason Wade in an editorial note from an unidentified letter.

Parkman believed that the Iroquois had evolved more intense spirit of nationality than any other people since the Spartans and he observed that, contrary to popular notions, Indians in general were a gregarious people.[34]

Parkman asserted that the Great Indian orator, Red Jacket, was in many ways, characteristic of his race. He noted that Red Jacket was in no sense a broad intellect, but was remarkably shrewd and subtle, possessing an amazing power of sarcasm. But this Indian leader insisted that he could find no advantage for his people either in civilization or in Christianity. He persisted, instead, in a "curious Indian idea" that one divine government existed for his own people and another for the white race. Far from concluding that the Indian's limited vision was inherent, Parkman declared that it was due to the fact that the contact of the Indians with whites was limited either to missionaries of narrow vision or to other whites of the lowest character. The implication is clear that Parkman believed that if he were given the right environmental opportunities, the Indian could learn and advance his estate as well as anyone.[35]

Shortly after the close of the last Indian wars in the United States, Parkman stated his views on the sources of Indian character in most emphatic terms. Insisting that the Indian was worth saving, he declared that the nation had an obligation to help him adjust to a new life. The Indian would not understand sentimentality, he warned, but he would understand justice and honor. Then, to counteract the objections of those who still nourished the frontier hatred of the Red Man, he examined the character of the Indian in purest Darwinian terms. Refusing to be drawn into any futile effort at comparing white and Indian morality, he noted that, with the Indians,

> The law of the survival of the fittest bore upon them with peculiar harshness; and the fittest were with them the boldest, the hardiest, the most crafty and the fiercest. It is by the working of this pitiless law through countless generations that the distinctive qualities of the Indian have been formed and wrought out of him in one generation or two.[36]

Here it is evident that Parkman believed natural selection through the law of the "survival of the fittest" was operative on man. The

---

[34] "Manners and Customs of Primitive Indian Tribes," 40, 50–52, 59.

[35] Review of Stone's *Life and Times of Red Jacket*, in the *Atlantic Monthly*, XIX (March, 1867), 384–385.

[36] "Letter on the Indian Rights Association," *Critic*, VIII (May, 1886), 248.

pressure of the environment acted to depress the weak still further while the traits of those best suited to survival in the Indian's environment were transmitted to their offspring. The process of natural selection could be altered—but only over a great period of time by a gradual alteration of the environment.

Parkman's major biographer, Mason Wade, has quite properly made much of the Romantic influence in Parkman's work. At the same time, however, through all of Parkman's thought on the nature of man, a single theme consistently predominated. This was, of course, the tremendous emphasis which he placed on the role of the environment in molding human nature. With all men born savages, and with all men possessed of the same components in their nature, inherent differences existed among men in the form of varying endowments of the multiple elements of human nature. But even the influence of these components could be altered by environmental conditions which Parkman declared would shift the emphasis from one facet of an individual's nature to another. As an environmentalist, Parkman actually moved into one of the major streams of thought traditional to the Age of Reason.

It has been said of the great Roman historian, Tacitus, that he could not have attacked the degeneration of Nero's Rome had it not been for the fact that high standards of personal and public virtus remained the Roman ideal. In similar sense, Parkman's strictures against American life in his own time were born of his conviction that, within admitted limitations, man had an almost infinite capacity for improvement.

Parkman often wrote in anger and sometimes he wrote in disgust; but he never wrote without hope. Because he had overcome so many obstacles himself, he believed that others could do the same. He specifically declared his faith in the high potential of mankind. His concern for education, to be improved along broadly defined lines, only underscored his basic faith in the improvability of man. Parkman criticized the democracy in which he lived, then, because he believed its people had not attained the standards which he was certain their basic nature placed within their reach. The fact that he should set those standards so high made Parkman's view of human nature a true compliment to his fellow men.

Richard A. Thompson

Ohio University
Athens

The Committee of Mexican Bondholders and European Intervention in 1861

The origin of British investments in Mexico dates from a letter of March 26, 1822, of Francisco de Borja Migoni, a Mexican merchant residing in London, to General Agustín Iturbide. Migoni, having heard of the financial problems facing his native land, wrote to Iturbide offering his services to assist the destitute national treasury by attempting to raise a loan in England.[1] That Mexico was in need of a loan at this period of her history is evident from the fiscal records of 1819. In that year, the ninth of the revolution against Spain, the total revenues of Mexico were $9,646,657, and the total expenditures amounted to $10,212,373. In order to cover this deficit of $565,716, the Mexican government inaugurated "forced loans" in the amount of $12,500,000 from the Catholic Church and private individuals.[2]

Forced loans, however, were not sufficient to meet the expenses of the debt-ridden administration. Therefore, the Mexican Congress on June 25, 1822, approved Migoni's suggestion by authorizing the government to

> "... seek among foreign powers a loan of twenty-five to thirty million pesos in such manner and under such conditions as its well known zeal may consider least onerous to the nation."[3]

Actually, the amount desired as a loan was not extravagant because by April, 1823, the national debt of Mexico had reached the staggering figure of $45,000,000.[4] One cause of the early financial chaos of the young nation was the fact that, since Spanish forces had remained in control of San Juan de Ulloa off Vera Cruz for four years after the mainland had won freedom, the Mexican customs officials could not collect import duties, the most important item in the national revenue.[5] Walter F. McCaleb suggests that the principal cause of the financial difficulties was the inexperience of government officials, long accustomed to viceregal adminstration

---

1 Edgar Turlington, *Mexico and Her Foreign Creditors*, New York, 1930, 21.

2 Walter Flavins McCaleb, *The Public Finances of Mexico*, New York, 1921, 23.

3 Turlington, *Mexico*, 22.

4 *Ibid.*, 25.

5 Hubert Herring, *A History of Latin America: From the Beginnings to the Present*, New York, 1956, 305, note 1.

of financial affairs. Thus, after 1821, these officials were unable to solve the complex financial problems which accompanied their country's newly found freedom. Mexico, in the words of McCaleb, was "like a child suddenly possessed of a gigantic toy, with its puzzling mechanism."[6]

Whatever the cause, the fact remained that the country was faced with an astronomical debt. The nation had then turned to Migoni hoping that through his intercession a foreign government would come to the rescue. On May 14, 1824, the Mexican Government approved a contract made by Señor Migoni with B. A. Goldschmidt and Company, Bankers of London, for a loan of £3,200,000 at five per cent.[7] By this contract Goldschmidt and Company agreed to place at the disposal of the Mexican Government, within fifteen months, the sum of £1,600,000. In return for this money, the Mexican Government issued bonds for £3,200,000 redeemable within thirty years from October 1, 1823, and bearing interest at the rate of five per cent per annum. For the payment of interest and the maintenance of the redemption fund of £32,000 a year, the Mexican Government gave a general pledge of its entire revenues and a special pledge of one-third of all duties collected at Vera Cruz after April 1, 1825.[8] It was this Migoni-Goldschmidt transaction which later served as the foundation for the claims of the Committee of Mexican Bondholders which are so well expressed in *The Times* (London), 1861.

Goldschmidt sold the bonds to the public at fifty-eight per cent of their face value, leaving a gross profit of a million pounds with an expected yield to investors of 8.26 per cent.[9] For the next thirty years, this group of speculators was continually appealing to the British Foreign Office to secure for them the revenues to which they were entitled by contract and of which they were deprived by the anarchical Mexican Government. Shortly after their original investment these investors formed a Committee of Mexican Bondholders at London in 1829 to protect their foreign interests.[10] The formation of this committee is in itself an indication of the lack of confidence that the investors had in the Mexican Government. The fact that the date of the Committee's organization coincided with

---

6 McCaleb, *Public Finances of Mexico*, 24.

7 Thomas R. Lill, *National Debt of Mexico: History and Present Status*, New York, 1919, 12.

8 Turlington, *Mexico*, 35, 36.

9 Corporation of Foreign Bondholders, *Sixty-Fourth Annual Report*, London, 1937, 344.

10 Turlington, *Mexico*, 11.

that of the revolution of General Anastasio Bustamante against President Vicente Guerrero may be regarded as an explanation for the investors' shortlived trust in the government of Mexico. The earlier ouster of Iturbide and the subsequent overthrow of Guerrero convinced the Bondholders of the impossibility of the Mexican Government's position.

The floundering efforts of the new republic to develop a stable government following independence are summarized by Professor Herring in the following manner:

> The public treasury was drained by greedy rulers and costly wars, while successive administrations were forced to conclude disadvantageous bargins with foreign bankers. . . . In this period Mexican political life was fixed with the curse of *Personalismo,* a doctrine which discards constitutions, political parties, and ideals, and exalts the anarchic rule of the demagogue.[11]

Besides the Bondholders there were other citizens who in the early 1820's had begun risking their capital in Mexico by organizing and investing in seven mining associations.[12] Paradoxical as it may seem, the British-controlled mining companies were extremely prosperous throughout the forty years of Mexican anarchy. By 1861 stock in the United Mexican Mining Company was the most sought-after investment on the London Stock Exchange.[13] Clearly, in spite of the existing anarchy, the British investors were shrewd enough to realize that a profit could still be realized in the potentially wealthy young nation. The Bondholders also must have sensed that their investment was not so insecure as it superficially appeared. Ample proof of this is found in an examination of the annual publication of the trade and navigation statistics of the port of Vera Cruz for the three years, 1856-1858:

IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF THE PORT OF VERA CRUZ[14]

Official statement for the three years, 1856-58

Total	1856	1857	1858
Imports	$17,720,582	$11,224,415	$10,033,569
Exports	8,942,988	11,384,765	2,915,576
Import duties	4,757,397	2,155,386	1,517,930
Export duties	243,035	375,382	100,617

---

11 Herring, *History of Latin America,* 306.

12 J. Fred Rippy, "English Investments in Mexico: A Study of Bonanzas and Heartbreaks," *The Journal of Business of the University of Chicago,* XXV (October, 1952), 242.

13 *The Times,* London, January 2, 1861, p. 7, col. 4.

14 "The Trade and Prospects of Mexico," *The Bankers' Magazine: Journal of the Money Market and Commercial Digest,* XXI (1861), 77.

In order to understand the significance of the imports and exports at Vera Cruz for the period 1856-58 and the relationships of the duties collected during that period to the Bondholders, it is necessary to review quickly the provisions of a law passed by the Mexican Congress on October 14, 1850. This law, which effected the seventh alteration and second conversion of the original debt contract, provided that the Bondholders would henceforth receive twenty-five per cent of the import duties and five per cent of the export duties in the Gulf ports.[15] By the law of 1850, then, the Bondholders, according to the official statement for the years 1856-58, should have received $2,082,928 of the import duties and $35,901 of the export duties, a three-year grand total of $2,118,829. But, with the beginning of the revolution of Ayutla in March, 1854, the foreign debt became abeyant.

The import and export statistics of the port of Vera Cruz show that theoretically the state was in a position to pay the Bondholders the money due them by virtue of the law of October, 1850. The revolution of Ayutla, however, precluded any possibility of satisfying the Committee of Mexican Bondholders. The Vera Cruz illustration further furnishes convincing proof that the anarchic rule of Mexico was the fundamental cause of the Mexican Government's inability to meet its financial obligations. The port of Vera Cruz was in no sense an exception but rather an example of the general policy followed throughout Mexico at this time.

One of the first acts of the new government under President Ignacio Comonfort, one of the leaders in the Ayutla revolution, was to issue a decree authorizing the Bondholders to name agents in each of the ports of the Republic, with authority to collect the amounts due direct from the importers and exporters.[16] Comonfort's attempt to placate the Bondholders was of little consequence, however, as his stay in power was of brief duration. Factions within the Constitutional Party, partly attributable to the insolvent condition of the national treasury and also to the growing divsion between the clerical and constitutional party, led to Comonfort's resignation and the beginning of the bloodiest war in Mexican history—the War of the Reform. Two political parties were involved in this war, one representing the Church and the army, the other composed of the group favoring the recently promulgated

[15] Lill, *National Debt of Mexico*, 36. For a detailed account of the seven alterations in the original Bond issue from 1824 to 1850 see Turlington, *Mexico*, 49–100.

[16] Lill, *National Debt of Mexico*, 39.

Constitution. The clerical or conservative forces had headquarters at Mexico City and were headed by General Felix Zuloaga and later by General Miguel Miramón. The Constitutional forces were presided over by Benito Juárez, who established his government at Vera Cruz. Because Juárez was at the customs city of Vera Cruz, it was to his party[17] that the first definite overtures were made in behalf of the Committee of Mexican Bondholders.

On January 24, 1859, Captain Hugh Dunlop of the British Navy in command of *H.M.S. Tarter* sent a letter to Governor Manuel G. Zamora of Vera Cruz. Dunlop wrote:

> In order to remove the just indignation with which Her Majesty's Government has viewed the frequent infringement of the rights of British subjects in Mexico, and to bring this question of grievances to a prompt and satisfactory termination, the Undersigned submits for ratification the Articles herewith appended:—
>
> To be charged on the whole customs revenue [at Vera Cruz]; twenty-five per cent for the Mexican Bondholders in London.
>
> The immediate payment to Her Majesty's Consul at Vera Cruz of 7,680 dollars due to the London bondholders. . . .
>
> That the authorities in possession of Vera Cruz insist upon the assignments to the British creditors being punctually and fully paid at Tampico to the agent for the debt; and in case of failure to do so, the claim to be made good from the Custom House at Vera Cruz at the expiration of one month's notice.[18]

On February 7, 1859, Zamora, who referred to himself as "the mouthpiece" of Juárez, wrote to Dunlop that:

> The British creditors' assignments shall be paid punctually and in full, the Constitutional Government having taken measures to carry out this obligation with the most entire good faith.
>
> Besides the payment of the . . . twenty-five per cent, belonging to holders of Mexican bonds in London, there shall now be set apart eight per cent of the Custom-house dues on foreign vessels (with the exception of French vessels, which are already very heavily taxed) for the payment of arrears of interest. . . .
>
> The amount now due to the holders of Mexican bonds in London, and which was left unpaid in September last, shall be paid.
>
> The Government of Vera Cruz will continue using every effort to en-

---

[17] The use of the word *party*, rather than *government*, is proper because at the inception of the Civil War, Zuloaga, and not Juárez, was recognized as the head of the *de facto* government; see Edgar L. Erickson (ed.), *British Sessional Papers: House of Commons*, 1861, LXV, 339, New York, (Readix Microprint, n. d.); hereinafter cited as *British Sessional Papers*.

[18] *British Sessional Papers*, 339, 340.

force the payment of the British assignments by the Customs-house at Tampico. . . . [19]

Though Governor Zamora, the spokesman for Juárez, had given his word of honor that British holders of Mexican bonds would be paid "punctually and in full," the Juárez Government failed to keep its promise. As a result of this latest infraction a new agreement was reached at Vera Cruz on December 15, 1860, between Captain W. Cornwallis Aldham, Dunlop's successor as commander of the British squadron in the Gulf of Mexico, and Melchor Ocampo, Foreign Minister in the Juárez Government. The new agreement contained the following provisions:

> An additional ten per cent on all import duties, from all vessels, shall be assigned at the Customs houses of Vera Cruz and Tampico, to repay the sums withheld in both ports during the present year; and when these sums are paid up, the said new assignments of ten per cent, shall cease and return to the National Treasury.
>
> The payment of the assignments shall commence on the first of January, 1861, excepting that of the new ten per cent, which shall not commence until the first [of] February, by which time the Sea Customhouse of this port shall furnish her Majesty's Consul with a complete and exact statement of the sums unpaid by it during the whole of the present year. . . .
>
> The Government engages solemnly not to tolerate in [the] future the violation of the present or the Dunlop Convention, and to remove from office any officer or public employé appertaining to or dependent on it who shall again attempt to infringe the present arrangement of that of Captain Dunlop . . . . [20]

Three months prior to the Aldham-Ocampo agreement the Juárez forces, financially pressed in the last months of the war, had seized over a million pesos of foreign funds which were chiefly the property of citizens of Great Britain, France, Spain, and Germany. The consuls of those powers immediately reported the confiscation to their home Governments. George B. Matthew, the British chargé d'affaires, wrote to Lord John Russell, British Foreign Secretary, on September 28, 1860:

> I regret to have to communicate to your Lordship . . . the seizure of the *conducta* of silver [at Laguna Seca] proceeding from Guanaxuato and San Luis Potosi to Tampico for embarcation, in which various British subjects had money to the amount of between £80,000 and 100,000 sterling.[21]

As would be expected, this unscrupulous theft of the property of

---

[19] *Ibid.*, 343.
[20] *Ibid.*, 345, 346.
[21] *Ibid.*, 266.

British subjects caused fiery editorials to appear in British newspapers demanding an apology from the Juárez party.[22] Matthew wrote to General Santos Degollado, the general under whose authority the crime had been committed, urging him to consider the restitution of the $400,000 of stolen money.[23]

In the event that Degollado should refuse to return the stolen funds, Matthew on December 9, 1860, wrote to Captain Aldham:

> In this disagreeable and difficult position I see no alternative but in the forcible occupation of the Custom-houses of Vera Cruz and Tampico (and if necessary, of those places), should our just demands be rejected.[24]

It is the parenthetical phrase of Matthew's letter that is pregnant with significance. Here was the British chargé d'affaires suggesting to the commanding officer of a British naval squadron that Her Majesty's troops forcibly occupy the cities of Vera Cruz and Tampico. Admittedly, Matthew's letter was not an official statement of the British Foreign Office, but it does reveal the drastic steps a high-ranking governmental official was contemplating in order to protect the investments of Her Majesty's subjects.

Understandably, the Committee of Mexican Bondholders did not fail to give the Degollado seizure of the silver train at Laguna Seca their undivided attention. In the summer of 1861 the Committee presented a series of resolutions to Lord Russell demanding that he formulate a definite policy in order to resolve their claims of $10,000,000 against Mexico. One of the resolutions dealt with the theft (by Degollado) of commercial house property from an official *conducta*.[25] President Juárez realized that his cause would be very seriously jeopardized if the British Foreign Office, which still had not recognized him, should turn against his party. He therefore ordered that the British money be returned and that Degollado stand trial on the charge of treason to the Constitutional Government.[26] That the Laguna Seca incident did not erupt into an international war may be attributed, at least in part, to this decisive action on the part of the chief executive of the liberal forces.

The Juárez forces were not alone in their seizure of British property. The Miramón Government aggravated the situation by an even more serious blunder: On November 17, 1860, Leonardo Már-

---

22 *The Times*, February 19, 1861, p. 5, col. 4.
23 *British Sessional Papers*, 300.
24 *Ibid.*, 309. This letter was a contributing factor in effecting the Aldham-Ocampo agreement, previously discussed.
25 *The Times*, July 4, 1861, p. 10, cols. 1, 2; July 9, 1861, p. 11, col. 5.
26 Ralph Roeder, *Juárez and His Mexico*, I, New York, 1947, 250–255.

quez, Miramón's leading general, wrote to Charles Whitehead, the Bondholders' agent in Mexico City, indicating the audacity of the Miramón-Márquez forces:

> As the moneys belonging to the public funds which are in your custody, destined to the payment of the bondholders of the foreign debt contracted in London, are not yet derived in definite payment, and in the actual circumstances may run much risk . . . his Excellency, the General-in-chief of said forces, in compliance with his duty, and in order to save his responsibility in respect to the valuable property, has directed that you place the said sums at the disposal of the Commisariat of the army; with the understanding that only the accounts absolutely necessary shall be removed from the chests in which they may be found. . . . This day you will please to deliver the sum of 200,000 dollars, for which the Commisary-General will give you a receipt. God and Law.[27]

When Whitehead refused to turn over the money,[28] Márquez replied that he was sending Colonel Don Antonio Juaregin to carry out Miramón's order.[29] And the orders were ruthlessly carried out. Juan B. Pacheco, Spanish Ambassador to the Miramón Government, was in the British Legation at the time of the robbery of the $600,000 belonging to the British investors. In a letter to Matthew, Pacheco reported that the Miramón forces had broken through "a closed door, shut, and stamped with the seals of that [British] legation."[30]

An immediate result of the seizure of the Bondholders' money was the official severance by the British Foreign Office of all diplomatic relations with the Miramón Government.[31] After the seizure of the Bondholders' money at the British Legation there followed a barrage of letters to Lord Russell demanding that the British Government take action. On December 15, 1860, David Robertson, Member of Parliament and Honorary Chairman of the Committee of Mexican Bondholders, wrote to Russell describing the Bondholders as:

> . . . a most respectable body, many of them whose fathers, husbands, and brothers embarked their all in the funds in 1825 to aid the Mexican Government and people to achieve their independence, to which the British Government of that day lent their open countenance and avowed support.[32]

As spokesman for the Committee of Mexican Bondholders, Robertson added:

---

27 *British Sessional Papers*, 280, 281.
28 *Ibid.*, 282.
29 *Ibid.*
30 *Ibid.*, 287.
31 *Ibid.*, 274.
32 *Ibid.*, 296.

As a body of ill-used Englishmen we feel confident that we shall not seek in vain at your Lordship's hands for immediate redress. . . .[33]

On the 12th of January, 1861, Lord Russell assured Robertson and the Committee of Mexican Bondholders:

Her Majesty's Government will hold the Mexican nation, by whatever Government it may happen to be ruled, responsible for the money recently seized at Mexico.[34]

Russell's reply, written after the triumph of the Juárez forces, was temporarily effective in pacifying Robertson and the Committee. In the months following the robbery the Bondholders were by no means alone in their loud protests against the Miramón pillage. Robert Phillimore, the foremost jurist in England, remarked that the act of seizing public funds under the seal of the Legation assumed the public character of an offense against the Queen of England.[35]

Echoes of the Miramón seizure even reached the British House of Commons. On February 12, 1861, one week after the reconvening of Parliament, Henry Bristow, M.P., asked Lord Ruessell what measures his office had taken or were going to take to protect British interests in Mexico. Russell replied that after the recent shameful robbery committed by General Miramón, Her Majesty's Government had informed Matthew to contact Juárez, and "to intimate that we would recognize his Government if he would acknowledge responsibility for our financial losses."[36]

The public excitement over Miramón's embezzlement of Bondholders' funds and the general financial chaos in Mexico in the momentous year of 1861 is clearly seen in the columns of *The Times,* which in the 1860's was the world's most influential newspaper. And inasmuch as Lord Russell was not regarded with favor by John Thadeus Delane,[37] editor of *The Times,* 1841-1877, the newspaper did not hesitate to ally itself with the Bondholders against the Foreign Secretary. Russell was attacked by the editor of *The Times* as a man who

. . . has shown by his past course that British property may with perfect impunity be seized and misappropriated in that country [Mexico] the

33 *Ibid.,* 297.
34 *The Times,* May 30, 1861, p. 7, cols. 1, 2.
35 Joaquín D. Casasus, *Historia de la deuda contraída en Londres,* Mexico, Imprenta del Gobierno, 1885, 340.
36 T. C. Hansard, *Parliamentary Debates,* CLXI, London, 1861, 340, 341.
37 William Dodgson Bowman, *The Story of the Times,* London, 1931, 235.

bondholders are evidently at the mercy of the Government, and in a position no bettter than if they had never given up three-fourths of their claims in order to obtain the concession of the customs' duties as a fancied security for the remainder.[38]

A week later, Lord Russell again found himself censured—this time in the House of Lords by William Graham. The subject was the recently reported[39] escape of Miramón with the connivance of the French Minister in Mexico. Graham directed Lord Russell to ask the French Government to explain their assisting General Miramón, the embezzler of the Bondholders' money.[40]

In the meantime, the British chargé d'affaires had presented Lord Russell's condition of recognition of Francisco Zarco, Juárez's Secretary of State. The conditions were that all the just claims of the British subjects be acknowledged by the Juárez régime. On February 23, 1861, Zarco notified Matthew that the conditions were accepted, whereupon recognition was accorded.[41] It is difficult to understand just how Juárez proposed to fulfill his acceptance of the British claim. Mexico was an effete nation, exhausted by its recent civil war. Furthermore, almost all the major revenues of the country were assigned to foreign creditors. The total assignments for the ports of Vera Cruz and Tampico in January, 1861, were at the preposterous figure of ninety-two per cent.[42] Juárez was in a dilemma. He was faced with the mutually exclusive problems of satisfying the uncompromising claims of the foreign bondholders and establishing an adequate budget for the operation of his government.

By the end of April a decision was reached. Señor José Mata, the Minister of Finance, notified Whitehead that the present Mexican Government did not consider itself liable for the $600,000 confiscated by Miramón.[43] The Committee of Mexican Bondholders, on hearing of Mata's statement, called a special meeting to discuss the effect of the Mexican government's decision on their investments. At this meeting, presided over by David Robertson,[44] a resolution was passed which provided that:

---

38 *The Times*, March 15, 1861, p. 10, cols. 5, 6.
39 *Ibid.*, March 19, 1861, p. 10, col. 5.
40 Hansard, *Parliamentary Debates*, CLXII, 249, 350.
41 *British Sessional Papers*, 330–332.
42 Turlington, *Mexico*, 124.
43 *The Times*, May 30, 1861, p. 7, cols. 1, 2.
44 The fact that a member of Parliament was the chairman of the meeting clearly indicates the prestige and influence of the Committee of Mexican Bondholders.

The British Government be warranted by the principles of international law to intervene in Mexico to enforce the just demands of the Bondholders.[45]

If the Committee of Mexican Bondholders were the first to pass a resolution calling for intervention in Mexico, they were by no means the only ones favoring the idea. On July 19, 1861, Dubois de Saligny, French Minister in Mexico, had written to Edouard Antoine Thouvenal, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, proposing that England, France, and Spain seize the Mexican custom houses to assure the payment of their respective claims.[46] Ten days later the Mexican Congress by a vote of 112 to 4 passed a law which suspended all payments on the nation's indebtedness for a period of two years.[47] It was as a direct result of this act that the British Government on July 26, 1861, severed diplomatic relations with the Juárez administration.[48] Paradoxically the suspension of diplomatic relations for financial reasons occurred almost simultaneously with the arrival in Britain of $317,020 in specie and bullion from Vera Cruz.[49] Though this treasure of private British mining associations was not connected with the claims of the Committee of Mexican Bondholders, it clearly was an indication of the vast wealth in Mexico at the height of the nation's bankruptcy.

When the news of the debt suspension reached England, John Delane wrote an editorial demanding that British arms be used to assist the Bondholders to recover their investments.[50] And on September 18, the Bondholders wrote Lord Russell demanding the intervention of British and French troops to protect their past investments.[51] Following this plea by the British investors, Lord Russell on October 7, 1861, wrote Henry Wellesley Cowley, English Ambassador at Paris, directing him to contact the French Minister of Foreign Affairs and inform him that:

The demands of the Three Powers [Spain, France, and England] must be drawn up with precision and care. They would comprehend the delivery of the Forts of San Juan de Ulloa and the Forts at Tampico to the Allied Forces to be retained by them until reparation for their wrongs is obtained.

---

45 *The Times,* July 5, 1861, p. 5, cols, 1, 2. The research of this writer has not uncovered any intervention resolution enacted by other organizations prior to July 5, 1861. Thus, possibly the distinction of being the first belongs to the Committee of Mexican Bondholders.

46 William Spence Robertson, "The Tripartite Treaty of London," *The Hispanic American Historical Review,* XX (May, 1940), 168.

47 *The Times,* August 30, 1861, p. 5, cols. 1, 2.

48 *Ibid.*

49 *Ibid.,* p. 8, col. 3.

50 *Ibid.,* September 6, 1861, p. 6, cols. 4, 5.

51 *Ibid.,* September 18, 1861, p. 10, col. 3.

For this purpose the Custom Houses of Vera Cruz and Tampico must be placed unreservedly in the hands of Commissioners appointed by the Combined Powers.[52]

In the last week of October, 1861, representatives from Spain, France, and England met at London to discuss a military expedition against Mexico as a result of Mexico's failure to meet its contracted obligations.[53] On October 31, 1861, the negotiations ended, and European intervention officially began. Among the provisions in the London Pact of Intervention, the following was of chief importance to the Committee of Mexican Bondholders:

The troops will occupy Vera Cruz and the other cities on the coast where Custom-Houses are established. If, after a given delay, the Government of General Juárez has not paid up the money it owes, an advance will be made on the capital.[54]

With the beginning of armed intervention there did not immediately follow a return of the Committee of Mexican Bondholders' money. In fact the British citizens who had purchased the thirty-year Mexican Bonds in 1824 were not completely reimbursed until 1888—sixty-four years later. That story, however, is not within the scope of this paper. The evidence which has been presented in this essay clearly indicates that the Committee of Mexican Bondholders was a major factor in effecting European intervention. The constant pressure exerted by the Committee and their ally, *The Times,* on Lord Russell eventually bore fruit at the Tripartite Conference. The basic tenet of the Committee of Mexican Bondholders was that the British flag must follow and protect British investments. On October 31, 1861, after years of remonstrances to their government, the pleas of the Committee of Mexican Bondholders were finally heard. Intervention in their behalf was now to become a reality.

PHILIP J. SHERIDAN

St. Mary's University
San Antonio, Texas

---

52 Robertson, "Tripartite Treaty," 173.

53 Lord Russell was primarily interested in a military occupation of Mexico. For a severe censorship of the shady transactions of the British Foreign Secretary at the tripartite conference, see Karl Blind, "An English Government and the Mexican Republic," *Westminister Review,* CLXII (October, 1904), 357–365.

54 *The Times,* November 7, 1861, p. 7, col. 5.

The Founding Fathers and the Middle Ages

The reliance of the American founding fathers upon historical precedent is well known. No modern man, they argued, could understand his world unless he studied history. Such was especially true for republicans and democrats, who had much to learn from the mistakes of their predecessors, and the speeches and letters of the men who formed the federal govrnmnt are studded with allusions to the classical republics. It was John Adams who suggested that the history of Greece ought to serve as an octagonal mirror, whose many sides would reflect the past and present, showing modern republics the defects present in themselves and in their predecessors, thus helping to remedy the defects. Who could understand republican government who did not know the history of Greece and Rome? Who could hope to avoid the problems that beset Athens and the Roman Republic unless he studied them in detail?

While the attraction of the founding fathers for Greece and Rome is both interesting and instructive, their distaste for what followed classical civilization is equally so. Few of the men who went to the federal convention, or who corresponded or advised with the men who did, showed any interest in the middle ages. Their thoughts ran to Greece and Rome as water runs downhill, and the ten centuries that separated the fall of western Rome and the Ninety-nine Theses was for them more remote than the ages of Pericles and Cicero. Thomas Jefferson spoke for most of his educated contemporaries when he styled the middle ages "the Dark Ages," and dismissed them as an arid era. "We have seen, indeed, once within the records of history, a complete eclipse of the human mind continuing for centuries," he wrote John Adams in his old age.[1] And Adams easily agreed. To him, feudalism and the middle ages was "A thousand years of barons' wars, causing universal darkness, ignorance, and barbarity, ended at last in a simple monarchy. . . ."[2]

---

[1] Jefferson to Adams, September 12, 1821; in Andrew Lipscomb and Albert E. Bergh (eds.), *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson*, Washington, 1905, XV, 334.

[2] Charles Francis Adams (ed.), *The Works of John Adams*, Boston, 1850, VI, 251.

In the booklists and recommendations for reading which they circulated among themselves and friends, neither Jefferson nor Adams, Madison nor Washington recommended many studies dealing with the middle ages. In his recommendations to friends and students, Jefferson passed easily from Plutarch and Tacitus to Robertson and Bolingbroke. He did so partly because literature on the medieval period was scarce, but largely because he felt that the whole era offered little in the way of instruction to his contemporaries. He preferred the histories of Greece and Rome in the ancient world, and those of France and England in the modern world.[3]

There were reasons for this. In almost every way, the Greeks and Romans appeared to eighteenth century men as more modern than their medieval counterparts. The Greek, at once so erratic and brilliant, and the Roman, shifty but constructive, offered both a lesson and an enlightenment that was not rivaled for the founding fathers by anything in the middle ages. The interplay of politics, the problems of national growth and development, the emergence of political theories and institutions, and the luster and accomplishments of famous men seemed clearer in a Greek or Roman setting. In short, to the founding fathers, the Greeks and Romans resembled eighteenth century men more than did medieval men.

The middle ages was a period of unity, or so everyone had been taught, but that unity was more apparent than real to the founding fathers. The medieval unity did not correspond to the unity of the Roman Republic. To the founding fathers, it was more a spiritual unity than a temporal one. The men of their generation thought in political and sociological terms, and this is the key to understanding their attitudes toward the middle ages. To them much of the middle ages seemed to be a wrangle over religious beliefs; the emphasis lay on faith rather than works, and the generation of 1789, schooled in war and revolution, preferred for its purposes to look to the latter for success in government and society. The only great political development of the period was the common law, and this seemed to the founding fathers to be in spite of rather than because of the medieval setting. Much of

[3] Jefferson, *Writings,* XVI, 124–129; *Ibid.,* XIX, 103–105; J. C. Fitzpatrick (ed.), *The Writings of George Washington,* Washington, 1939, II, 515–517; Gaillard Hunt (ed.), *The Writings of James Madison,* Washington, 1904, II, 132–134.

medieval life seemed to them to be the last bitter dregs of the Roman cup of tea, the final price paid by the successors of the Romans when they failed to maintain order and unity in their world.

The middle ages stood to the founding fathers as a rickety bridge spanning the chasm from ancient to modern times. Its contribution to government was feudalism, a system that seemed to be only an evasion of responsibility. Intrigued with government, the founding fathers thus tended to equate feudalism with medieval life, overlooking other aspects of the period. John Adams dogmatically asserted that everyone knew "the feudal system to be inconsistent with liberty and the rights of mankind."[4] The feudal law remained for him a "dark ribaldry of heraldry" which culminated in "the most mischievous of all doctrines, that of passive obedience and non-resistance."[5] The original colonists, according to Adams, had come to the new world to escape the remnants of feudal life that remained in Europe. "They detested all the base services and servile dependencies of the feudal system. They knew that no such unworthy dependencies took place in the ancient seats of liberty, the republics of Greece and Rome. . . ."[6]

James Madison, who did considerable research on the subject of confederacies, and who was a close student of history, thought as little of medieval institutions as Adams. He looked upon medieval power politics as a long series of struggles between local lords who resisted the advances made toward governmental consolidation pursued by the greater nobles. The result was political confusion and social unrest. The situation seemed to him to have been chronic. "Had no external danger enforced internal harmony and subordination," he wrote in the 45th *Federalist,* "and particularly, had the local sovereign possessed the affection of the people, the great kingdoms of Europe would at this time consist of as many independent princes as there were formerly feudatory barons."

The middle ages might offend Madison's sense of harmony and Jefferson's sense of liberty, but to Hamilton the whole period was a lesson in the evils of disunion. The very feudal system carried within itself the seeds of its own destruction, for it created friction where none would have existed had there been unity.

---

4 Adams, *Works,* IV, 455.
5 *Ibid.,* 454.
6 *Ibid.*

"The consequences of this situation were a continual opposition to the authority of the sovereign, and frequent wars between the great barons or chief feudatories themselves." Nothing could better reflect the need for national unity. "This period of European affairs is emphatically styled by historians, the times of feudal anarchy."[7] To him, nothing so easily condemned the feudal economy as the welter of restrictions which had arisen as a consequence of this political disunion in the states of the Holy Roman Empire.[8] To Hamilton, the sum of medieval politics was confederation, and he saw nothing worth salvaging from it. Confederation failed where it needed success most, in the possession and dispensation of unified national authority, because it was based on the medieval idea of division of power among the component parts of the political system.

> The separate governments in a confederacy may aptly be compared with the feudal baronies; with this advantage in their favor, that from the reasons already explained, they will generally possess the confidence and good-will of the people, and with so important a support, will be able effectually to oppose all encorachments of the national government. It will be well if they are not able to counteract its legitimate and necessary authority.[9]

It was with much uncertainty that the delegates met in Philadelphia during the hot summer of 1787. Could they frame a new government? Could this government be a republic, and would it last? In order to answer these questions and to guide their discussions they turned repeatedly to history and the lessons of past republics. None was more searching in his inquiry than John Adams. Racing against time in London, where he was on a diplomatic mission, he wrote the first volume of his *A Defense of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America,* in order to make his study of historic republics available to the delegates. He devoted much space to the Greek and Roman republics and concluded that they had much to offer in the way of precedent to any New American republic.

He also devoted much of his book to a discussion of the Italian republics of the middle ages, and found little solace in their examples. Their singular virtue seemed to be a warning not to repeat their histories. "The history of one is, under different

---

[7] Henry Cabot Lodge (ed.), *The Works of Alexander Hamilton,* Federal Edition, New York, 1904, XI, 132–133.

[8] See his *Federalist,* 22.

[9] See his *Federalist,* 17.

names and various circumstances, the history of all; and all, excepting two or three that are still decided aristocracies, had the same destiny, an exit in monarchy."[10] As far as Adams was concerned, not much of worth had survived from the welter of city states and duchies raised up in the name of republicanism in medieval Italy. "During [the middle ages], republics without number arouse in Italy; whirled upon their axles or single centers; foamed, raged, and burst, like so many waterspouts upon the ocean. They were all alike ill constituted; all alike miserable; and all ended in similar disgrace and despotism."[11] Thus they illustrated graphically for Adams and his contemporaries that out of medieval political disunity had come in the end the thing which they feared most—monarchy.

It is true that Adams wrote with a purpose, and that that purpose colored his selection of material and his judgments, but his conclusions generally reflected the thinking of his contemporaries. He thought the feudal system, especially as mirrored in the German principalities, the height of folly. "Nothing ought to have more weight in America, to determine her judgment against mixing the authority, of the one, the few, and the many, confusedly in one assembly, then the wide spread miseries and final slavery of almost all mankind, in consequence of such an ignorant policy in the ancient Germans."[12] He could never forgive the middle ages for not having produced a system of balanced government.[13]

Endeavoring to leave no stone unturned in his quest for historical insight, Madison likewise turned to the middle ages to examine its republics. He agreed with Adams that it was hardly worth the quest except to illustrate pitfalls to be avoided. His two lengthy research memoranda, which provided material for his remarkable speeches at the Federal Convention, were largely concerned with Greek and Roman history, but he also made notes on

---

[10] Adams, *Works*, V, 332. In writing the *Defense*, Adams consulted numerous authors, copied from most of them, and quarreled with all of them. He displayed knowledge of the work of a number of students of medieval Italian history, especially Machiavelli and Guiccardini, upon whom he drew liberally for his chapters on Florence. The whole thing seemed at times to be a satire. "Kings, nobles, and people claimed the government in turn; and after all the turbulence, wars, and revolutions, which compose the history of Europe for so many ages, we find simple monarchies established everywhere." *Ibid.*, IV, 297.

[11] *Ibid.*, VI, 217

[12] *Ibid.*, IV, 298.

[13] For an elaboration of Adams' political philosophy and his ideas on balanced government, see Correa M. Walsh, *The Political Science of John Adams*, New York, 1915.

the fourteenth century Swiss confederation. He concluded that it was a *marriage de convenance,* and had little to bind it together; there was no common coinage; cantons were of different sizes; different kinds of government prevailed in different areas. To him, the whole thing provided "a striking proof of the want of authority in the whole over its parts."[14] He also weighed the Italians and found them wanting. Like Adams he looked to Greece and Rome, not to the middle ages, for proper examples.

As the delegates to the Federal Convention debated through the summer heat, they studded their remarks with allusions to the classical republics, hoping to discover precedents which would prevent error and which would light the path they were taking toward their new republic. They seldom turned with favor to any medieval examples. In pleading for a stable central government, Madison condemned confederation by comparing it to the "feudal licentiousness of the middle ages of Europe. . . ."[15]

Gouverneur Morris shortly rose to support the Virginian. He considered the German Confederation of his day a feudal relic and earnestly desired that its example be avoided in the new United States. The Germans were threatened not only by foreign powers but also by internal disunion. "From whence does this proceed? From the energy of the local authorities, from its being considered of more consequence to support the Prince of Hesse, than the happiness of the people of Germany."[16]

For Hamilton, the whole feudal period boded ill for effective government. With his predilection for strong central government, he admired the example of Charlemagne in the middle ages, but "The great feudal chiefs . . . exercising their local sovereignty, soon felt the spirit and found the means of encroachment, which reduced the imperial authority to a nominal sovereignty."[17] He thought that nothing better illustrated the course of all confederations, and nothing ought to be more sedulously avoided by the framers of the new constitution than such feudal divisions.

The one great surviving medieval political structure which illustrated the course of feudal politics to the founding fathers was the Holy Roman Empire, which Jefferson called "a burlesque on gov-

---

14 Madison, *Writings,* II, 375–379.

15 Max Farrand (ed.), *The Records of the Federal Convention,* New Haven, 3 vols., 1911, I, 448; Cf. *Ibid.,* 326, 449.

16 *Ibid.,* 552.

17 *Ibid.,* 285.

ernment. . . ."[18] To them it was indeed neither Holy nor Roman nor an empire. Madison devoted most of the 19th *Federalist* to a discussion of its merits and demerits, and this pamphlet reflected the biting words he had used regarding it in the Convention itself. In medieval Germany, he reported, "The most furious private wars, accompanied with every species of calamity, were carried on between the different princes and states." The result was the disappearance of any unity which the confederation may ever have had. "In the eleventh century the emperors enjoyed full sovereignty: In the fifteenth they had little more than the symbols and decorations of power."

The German confederation of the eighteenth century had developed out of this medieval confusion, but to Madison it was little more than a false front disguising an aged and decayed structure. Even in the eighteenth century, according to him, it rested on the principle which had brought feudalism to grief—unbalanced and divided sovereignty—and consequently it was but a hollow shell, prey to quarrels within and foes without He passed a harsh judgment on it and medieval politics in general when he wrote:

> The history of Germany is a history of wars between the emperor and the princes and states; of wars among the princes and states themselves; of the licentiousness of the strong, and the oppression of the weak; of foreign intrusions; of requisitions of men and money disregarded or partially complied with; of attempts to enforce them, altogether abortive, or attended with a slaughter and desolation, involving the innocent with the guilty; of general imbecility, confusion and misery.

Only family pride and the weakness of the component parts held the Confederation together. The Holy Roman Empire stood for the founding fathers as a sad reminder of the confusion bred by feudalism, of the impossibility of union under anything like confederation, and of the lessons of medieval politics.[19]

At first glance it seems strange that the founding fathers should have so completely condemned feudalism. With its elaborate system of checks and balances that guaranteed certain liberties to servant and master alike, and in its elaborate precautions against usurpations of these basic rights, it contained some of the seeds

---

[18] Jefferson, *Writings*, I, 52.

[19] Cf. Robert C. Binkley, "The Holy Roman Empire versus the United States," in Conyears Read (ed.), *The Constitution Reconsidered*, New York, 1938, 271–285.

of the constitutionalism and balanced government that the fathers were so anxious to establish.[20]

Their attitude can be explained partly by their almost complete lack of objective historical information dealing with the period from 800 to 1200. The strongest arguments against feudalism, however, were the "feudal relics" that survived in Europe, especially the Holy Roman Empire. The founding fathers agreed that the medieval period may have produced some advances in law, but feudal politics in action were simply too chaotic for them.

In the largest sense, the founding fathers disliked the feudal system because they did not believe that it had ever worked for the good of the whole people and had never lent itself to just government. The political power in the feudal system had been placed in the wrong place, among the nobles and kings, with no broader base of support and responsibility in the people as a whole. "The common people had no adequate and independent shares in the legislatures, and found themselves harrassed to discover who was the sovereign and whom they ought to obey, as much as they ever had been or could be to determine who had the most merit."[21] Thus, instead of producing the pyramid of loyalty and service which it envisioned, feudalism had brought faction and strife among the nobility, each contending for greater power, to the perpetual detriment of the people as a whole. Feudal economics, in hand with feudal politics, had bound the people to the soil and they were accorded no voice in their government. The whole feudal system was so intricately balanced that, ironically, it became unbalanced in operation. In theory it balanced political powers against each other; in practice, it pitted them against each other. That genuine democracy or representative government would have been too advanced for the medieval system seems never to have occurred to the founding fathers, who simply assumed that the failure to have either in the medieval scheme was the failure of the age, not the men.

---

20 Cf. Charles McIlwain, "The Fundamental Law Behind the Constitution of the United States," *Ibid.*, 3–15. Even John Adams was willing to admit that some good had been accomplished by the medieval nobility and that "the nobles have been essential parties in the preservation of liberty, whenever and wherever it has existed. In Europe they alone have preserved it against kings and people, wherever it has been preserved; or, at least, with very little assistance from the people.... By nobles I mean not peculiarly an hereditary nobility, or any particular modification, but the natural and actual aristocracy among mankind." Adams to Samuel Adams, October 18, 1790; Adams, *Works*, VI, 417.

21 *Ibid.*, VI, 251.

When the new constitution was finished, Madison thought he detected traces of feudalism in it but felt that they would be negated by other aspects of the new system. He certainly hoped so. "And what has been the progress . . . of the feudal constitutions?" he asked of Jefferson. "In all of them a continual struggle between the head and the inferior members. . . ."[22] But he felt that the balance of power struck in the new federal constitution would avoid conflict; power would flow up from the "subordinate members," resting always on the consent of the people. Moreover, the careful division of responsibilities and powers in the three branches would not be permitted to dissolve into feudal anarchy if proper care were taken.

But politics was not the only subject upon which the founding fathers touched when they read history; they realized only too well that the law under which they lived was a product of history, especially English history. In their own minds, the founding fathers differentiated England from the rest of Europe in all things, and especially regarding the middle ages. John Adams knew only too well how much English law had developed during the middle ages. He had spent countless hours over the law books as a young man and the whole experience, arid in memory as well as in fact, led him to agree for once with Rousseau that the feudal system was "the most iniquitous and absurd form of government."[23] He looked with horror upon the twin products of medieval legalism, the canon and the feudal law. "Since the promulgation of Christianity, the two greatest systems of tyranny that have sprung from this original, are the canon and the feudal law."[24] He thought that a combination of lord and clergy had enslaved Europe for a thousand years. Though he admitted that English law was composed of a combination of classical and medieval precedent, he avowed that the former had been more beneficial than the latter. Out of the blending of heritages had come a law "which avoids the inconveniences, and retains the advantages of both." Appeals to medieval legal precedent left him cold, and he thought it only folly "to go back to the institutions of Woden and of Thor. . . ."[25] He looked upon Magna Carta and later legal developments as wise progressions away from medieval legal institutions.

---

[22] Madison, *Writings*, V, 25.
[23] Quoted in Zoltan Haraszti, *John Adams and the Prophets of Progress*, Cambridge, Mass., 1952, 80.
[24] Adams, *Works*, III, 449.
[25] *Ibid.*, IV, 298.

In that long and rich correspondence which passed between Thomas Jefferson and John Adams, there are numerous references to the medieval saints and their writings. Both knew of such figures as Thomas Aquinas, Saint Jerome, and Saint Augustine, though their information came from secondary sources. Both men felt grievously handicapped by their lack of adequate reference materials on the history of the Church, and Jefferson lamented that his knowledge of medieval religious figures came only from haphazard secondary sources.[26] He was intrigued by ideas on the nature of the soul put forward by some of the saints but could not pursue the subject due to lack of sources.[27]

Both Adams and Jefferson looked upon the saints with a jaundiced eye. They were in the forefrout of a generation skeptical of clerical activities, and they hardly accepted the miracles attributed to the saints. They felt that much of this was but an effort to sustain religious authority. Believing as they did that the middle ages was a time of clerical domination, they found only more evidence to condemn the period rather than to glorify it in their studies of medieval church figures. Neither objected to the lives of the saints and church fathers, it should be noted, so much as to the use to which they had been put by religious authority.

To the study of the lives of the saints, Adams applied the same intellectual diligence and sharp tongue that had brought more earthly flesh to ruin. Exasperation often outran scholarship as he read. "From all that I have read, of the legends, of the lives, and writings of the Saints, and even of the Fathers, and of ecclesiastical history in general, I have no doubt that the *Acta Sanctorum* is the most enormous mass of lies, frauds, hypocrisy, and imposture, that ever was heaped together on the globe."[28] A confirmed believer in the separation of church and state, Adams disliked the unity between the two in the middle ages. Indeed, it was this cooperation between king and priest that had initially soured his attitude toward the period.[29]

Like Jefferson, he hated the censorship and oppression which he thought abounded during the middle ages, and lamented the loss to scholarship of many pagan writings. In such sentiments he

---

[26] Jefferson, *Writings*, XIV, 14–20, 322–329; Adams, *Works*, X, 105.
[27] Jefferson, *Writings*, XV, 264–269.
[28] *Ibid.*, XIV, 322–329.
[29] Cf. Adams, *Works*, V, 479.

was joined by others, who tended to identify the medieval period with clerical domination and usurpation.[30]

So biased and critical an attitude in the founding fathers is partially explained by the critical and unappreciative secondary histories available to them. Adams had thoroughly read Gibbon, Hume, and Robertson, and felt that their discussion of the medieval period was so prescient that he himself need not add anything to it.[31] Jefferson read and recommended Robertson's *History of Charles the Fifth,* which the author prefaced with a long introduction covering the period from the fall of Rome to the fifteenth century.[32] To Robertson, the two centuries after Rome's fall were the very nadir of civilization and he saw nothing but disorder in the feudal system that entrenched itself in Europe between 800 and 1200. However admirable it was in theory, he thought, it was politically chaotic in practice. "The bond of political union was extremely feeble; the sources of anarchy were innumerable," he said of the period of feudalism.[33] In the resulting tug of war between kings and nobles, Europe descended into the "Dark Ages."

> An universal anarchy, destructive in a great measure, of all the advantages which men expect to derive from society prevailed. The people, the most numerous as well as the most useful part of the community, were either reduced to a state of actual servitude, or treated with the same insolence and rigour as if they had been degraded into that wretched condition.[34]

If the eighteenth century reader doubted Robertson's unfavorable view of the medieval period, he could turn elsewhere, but the judgement was not likely to be much less severe. In his celebrated *History of England,* David Hume drew a much more detailed and generally more sympathetic picture of England in the medieval period. Jefferson greatly disliked Hume's toryism but admired his style, and his work was immensely successful in his day. However much he admired certain aspects of medieval law, the social responsibilities inherent in the feudal system, and the chivalric ideal, Hume had little respect for the actual workings of medieval society.

---

[30] Adams, *Works,* VI, 480. Madison agreed that the separation of Church and State was a felicitous doctrine in which "the genius and courage of Luther led the way. . . ."; in *The Letters and Other Writings of James Madison,* Philadelphia, 3 vols., 1865, III, 242–243.

[31] Adams, *Works,* IV, 298.

[32] Jefferson, *Writings,* XVI, 124–129.

[33] William Robertson, *History of the Reign of Charles the Fifth,* London, 2 vols., 1857, I, 13.

[34] *Ibid.,* 14, 16.

It appeared to balance powers, yet "it was almost impossible to preserve harmony in its parts. . . ."[35] Strife among the nobles ruined the system because "the loose policy, incident to the feudal constitutions, maintained a perpetual, though secret, hostility, between the several members of the state. . . ." The lower elements of society were perpetually and purposely impoverished by the system. "A great part of them were *serfs,* and lived in a state of absolute slavery or villainage" while "The barons and gentry, living in rustic plenty and hospitality, gave no encouragement to the arts. . . ."[36] In reading Hume, the founding fathers passed over his more favorable comments on the possibilities inherent in the medieval system and noted only that he seemed to agree with everyone else in a generally harsh judgement of the period.

In his history of the middle ages, published in 1818, Henry Hallam presented a wealth of detail which had either eluded or repelled his predecessors. He made a genuine effort to view the middle ages as a whole and his work corrected many erroneous judgments of the period. He presented a far more favorable view of the period than any previous scholar. While he admired some aspects of the feudal system and medieval politics, crediting them with having saved Europe from universal monarchy after the fall of Rome, he could not shake off doubts that the feudal system left much to be desired. "Though private wars did not originate in the feudal customs, it is impossible to doubt that they were perpetuated by so convenient an institution, which indeed owed its universal establishment to no other cause."[37] Socially and culturally, he divided the middle ages into two periods, the Dark Ages of 500 to 1000, and the later middle ages, which he admired, from 1100 to 1400.[38]

Both Jefferson and Adams knew of Hallam's work,[39] but it doubtless came too late to change their attitudes toward the medieval ethos. Hallam's respect for the common law, medieval culture, and the arts and life of the later middle ages could not disguise for the founding fathers what they considered the general confusion and intellectual aridness of the era. These and similar sec-

---

35 David Hume, *The History of England From the Invasion of Julius Caesar to the Revolution in 1688,* London, 6 vols., 1800, I, 312.

36 *Ibid.,* 487–488.

37 Henry Hallam, *View of the State of Europe During the Middle Ages,* London, 3 vols., 1853, I, 269. See his estimate of feudalism in *Ibid.,* 144–270.

38 *Ibid.,* II, 269–270, 316–317.

39 Jefferson, *Writings,* XVI, 124–129; Adams, *Works,* VI, 563n.

ondary sources were the makers of their unfavorable attitudes toward the middle ages.

It was left to Thomas Jefferson to view the problem in its entirety. As has already been noted, he dismissed the middle ages as an arid waste, lumping ten centuries under the opprobium "Dark Ages." The middle ages were to him the permanent encampment of the barbarians that over-ran Rome. There were many fallacies and false principles abroad in his own day and "All of these were legitimate principles in the dark ages which intervened between ancient and modern civilizations, but exploded and were held in just horror in the eighteenth century."[40] He held that the French Revolution, and that of his own countrymen, had been in some measure efforts to overthrow the surviving aspects of medievalism in modern life. To the end of his days he prided himself on his part in the abolition of the "feudal dues" of entail, primogeniture, and quit rents in Virginia. In saying all that he did about the middle ages, Jefferson merely repeated the attitudes of his educated contemporaries. He loved Greece and Rome more than the middle ages because he considered them more modern. It was not a coincidence that *Don Quixote,* the great burlesque on medieval institutions, was among his favorite books.

The key to Jefferson's dislike of the medieval period is his belief that it was an era during which the arts and sciences languished. Though he was by no means a slavish admirer of classical civilization, he found in it a growth and freedom which he missed in the middle ages.

Such were the attitudes of the founding fathers toward the middle ages. Often they were erroneous, just as their attitudes toward classical civilization were erroneous. But then, as now, what men think as well as what men know determines their actions and shapes their beliefs. This attitude is largely a result of the unfavorable treatment accorded the middle ages by contemporary historians. The very revival of classical literature and learning that had come with the renaissance seemed to be a repudiation of medieval art and culture. In his old age, John Adams enjoyed the romantic novels of Walter Scott, especially *The Lady of the Lake* and *The Lay of the Last Minstrel,* but he never took them seriously. Indeed, he could not forbear injecting his politics into a discussion of their merits. "These Scottish and German romances show in a clear light

[40] Jefferson, *Writings,* VII, 449.

the horrors of the feudal aristocracy," he wrote Benjamin Rush, "as the histories of Ghengis Khan and Tamarlane shew the same anarchy in the Asiastic aristocracy."[41]

Even if adequate and favorable secondary sources on the middle ages had been available to the founding fathers, it is doubtful that it would have impressed them as deeply as classical literature. The whole eighteenth century educational system was based upon the ancient classics; men's minds ran to Greece and Rome with the force of habit.

In fairness to the middle ages it must be noted that the founding fathers did not possess the rich store of knowledge available to later generations on the arts, literature, and cultural life of the middle ages. Had they known this, they too would doubtless have studied the era more closely. There were men and things in the middle ages that would surely have interested a Jefferson or an Adams.

The ancient world still seemed more real and more profitable for study to Jefferson's generation than did the middle ages. Tacitus seemd as modern as yesterday and Plutarch's *Lives* could have been written in 1789. Pericles and the power politics of the Peloponnesian wars seemed as real as any of the wars of Louis XIV or William III. The middle ages remained distant to the founding fathers largely because of medieval life itself. From any vantage point, it seemed radically different both from their own and from classical patterns of behavior. It remained for another Adams of a later generation, who perhaps needed unity more, to find the Good Life in the medieval unity. Such was not the case with the generation of his great-grandfather.

H. Wayne Morgan

University of California
Los Angeles

41 Quoted in Haraszti, *John Adams*, 16.

Search for Fortune along the Mississippi

Pratt Letters, 1860-1861

Despite the feverish activities regarding the promotion of railroads, in the years just preceding the Civil War the Mississippi River remained the great commercial highway for the interior of the country. Along it passed a wide variety of produce, stimulating and nourishing the growth of many towns and private enterprises. After the admission of Minnesota in 1858 a solid tier of states bordered each bank, while multiplication of bulging warehouses and comfortable homes at many spots along its course testified to the local prestige if not always to the solid wealth of the owners. Not every man possessed the necessary qualities to wrest a fortune from the river traffic. In the prevailing enthusiasm of the era many men underestimated the degree to which patient, careful, experienced attention to detail proved the underlying clue to success, rather than spectacular seizure of sudden gifts of fortune.

To the person who would see the whole picture of business activities along the river, failure of a man to make the mark that he so confidently expected may also be an important indication of the conditions that prevailed in a given era. In Albert H. Pratt we see a very ambitious and optimistic young man, who first appeared in 1859 along the upper stretches of the Mississippi in the employ of the extremely shrewd and successful Milwaukee entrepreneur, Daniel Wells, Jr.[1] A series of letters subsequently unfolds the story of his determination to strike out for himself, but the pressure of the debt owed to Wells, the uncertainties of the produce market in early 1860, and his utter lack of capital forced him to seek employment which would guarantee him a salary. In these circumstances he decided to transfer the base of his operations

[1] Daniel Wells, Jr., (1808-1902) made his first trip to Wisconsin in 1835 to invest in lands, and the following year moved his residence from Maine to Milwaukee, then a town of 40 white inhabitants. For years he prospered as a surveyor, merchant, and owner of well-located stores, hotels, and warehouses. During 1853–1857 he served in the House of Representatives, where he proved adept at securing land grants for railroads in Wisconsin and Minnesota. In 1859 he was active as a grain dealer, owner of extensive lumber interests, president of several banks, and director of railroads and insurance companies.

farther down the Mississippi, and he fixed upon St. Louis as the most likely spot in which to quickly recoup his fortunes.

The place of Pratt's origin is uncertain; perhaps he was a transplanted New Englander like so very many of the young men who worked for Wells. Evidently he had no roots in Milwaukee, for he was unable to obtain a good position there, and the few names mentioned in his letters were those of prominent businessmen who were friends or partners of Wells. Possibly he had some friends or relatives in the nearby Wisconsin town of Racine, for he returned there during illness and while searching for employment, but his letters give no clue concerning home or family. As far as it can be traced, the business record of A. H. Pratt begins on May 28, 1859, when he appeared as bookkeeper for the new La Crosse and La Crescent Bank opened by Daniel Wells, Jr. in Hokah, Minnesota.[2] For some months he constituted the sole office force; and he bustled about, ordering a counter made for the office at a cost of $25, overseeing the hauling of a safe from the steamboat landing, and arranging for a bed so that he could sleep in a small back room rented with the business quarters.[3] The amount of actual banking business transacted at this place was very small, for the bank had been brought into existence largely to facilitate advantageous purchase of produce from the Minnesota farmers, and to serve as a convenient observation post for the railroad and land speculations of Wells in this new state.[4] Hence Pratt's time was occupied chiefly with the purchase of grain, and the accounts show his drawing expense money for frequent trips to La Crosse and St. Paul, evidently in the interests of his employer.[5]

Pratt did not remain satisfied, however, with his salary of $250 for a three month period, for toward the end of September, 1859 he left Hokah and the affairs of the La Crosse and La Crescent Bank.[6] During the next two months he ranged up and down

---

[2] Statement of Transfer of Capital Stock of the La Crosse and La Crescent Bank, located at Hokah in the State of Minnesota, dated May 28, 1859, and witnessed by A. H. Pratt. All manuscript citations are from the Daniel Wells, Jr., Papers in the Milwaukee County Historical Society of Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

[3] Undated letter from Pratt to Wells, obviously soon after his arrival in Hokah.

[4] Statements of Accounts with La Crosse and La Crescent Bank, July 1 and September 20, 1859; Pratt to Wells, June 30 and September 2, 1859.

[5] Pratt to Wells, July 13, August 24, and September 2, 1859.

[6] Pratt's salary July 1–October 1, 1859, given in the Quarterly Report of the La Crosse and La Crescent Bank, dated September 20, 1859. Letter from J. Thomas Foster to Wells, September 19, 1859, shows he had already arrived to take over the duties of bookkeeper.

this section of the river, purchasing grain and distributing it for storage at La Crosse, Trempeleau, Winona, Hastings, and St. Paul.[7] Considerable new responsibility now devolved upon him, for he had entered into an agreement with Daniel Wells, Jr. and his brother-in-law, William Brown, Jr., of Milwaukee,[8] by which each of them was to receive one-third of the profits from the sale of this produce. Pratt continued to use the credit and business connections of Wells, but his expenses were only advanced and not guaranteed to him.[9] Thus all hope of profit for him depended upon his own judgement concerning the probable course of the market during the next few months. The prices which he paid to suppliers were based on quotations appearing in the *Milwaukee Sentinel,*[10] which he received two days late at points along the upper river. Since these transactions took place in the fall of the year, another major decision involved the question of how much to purchase after the close of navigation on the river, when much of the trade halted abruptly. Early in December, 1859, Pratt reported that he had transferred his activities to Prairie du Chien, Wisconsin and McGregor, Iowa; all traffic on the river had ceased, and he expected to cross over between them on foot. Here for the first time he expressed discouragement over sharp competition and a declining market; and he pleaded with Brown to telegraph him, daily if necessary, whenever changes occured in the market prices quoted in Milwaukee.[11]

His restlessness and discouragement deepened, and early in January, 1860, Pratt wrote Wells that he wished to terminate their business arrangement, citing meagerness of profits for him and hinting at dissatisfaction with the policies of Brown. At the same

---

7 Pratt to Wells, October 20 and 27, 1859; Foster to Wells, January 9, 1860.

8 William Brown, Jr., (?–1862) was a former clerk for the American Fur Co. when he arrived in Milwaukee from Michigan in 1836; the same year he opened a store in the name of Brown & Miller. By 1839 he had married Susan Wells and was prominent enough to be appointed to the first Board of Commissioners of the Wisconsin Marine and Fire Insurance Co., which actually engaged in a general banking business. James S. Buck, *Pioneer History of Milwaukee,* 4 vols., 1876–1886, I, 91, 97, 232–233. *The Milwaukee City Directory* for 1859–1860 lists his residence, but no business address.

9 Pratt to Wells, August 24, 1860.

10 *The Milwaukee Sentinel* was founded 1837 as a weekly, and became the first daily paper in Milwaukee in 1844. Bayrd Still, *Milwaukee, the History of a City,* Madison, 1948, 67–68.

11 Pratt to William Brown, Jr., from Prairie du Chien, Wisconsin, December 2, 1859; Pratt to Wells, from McGregor, Iowa, December 20, 1859.

time he expressed his high hopes of entering a partnership with an established commission man in Milwaukee, while confessing that his great aim during the preceding months had been to demonstrate sufficient ability as an agent so that Wells would consider it worth while to give him a permanent place as a partner in one of his many business firms.[12] Later in the month Pratt was still carying out some banking errands for Wells in Prairie du Chien, and sending quotations on produce from McGregor, but he acknowledged the existence of a debt to his former employer and patron, and presumably he was chiefly engaged in some personal speculations.[13] By March Wells evidently was pressing him for payment. This time Pratt wrote from Racine in a tone both deferential and pleading, emphasizing his own ill-health and the impossibility in current hard times of collecting money due him, but also refusing to sign a note covering the debt. At the same time he promised to repay in full, and asserted that if he could not obtain a suitable position in Milwaukee he intended to go "where I can."[14]

In his search for a place where he could utilize experience gained in the river trade of the upper Mississippi it is not surprising that such a young man thought of St. Louis. During the very same months Pratt's successor at Hokah, J. T. Foster, currently handling banking matters for Wells at La Crosse, kept urging the importance of St. Louis as a market for the produce of the region.[15] The advice was judged important enough for Wells to arrange an account that would facilitate currency exchange and credit for him in St. Louis.[16] Albert Pratt, however, could hardly have known of this particular development, for he had purposely avoided contact with Wells for some weeks, and he appeared confident that he could succeed in that city without a reference from his former employer.

There follow three letters from Missouri, covering a period of about six months in 1860, and describing business activities in St. Louis. In these Pratt's tone changes from the ebullience and brashness of a young man about to snatch up a fortune to one of ag-

---

12 Pratt to Wells, January 8, 1860.

13 Charles Ray, cashier of the Bank of Prairie du Chien to Wells, January 25, 1860; Pratt to Wells, January 18 and 26, 1860.

14 Pratt to Wells, March 9 and April 18, 1860.

15 J. T. Foster to Wells, March 1, 13, 19, 28, and 30, 1860.

16 Daniel Wells, Jr., was president and owner of the Green Bay Bank of La Crosse in 1860. Statement of Accounts for April 7, 1860, contains the first listing of an account with J. J. Anderson & Co., Bullion & Exchange Brokers, St. Louis.

grieved recital of business reverses, and finally to a plea for aid in extricating himself from an unfortunate plight.

Ironton, Missouri June 22, 1860[17]

My Dear Sir:

In justice to myself, and to you, I ought to explain my reasons for not fulfilling my agreement; "to come and see you as soon as I was able."

I was sick longer than I expected; and when sufficiently recovered to carry out my previous intentions, my money,—that I had of Mr. Inbusch to support myself until I could get a situation—was nearly exhausted.

The times were dull at the North, and St. Louis seemed to be the only place where I could hope for success. I had not enough money to defray my expenses to both places. I looked upon both as evils, and of the two, choose that which offered the best inducements.

I arrived in St. Louis May 2d reduced to my bottom dollar. There was no show for a salaried berth there, all kinds of business being very dull. I took it as coolly as possible, finally made a raise, & started in business for myself. Leased the "Terre Haute Alton and St. Louis RR" for the News Agency in company with "Buel" who once had the "La C [rosse] RR."[18] We pay $500 per annum rent. At present it is very dull & pays only five to eight dollars per day. At an average, it will pay 2000$ or 2500$ per annum. During the State Fair and the Campaign we hope to clear between 500 and 1000$. We are aiming to get all the words out of St. Louis, within the next year.[19]

In addition to this I have a traveling agency that pays me between two and three hundred dollars per month, and my expenses are very light.

"Durant and Co." St. Louis will corroborate my statement. "Durant" is Son in law of Cashier Scott of the St[sic] Bank.[20]

Now what I wish to ask, is this;—that you will not attribute to ingratitude or bad intentions, my failure to keep my promise. God knows I am grateful, very grateful for your many kindnesses, and if I know my own heart I meant nothing wrong. I have always tried to do what was right, and always shall. I have learned some useful lessons in the past few months. One of which is to use no mans capital but my own in carrying out my plans. Another—that I can do better to work for myself.

---

17 Permission has kindly been given by the Milwaukee County Historical Society to publish the following letters. Except where otherwise indicated, they are given in full, with the original spelling and punctuation.

18 A connection is possible with the family of Henry Buel of Red Wing, Minnesota, who wrote Wells October 19, 1859, to suggest that a son in business in St. Paul would be glad to buy wheat for Wells.

19 The importance of timeliness in the receipt of news, including market prices, led to rapid expansion of news services. St. Louis in 1860 could boast of ten newspapers, while telegraphic connections had been established with the east as early as 1847. Frank Luther Mott, *American Journalism: 1690–1950,* New York, 1950, 244–248, 283.

20 The Milwaukee City Directory for 1859–1860 lists Moses S. Scott as cashier of the State Bank of Wisconsin, located in Milwaukee.

I will pay you as soon as I can, with interest satisfactory, and want you should give me a little time. Should have written before. But wanted to get into business first, & form some idea of my chances for paying my debts. This year if I have my health, I will draw between three and five thousand dollars besides paying every cent I owe.

If I have erred, Forgive me. For I wish to count you among my friends. I have loved and esteemed you as I never did man before, and if I have forfeited your friendship, I owe it to the fruit of the seed you sowed—my ambition. When last in Milwaukee and in *need* of a situation J. A. Noonan[21] wanted a Bookkeeper. He did not offer me the place, but called me "flighty." Of course I would not then ask it of him. While in St. Louis—he wanted I should come and see him—supposing that I was in Racine—reduced to an extreme that he could get me for a song. But he missed his man for once. He ought to have known me better. I certainly had a better opinion of him. I wish you to know how the matter stands—as he will probably give you a different version.

I go from here through the Southern and Southwestern portion of the State. I will probably return to St. Louis about the 1st of Oct. I hope to be able to pay you before that time & think there is no doubt but that I will. I shall visit you next spring if my business will permit, when I will account to you for the years business and adventures.

Give my kindest regards to Mrs. Wells & remember me kindly to Judge Pringle,[22] and believe me as Ever,

Faithfully yours,

Two months later Pratt confessed his prospects had been substantially reduced, as he revealed disappointments regarding his partner:

Hannibal, Mo. August 24, 1860[23]

My Dear Friend:

I returned to St. Louis a week since & found your letter. I am very grateful for your kindness and good wishes, & will try to deserve them. . . .

When I returned to St. Louis, I found that my partner in my RR business had become so elated with our success (we made at the start 10$

---

[21] Josiah A. Noonan (1813–1882) was an experienced printer and newspaperman when he came to Milwaukee from New York in 1836. Very active in politics as a Democrat, he served as editor of the *Milwaukee Courier*, 1841–1845, and as Postmaster of Milwaukee 1843–1849 and 1853. In 1857 he retired from politics to devote more time to his paper mill, and he continued in related fields until his death. Lieut. Col. Jerome A. Watrous, (ed.), *Memoirs of Milwaukee County*, 3 vols., Madison, 1909, I, 433–436.

[22] Benjamin Pringle was associated with Wells in railroad and lumber speculations; he was evidently not a resident of either Wisconsin or Minnesota, but during 1859–1860 he spent some time in St. Paul in hopes of influencing the Minnesota legislature. Pringle to Wells, September 11, 1859, January 28 and February 8, 1860.

[23] The paragraph omitted recapitulates the conditions under which Pratt had accumulated the debt to Wells.

25,728



per day clear) that he went on one grand spree, raised the devil generally, let the sup't see him, in fact called him his nigger—& of course lost the road. It was quite a damper on me, for I was obliged to pay some debts & it took a good two thousand dollars out of my pocket for the year. I had set my mark at 4000$ clear profit this year. But will fail to connect on that amount unless I strike some other business that I can combine with my present trade.

Remember me kindly to all & believe me

Yours very truly,

I go to St. Louis in a few days—will you not be there at the Fair?

After another wait of several months, the next letter revealed still more of his business ventures:

Paris, Monroe County, Missouri November 1, 1860

Dear Friend:

Can you not send me a recommend that if necessary will enable me to secure a position with the grain dealers of St. Louis. I wish to continue in that business & if I can furnish good recommends as to character, etc. there is a man in St. Louis who will give me a chance to get even should wheat continue to fall.

My partner left me in the lurch in my RR business & I lost considerably by him. I was also engaged as State Agent for a fine Sewing Machine—in which but with little trouble I could clear 10$ per day. Now, just as I have got clear of RR obligations, the Supreme Court decides that our patent is an infringement. I am not discouraged. But it is very discouraging.

If I am worthy of a good recommend, you will confer a favor by sending me one, in the care of Durant & Co. St. Louis.

& oblige Yours Very Truly

Have just recovered from a severe illness (fever) & never was as well in my life.

Albert Pratt remained in Missouri for several more months, during which no record of further adventure remains. These were the eventful months following the election and inauguration of Abraham Lincoln, and the outbreak of the Civil War; they were also months of great uncertainty for the river trade, and many a successful and experienced man found the difficulties overwhelming. Early in the summer of 1861 Pratt abandoned his hopes of fortune in this area and returned to Wisconsin in a new and chastened mood. The next letter gives his final version of conditions prevailing in Missouri.

Racine July 1st, 1861

Dear Sir:

I returned to this place about a month since. Was obliged to leave Missouri in consequence of the troubles there.

As soon as I can get a Situation I will do what I can towards paying you. Should have done so before, but I could not make any collections before coming away, as there has been almost a famine in Mo. for a year, and the money I brought with me has been discredited. But I am getting used to hard luck and have learned to take it coolly. If the few I owe will wait with patience & faith I hope to be able to bring everything out right soon. The past two years have been full of bitter experience to me and I am now ready to settle down to anything that will pay board and clothes, and stick to it. If you know of any openings, (I don't care if it is breaking on a Railroad) be kind enough to inform me and you will oblige

Yours Truly,

One more letter written in 1861 seems to show that Albert Pratt had indeed learned his lesson, for he was willing to demonstrate the genuineness of his new resolves by accepting a minor position, with a salary much lower than the one he had considered inadequate two years earlier, when he was the bookkeeper for Daniel Wells, Jr. at Hokah, Minnesota. However, the familiar tone of optimism is still very much in evidence:

Chicago Dec. 22, 1861

Dear Sir:

I am informed that you were in Chicago a few days since, and made some Enquiries concerning me, but did not see fit to call. I conclude therefore that I have offended you, and regret it the more, because I have never wronged you,—or any other one—intentionally.

The last two years have been full of errors, but their reward has accompanied them. If they have developed the man, and made me more self-reliant, then have I gained. The rest is lost. Now, profiting by experience, I am trying to retrieve the Past.

Through the influence of your letter of recommend, (for which I have again to thank you) together with one from M. S. Scott, Esq. I succeeded in obtaining a Situation as bookkeeper in a Grocery house here, at a salary of 400$ per year. It is commencing at the lower round of the ladder, but that I shall succeed in attaining the summit, I have no doubt. I have already a Prospect of advancing a step, by a change to a larger house. Should I make the change, I shall endeavor to make it permanent. In any event, I think my Salary will be increased on the 1st of January, in which case, I will use all possible self denial until I can liquidate my obligations to you.

Whenever you are in Chicago, and it is convenient for you to call, I shall be very glad to see you.

My kind regards to your family—and believe me

Yours Affectionately,

Here the record ends; whether Albert Pratt made a fortune anywhere, or even whether he finally repaid his debt to Daniel Wells, Jr. cannot now be known. Perhaps he settled down to become a solid businessman in Chicago, for the sole remaining bit of correspondence is dated from there in 1867; but it is merely a hasty note of introduction for a friend who sought a position in the lumber business, and it reveals nothing concerning his personal affairs.[24] In any case, however, it is unlikely that Albert Pratt ever forgot the stirring years of 1859-1860 and his adventures while seeking his fortune along the Mississippi.

DOROTHY J. ERNST

University of Wisconsin
Milwaukee

[24] Pratt to Wells, May 23, 1867.

Book Reviews

Crown and Parliament in Tudor-Stuart England; *A Documentary Constitutional History, 1485-1714.* By Paul L. Hughes, Robert F. Fries, eds. New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1959. Pp. xvi, 359. $6.95.

The teacher of English history, both by choice and necessity, must put great emphasis upon constitutional development and the use of relevant documents. Various one-volume and multi-volume collections of important documents, covering all or subdivisions of England's history from Anglo-Saxon times to the present, have long been readily available to teacher and student. When another appears, it must prove its worth by being sufficiently different and useful to supplant existing works.

Crown and Parliament in Tudor-Stuart England, by two professors of De Paul University's history faculty, makes good claim either to supplant or at least to supplement some of the books now being used. It treats a fairly narrow field of history, 1485-1714, a period of intense constitutional development. Because perenially there is a strong interest in the Tudor-Stuart era, the limitation to these two hundred and twenty-nine years permits greater concentration on depth. The documents chosen by the editors, covering the range of legal, political, ecclesiastical and economic, are placed chronologically in chapters divided by reigns from Henry VII to Anne, including the Interregnum. At the beginning of each chapter is an introduction, which in every case is well written and shows that the authors possess a real familiarity with the constitutional developments of the period treated. Each individual document also has a brief explanation pointing out its relevance. One finds very full citations from the legislation of Henry VII, the varied laws, so pregnant of future importance, of the reigns of Henry VIII, Edward VI and Mary, the significant ecclesiastical and economic legislation of Elizabeth I, and the most important legal enactments which in sum total represent the fundamental constitutional changes of the Stuart era. Over half of the book, in fact, is devoted to the period 1603-1714.

What impresses one is the care with which the authors determined the extent of the documents to be quoted; they are given in sufficient length (and with modern versions of spelling) to be useful for classroom use and as a handbook for undergraduate and graduate work alike. For those who have learned their constitutional history through such a biased work as M. R. Tanner's *Tudor Constitutional Documents,* the present book will prove refreshing because of its lack of prejudice. One finds only details of interpretation rather than any major point of interpretation or of fact with which to disagree. Although this reviewer is tempted to criticize here and there the choice and the omission of a few documents, he feels that the judgement of the two editors must prevail, considering the limitations of space and the validity of their experience in teaching constitutional history.

The over-all conclusion is that this book must be viewed as very serviceable to teachers and to both undergraduate and graduate students. It

must further be added that the volume is attractive in appearance, that it contains a minimum of typographical errors, and that the structure of the book (which includes an index) represents careful planning to make it very useful to the reader. The bibliography at the end, of both general and special works on Tudor-Stuart history, is another recommendation of the serviceability of this volume.

WILLIAM R. TRIMBLE

Loyola University, Chicago

Alexis de Tocqueville in the Chamber of Deputies. His views on Foreign and Colonial Policy. By Mary Lawlor, S.N.D. Washington, D.C., The Catholic University of America Press, 1959. Paper. Pp. xi, 201.

Last year, commemorations marking the centenary of Tocqueville's death gave evidence of the increasing interest in the remarkable French thinker. This dissertation on Tocqueville's career in the French Chamber of Deputies is directed toward a neglected area in the field of Tocqueville studies. The sub-title indicates the scope of the work with its concentration on an anaysis of Tocqueville's speeches and of his reports on foreign and colonial policies during his deputyship in the Chamber under the Bourgeois Monarchy. For this material, the author has relied on the Beaumont edition of Tocqueville's *Oeuvres complètes,* the volumes published thus far in the definite edition by J. P. Mayer, *Le Moniteur Universel,* and articles by Tocqueville in *Le Siècle.*

After the Revolution of 1830, the young magistrate in the Court of Versailles gave allegiance to the new regime as the only valid political possibility for France at the time. In his first candidacy for the legislature in 1837, Tocqueville was defeated; his career as a deputy began with his election in 1839, four years after the publication of the first volume of his famous *Democracy in America.* He served as a representative from La Manche until February 1848, when another revolution of greater portent swept away the Bourgeois Monarchy. The author begins with a description of Tocqueville's entrance into politics in which she emphasizes his insistence on being a free man without party or commitments. She devotes succeeding chapters to the Egypto-Syrian phase of the Eastern Question, the Right of Search, Slavery in the French Colonies, and Algeria. Appendices are included.

The crisis over the Eastern Question which led Tocqueville to urge the government to go to war if necessary, rather than permit the powers to regulate the Question without France, reveals him as an "ardent nationalist." His plea for a strong foreign policy went unheeded; and the real goal of his speech on the Right of Search—negotiations with England to abolish the slave trade by abolishing the market—was not achieved. When Tocqueville's views roused some opposition in England he disclaimed any responsibility for the deterioration in Anglo-French relations. Tocqueville's correspondence with his English friends, John Stuart Mill, Nassau William Senior, and Henry Reeve, as presented here, throws light on the

positions on both sides of the channel. When the Ministry shelved his report to the Chamber of Deputies on slavery in the colonies, Tocqueville turned to the press. Six articles calling for the abolition of slavery appeared in *Le Siècle* in 1843. His comments and advice on Algeria show his continuing interest in the problem. Though Tocqueville did the unusual by ultimately supporting the government's compromise bill regulating slavery and was willing to support its policy "on the neutral terrain of Africa," here again, the action of Louis Philippe's government disappointed him and his recommendations bore little fruit.

This informative study fills a gap in the literature on Tocqueville. But some readers might wish further enlightenment on the motives of the do-nothing government in certain instances and a more explicit concluding discussion on the opening question, "How close is the correlation between theory and practice in politics?" To the reviewer, some of the judgements, such as the thesis stated in the preface that "an intensive nationalism was the core of his political thought," might be questioned. Also, examination of the extent of Tocqueville's commitment to imperialism would probably qualify the assertion that he "was an imperialist." If Tocqueville's query as to the time and method of ending slavery is "one of the few examples of [his] practical questions during this period," one may wonder whether these speeches and reports disclose "an urgent practicality" as a facet of his character. The dissertation, however, is an interesting contribution to the story of Tocqueville, the deputy.

MARGARET M. O'DWYER

Loyola University, Chicago

Lincoln Finds a General, Volume Five. By Kenneth P. Williams. Macmillan Co., New York, 1959. Pp. 395. $7.50.

Kenneth P. Williams, the Indiana University mathematician turned historian did not live long enough to finish the last two chapters of this volume. On July 1, 1958, he retired from his teaching career with the title of Distinguished Service Professor of Mathematics. On September 5, 1958, he died, after having outlined Chapters X and XI of Volume V, but before he was able to write them. Chapter X would have been concerned with the battle of Chattanooga, November 24-25, 1863; Chapter XI would have included an account of Grant's receiving his commission as Lieutenant General from President Lincoln on March 8, 1864. On that date Lincoln would have found his general and Williams might have felt that the record was complete, because in his preface to Volume One he had declared that "Lincoln's chief military problem was to find a general equal to the task the north faced in the Civil War."

However, had he lived it seems perhaps more likely that Professor Williams would have written not only two more chapters but also two more volumes, both concerned with the last year of the war and including Sherman's campaigns in 1864 and 1865 as well as Grant's sustained campaign against Richmond. We would then have had a very comprehensive history

of the major phases of the military history of the federal armies in the Civil War. Although not entirely finished, this set has been described as "a major work of scholarship written in the grand style on a grand scale." Volumes I and II, published in 1949, covered the campaigns in the East from the outbreak of the war in April 1861 to the victory of the North at Vicksburg on July 4, 1863. Volume III, which appeared in print in 1952 told of Grant's early career, of the campaigns including Shiloh and Corinth and the first efforts to take Vicksburg. Volume IV, published in 1956, related the story of the campaigns culminating in the capture of Vicksburg.

This volume gives us detailed accounts of the federal defense of Helena, located on the Mississippi some distance north of Vicksburg, and the surrender of the Confederates at Port Hudson also located on the Mississippi but south of Vicksburg. The volume ends with the defeat of Rosecrans at Chickamauga on September 20, 1863, and with the plans of Grant to go to the rescue of Rosecrans, besieged in Chattanooga. Throughout each chapter, one detail is given after another with the result that the reader has a very graphic picture of every event described. This is very true, for example, of the Battle of Helena, July 4, 1863, the day that Vicksburg fell to Grant. We learn that the successful Union defense of Helena was the result not only of the soldiers and land batteries concerned but also of the gunboat *Tyler* firing at the Confederates from its position in the Mississippi River. We learn that some of the Union troops took from some of the captured Confederates the "reliable muzzle loading Enfields" of their captives and used them instead of the "poor breech-loading carbines" formerly used by those same Union soldiers.

The notes given at the back of each volume are exceptionally detailed, many of them extending over more than a page and some of them for two or three pages. The *Official Records* are used continuously as are also contemporaneous newspaper accounts as well as scores of other primary and secondary sources. Admittedly not easy reading, the volumes by Kenneth P. Williams will nevertheless give you a comprehensive view of the military phases of the Civil War which you will perhaps get from no other writer. His five volumes have become an essential part of the history of the Civil War.

PAUL KINIERY

Loyola University, Chicago

Gallant Pelham, American Extraordinary. By Charles G. Milham. The Public Affairs Press, Washington, D.C., 1959. Pp. 250.

When on May 6, 1863, the *London Times* reported that the shell which killed Major John Pelham "... extinguished one of the purest and bravest spirits which [had] been yielded up in this desolate war," it expressed the conviction with which one concludes Charles G. Milham's *Gallant Pelham, American Extraordinary,* one of the best recent publications on the War Between the States. The work is all the more remarkable because it was

written, not by a native southerner, as its sympathetic treatment would lead the reader to believe, but by a native of New York who spent most of his life in the state of his birth.

To collect his material, the author visited all the places with which the "boy hero" had had contact, and interviewed more than forty people who had known him. He searched the historic record, and found hardly more than passing references to one who was considered Lee's greatest artillery genius. Even a search for Pelham's letters proved almost fruitless, for most of them have disappeared. It is remarkable that, in view of these circumstances, Milham was able to reconstruct so complete and detailed an account.

John Pelham was born in 1839 near Jacksonville, Alabama. Descended from English nobility who had settled in Virginia, he counted among his forebears individuals who had held high rank in earlier American wars, and among immediate family connections such persons as John Singleton Copley and Henry Clay. His father was a planter and John, along with his brothers, spent most of his early life out-of-doors. Selected for West Point at the age of eighteen, he was a student there when the war began. Pelham was commissioned a first lieutenant in the Confederate Artillery and ordered to Virginia. He soon found himself under the immediate command of J. E. B. Stuart with whom he is said to have experienced " . . . one of the most notable associations of military minds in the war." Later, he was almost as intimately associated with Thomas J. Jackson and Robert E. Lee.

As commander of Stuart's horse artillery, the gallant Pelham fought twice at Manassas, through the Peninsula Campaign, and at Sharpsburg and Fredericksburg. Official records show clearly that it was Pelham's guns, skillfully placed and accurately aimed, which played a major part in bringing victory or averting disaster. Stuart looked upon him as "all but brother," and referred to him as " . . . the noble, the chivalric, the gallant Pelham." Both Jackson and Lee frequently spoke and wrote of him, not as colorfully, but equally as sincerely. At twenty-four John Pelham died at Kellysville, a battle so minor that it would hardly be noted, had it not been the occasion of his death. His body lay in state in the Confederate Capitol, and was escorted to the train by representatives of the Confederate Government. He lies buried among members of his family at Jacksonville.

Charles Milham spent many years on this work, but died before its publication. The biography is presented, not in a dry historic manner, but in a more popular style which makes reading pleasant and easy. Careful examination of the text, documentation, and bibliography convinces one that historic truth is not violated. If, in the plethora of Civil War literature with which we are being deluged, we find other works equally as valuable, accurate, and readable, we shall indeed be fortunate.

KENNETH M. JACKSON

Loyola University, Chicago

We the People, The Economic Origins of the Constitution. By Forrest McDonald. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Ill., 1958. Pp. viii, 436. $7.50.

Since the publication of Charles A. Beard's *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States,* a veritable storm has raged in historical circles over its accuracy. Beard, unwittingly it seems, fathered a school of historians who vigorously preached and defended his "interpretation." With equal vigor Beard's critics challenged his position and accused him of interpreting the past for the benefit of the Progressive Movement, at the peak of its popularity the very year this essay was first published. Some few, in an effort to discredit his hypothesis, even went so far as to attach the epithet "Marxian" to his work. But the stronger the denunciation, the more firmly did the thesis seem to take hold. Ultimately, all students of American history were obliged to genuflect before it, reverently or irreverently. The first systematic analysis of the methodology of the thesis came with the publication of Robert E. Brown's *Charles Beard and the Constitution,* in 1956. The present study by Forrest McDonald is the latest and most significant entry in a growing bibliography on this subject.

The Beard thesis can be viewed in three ways: as propaganda, as a form of historical methodology, or as history. The present study considers it under the last heading accepting without qualification Beard's system of interpretation and his method of testing it. In short, the author takes the Beard hypothesis—that economic elements were the prime motivating factors in the writing and ratification of the Constitution—and applies it to the material, asking the very questions which Beard said would have to be asked before his thesis could be proven conclusively. The result is an exhaustive analysis of the economic interests present during the drafting and ratifying of the Constitution. The personalty and realty of each individual associated with this process are carefully and fully delineated. Dr. McDonald's conclusion was that: "On all counts . . . Beard's thesis is entirely incompatible with the facts." (p. 357)

Such a conclusion, of necessity, makes the work essentially negative in character. An hypothesis has been tested and found totally inadequate. The importance of a work of this type can be measured only in terms of the significance which is attached to the thesis it attempts to analyze. If the Beard thesis is no longer accepted as a meaningful interpretation of the Constitution, the present work is unnecessary. A cursory examination of any textbook in American history will reveal that such is not the case. The Beard thesis, although somewhat less popular than it was in the decade of the thirties and earlier, still has a significant following in American historical circles. The present work, a complete, total, and devastating refutation of Beard's position, is of utmost importance, for subsequent studies of the Constitution must be cast in the image of its conclusions.

The positive aspects of this monograph, although comparatively brief, are also worthy of note. Toward the end of his study the author raises two significant questions. Is there another economic interpretation (besides Beard's) that might be advanced as a tenable thesis to explain the Con-

stitution, and what conclusions, if any, on methodology and the entire concept of economic interpretation of historical phenomena can be drawn from this analysis? In answering the first question the author maintains that this study indicates quite clearly that: "It is . . . not even theoretically possible to devise a single set of alignments . . . that would explain the contest (i.e. the writing and ratifying of the Constitution) as one in which economic self-interest was the principal motivating force." (p. 398) As to the second question, he challenges the usefulness of any methodology which begins with a single, all-embracing hypothesis, endorsing instead an inductive approach which recognizes the pluralistic forces at work in any historical phenomena. This, I suspect, is the methodology he intends to employ in the subsequent volumes on this subject referred to in his Preface.

With the removal of the Beard thesis as a meaningful criterion for analyzing this period, the way is now opened for a new and fresh interpretation. Dr. McDonald has the first and strongest claim on the subject. When that new analysis is made economic factors will undoubtedly be an important part of the story, but they will never be elevated to the unique position given to them by Beard and his followers. Dr. McDonald, with this singular example of scholarship in depth, has destroyed the Beard thesis and made a distinct contribution to American historiography.

JOHN J. REARDON

Loyola University, Chicago

A Guide to American Catholic History. By John Tracy Ellis. The Bruce Publishing Company, Milwaukee, 1959. Pp. viii, 147. Paper. $2.50.

This very servicible implement for the study of the history of the Catholic Church in America from 1492 to 1959 has its contents arranged in what Monsignor Ellis thought would be the most convenient form. The ten larger sections are: published Guides to materials and bibliographies; Manuscript Depositories; General Works in Catholic history; Studies in Diocesan, Sectional, and Parish History; Biographies, Correspondence, and Memoirs; Histories of Religious Communities; Education; Special Studies, under nine classifications; Periodicals; and Catholic Historical Societies. The items are numbered consecutively from 1 to 814. There is an unusually detailed index which simplfies the task of finding authors and books and classifications of materials. The modest price should make it readily available to students.

JEROME V. JACOBSEN

Loyola University, Chicago

Notes and Comments

Sources of Our Liberties, edited by Richard L. Perry, under the general supervision of John C. Cooper, was published last September by the American Bar Foundation and is distributed by New York University Press and by Associated College Presses. This contribution amply fulfills the purpose stated in the Foreword by Mr. Cooper: "To present in a single usable volume the historic documents constituting the major legal sources of our individual liberties." The need for this book has long been felt and several notable attempts have been made to satisfy it in part by publications of some of the documents. The Committee on American Citizenship of the American Bar Association, headed by Mr. Cooper, proposed that the scattered documents be brought together and assigned the task to the American Bar Foundation, the research affiliate of the ABA. The Sloan Foundation made two grants to bring the project to this happy conclusion. The research by a number of authorities was directed by Mr. Perry who composed the excellent introductions to the thirty-two documents presented. Half of these are from Thorpe, five from Pickering, three from Tansill, three from *United States Statutes,* and the others from various source books.

The careful and pertinent selections from Magna Carta through the English colonial charters, the Revolutionary Congresses, and the Constitutions of the new States to the First Ten Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, establish legally that the individual liberties of American citizens depend upon historic laws "limiting the authority and discretion of men wielding the power of government." Each of the documents is thus a foundation stone "on which the structure of our individual liberties has long stood." Mr. Perry places each stone in its proper position. Each introduction follows the same form, giving the origins of the document, its contemporary and later significance, and its effects. In the margins of the wide pages are the paragraph topics in italics. The footnotes contain all one would wish for further study. The type and format is excellent. A selected bibliography and good index complete the volume in 456 pages. The work has value for all citizens, and many values for scholars, lawyers, justices and legislators. It is listed at the reasonable price of five dollars.

* * * *

After some years of diligent research Dr. Alberto Francisco Pradeau of Los Angeles, California, has brought forth his documents and study on the expulsion of the Jesuits from their missions in northwest Mexico and southern Arizona under the title *La Expulsión de los Jesuitas de las Provincias de Sonora, Ostimuri y Sinaloa en 1767,* published in 1959 by Antigua Librería Robreda, José Porrúa e Hijos of Mexico City. The paper bound work gives complete details of the suppression of the Society of Jesus as it was carried out in this one sector of the vast Spanish Empire.

In the seven hundred miles of mountainous and desert area between Sinaloa and Tucson, Arizona, Dr. Pradeau found forty-eight missions and *visitas* under the care of fifty-two Jesuit fathers, many of whom were from central Europe. He gives biographical sketches of each of these exiles. The first block of documents contains the royal decree of February 27, 1767, ordering the Conde de Aranda, President of the Council of the Indies, to draft all instructions and to issue orders to all colonial officials for the arrest and exile of every Jesuit in his colonies. Aranda's long instruction of March 1 specified in twenty-nine articles the procedures for the removal of the fathers from their missions, colleges, universities and parishes and for the confiscation of their properties. The utmost secrecy was to prevail. The sealed orders reached Viceroy Marqués de Croix on May 31 and were sent by special post to the officers in Sinaloa and Sonora. Croix ordered each to open the packet on June 25 and to arrest the fathers simultaneously in the night of June 30. The following morning the Jesuits were prisoners on the roads to ports of embarcation. Many of the missionaries died en route or in jails. Governor Pineda's official reports and letters of the arrests and journey written by the fathers follow. The long journal heretofor attributed to Father Sterkianowski is now proved to be that of a Father Jaime Matheu who organized the narrative from writings and verbal accounts of exiles passing through Spain. All in all, this is a solid book, well annotated, a contribution to the history of the Pacific States and an authoritative work on the tragic event in the long history of the Jesuits.

* * * *

The Papers of Henry Clay, Volume I, *The Rising Statesman, 1797–1814,* edited by James F. Hopkins and Mary W. M. Hargreaves, Associate Editor, was brought forth December 6, 1959, by the Uni-

versity of Kentucky Press, Lexington. This is the first of ten volumes of a truly monumental work and everyone aiding in its production should receive rousing congratulations and deep gratitude from the legions of scholars to whom it will forever be a boon. The modest introduction of the Editor reveals the astonishing nature of the task to be performed, and a study of any one of the papers exemplifies the meticulousness with which the rules for editing are being followed. This volume includes Clay's incoming and outgoing correspondence from the time of his arrival in Kentucky as a young lawyer in 1797 to the end of 1814, when as American Commissioner he co-signed dispatches of the Treaty of Ghent. The papers include all personal business papers, legislative proposals, reported speeches, and his personal diplomatic contributions. The editors omit or summarize items of a non-personal nature, as land deeds, court files, and suits in which he partook as counsel. The original autograph items had to be found, filmed, classified, and used as checks against later copies or printings, an enormous task. A descriptive note follows each entry. More, footnotes placed within the entry identify persons, places, and special subjects. The mechanical part of the editing indicates tremendous patience. The type is beautiful, a revival of the Baskerville, cut about 1760. The binder has done a notable service in pressing the 1037 pages into a pliable form and a Bradford Buckram cover. The list price is reasonable, fifteen dollars.

* * * *

Mexico 1825–1828: The Journal and Corespondence of Edward Thornton Tayloe, edited by C. Harvey Gardiner, is published by The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill. When Joel R. Poinsett went to Mexico as United States Minister to the new republic he took with him as private secretary Edward Thornton Tayloe of the prominent Virginia family. Tayloe, twenty-two years old in 1825, just out of Harvard where his studies were undistinguished, was not on salary. His father paid his expenses, hoping to land a diplomatic appointment for his son. The three years which young Tayloe spent in Mexico ended his diplomatic career. He subscribed to Poinsett's policy of meddling in the internal affairs of the country and of seeking commercial gains for American companies. The only fruit of his stay is his journal and letters which Professor Gardiner here presents in a well-printed illustrated volume of 212 pages, including an ample index. Tayloe traveled some

2000 miles, chiefly examining mines, and he described all the physical features of mountains, towns, mines, roads, and farms, the beautiful and the annoying of Mexico, just as has been done by numerous tourists before and since. He never enters into the thoughts of the "amiable" but "miserable" people, whose Catholic religion he repeatedly holds in contempt. He made one mistake of criticising the governmental officials in a letter to his brother who had the remarks published, and thereafter Tayloe gave no valuable information, not even the reasons for Poinsett's "resignation," as he terms the recall. The book will be flavorable to all who have visited Mexico. Its list price is $5.

* * * *

Bluegrass Craftsman, Being the Reminiscences of Ebenezer Hiram Stedman, Papermaker, 1808–1885, edited by Frances L. S. Dugan and Jacqueline P. Bull, was published last October by the University of Kentucky Press. Born in 1808 near Boston, Ebenezer Hiram Stedman began to write his memoirs in the form of letters to his daughter in 1878, and the papers together with his two manuscripts on the history of papermaking gathered dust until the two enterprising editors brought them before the public in this neatly printed volume. Since Stedman wrote phonetically his spelling, grammar, and punctuation are abominable, and all credit must be given to those who typed the copy, set it in print, and proofread it. The "Bluegrass Craftsman" was a noted papermaker in Kentucky. His father had moved the family from Massachusetts and had set up the business of making paper about 1823. In the face of fires and floods and innumerable hardships, each recounted stoically by Stedman, he and his brother carried on the state's biggest paper industry until the Civil War reduced Stedman to bankruptcy and forced him to seek new work in Texas. His rambling, repetitious recollections of people, places and events will be read with mingled enjoyment and sadness by Kentuckians, and they will prove interesting to many general readers. Scholars, however, will be wary of trusting the memory of the septuagenarian, but they may well pay heed to the footnotes of the editors. Just before taking leave of Kentucky Stedman wrote a short history of the craft of papermaking in early Kentucky, the "Buisness that I have bin engaged in, for the last fifty years." This is published as an appendix of

eleven pages. The book runs to 226 pages including a brief index and is listed at five dollars.

* * * *

There is a very beautiful map in the James Ford Bell Collection of the University of Minnesota. Recently added to the other items on the Portuguese discoveries and trade in Africa, India, and Brazil, the map or chart was drawn by Jorge Reinel about 1534 to illustrate the development of trade and navigation and to indicate the commercial rivalries of the time. This has now been reproduced in a handsome brochure by Philip W. Porter entitled *Benin to Bahia,* with a descriptive sub-title, "A Chronicle of Portuguese Empire in the South Atlantic in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries, with Comments on a chart of Jorge Reinel." The foreword is by John Parker, Curator of the Bell Collection. After chronicling the expansion of commerce from the time of Prince Henry, Professor Porter tells what is known of the famed cartographer, Jorge Reinel, and gives an interpretation of the meaning of the chart. Altogether, this is an attractive and interesting brochure.

MID-AMERICA

An Historical Review

VOLUME 42, NUMBER 2 APRIL 1960

MID-AMERICA

An Historical Review

APRIL 1960

VOLUME 42 NUMBER 2

CONTENTS

CATHOLICISM AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, 1865-1900 . . . . *Vincent P. De Santis* 67

THE PHILIPPINES AND THE ROYAL PHILIPPINE COMPANY . . . . *James F. Cloghessy* 80

THE MAKING OF AN INSURGENT . . . . . *Richard Lowitt* 105

ROGER BARLOW: FIRST ENGLISH TRAVELER IN THE PAMPAS . . . . . *F. Samuel Trifilo* 116

BOOK REVIEWS 121

NOTES AND COMMENTS 127

MANAGING EDITOR

JEROME V. JACOBSEN, *Chicago*

EDITORIAL STAFF

WILLIAM STETSON MERRILL
J. MANUEL ESPINOSA
W. EUGENE SHIELS
RAPHAEL HAMILTON
PAUL KINIERY
PAUL S. LIETZ

Published quarterly by Loyola University (The Institute of Jesuit History) at 50 cents a copy. Annual subscription, $2.00; in foreign countries, $2.50.

Entered as second class matter, August 7, 1929, at the post office at Chicago, Illinois, under the Act of March 3, 1879. Additional entry as second class matter at the post office at Effingham, Illinois. Printed in the United States.

Subscription and change of address notices and all communications should be addressed to the Managing Editor at the publication and editorial offices at Loyola University, 6525 Sheridan Road, Chicago 26, Illinois.

MID-AMERICA
An Historical Review
APRIL 1960
VOLUME 42 NUMBER 2

Catholicism and Presidential Elections, 1865-1900

Since it was not until 1928 that a Catholic won the nomination for President it might be assumed that the factor of Catholicism seldom if ever received any attention in previous presidential elections. While it never gained the national prominence that it had in 1928, Catholicism was dragged into practically every presidential election in the post-Civil War generation. Yet as an issue it played a minor and subordinate role, and never came close to being a determining factor in the outcome of any one of these contests. This significant fact has sometimes been obscured by the exaggerated importance that has been attached to the amount of anti-Catholic propaganda used in some of these campaigns. But the appearance of much of this bias on a few occasions meant nothing more than that the parties were using every possible means to win votes and to discredit their opponents.

What Catholic issue there was in American politics in the Gilded Age grew out of the traditional anti-Catholicism that existed in the United States. This assumed that Catholics could not be trusted in public office, since they owed their political allegiance first to Rome, and because they sought to destroy the Republic and to abolish freedom of speech and of the press and religious toleration. Also as Catholics grew in numbers and political strength in the increasing industrial areas after the Civil War, and as the importance of rural areas, strongholds of Protestantism, began to decline, more and more the rural elements came to look upon Catholics as representing the most degrading features of urban life—slums, saloons, gambling houses, and corrupt political machines. Many Americans also feared that Catholics would destroy

the public school system if they got into public office, and some of the actions and statements by Catholics helped to increase this fear.

While the question of Reconstruction overshadowed all other issues in the presidential elections of the decade following the end of the Civil War, Catholicism, in a minor way, became involved in all three of them. In 1868 the most widely circulated charge by the Democrats against Schuyler Colfax, Grant's running mate, was that he had an anti-Catholic record. The Republicans retaliated when they attempted to discredit the Democrats by associating them with the Irish-Catholics and with "that abomination against common sense called the Catholic religion."[1] During the campaign of 1872, *Harper's Weekly* asserted that the Catholic Church in America was "loud in its denunciation of American civilization," that it furnished "three-fourths of the criminals and paupers who prey upon the Protestant community," that it never ceased its "attacks upon the principles of freedom," and that "its great mass of ignorant voters have been the chief source of our political ills."[2] This influential Republican journal declared that "Romish priests" and "Romish bishops" had become the partisans of Horace Greeley, "the candidate of disunion and religious bigotry," and the charge was made that the election of Greeley would be fatal in its results because he was "a noted opponent of the Bible and a firm friend of Rome."[3] Furthermore, *Harper's Weekly* pictured Greeley as the accomplice of the "Jesuit faction" which "would rejoice to tear the vitals of American freedom, and rend the breast that has offered it a shelter."[4] It charged that the Jesuits had allied themselves with the Ku Klux Klan and Tammany Hall, and it called upon "every sincere Protestant to labor ceaselessly to defeat the schemes of the Jesuits, and drive their candidate back to a merited obscurity."[5]

During the same campaign Thomas Nast, in a very famous cartoon, had Uncle Sam attempting to cut the ties between an

---

1 Charles H. Coleman, *The Election of 1868*, New York, 1933, 99, 302–303.

2 *Harper's Weekly*, September 14, 1872, quoted from J. R. G. Hassard, "American Catholics and Partisan Newspapers," *Catholic World*, XVI (March, 1873), 760.

3 *Ibid.*, 761, for first quotation; Leon B. Richardson, *William E. Chandler, Republican*, New York, 1940, 149 for second quotation.

4 *Harper's Weekly*, October 12, 1872 quoted from Hassard in *Catholic World*, XVI, 762.

5 *Harper's Weekly*, October 26, 1872 quoted from Hassard in *Catholic World*, XVI, 764.

American Bishop and the Pope by holding a naturalization paper inscribed, "This ends the foreign alliance." The Bishop had his arms full of papers with such items as "Vote for Horace Greeley because he does not want the Bible in public schools," "Vote as Roman Catholics. Destroy the Public Schools," "Orders from the Pope of Rome to the Catholics of America." Close by the side of the Bishop stood the Pope in a menacing and cunning fashion with his arms also full of papers that read, "Orders to all state officials that are Roman Catholics," "Down with the American public schools," and "I am Infallible. Therefore I must rule Church and State."[6]

By the mid-seventies the school question had stimulated such public interest that many Republican politicians began to talk about schools and religious issues. The New York Republican platform of 1875 denounced the use of any public funds for sectarian institutions "as a crime against liberty," and similar statements came from the Republican party in Connecticut, Ohio, Wisconsin, Missouri, and California.[7] In Indiana the Republican state platform asserted that it was "incompatible with American citizenship to pay allegiance to any foreign power, civil or ecclesiastical."[8] In most places the Republicans charged that the large number of Catholics in the Democratic party and its occasional support of state aid for their schools and religious equality in the public schools proved that a Democratic-clerical alliance had been formed to bring about a union of Church and State. President Grant, speaking at Des Moines, Iowa, in the fall of 1875 by implication condemned the Catholic Church and praised the public schools, and in his annual message to Congress, a few months later, recommended the adoption of a constitutional amendment that would have obligated the states to maintain a free public educational system, and that would have prohibited religious training in the schools and public aid to sectarian schools.[9] In the same month James G. Blaine, one of the most prominent Republican leaders in the country, introduced in Congress an amendment to the federal Constitution that would have prohibited any

---

[6] *Harper's Weekly*, XVI (October 19, 1872), 788.

[7] Alvin P. Stauffer, "Anti-Catholicism in American Politics, 1865–1900," Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University (1933), 65,

[8] *Catholic Record*, X (April, 1876), 325.

[9] *New York Tribune*, October 1, 1875; James D. Richardson, *A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789–1897*, Washington, 1899, VII, 334, 356.

state from appropriating public funds for sectarian schools.[10] The *New York Tribune* felt that Blaine was attempting to make whatever capital there was out of this issue, for as it observed, "Every politician knows that there is no subject on which the average well-to-do citizen in the country districts is so sensitive as upon the possibility of Roman Catholic aggression, particularly with reference to the schools."[11]

In their national platform of 1876 the Republicans came out for a constitutional amendment forbidding the use of public funds for sectarian schools, and the Democrats, alarmed by the charge that they had joined an alliance with "the emissaries of the Pope" restated their loyalty to the public schools and their opposition to a division of the public school fund with denominational institutions.[12] The Republicans attempted to exploit the alleged Democratic—Catholic alliance by issuing several pamphlets which charged the Catholic Church in America with forcing her communicants to vote Democratic in order to make way for a change in our form of government. The pamphlets warned that the United States would be in danger "if the Ultramontane element of the Church, through the success of the Democracy, should obtain control of our national affairs."[13] Several Republican papers and journals like the *Washington Chronicle* and *Harper's Weekly* published alleged exposures of clerical threats to excommunicate Catholics who voted for Rutherford B. Hayes, the Republican nominee.[14]

Harper's Weekly continued its assault upon Catholics when it asserted that of all religious groups only the Catholics proclaimed their

> hostility to American institutions and laws . . . All the Roman Catholic press unites in the assault upon American education . . . The Roman Catholic priesthood holds in abject discipline the whole body of our Democratic voters . . . There is no room for dissent in this remarkable political organization. From the pulpit, the confessional, the church door, the lecture room, Roman Catholics are directed to obey the suggestions of their oracle at the Vatican . . . The Vatican directs the policy of the ruling section of the Democratic party.[15]

Harper's Weekly felt that in the centennial year of our nation "we

---

[10] *Congressional Record*, 44 Cong., I Sess., p. 205.
[11] *New York Tribune*, December 1, 1875.
[12] Kirk Porter, *National Party Platforms*, New York, 1924, 89, 96.
[13] Stauffer, "Anti-Catholicism in American Politics," 76–77.
[14] Washington, *Chronicle*, October 15, 28, 1876; *Harper's Weekly*, XX (October 21, 1876), 854.
[15] *Harper's Weekly*, XX (July 29, 1876), 615.

are threatened with the complete reversal of the principles of Jefferson and Adams," and it asked, "Will not the people rise, from Maine to Texas, to defeat by an utter overthrow the plans of our foreign foe?"[16]

The support that Hayes received from the surviving Know-Nothing societies along with the anti Catholic sentiments of some of the Republican campaign literature naturally alienated Catholics, and a number of their journals spoke out against Hayes. The *Boston Pilot* on August 15, 1876, stated that Hayes was "supported by every anti-foreign, Know-Nothing clique that disgraces the country," and on September 2 declared that the Republican party would make the foreigner "a political helot without voice or vote." Earlier John Gilmary Shea in the *American Catholic Quarterly Review* had written that up until the time of Grant, the religion of a President was of no importance. But with Grant it had become different. Shea wrote:

> That he is a Methodist is kept constantly before the public mind. He is actually priest-ridden. The bishops and ministers of his creed exercise an influence that the Presbyterians never dreamed of coveting, while Jackson or Polk were in power; or Episcopalians under Washington, Madison or Monroe.[17]

Because Catholics were unhappy about Hayes, the Democrats made an effort to win their votes for Tilden by publishing a number of documents aimed at proving that Hayes was anti-Catholic. But Hayes seemed to be bothered more by the charge of nativism than by that of religious bigotry. He told a close personal friend in a private letter that "the Know-Nothing charges are more than met (not by denial or explanation) but by charging the Democrats with their Catholic alliance," and in a letter to the Secretary of the Republican National Committee, Hayes said that he did "not favor the exclusion of foreigners from the ballot or from office," but that he did "oppose Catholic interference and all sectarian interference with political affairs, and especially with the schools."[18] When the returns of the 1876 election were in and James A. Garfield thought that the Democrats had won he wrote privately that the Republicans had been defeated by "the combined power of rebellion, Catholicism, and whiskey."[19]

---

16 *Ibid.*

17 Volume I (January, 1876), 168.

18 Charles R. Williams, ed., *Diary and Letters of Rutherford Burchard Hayes*, Columbus, Ohio, 1929, III, 358, 366.

19 Allan Nevins, *Grover Cleveland, A Study in Courage*, New York, 1934, 182.

Catholicism was hardly discussed in the 1880 campaign, although the *New York Herald* proclaimed this was a Protestant country and we were a Protestant people, and the *San Francisco Argonaut* maintained that "Where the Protestant Church and the non-sectarian schoolhouse cast their shadows, wherever temperance, intelligence, and patriotism exist, there the Republican party has triumphed."[20] Garfield's margin of victory was less than 10,000 votes, and interestingly enough, John Gilmary Shea felt that the narrow Democratic defeat had been "brought about by the introduction of the Catholic question into politics, not by Catholics who did nothing, said nothing, asked nothing, but by schemers who used an old bugbear, and found fools enough to think them honest men."[21] But the Catholic issue played no role at all, let alone the decisive one, in the outcome of the 1880 election, and Shea was probably misled by the undue importance he attached to some of the anti-Catholic sentiments that appeared occasionally in the press.

While Catholicism was a side issue in the national campaign of 1880, this did not appear to be the case in New York City. Here William R. Grace, an Irish-American and anti-Tammany Democrat, became the first Catholic to be named by either party for the office of Mayor. The Republicans emphasized his religion as a major obstacle to his election. Elihu Root stated that Grace's nomination meant that it was proposed to deliver control of the city government "to one sect to the exclusion of all others."[22] A Protestant minister declared that Leo XIII contemplated the destruction of all Protestant institutions in the city if the Democrats won,[23] and the *New York Times* predicted that the election of a Catholic Mayor would mean that the public schools would be "Romanized" by the introduction of Catholic teachers and textbooks.[24] The religious issue probably cost Grace the vote of thousands of Protestant Democrats, for while he won, his plurality of 3,000 votes fell far below Hancock's 40,000 in the presidential election.

An incident occurred in 1884 which seemed to demonstrate how difficult it would have been to nominate a candidate for

---

[20] John Gilmary Shea, "The Anti-Catholic Issue in the Late Election," *American Catholic Quarterly Review*, VI (January, 1881), 40.
[21] *Ibid.*, 37–38.
[22] *New York Times*, October 30, 1880.
[23] *Ibid.*
[24] *Ibid.*, October 31, 1880.

President who had Catholic relatives, let alone a Catholic himself. A few of the Republican reformers like George Frisbie Hoar and George William Curtis opposed the nomination of either Blaine or President Arthur and decided to back General William T. Sherman who, next to Grant, was the most popular war hero in the North. But opposition to Sherman arose from the New York and Massachusetts delegations, because his wife was a Catholic, and Hoar's own group told him, "Our people do not want a Father Confessor in the White House."[25] But we must not read too much into this, for this does not prove the point that Sherman lost because of his Catholic connections. He was never a serious contender in 1884, and any candidate endorsed by the reform element would have found little support at the Republican national convention that year.

Catholicism also plagued Grover Cleveland in his bid for the nomination on the Democratic ticket although for reasons quite opposite from those that seemed to handicap Sherman. Before convention time Tammany opponents of Cleveland spread the word that he was a Know-Nothing, a "Presbyterian bigot," and "bitterly hostile to anything relating to Catholicity."[26] Tammany played up the fact that Cleveland, as governor of New York, had vetoed a bill appropriating state money for the Catholic Protectory in New York City. When Cleveland's managers arrived at Chicago they found many worried supporters, "for all Chicago was talking about Cleveland's anti-Catholicism."[27] But officials of the Catholic Protectory repudiated the charge of bigotry made against Cleveland, and several of his prominent Catholic appointees hastened to the Democratic convention to counter the rumors that he was anti-Catholic.[28]

When Tammany continued to circulate the anti-Catholic charges against Cleveland during the campaign, some Catholics spoke out against these tactics. A group of them met in New York to protest against the attempt of Patrick J. Hickey, editor of the *Catholic Review,* to make it appear that their organization, the Catholic Union, opposed Cleveland and favored Blaine.[29] Father Edward McGlynn also came out publicly to the rescue of Cleveland.

---

[25] George F. Hoar, *Autobiography of Seventy Years,* New York, 1903, I, 407–408.

[26] Denis Tilden Lynch, *Grover Cleveland, A Man Four-Square,* New York, 1932, 180.

[27] *Ibid.,* 171.

[28] *Ibid.,* p. 172; H. C. Thomas, *The Return of the Democratic Party to Power,* New York, 1919, 179.

[29] Lynch, *Cleveland,* 262.

I am disgusted at the talk about alleged Irish defection and the Catholic vote for Blaine, and at the cost of several journals of supposed Irish and Catholic leanings, which had procured them the distinction (not without the profits) of being scattered broadcast as Blaine literature. The attempt to excite Catholic prejudice against Grover Cleveland is due almost entirely to conscienceless politicians . . . conscienceless scamps.[30]

Cleveland seemed to be undisturbed about the religious allegations made about him and even felt that they would prove to be advantageous to him. "The Catholic question is being treated," he wrote in a letter, "and so well treated in so many different ways that I should not be at all surprised if what has been done by the enemy should turn to our advantage."[31]

Blaine was also caught up in the Catholic issue. Born of a Presbyterian father and a Catholic mother and raised as a Catholic, he had become a Presbyterian in his adult life. Thus Catholicism affected Blaine's candidacy in several different ways. In spite of his switch in faiths he was charged by some with being in reality a Catholic because he had sent one of his daughters to Paris to be educated in a "Romish" convent, and because another of his daughters had been married by a "Romish priest" to a former officer of the Papal Guards.[32] To counter these allegations some of Blaine's friends made public a letter he had written in 1876 in which he asserted that the charge of Catholicism was a plot of his enemies, that his ancestors on his father's side were Presbyterians, that he abhorred religious tests in a republic where freedom of conscience was the birthright of every citizen, that he would not speak disrespectfully of his mother's faith, and that he would not be drawn into any avowal of hostility or unfriendliness to Catholics, though he had never received, nor did he expect, any political support from them.[33] The American Protestant Association issued a circular which stated that Blaine "was not a Papist," but "a straightout New England, orthodox Congregationalist."[34] Protestants pointed out that whatever Catholicism Blaine had had as a youth surely would not injure him in his later life, and one of them declared, "If, as a little child, he took his mother's hand and walked with her to church, why there is a good Protestant day of

30 *Ibid.*, 269.
31 Nevins, *Cleveland,* 170.
32 *The Republic,* June 4, 1884.
33 Gustavus Myers, *History of Bigotry in the United States,* New York, 1943, 220–221.
34 Lynch, *Cleveland,* 230.

judgement coming which will, no doubt purify, as by fire, the touch of that mother's hand."[35] In contrast with these appeals the Democrats attempted to win the votes of Catholics by accusing Blaine of being a former Know-Nothing and "a renegade to his mother's faith," and by recalling his sponsorship of the constitutional amendment to prohibit state aid.[36]

Much has been made about the Burchard episode playing a prominent part in Blaine's defeat in 1884. According to many contemporaries and historians, Blaine's failure to repudiate Burchard's slur of "Rum, Romanism, and Rebellion" made against the Democratic party alienated so many Irish-Catholic voters in New York City that the Republicans lost New York, a key state, by less than 1,200 votes. If this were the case, then Catholicism might be regarded as playing a determining role in the outcome of this election. But the importance of this incident in causing Blaine's defeat has been exaggerated. A number of factors explain Blaine's loss in New York, which both sides regarded as a doubtful state to begin with, and in a victory parade the Democrats carried a banner that summed up some of these.[37]

The World Says the	Independents	Did It
The Tribune Says the	Stalwarts	Did It
The Sun Says	Burchard	Did It
Blaine Says	St. John	Did It

Theodore Roosevelt Says it was the Soft Soap Dinner
We say Blaine's character Did It
But We Don't Care What Did It
It's Done.

But the temptation to regard Burchard's statement as swinging the Irish-Catholics in New York City away from Blaine in sufficient numbers to cause his defeat has persisted.

In the late eighties and early nineties there was another revival of the doctrines of Know-Nothingism, and such groups as the United Order of Deputies and the Patriotic Order Sons of America sprang up whose membership took an oath "not to help in electing or appointing a Catholic or a Catholic sympathizer to office,"[38] and periodicals like the *Loyal American* appeared which had edi-

---

[35] E. P. Oberholtzer, *A History of the United States Since the Civil War*, IV (1931), 205.

[36] Stauffer, "Anti-Catholicism in American Politics," 119–120.

[37] Henry L. Stoddard, *As I Knew Them, Presidents and Politics from Grant to Coolidge*, New York, 1927, 138.

[38] George Potier, *The American League*, Chicago, 1890, 20.

torials that declared, "The modern 'holy alliance:' Rum, Rome, the saloon and the priest. All they ask for is a fair divey between them of the boodle of American citizens."[39] The most important of these groups was the American Protective Association which was formed in Iowa in 1887 and which soon spread into other parts of the country. The story of the A.P.A. is a very familiar one, and need not detain us here except to recall a few pertinent facts. There is no doubt about this organization being extremely anti-Catholic and its seeking to exploit Protestant fears about Catholicism. Every A.P.A. member had to take an oath in which he denounced Catholicism and in which he swore that he would not "knowingly vote for, recommend for nor appoint, nor assist in electing or appointing a Roman Catholic nor any one sympathizing with Roman Catholicism to any political position whatever."[40]

The A.P.A. put out inflammatory pamphlets. It published fabricated pastoral letters from the American hierarchy to American Catholics calling upon them to form a "Papal Party," to "plot and labor for the absolute supremacy" of the Pope, to serve "the interests of Catholicism" in "their political work," and to fill all the political offices "with men selected by the bishop of the diocese." It printed and widely circulated forged papal encyclicals such as the one from Leo XIII which represented the Pope as declaring that since the Catholic Columbus had discovered America, this continent belonged to the Pope, and the time had come to take forcible possession. It spread stories that Catholics had stored arms and ammunition in cathedrals, convents, churches, and parochial schools for use against Protestants.[41] That these fabrications had their effect, especially in the rural areas, is illustrated by a letter from a physician in a small town in Ohio.

> We have been, and still are, having an excitement in our usually quiet town, in regard to the Catholic question. There is not a Catholic in the entire township; but a large number of our people are intensely stirred up, some almost prostrated with fear, afraid that the Catholics are about making a wholesale attack upon Protestants, killing and plundering, and destroying our schools and churches. Of course it obtains the strongest foothold among the ignorant and unthinking, yet it seems to cause great uneasiness and fear among many of the more intelligent.[42]

---

[39] Stauffer, "Anti-Catholicism in American Politics," 170.
[40] *Ibid.*, 176.
[41] *Ibid.*, 225–226, 300–301; Oberholtzer, *History of the United States*, V, 428.
[42] Washington Gladden, "The Anti-Catholic Crusade, *The Century*, XLVII (March, 1894), 792–793.

Now all this would seem to indicate that the A.P.A. had stirred up a national excitement about the participation of Catholics in American public life, but we must be careful not to exaggerate the importance of this organization and its propaganda in national politics. Cecil Spring Rice described it as a group which sought "to prevent Catholics, especially Irishmen, from being Republican office holders,"[43] and it is true that in just about every case it worked with the Republican party. But where the A.P.A. influenced elections most was in local areas and especially in the Mid-West. In a number of communities in Nebraska, Iowa, Illinois, Michigan, and Ohio, the A.P.A. won control of the Republican party and carried many local elections, and in these areas politicians appeared to be reluctant to nominate Catholics for office for fear the religious issue would defeat them. In 1894 when the A.P.A. claimed a membership of two million and boasted that it was "travelling at the rate of a cyclone," it was asserted that it ruled a number of leading cities including New York, Brooklyn, Boston, Chicago, New Orleans, San Francisco, Pittsburgh, St. Louis and Kansas City.[44] However, such claims by the A.P.A. along with the one in 1896 of controlling four million votes in the United States have to be accepted as more propaganda than fact. Politicians and parties did not succumb so easily, as it has been assumed, to A.P.A. demands, even on the local and state level where the organization wielded its greatest power. For example, Henry Cabot Lodge, a young rising Republican politician then, never had anything to do with the A.P.A. and resisted its demands. Writing to Theodore Roosevelt in 1894 about the Massachusetts Republican platform of that year, Lodge said, "It meets the A.P.A. squarely, denouncing any attempt to discriminate on account of religion, which was bold and wise." Himself a rising and ambitious politician, Roosevelt told Lodge, "I think that no good can be done with such a movement as the A.P.A.," and he further predicted that "The A.P.As. won't cut any figure at all."[45]

What excitement the A.P.A. might have been able to stir up if a Catholic had been running for President we shall never know, and to speculate about it with personal opinions is not the task of the historian. Catholicism received practically no attention in

---

[43] John A. Garraty, *Henry Cabot Lodge*, New York, 1953, 141.
[44] Oberholtzer, *History o the United States*, V, 427–428.
[45] Garraty, *Lodge*, 141–142; Elting E. Morison, ed., *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, Cambridge, Mass., 1951, I, 400–401.

the 1888 campaign, but in that of 1892, the A.P.A. tried to arouse voters about the Catholic issue in several different ways. The A.P.A. pointed to the maladministration of New York City under Tammany Hall as an example of the evil effects of the alleged alliance between a corrupt political machine and "Romish emissaries." It accused Cleveland of installing a direct telephone connection from the White House to the residence of Cardinal Gibbons to secure the latter's approval of everything the President did. Cleveland was also charged with putting a Catholic at the head of every division of the federal employees and with having issued orders that every government clerk contribute to the Sisters of Charity. Blaine was accused of currying favors with the Catholics by sending his children to Catholic schools and by holding conferences with the hierarchy, and the selection of Catholics to head both national committees was attacked as a bid for papal control.[46] But while these matters were played up they were really side issues and diversions, and they had no effect upon the outcome one way or the other.

Catholics even received the blame for bringing on the Panic of 1893. The charge was made that servant girls and workers in the Mid-West, prodded by the Catholic clergy had started runs on the banks and that everywhere Catholic merchants had refused to purchase and Catholic manufacturers had closed their plants as part of a Catholic plot to disrupt our economic life so as to seize control of the country.[47] At their national convention in 1896 the Republicans, not wanting to offend the A.P.A. by using a Catholic and not wishing to affront Catholics by employing a Protestant, asked a Jewish Rabbi to open the proceedings with a prayer.[48] But by this time whatever political influence the A.P.A. had had on a national level had begun to disappear. The Republicans, who had adopted a plank declaring against appropriations for sectarian institutions in every one of their platforms since 1876, refused to take a similar stand in 1896. This was humiliating enough for the A.P.A., but what was even more humiliating, and which dramatically underscored its weakness in national politics, was the fact that the Committee on Resolutions had at first accepted the plank, then reconsidered and defeated it when Archbishop John Ireland sent a telegram to the national chairman asking the Repub-

46 Stauffer, "Anti-Catholicism in American Politics," 309–310.
47 *Ibid.*, 326.
48 Oberholtzer, *History of the United States*, V, 429.

lican party not to "lower itself to recognize, directly or indirectly, the A.P.A."[49] While some efforts were made during the campaign to list both McKinley and Hanna as Catholics, the economic issues in 1896 crowded everything else out.

Thus Catholicism had no real significance in any one of the presidential elections of the post-Civil War generation. As an issue, and even as a propaganda device, it was always overshadowed by other matters. Whether Catholicism would have become an important factor if a Catholic had run for President we shall never know, for neither one of the major parties seriously considered a Catholic as a candidate for the presidency. From this it might appear that they were unwilling to take the risk of running a Catholic for President, and that this reluctance excluded presidential possibilities who, had they not been Catholics, might have otherwise been considered or named. But such a conclusion rests more upon emotionalism than it does upon historical evidence. No doubt there would have been sturdy obstacles in the way of running a Catholic for the presidency, but how much of a risk or liability such a nomination would have been to a party in these years will never be known. There is no evidence to warrant the conclusion that the major parties held back from naming a Catholic because of the risk element involved. More to the point is the fact that there were no Catholics prominent, popular, or attractive enough for the parties to consider. We do know, though, that Catholicism did provoke bitter political fights in local and state contests in these years, but even in these situations, the religious factor did not prevent Catholics from being elected to office.

VINCENT P. DE SANTIS

University of Notre Dame

[49] Humphrey J. Desmond, *The A.P.A. Movement*, Washington, 1912, 88–89.

The Philippines and the Royal Philippine Company

The Royal Philippine Company, created in 1785 by decree of Charles III of Spain, passed through various stages of fortune, and dissolved in 1834 amid the internal difficulties that racked Spain and the international imbroglios in Europe. Spain's Asian venture in imperialism is significant in relation to the status of international trade at the time of the Company's inception. The existence of the Royal Philippine Company could not but be regarded by Holland and England as a frontal attack upon their interests in the Orient because the success of the Company would not simply have eliminated the Spanish peninsula as a market for Asian goods carried by these two great mercantile powers, but would have seriously afflicted their illegal trade in such materials with the ports of Central and South America. Indeed, the success of the Spanish endeavor would have been a major step toward sealing off the Spanish empire from the commercial nations of Europe, an objective long sought by the Spanish kings. Within the framework of the Spanish empire, the Royal Philippine Company could have served as a unifying factor, a factor sorely needed in view of the dismemberment of the empire that occurred in the nineteenth century.

The historical importance of the Royal Philippine Company is inseparable from the royal intention in its formation. In the Company's founding cedula, Charles III specifically states that the Company's "principal purpose must remain the union of American and Oriental commerce. . . ."[1] Eduardo Malo de Luque, writing in Spain at the end of the first five years of Company existence, concurs with the cedula in his statement of the Company's major objective.[2] In 1810, Tomás de Comyn, a Company agent in the Philippines, reiterates the view of Malo de Luque and the clear wording of the royal cedula.[3] Comyn's statement was made in

---

1 *Real cédula de la Compañía de Filipinas de 10 de Marzo de 1785*, Articulo xxvi, in Eduardo Malo de Luque, *História política de los establecimientos ultramarinos de las naciones europeas*, V, Madrid, 1790, piezas anexas 2, 11–94.

2 *Ibid.*, V, 344.

3 Tomás de Comyn, *Estado de las Islas Filipinas en 1810*, Manila, 1820, 68–69.

defense of the Company against those who considered the development of the Philippine Islands to be the sole purpose for the existence of the Company. Curiously, existing writings on the Royal Philippine Company, while drawing heavily upon both Malo de Luque and Comyn, have adopted the view which both writers opposed. This tendency to regard the Company only in its Oriental context with emphasis on the Philippines pervades the entire published bibliography of the Company. Unfortunately, this Philippine-centric interpretation of Company history has achieved so general an acceptance that an accurate assessment of the place of the Company in Spanish history must be corroborated by a reappraisal of the role of the Philippines in Company history. A chronological survey of pertinent materials will help to explain the inaccuracy of the Philippine-centric interpretation.

The introduction of the Philippine Islands into Company literature begins in 1765, with the "Demonstración" of Francisco Leandro de Viana.[4] This document is a plea to the king of Spain for renewed efforts in the development of the Philippines. Viana's view of possible royal profit in the Philippines is optimistic, although as a royal official he well knew that to his time the Islands constituted a drain on the Spanish treasury and had never been profitable to their Spanish majesties.[5] The plea of the "Demonstración," then, was in the nature of a promise to the crown. Viana's demand for an increase in the quality, discipline, and number of Spanish troops in the Islands points up a serious obstacle in the path of any proposed plan for the improvement of the Philippines.[6] The southern Islands were under continual Moro attack and the success of either cash-crop agriculture or regular coast-wise traffic among the islands would have had to depend upon the unquestioned power of Spain throughout the archipelago. The Philippine historian José Montero y Vidal adequately underscores the failure of Spain to rectify this debility within the Company's time.[7] Moreover, the Company, as constituted under Spanish law, was in no way able to inaugurate measures in this direction as were its English and Dutch counterparts in their respective

---

4 Francisco Leandro de Viana Zavala Vehena Saenz de Villaverde, "Demonstración del misero deplorable estado de las Islas Philipinas..., Febrero, 1765"; Newberry Library, Chicago, Ayer Collection, cited hereinafter as Ayer Collection.

5 William Lytle Schurz, *The Manila Galleon*, New York, 1939, 182.

6 Viana, "Demonstración," Parte I, capitulos 1–2.

7 José Montero y Vidal, *Historia de la Piratería Malayo-Mohametana en Mindanao Joló y Borneo*, II, Madrid, 1888.

spheres. The language of the king was most explicit. The Company was defined as "solely mercantile" and was forbidden to employ any of its facilities or personnel in political activities.[8]

The writing of Nicholás Norton y Nichols preceded Viana's "Demonstración" by a few years, and contributed to the support of Viana's contentions and perhaps to the formulation of his ideas. Norton, a naturalized Spaniard of English origin, accused Spain, the world's greatest consumer of cinnamon, of supporting the Dutch establishments in Ceylon by neglecting to develop cinnamon in the Philippines.[9] Viana, with access to the royal ear, included Norton's charge in the "Demonstración" with a mention of the "benefit of cinnamon" cultivation.[10] The preoccupation of both Viana and Norton with the production of spices stems, of course, from their knowledge of the Dutch success in the Spice Islands. The area of the Philippines suited to the cultivation of cinnamon, however, was well within the striking range of the Sultan of Joló. The dream of spice traffic formed the foundation of these and subsequent demands for agricultural development of the Philippines.

In 1790, the sixth year of the Company's life, there was published in Madrid the fifth volume of Eduardo Malo de Luque's *História política.* This author is identified from various sources as the Duke of Almodóvar.[11] His volumes are generally regarded as a Spanish version of Raynal's *Histoire Philosophique.*[12] The

---

[8] *Real cédula ... de 10 de Marzo de 1785*, Articulo xxxiii. The royal injunction reads as follows: "Declaro que esta Compañía ha de ser solamente mercantil, sujeta á las leyes de la Monarquia, como qualquiera otro comerciante particular; á excepción de la gracias, privilegios y exenciones que le concedo para su fomento, sin que por ningun motivo ni pretexto puede mezclarse ni introducirse en materias políticas, alianzas ni otros negocios de esta naturaleza, á menos de tener expresa orden ó comision mia; y si alguno de sus empleados ó Subalternos contraviniese á esta prohibición, y usase de los buques y facultades de la Compañía en otras empresas que las de comercio se castigará severamente como reo de Estado."

[9] Nicholás Norton y Nicols, "Commercio de las Islas Philipinas..., Manila,[1759]," Ayer Collection.

[10] Viana, "Demonstración," Parte II, capitulo 3.

[11] Eduardo Malo de Luque is so identified by W. E. Retana, the Philippine collector and bibliographer in his *Aparato*, II, Madrid, 1906, 581; Tomás de Comyn quotes from the fifth volume of Malo de Luque and attributes the quotation to the Duke of Almodóvar, *Estado*, 71; Antonio Palau y Dulcet says of the *História política*, "Su autor es Pedro Francisco Luxán y Suárez de Góngora, Duque de Almodóvar, quien se escudó bajo el anagrama de su título nobilario," in *Manual del librero Hispano-Americano*, V, Barcelona and London, 1926, 22.

[12] Roland Dennis Hussey, *The Caracas Company, 1728–1784, a Study in the History of Spanish Monopolistic Trade*, Cambridge, 1934, 342. Professor Hussey calls it "A revision, satisfactory to the Spanish censor, of Abbé Raynal's *Histoire Philosophique.*"

introduction to the fifth volume is prefaced by the statement that publication was delayed to allow for the securing of Company documents; Malo de Luque, then, presumably concludes his fifth volume with original material on the Company. In his text, the author cites two documents, a report of the Manila directors to the Captain-General of the Philippines, dated November 18, 1788, and a report of the Manila directors to the Madrid directors, dated July 10, 1789. The same volume of the *História política* contains appended documents including the Company's founding cedula and a *Plan general.* The latter document is a concise report of the Company's commercial achievement to September 30, 1789.

The *Plan general* makes the fifth volume of the *História política* the most valuable work published to date on the Royal Philippines Company, because it completes and places in world context the narrower considerations of Malo de Luque's narrative. The sixty pages of text which the author devotes to the Company are concerned almost wholly with Company efforts in Island development, such as investments in agriculture, expenditures on installations for external and internal trade, and the blind opposition of the Manilans to the venture. Taken alone, these pages are the foundation of the Philippine-centric interpretation of Company history. The following examination of writings on the Company will show that through a process of incremental distortion, the textual portion of the *História política* has served as the nucleus for a series of commentaries and histories that accept the Company as an almost purely Philippine venture.

Within the lifetime of the Company, another writer contributed his observations to the bibliography of the Royal Philippine Company. In 1810, Tomás de Comyn, a Company factor in the Islands, published his *Estado,* an analysis of the economic state of the Philippine Islands in 1810. One chapter of the *Estado* is devoted to the Company and even this is in the nature of a post mortem. Comyn, in the employ of the Company in the Islands, was predisposed to regard Company abandonment of the Philippines as gravely significant; his account of the Company's failure in the Islands carries with it an impression of global failure. He explicitly states, however, that the development of the Philippine Islands was not the primary objective of Company commerce. He cites Malo de Luque in his contention that the primary purpose of the organization was to unite Asian, American, and European trade.[13] A more

[13] Comyn, *Estado,* 68–69, citing Malo de Luque, V, 344.

precise delineation of this primary objective is lacking in the work of either man. Presumably, the royal intent encompassed a scheme of traffic among Spanish dominions routed through Spain for the benefit of Spain, but neither Comyn nor Malo de Luque regarded Philippine development as the Company's cardinal goal. Later writers, however, were to mate the Philippine emphasis of Malo de Luque's text with Comyn's concern for the Islands and produce the Philippine-centric interpretation of Company history.

Malo de Luque details the Company's attempts to improve the Islands. Comyn qualifies Malo de Luque's sanguine exposition by reference to "[t]wenty-four years of impotent and gratuitous efforts," and so predicates failure as the sequel to great effort. Comyn continues in this pessimistic vein telling of a more than 80 per cent increase in the purchase price of Asian goods caused by the compulsory routing of traffic through Manila. He states that this "mal extendida sistema" prevailed for ten or twelve years, and detracted consistently from the Company's security. What remains as Comyn's most damaging criticism of the Company's organizational pattern was his characterization of the entire Company approach to Philippine development as mistaken. He believed that the Company had set an impossible task for itself in assuming the triple role of investor, producer, and carrier of Philippine agricultural and manufactured produce.[14] The backward economic state of the Philippines at the time of the Company's arrival unquestionably forced the Manila directorate to take this manifold action. Comyn's criticism, however, implies unrestrained zeal on the part of Company officials whereas later Philippine writers infer, simply, stupidity. The importance of both Comyn and Malo de Luque to the Philippine-centric view is not in what they wrote, but in how their writings were used in the course of the nineteenth century.

The first step in the development of the Philippine-centric interpretation was taken by Sinibaldo de Mas y Sans nine years after the Company's official demise. In 1843, Mas had published at Madrid his *Informe sobre el estado de las islas Filipinas en 1842.* A point by point comparison shows that he takes almost all his information from Malo de Luque. W. E. Retana says that Mas "in the historical section [of the *Informe*] drank the blood of the Duke of Almodóvar. . . ."[15] In copying Malo de Luque without

[14] *Ibid.*, 62–71.
[15] *Aparato,* II, 581.

citation, Mas devoted more attention to rephrasing than did those who, in their turn, were to copy him. Malo de Luque had originally attributed the difficulties between the Company and the Manila merchants to the blindness and ill-considered action of the latter, resulting in the maintenance of "... *la mas absoluta separación de intereses, y abrigando un funesto espíritu de división.*"[16] Mas, writing in the Philippines, might have been expected to seek out better causes for this resentment, but contents himself with ascribing Manilan reluctance to "... *un funesto espíritu de separación de intereses...*."[17] Malo de Luque lists the following Company expenditures in the Islands: Philippine produce, 3,127,712 *r.v.;* real estate, 5,168,247 *r.v.;* Asian produce purchased from Manilans, 8,779,876 *r.v.;* totaling to 17,024,836 *r.v.*[18] With arithmetic fastidiousness, Mas presents the same information—correcting a one *real* error in Malo de Luque's addition.[19] The importance of this particular instance of copying is that in the original, Malo de Luque is emphasizing the success of the Company in off-setting the loss to Manila of the Acapulco galleon of the previous year while Mas is presenting an account of the tremendous waste of capital by the Royal Philippines Company.

Mas draws from Tomás de Comyn after fully utilizing Malo de Luque's record of the first five years. The *Informe* tells us of an 80 to 100 per cent increase in the cost to the Company of Asian goods purchased at Manila, the establishment of agencies in China and India, and the ten or twelve years of the compulsory Manila call.[20] All of this is from Comyn's *Estado.*[21] The only significant change interpolated by Mas is where Comyn speaks of an increase in excess of 80 per cent in the cost to the Company

16 *História Política,* V, 319, 345–346.

17 *Informe,* I, Parte Segunda, 33.

18 Malo de Luque, V, 362–363, citing a report of the Manila directors to the Captain-General of the Philippines, November 18, 1788.

19 The reliability of Malo de Luque's arithmetic is certainly open to question. Another instance of his inaccuracy is his statement, *Ibid.,* V, 349, that the Company exported from the Philippines 14,350 *libras* of indigo in 1786, at which figure he may have arrived through some calculation involving the price of indigo; whereas an official Company document lists the figure at exactly half that amount. The document: *Exposición de la compañía de Filipinas, relativa á su establecimiento, y á su importancia politico-mercantil: a los medios que ha empleado para llenar los fines de su instituto; y á la justicia y necesidad de su conservación para utilidad general del Estado, dirigida por su Junta de gobierno a las Cortes generales y extraordinarias de la Nación,* Cadiz, 1813, 361; hereinafter cited as *Exposición,* 1813.

20 *Informe,* I, Parte Segunda, 48.

21 *Estado,* 65.

of Asian goods purchased at Manila, Mas categorizes the increase as an 80 to 100 per cent loss of investment. Mas continues the emphasis on Company efforts in agriculture with the adoption of Comyn's regret, but in a more modest presentation. *"El sistema de derramar dinero para transformar el estado agrícola y fabril de las islas fué seguido por 20 años. . . ."*[22] Mas concludes with the comment that Island development "diminished frightfully" the capital of the Company. He attributes the failure of Oriental commerce to the "political convulsions of the epoch."[23] This estimate of the effect of the war on Company commerce can probably be justified. In short, Mas' Company history is taken from Malo de Luque and Comyn; the first five years are a repetition of the *História política* and later years are covered with information from the *Estado*. With minor exceptions and what appears to be a single error in copying, Mas' dependence upon these two works is complete.[24] His contribution to the Philippine-centric interpretation of Company history is the result of his distortion of the sources which he employed.

In December, 1842, J. Mallat, a French author, returned to Paris from his world travels to write his two volume work on the Philippines.[25] His arrival was well timed with the January, 1843, publication of Mas' *Informe* in Madrid. Where Mas takes from Malo de Luque with attention to rephrasing, Mallat takes from Mas and shields the theft by escape into another language. Mallat's dependence upon Mas can best be described by comparative statements from their works.

On the foundation of the Company:

En 1784 la compañía de Caracas, que por la cesación de su privilegio esclusivo buscaba objeto ocupar sus cuantiosos fondos. . . .[26]	En 1784, la compagnie des Caraques vit expirer son privilége; éprouvant quelque embarras à trouver un emploi avantageux pour ses grands capitaux. . . .[27]

[22] *Informe*, I, Parte Segunda, 48; Comyn tells of "twenty-four years of impotent and gratuitous effort," *Estado*, 62–71.

[23] *Informe*, I, Parte Segunda, 49.

[24] Mas dates the *Real cédula . . . de 10 de Marzo de 1785*, 1784, *Informe*, Parte Segunda, 31, while Malo de Luque, *Historia política*, V, 342, gives the correct date.

[25] *Les Philippines, Histoire, Geographie, Moeurs, Agriculture, Industrie et Commerce, des Colonies Espagnoles dans L'oceanie*, 2 vols., Paris, 1846.

[26] Mas, *Informe*, Parte Segunda, 31.

[27] Mallat, *Les Philippines*, II, 292.

On the royal requirement of Philippine development:

Un 4 por 100 de los beneficios debia emplearse en el fomento de la agricultura é industria del pais: la compañía tenia que comprar todos los efectos de China é India en Manila, ya fuese de sus vecinos ya de especuladores de aquellos paises por medios de contratas á entregar en Manila. . . .[28]

Quatre pour 100 de bénéfice devaient être employés a l'encouragement de l'agriculture et de l'industrie du pays. La compagnie était obligée d'acheter a Manille toutes les merchandises de la Chine ou de l'Inde, soit des habitants, soit des speculateurs venus ces pays. . . .[29]

The foregoing information concerning the purchase of Oriental goods at Manila was taken by Mas from Comyn.[30] The story of the foundation of the Company and the expiration of the privileges of the Caracas Company was drawn from Malo de Luque.[31] Mallat, of course, simply translated Mas. In the following quotations, the data on the comparative price of Sumatran pepper and the estimate of total Philippine pepper production are of unknown origin.[32] The data on the price offered by the Company for Philippine pepper and the optimistic estimate of annual pepper production by the Manila directors are taken from Malo de Luque.[33]

On the Company attempts in agriculture:

Concibió la erronea idea de crear en las islas los articulos de que necesitaba vastos acopios para sus operaciones, la seda, el anil, la canela, el algodon, la pimienta; estableció factorias subalternas, compró tierras, repartió semillas, aperos de labranza y premios, hizo adelantos de dinero y consiguió el que algunos pueblos contratasen entregar á una convenida época cierta cantidad de dichos productos á precios muy subidos: la pimienta se estipuló al de 13 de medio pesos fuertes el pico de

[M]alheureusement, elle concut la fausse idée de cultiver, dans l'archipel même, des productions dont il lui fallait, pour ses opérations, de grands approvisionnements, telles que la soie, l'indigo, la canelle, le coton, le poivre; elle établit des comptoirs, elle acheta des terres, elle distribua des graines, des instruments et donna des primes; elle fit des avances de fonds et engagea certains pueblos à des époques convenues, certaines quantités des ces produits à des prix très-éleves; ainsi, par exemple,

28 Mas, *Informe*, Parte Segunda, 31.
29 Mallat, *Les Philippines*, II, 292.
30 Comyn, *Estado*, 65.
31 Malo de Luque, *História política*, V, 341–342.
32 This figure of unknown origin, 64,000 *libras*, is far short of the Company tally of pepper production to 1802. The official figure is 272,446 *libras*, 13 *onzas*, *Exposición*, 1813, 48–54.
33 *História política*, V, 368, citing a report of the Manila directors to the Madrid directors, July 10, 1789.

137 libras, mientras que en Sumatra se puede comprar á 3 ó 4. El factor de Manila se hallaba en 1789 tan alucinado acerca de este punto que en un informe a la superior dirección de Madrid, calculaba que de alli á tres años esportaria la compañía 9600 picos y en los sucesivos se podria abastecer á la España, America y buena parte de Europa. Sin embargo, nunca se llegaron á recoger mas de 64,000 libras a costa de grandes pérdidas.[34]

elle offrit de payer le poivre 13½ piastres le picol de 137 livres, tandis qu'a Sumatra en pouvait l'acheter pour 3 ou 4 piastres. L'illusion fut poussée si loin à cet egard, qu'en 1789 l'agent de la compagnie à Manille écrivit à la direction générale, à Madrid, qu'il espérait, au bout de trois ans, pouvoir expédier, 9600 picols, et que, plus tard, el fournait seul aux besoins de l'Espagne et d'une grand partie de l'Europe. Le fait est qu'il ne put jamais se procurer plus de 64,000 livres par an, sur lesquelles encore la compagnie éprouva des pertes considérables.[35]

Manuel Azcarraga y Palermo wrote *La libertad de comercio en las islas Filipinas* which was published in Madrid in 1871. Azcarraga employed Malo de Luque, Comyn, and Mas in his thirty-four page presentation of Company history. Only Mas is cited. Azcarraga's reliance upon Malo de Luque may be partially illustrated by comparative statements of the two authors on the foundation of the original Philippines Company in 1733.

... por cédula de 29 de Marzo de 1733: por ella se le concedian varios privilegios, no del agrado de nuestros comerciantes de Manila, los cuales protestaron y reclamaron por medios de diputados en la Córte contra la creación de aquella sociedad; y por desgracia para las islas, no llegó esta á consolidarse ni á despachar espedición alguna.[36]

... Real Cédula de 29 de Marzo de 1733, en que se le erigió concediendola varios privilegios que enormemente perjudicaban las ideas del comercio de Manila. Protestaron sus Diputados contra la espresada erección y sus condiciones. Estas y otras inoportunas curcunstancias de aquel tiempo, embarazon que llegase á consolidarse la citada compañía, ni á emprehender expedición alguna.[37]

Azcarraga follows the crop by crop coverage of agricultural endeavor exactly as in Malo de Luque. *La liberatad* adheres so closely to Malo de Luque that 27 of the 34 pages which Azcarraga devotes to the Company deal with the first 5 years of Company

---

34 Mas, *Informe*, I, Parte Segunda, 33–34.
35 Mallat, *Les Philippines*, II, 293–294.
36 Azcarraga, *La libertad*, 114–115.
37 Malo de Luque, *História política*, V, 233–234.

history. The remaining 44 years are covered in 7 pages. Azcarraga like Mas is dependent upon Comyn for the period after 1790. He tells of European goods smuggled into Manila by foreign European carriers after the Spanish king opened that port in 1789 to European ships bringing Asian produce.[38] Possibly Azarraga draws this information from Mas, but it is clearly traceable to Comyn.[39] Also traceable to Comyn through Mas is Azcarraga's account of the establishment of agencies in China and India.[40] *La libertad* speaks of the continuance of the Manila call after 1803,[41] and indeed, an official Company document also makes this claim.[42] Nevertheless, the continuance of the Manila call should not be interpreted as a spirited Company effort to continue Philippine development. This call would not be for the purpose of procuring Philippine produce, nor would the transmission of merchandise by way of Manila fatten the Manila customs since duties would only have been imposed on goods sold in the Philippines.[43] Goods sold in the Philippines, by admission of Company officials, constituted only a negligible trade.[44] Azcarraga takes up the *Nueva real cédula* of 1803, and describes some of its provisions, but because his presentation is at variance with the data in the document, it is doubtful that the cedula itself was available to him.[45] He continues:

> Los cálculos equivocados de los directores sobre los precios en que habrian de poder realizar los productos del país, que á tanto costo habian contratado, les ocasionaron grandes pérdidas principalamente en la pimienta.[46]

This is an obvious reference to the comparison between Sumatram and Philippine prices provided by Mas and copied by Mallat. By Azcarraga's time, the failure of the essay of the Manila directors

---

38 Azcarraga, *La libertad*, 142–143.
39 Comyn, *Estado*, 70.
40 See above p. 85.
41 Azcarraga, *La libertad*, 142.
42 *Exposición*, 1813, 102.
43 *Nueva recl cédula de la compañía de Filipinas de 12 de Julio de 1803*, Titulo IV, Articulo lix.
44 Se. un tratado de Comercio y navegacion entre Las Compas. Inglesas y Español, ca. 1796, Ayer Collection, 9.
45 *La libertad* dates the cedula 1805 while the actual date was 1803. Further, Azcarraga says that the war time permission to ship goods from Manila to Peru was extended by the king in the amount of 300,000 pesos annually, *La libertad* 142–143. This information could not have been drawn from Comyn who correctly states the value of war time shipment at 500,000 pesos annually, *Estado*, 69. It is possible, however, that permission was extended before 1803, in a lesser amount than reaffirmed and raised in the *Nueva real cédula ... de 1803*.
46 Azcarraga, *La libertad*, 145.

in pepper production had attained legendary stature. In immediate sequence, he takes up the native attitude toward the Company's methods:

> los labradores parece tambien que se aprovecharon de los errores y larguezas de la Compañía y hubo el caso de una indígena que quedó mudo ó fingió estarlo, para no dar cuenta de un capital de ochenta mil duros, que por sus manos pasó para las de los cosecheros; nuestra misma legislación, que declaraba nula toda obligación consistente en anticipos hechos á los indígenas que escediera de cinco pesos, era un gran obstaculo que imposibilitando á la Sociedad de enjuiciar á sus acreedores, le daba las mas veces un resulatado contrario al que se proponia en aquellos anticipos, y todos estos quebrantos no le permitierón repartir mas que cuatro dividendos activos en veinticinco años.[47]

In the foregoing, the preoccupation of the Philippine-centric interpreters with the supposed importance of Philippine agriculture and internal development to the Company's general welfare is carried almost to the ultimate. The central thesis of the Philippine-centric view is that Company global success was somehow dependent upon the Company's rather limited effort within the Philippine Islands. With Azcarraga, the formation of this misinterpretation is proceeding apace—developed almost wholly from Malo de Luque's brief account of the early years and Comyn's truthful, if not objective, lament of Company failure *within the Islands.* Malo de Luque emphasizes Company efforts in Philippine agriculture as a Company contribution to Island welfare; Comyn bitterly regrets the Company's failure to make the Philippine venture pay; Mas attributes great loss of capital to the Company's pursuit of Philippine agriculture; Mallat copies; Azcarraga ascribes a diminution of dividends to Philippine agriculture. The fallacy of this line of development can be at least partially discerned in an examination of the founding cedula. Article L of that document requires the Company to invest 4 per cent of its profits in Philippine development; this investment was to depend upon estimated or realized profit, not vice versa as assumed by Azcarraga.[48] It is only a small step from Azcarraga's contention to the conclusion that the entire Company capital was swallowed up in the Philippines.

In 1878, seven years after the publication of Azcarraga's *La libertad,* José Felipe del Pan had published in Manila his *Las Islas*

---

[47] *Ibid.*

[48] See footnote 67.

Filipinas. Progresos en 70 años. Pan, the editor of *La revista de Filipinas* and a man intensely interested in Philippine development, republished Comyn's *Estado* as the first part of this work. The second part, by Pan, follows the categories imposed by Comyn and re-presents them in terms of the changes of seventy years. Pan is hostile to the theories of commerce held by Comyn and at times seems over-anxious to derrogate Comyn's position as spokesman for the economic condition of the Islands. His treatment of the Company is harsh and his criticisms pointed, although he accepts previous interpretations uncritically. Yet, among the writers examined herein, Pan is the first to relate what appears to be first hand knowledge of Philippine agriculture to the problem of Company failure in that field.

Pan begins his commentary on the Royal Philippines Company by taking his final step in the development of the Philippine-centric theory. He boldly assumes that the Company's sole objective was the promotion of the Philippine economy, and naively but truculently states that the entire capitalization of the Company was wastefully and uselessly plowed into the Islands.[49] Pan follows with a brief analysis of the reasons for this supposed waste of capital. He emphasizes bad management in agriculture and, as a case in point, ridicules Company officials who invested money in an attempt to raise pepper in the Islands; Pan points out that the climate of the Philippines is not suited to pepper cultivation.[50] This fact seems to have escaped other commentators.

Pan's arguments are of conclusive importance to the development of the Philippine-centric approach to Company history. With the publication of Pan's *Progresos,* this misinterpretation has achieved an impressive list of backers—each contributing his portion and each making easier the path of future adherents. Such a list

---

[49] Pan, pp. 252–253. The exact statement is as follows: "Concediendo, en primer lugar, que los juicios *á posteriori* son fáciles, porque en apoyo de los argumentos aparece la suprema razón del éxito conocido; aun con esta salvedad, no podemos dispensarnos de presentar con todo desembarazo algunas reflexiones acerca de la marcha de los negocios de *La Compañía de Filipinas* que disponía de un capital de doce milliones de pesos. Atendidas diferencias entre precios de jornales de entonces y ahora, asi como de todas las cosas mas necesarias á la vida, aquel enorme capital equivalía á treinta milliones de pesos hoy. ¡Que palanca tan poderosa de adelantos materiales! Asombra lo que, actualmente, con treinta milliones de pesos, y á fines del pasado siglo con doce, se podría hacer bajo un plan meditado y dirección enérgica é inteligente, para la transformación económica de este país.

Pues bien: de *La Compañía de Filipinas,* que aqui gastó en para pérdida tan crecidos capitales, apenas queda huella por parte alguna."

was almost bound to impress an historian attempting to present a brief summary of the Royal Philippines Company in a broad survey of Philippine history. Such a writer was José Montero y Vidal.

In 1895, Montero published his *Historia general.*[51] This brief account concentrates on Company organization, taken mostly from the founding cedula.[52] This treatment is largely a paraphrasing of Azcarraga. On the period after 1790, Montero is less informative, and, in keeping with his predecessors, leaned heavily upon Tomás de Comyn. Azcarraga was not slighted: whole sentences were lifted, without direct citation, from *La libertad,* including that most respectful gesture of the plagiarist, the carefully copied mistake.[53] Montero's conclusions are a re-presentation of Pan with the scorn extracted.[54] In short, Montero drew together all contributors to the Philippine-centric interpretation. His footnotes are the roster of those treated in the foregoing; Malo de Luque, Comyn, Mallat, and Pan. Curiously, Azcarraga and Mas are not mentioned.

The latest published work of the Royal Philippines is that of Professor William Lytle Schurz.[55] Schurz begins his article with a documented narration of the first Spanish attempts at direct trade with Manila. Four pages are devoted to these preliminary attempts, then the author proceeds into an examination of Viana's *Memorial.* Three pages are devoted to Viana's charges and recommendations. In evaluating Viana's plea, Schurz states "we see that it was fortunate for Spain's hold on the islands that before the Mexican War of Independence they had been made immediately dependent on the government in the peninsula, and that direct communications had been established with them."[56] This is a part of the Philippine-centric view in that it broadly states that Company operations in the Philippines were of sufficient magni-

---

50 *Ibid.,* 253.

51 *Historia general de Filipinas desde el descubrimiento de dichas islas hasta nuestros dias,* II, Madrid, 1895.

52 *Ibid.,* 297–301.

53 Montero uses Azcarraga's incorrect date for the *Nueva real cédula ... de 1803, Ibid.,* 304. See above footnote 45.

54 *Ibid.,* 305–307.

55 William Lytle Schurz, *The Manila Galleon,* New York, 1939; "The Royal Philippine Company," *Hispanic American Historical Review,* November, 1920, 491–508. The original article was abbreviated and appended to *The Manila Galleon* without the citations contained in the original. Nothing was added.

56 Schurz, "The Royal Philippine Company," HAHR, November, 1920, 495–496.

tude to overcome an established economic dependence on New Spain that had been nurtured over a period of two hundred years by annual galleons between Acapulco and Manila. The concluding remarks of Schurz' article lend further support to the Philippine-centric theory.

> The islands henceforth looked toward Spain and not toward Mexico, and this reorientation of the colony was in a large part the work of the Company. It marked the end of the long era which began with the expedition of Villalobos, and the beginning of the final epoch in the Spanish history of the islands.[57]

Schurz passes from an examination of Viana to a narration of the early royal efforts at direct trade with the Islands. Azcarraga is cited as the source for information on the arrival at Manila of a royal vessel, the *Buen Consejo,* prior to the formation of the Company.[58] In amplification of Manilan opposition to the Company, the author tells of the unwillingness of the city's merchants to participate in any new venture; Montero is cited.[59] The article continues for four pages with the establishment of the Company and a description of its composition taken mostly from the founding cedula. Immediately thereafter, Schurz returns to the problem of Manilan opposition to the Company.[60] Schurz evidences a strong reliance on Mallat by including a quotation from the latter in his verifying footnote. Schurz concludes his treatment of Manilan resentment against the Company with the statement that the Company promoters were conscious of the "... little chance of success the company would have in the face of this opposition."[61] A page and a half is then devoted to the provisions of the founding cedula which were composed with an eye to Manilan objections. The implication is clear. Company success was dependent upon Company achievement within the Islands. In logical order, Schurz next takes up the Company failure in Philippine agriculture. He presents the opinion of Fedor Jagor that this failing was due to lack of royal provision for impressed native labor.[62] Jagor, like Mallat, was a traveller who visited the Philippines, read Comyn

---

57 *Ibid.*, 508.
58 *Ibid.*, 497.
59 *Ibid.*
60 *Ibid.*, 501, citing Pedro Calderón Enríquez to Arriaga, A de I, 108–3–18 and Mallat, *Les Philippines,* II, 293.
61 *Ibid.*, 501.
62 *Ibid.*, 503, citing Fedor Jagor, *Viaje por Filipinas,* translated from the German, Madrid, 1875, 13.

and perhaps Malo de Luque, and returned home to write. Jagor's judgment was neither new nor carefully considered; it was drawn from Comyn's *Estado*.[63]

The material presented in "The Royal Philippine Company" concerning the Company's duties in Island development is taken largely from the founding cedula with additional information from the *Exposición* of 1813.[64] Schurz begins his treatment of Company commerce on the fourteenth page of his article, concludes in two paragraphs, and then devotes three pages to the reasons for the Company's passing.[65] Overall, the article assumes a familiar aspect. Of the eighteen pages of the paper, only four deal with the period after 1790, and of these, three are taken up with the Company's decline. With the exceptions of Comyn's brief, insular comments and Schurz' information on Company operations in Mexico, the history of the Royal Philippine Company remains as Eduardo Malo de Luque left it with the publication of the fifth volume of his *História política* in 1790.

Although mistaken, this Philippine-centric view of the Company has a ready appearance of proportioned judgement. At first it would appear no less than logical that a trade organization bearing the name "Philippines," and seemingly designed to unite the Philippine Islands with Spain would feature the same Islands as its focus of activity. A perusal of documents and published works in the Ayer Collection of the Newberry Library reveals the Philippine-centric theory to be a *non sequitur*.

Because of Malo de Luque's pre-eminent position in the writing of Company history, any re-examination of the Company must begin with him. This author's textual neglect of extra-Philippine aspects of Company commerce may be explained in two ways. First, the Royal Philippines Company was heralded in Spain as a new Oriental venture.[66] Consequently, Malo de Luque's readers

---

63 Comyn, *Estado*, 12. Speaking of early success in silk production, Comyn laments the lack of enforced labor. "... y son incalculables los felices resultados que se habrian seguido de plan tan vasto, y principiado con tanto vigor, si hubiese podido continuarse con igual teson por su sucesor, y no hubiese sido de una vez destruida la obra por equivocada humanidad con que se procedió poco despues de la partida del señor Basco, exhonerándose al indio de ser aplicado á cultivo alguno que no fuese plenamente espontáneo, en conformidad, segun se pretendia, con el espíritu general de nuestra legislación indiana."

64 *Exposición*, 1813.

65 Schurz, "The Royal Philippine Company," HAHR, November, 1920, 495–496.

66 Valentín de Foronda, "Disertación Sobre la nueva Compañía," in *Miscelanea*, Madrid, 1787.

would have been interested in a presentation of Oriental affairs—viewing operations in other quarters as uninterestingly ordinary. Second, Malo de Luque, the Duke of Almodóvar, may have had a financial interest in the Company. If Malo de Luque was an investor in the new Company, the wording of the founding cedula makes the reason for his emphasis on Island development readily apparent. All privileges and exemptions granted by the king to the Company were dependent upon a Company investment of 4 per cent of its annual net profit in Philippine internal development.[67] The initial desire of the king was, therefore, that the Islands should prosper with the Company. In the early years of Company history, the official Company position was, of course, that the Islands were prospering with the Company. Certainly this theme is carried out in the *Exposición* of 1813, directed to *"las Cortes generales y extraordinarias de la nación."*[68] Over 35 of the *Exposición's* 124 pages are devoted to the chronicling of the Philippine endeavor.[69] Not only does this Company document pursue the tenor of Malo de Luque, but frequently quotes the latter in defense of Company privilege.[70] Again there arises the question as to the relationship of Malo de Luque to the Company.

---

67. *Real cédula ... de 10 de Marzo, de 1785*, Artículo L states: "Todas estas gracias, privilegios y extenciones tan ventajosas á la Compañía, y el crecido interés que he tomado en sus acciones, han tenido en me Real ánimo el preferente objeto del bien general de mis amados vasallos, y que se fomenten la agrícultura é industria de las Islas Filipinas. Y como su prosperidad refluye en beneficio de las operaciones de este comercio, y que sus progresos tienen íntimo enlace con los de la Compañía, cuya utilidad será mayor, quanto mas se aumenten los frutos y las artes en aquellos dominios: declaro que la he concedido, y debe gozar de las franquicas contenidas en los artículos anteriores, con la precisa calidad de aplicar un quatro por ciento del producto libre de sus ganancias anuales, para destinarlo con su misma intervención al fomento de las Filipinas en los dos ramos de agricultura, é industria, y que á este fin la Junta de gobierno, que se formará en Manila, propondrá todo lo que tenga por conveniente á la de esta corte, para que examinado con el zelo, maduréz y pulso que exige un asunto de tanto importancia, resuelva lo que le parezca mas conducente al adelantamiento de dichas ramos, y me de cuenta de sus acuerdos, para que se observen con mi Soberana aprobación."

68 *Exposición*, 1813. The governing body of the Company was appealing to a hostile Cortes, an assembly opposed to privilege and monopoly, for an extension of the Company's special graces. With the monarchy in temporary eclipse, royal favor was of no avail. This *Exposición* is a recitation of Company services to the state with emphasis on the aid to the Philippines required in the founding cedula. This aid had, by 1813, been long a dead issue, but, in an effort to present the Company's record to the Cortes in the best possible light, the discontinuance of Philippine investment is not denied, but dliberately obscured.

69 *Ibid.*, 36–75.

70 *Ibid.*, 57–75.

The *Exposición* of 1813, then, is a defense of Company privilege and monopoly characterized by a zealous description of the areas wherein the Company had complied with royal demands. Professor Hussey's generalization applies particularly to the Royal Philippines Company. "The practice of monopoly always faced the need of itself granting privilege and laboring outside its chosen field, in order to retain ministerial favor."[71] The portion of the *Exposición* of 1813 devoted to Philippine trade and agriculture was an attempt on the part of the Company to convince the government that no stone had been left unturned in the quest for Island prosperity. Thus is evidenced the natural corollary to the duties of monopoly—the necessity to inform the government of every minute compliance with ministerial wishes. The total expenditure in Philippine agriculture to 1802, is listed at 2,300,473 *reales de vellón,* 25 maravedís in the *Exposición* of 1813.[72] This figure assumes considerable importance in its relationship to the investment in Philippine development demanded by the founding cedula. The *Exposición* of 1813 mentions declared dividends of twenty-seven per cent.[73] Converting this percentage into *reales de vellón* reveals that the investment in Philippine agriculture exceeded the required four per cent of profit, a fact which, no doubt, the Company officials wished to make abundantly clear to the government auditors. Ultimately, this listed investment denotes irrecoverable capital, *i.e.,* losses to the Royal Philippines Company in Philippine agriculture. Actual expenditures in the Islands, of course, far exceeded this amount. Malo de Luque reports that in the first five years, the Company disbursed in the Philippines an amount in excess of seventeen million *reales de vellón,* over three million of which were involved in agricultural purchases.[74] These expenditures, large even in relation to the total capitalization of the Company, do not represent a loss.

The foregoing material from the *Exposición* of 1813 is not found in the writings of Mas, Mallat, Azcarraga, Pan, or Montero, and it may be assumed that the *Exposición* was either not available in the Islands or were overlooked by these authors. Only Schurz, of the writers contributing to the Company bibliography, cites it and he does not employ its statement of total Philippine investment

71 Hussey, *Caracas Company,* 300.
72 *Exposición* 1813, 56.
73 *Ibid.,* 85.
74 Malo de Luque, V, 362–363, citing Manila directors to the Captain-General, November 18, 1788.

in his estimate of Company losses in the Islands. Moreover, the investment did not increase in the years following 1802. An *Exposición* directed to the Cortes by the Company's Madrid Junta in 1821, lists the same investment or loss in the Philippines.[75] The true position of the Philippine Islands in Company commerce at the conclusion of five years is found in the *Plan general* of Malo de Luque. Historians who have cited him but continued in the Philippine-centric interpretation, have either failed in their understandng of the *Plan general* or have neglected it altogether.

The *Plan general* is an enclosure bound in with the fifth volume of the *História política* and designated *pieza* three.[76] It opens as a single sheet approximating the area of six or eight pages of the same book. Its totality comprises the most useful and detailed presentation of Company commerce possible in so small a space. Capitalization is covered in broad categories, including amounts forthcoming from various merchant guilds, banks, and individual subscribers, along with the source and interest rates of borrowed capital. All voyages, points of arrival and departure, national origin of cargo, value, and taxes were recorded along with the value of sales and realized profit on each category of delivered merchandise. Succinctly, enough information is provided for a broad cost analysis.

While the dependence of the Royal Philippines Company on the declining Caracas Company is well known, some details of this dependence will be pertinent at this point. The holdings of the Caracas Company in the Americas on the eve of the conversion of these assets to the new venture exceeded thirty-four million *reales de vellón.*[77] Further, the directorate of the Royal Philippines Com-

---

[75] *Exposición dirigida a las Cortes por Junta de gobierno de la compañía de Filipinas, acompañada de la Consulta hecha á varios juriconsultos célebres de España, Holand é Inglaterra, y de las dictámenes de éstos acerca del derecho que tiene las accionistas, con arreglo á la Constitución y a las leyes, para exigir la indemnización competente, por haber sido anulado, cinco años ántes del plazo convenido, el pacto solemne que se contiene en el real Cédula o Patente temporal, que servió de base al establecimiento de la Compañía, Madrid,* 1821.

[76] *Plan general que comprehende los capitales con que girado, yel comercio que ha hecho la real compañía de Filipinas, desde su establecimiento en primero de Julio de 1785, hasta 30 de Septiembre de 1789, con expresión de la clase de efectos en que ha negociado, sus Derechos y Gastos, Ventas, Existencias, y resultas que ha producido hasta el misma dia, á saber,* in Malo de Luque, V, pieza, 3, 95.

[77] Hussey, *Caracas Company,* 294, citing Resumen general de la la liquidación... de la Real Compañía, (1787), A. de I., 108–5–7.

pany was identical with that of the terminating Caracas Company.[78] The transfer to the new company of the incumbent directors along with so large a portion of American holdings allows the inference that the old trade would not be abandoned—that it might be relied upon heavily by men experienced in it and unfamiliar with the new tack of the Asian venture. This inference receives corroboration in the following analysis of the *Plan general.*

To begin with, the course or routing of the Company's Oriental trade must be fully understood. A ship leaving Spain laden with domestic and foreign European manufactured goods and Spanish silver, would call at designated ports in South America, discharge the major portion of the finished products, take aboard American produce, and proceed to Manila with the newly acquired cargo and the bulk of the original silver. At Manila, the silver would be exchanged for Oriental produce which had arrived in foreign bottoms. These goods usually passed through the hands of the Manilans, producing prosperity in the city. The fully laden ship would then return to Spain by way of the Cape or the Horn with no further exchanges. There was to be no direct traffic between Asia and the Americas. With the exception of minor quantities of American produce disposed of in the Philippines, all goods handled by Company ships passed through Spain. Tariff adjustments and benefits were allowed the Company on trans-shipment of Asian goods from Spain to the Americas, but Spain remained the center of trade.

By September 30, 1789, the gross transactions of the Company amounted to 469,768,318 *reales de vellón.* From this is deducted the money involved in ships, warehouses, and administrative buildings, leaving the gross figure for current transactions at 429,345,755 *reales de vellón.* Also, silver carriage and merchandise carriage are undifferentiated; the divisions of trade are examined in terms of money value.

Exports to the Philippines constituted 28 per cent of the total commerce and produced 1 per cent of the gross profit. Imports from the Orient made up 29 per cent of the gross transactions and provided 21 per cent of the gross profit. The low profit on the outbound segment of the Asian trade was due to the fact that it was, for the most part, a one way carriage of Spanish silver. The Oriental branch of Company commerce, therefore, accounted for

[78] *Ibid.*, 297–298, citing Extracto de los Acuerdos de la Junta General ... 22 de Marzo de 1785, A. de I., 108–5–7.

57 per cent of the gross transactions by value and yielded 22 per cent of the gross profit. The fact that the Oriental branch of trade consumed the greater portion of the investment is, of course, in complete accord with the royal intent to develop Asian trade. An examination of the Company's American trade, however, reveals that the directors had not lost their skill in familiar fields.

Exports to the Americas, to 1789, made up 31 per cent of the gross transactions and produced 63 per cent of the gross profits. Asian merchandise in this outgoing leg of American trade constituted less than 2 per cent of cargo value. Consequently, this tremendous profit was not in any way dependent upon the influx of goods from the Pacific. Imports from the Americas accounted for only 12 per cent of the gross transactions and supplied 15 per cent of the gross profit. The most important facet of this analysis is that the known and established American trade was producing more than three quarters of the Company's profit while consuming less than half of the investment. The Oriental venture, on the other hand, produced less than half as much profit while requiring slightly larger investment. The Company directors were not, as assumed by adherents to the Philippine-centric interpretation, pouring money into the Philippines without a buffer in a more profitable area. Further, of the 29 voyages completed to 1789, 20 were solely in the American trade, and of the out-bound voyage.[79] The low profits in the import branch of Oriental trade was probably due to the novelty of the venture along with Comyn's "*mal extendido sistema.*" The latter, that is the acquisition of all Oriental goods at Manila, exposed the Company to the rapacity of foreign carriers and Manilan middle-men, increasing the cost of goods 80 per cent, according to Comyn.[80] As previously stated, Comyn is lamenting a loss of profit while Mas and others in the

[79] These findings, drawn and deduced from the *Plan general,* are not obvious and cannot be discerned at a glance. Perhaps this is an additional reason why other writers have shunned it. A case in point is the number of voyages initiated and completed to 1789. Under "deliveries" (*envios*), the *Plan general* lists forty voyages initiated: 21 to Caracas, Maracaybo, and Nueva España; 9 to Lima and Buenos Aires; 10 to Manila. Under "returns" (*retornos*), however, the *Plan general* lists 29 completed voyages: 9 from Manila; 20 from Caracas and Maracaybo. These figures indicate that 9 round voyages had been made to Manila from Spain with 9 calls at Buenos Aires or Lima. The tenth vessel, dispatched in 1789, had not yet completed its trip. Therefore, the 9 voyages to Lima and Buenos Aires are actually part of the 10 voyages to Manila. Whatever the cost accounting value of listing 40 voyages in the Plan *general,* the actual voyages initiated to 1789 did not exceed 30.

[80] Comyn, *Estado,* 65.

Philippine-centric lineage assume a loss of capital. The *Exposición* of 1813 states that in Spain, 24 per cent of the sale price of Chinese goods and 44 per cent of the sale price of Indian goods were due to the Manila routing.[81] While the Manila routing, then, was occasioning no loss, the inroads on profit could scarcely have been countenanced by an alert directorate. Given such circumstances, it would have been indeed unusual if the Company directors had not taken steps to eliminate Manila from the Company itinerary.

Unfortunately for those who relied upon Malo de Luque and Comyn for their narration of Company history, the former wrote too early to be aware of the abandonment of Manila by Company shipping and the latter obscures the actual train of events in treating the establishment of Company agencies in China and India. The *Exposición* of 1813, with its emphasis on the performance of Company duties to the crown, assumes the new routing without mentioning a specific date.[82] With more precision, an extract of the first meeting of shareholders in the Royal Philippines Company dated 1793, reveals that many abrogrations of the founding cedula were granted in the early years.[83] This "Extracto de la primera Junta General" lists among these special amendments the permission to by-pass Manila in Oriental trade and the permission to discontinue the investment of 4 per cent of profit in Philippine internal development. Not only had the Madrid directors secured royal permission to remove Manila from their trade routes, but permission to remove the Philippines from their expense accounts as well. The abandonment of Manila occurred before the Napoleonic conflicts deprived Spain of access to her overseas dominions, and the failure of the Company to maintain direct relations between Spain and the Philippines cannot be directly attributed to those wars. Without question, these wars did affect the later shaping of Company commerce, but the initial abandonment of Manila as the Oriental terminus of trade stemmed from the fact that routing goods through Manila resulted in a loss of profit to the Company. Of course, the official position of the Company in its correspondence with the government was to overlook the abandonment and cling to the fiction that Manila was still served.[84]

---

[81] *Exposición* 1813, 80.

[82] *Ibid.*, 97–98, 102.

[83] Extracto de a primera Junta General de la Real Compañía de Filipinas celebrada en los dias 9 de Septiembre de 1791, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, y 20 de Marzo de 92, 16 de Julio de 93, Madrid, 1793; Ayer Collection.

[84] *Exposición*, 1813, 102.

Prior to 1790, the Company dispatched 12 ships to Manila.[85] Between 1790 and 1813, only 20 additional voyages were made to the Orient, and of this number, not all called at Manila.[86] Only 20 ships according to a Philippine observer, came to Manila directly from Spain in the 40 years preceding 1820.[87] If we deduct from this figure the 12 Company ships that arrived prior to 1790, the last of the royal voyages in direct trade made by the *Asunción* in 1783 and 1784, the 1780 and 1782 expeditions carried out by the Five Major Merchant Guilds of Madrid, and the voyage sponsored by an independent house in the same period, we are left with a total of 4 direct voyages from Spain to Manila between the date of permission to by-pass it and 1820.[88] Thus, with the 12 voyages known and the 4 deduced, we have a tentative total of 16 direct voyages made by Company vessels in the years between 1785 and 1820. These voyages could hardly have affected a "reorientation of the colony" toward Spain and away from Mexico, as concluded Professor Schurz. This becomes particularly apparent when we realize the overall reduction of the Company effort within the Islands after the initial years. In 1803, the Manila Junta or administrative board was discontinued and the duties of the Company agents in the Islands reduced to preparing war time shipments to Peru, shipment of money to Oriental agencies, and the collection of Island produce for domestic sale.[89]

As previously stated, the final figure for Company loss in the Philippines was 2,300,473 *reales,* 25 maravedís.[90] The *Exposiciones* of 1813 and 1821, directed to the Spanish government by the Madrid Junta in defense of Company privilege, attempt to paint a picture of faithful and arduous service in the national interest, but the permission to cease investment severely injures the sincerity of these Company complaints. The exact date that the Company ceased to invest money in Philippine internal development is difficult to determine, but a loosely defined figure set against estimated profits in the *Plan general* opens the possibility that the

---

85 *Plan general; Exposición,* 1813, 18.

86 *Exposición,* 1813, 19.

87 Manuel Bernáldez Pizarro, Dictamen sobre las causas que se oponen á la seguridad y Fomento de las Yslas Filipinas, [Manila], 1821; Ayer Collection.

88 The respective citations for these voyages are as follows: *Exposición,* 1813, 83; Malo de Luque, V, 318; *Exposición,* 1813, 4–5.

89 *Nueva real cédula de la compañía... 1803,* Titulo III, Artículo xxxvi.

90 *Exposición,* 1813, 56; *Exposición dirigida a las Cortes...,* 1821, 14.

major portion of the investment had been made prior to December, 1788.

Examination of the *Plan general* reveals that all expenses of overhead, official salaries, maintainance, *etc.,* are charged directly to the expense of expeditions, apparently through the ordinary method of pro-rating employed by present day businesses. Only two exceptions are made to this presentation of expenses: a loss involved in the supply of slaves to the Americas and 2,190,583 reales, 18 maravedís in expenditures of "undetermined application." The latter bears a close numerical resemblance to the known total loss in the Islands. The significance of this expenditure of "undetermined application" lies in its listing with an enterprise initiated at royal command, that is, slave traffic. Philippine investment, another royal command, could not logically have been pro-rated over the expenses of Oriental voyages because to do so would obscure the amount invested, a procedure that would almost certainly meet with the king's disapproval.[91] Therefore, the separate listing of this expense and its separate deduction from estimated profits lead well to the tentative conclusion that 2,190,583 reales, 18 maravedís constituted the then to-date investment in Philippine internal development. This would mean that by December, 1788, less than 100,000 *reales,* the difference between the figure of "undetermined application" and the figure for final loss in the Islands, remained to be spent in Philippine internal development.[92] The royal permission to discontinue Philippine development prior to 1793, together with the expense of "undetermined application" indicate that the Company's Philippine investments ceased between the fourth and eighth year of Company existence.[93] The permission to cease and the probable cessation of investment preceded the declaration of the first dividends in 1793.[94] The removal of Manila from the Company's routes would also have come before 1793. The Company investments in internal development and Philippine trade,

---

[91] *Real cédula... de 10 de Marzo de 1785,* Artículo VI reveals the kings mistrust of certain accounting abuses by enjoining clarity in bookkeeping. Further, Artículo L, see footnote 67, would, by its provisions for determining the exact amount of Philippine investment, presumably make prorating or any other type of apportioning illegal.

[92] The *Plan general* limits its presentation of Philippine information to December, 1788.

[93] It is doubtful that the re-imposition of the 4 per cent requirement in 1803 (*Nueva real cédula... de 1803,* Titulo III, Artículo xlii) would have had any effect on the Company or the Philippines, inasmuch as only one dividend was declared after that date; *Exposición* 1813, 85.

[94] Extracto de la primera Junta General... 1793, Ayer Collection.

therefore, hardly exceeded the moderate demands of the king or financial self-interest. The inevitable conclusions are that the Company was not destroyed in the Philippines and that the Philippines were, in fact, abandoned by the Company. It is in their failure to understand this that Philippine-centric interpretors of Company history have made their error.

The narrow and parochial confines to which former writers have relegated the Royal Philippine Company do violence to the ecumenical character of the organization. The Philippines constituted a diminutive portion of the Company's scope, and concentration on this particular area neglects the carriage of slaves from Africa to South America, fabrication of metal containers for the Mexican mines, manufacture of moslem caps for Near Eastern trade, procurement of weapons for the Spanish army, and, most important of all, a vigorous American trade which produced the major share of Company profit.[95] The directors of the Company were merchants engaged in a world wide search for profit, not messiahs with a Philippine fixation. The new context for the Company, then, is the world and with the next context come additional areas for scholarly investigation.

Certainly, the microcosm, the Philippines, deserves a better history than it has so far achieved. Numerous questions remain unanswered. What was at the root of Manilan opposition to the Company? Certainly not Malo de Luque's one sided appraisal of colonial ignorance that echoes and re-echoes through the writings surveyed in this paper. What of the Company efforts in Philippine provinces? What of the "silent war" which Pan says the alcaldes waged against the Company? Examination of pertinent materials in the Ayer Collection leaves this writer with the impression that administrative affairs in agriculture were left to men more suited to account keeping than exploitation of the soil. This inference is tentative and is merely suggested as a line of inquiry. It is possible that archival records in Manila could answer these questions.

The broader facet of world trade demands a major share of attention. Five decades of voyages strung across two hemispheres cannot be telescoped into several paragraphs without distortion. Further, the important question of Company purpose remains unanswered. What is meant by "the union of American and Oriental

---

[95] *Exposición*, 1813, 32–33.

commerce" as set forth in the founding cedula? A cost analysis of the *Plan general* leaves strong indications that the Company was predicated on a mercantilistic premise almost passé even in Spain. Solid documentation is, however, preferable to the extrapolations of cost accounting, and so any generalizations in this vein must await further research.

On the penninsula, greater knowledge of the opposition of merchants and industrial interests to certain of the Company's retailing and import privileges would undoubtedly shed much light on the welfare of the Company during the rule of the Cortes. The Archivo General de la Nación at Caracas, Venezuela would certainly provide information on the American aspect of the Company traffic, particularly with regard to that trade which the Company inherited from the Caracas Company. In brief, the history of the Company is not yet written. The re-orientation attempted in this paper barely scratches the surface of the subject. Within the United States, there is little documentary material available. Thirty-five pages of manuscript, unexamined by this writer, pertaining to the Company are in the Library of Congress, and would undoubtedly assist in the general problem of Company history. Elsewhere, Roland Dennis Hussey, author of the *Caracas Company,* has stated privately that he has in his possession some documentation on the Company. Ultimately, the completion of the writing of the history of the Company will depend upon the records in the Archivo General de Indias in Seville, Spain.

JAMES F. CLOGHESSY

Purdue University
Hammond

The Making of an Insurgent

The Congressional career of George W. Norris substantiates the premise that some liberals are gradually molded by political circumstances. To develop adequately this theme would take far more space than is available, therefore I have chosen to discuss a segment of it: Norris' relations with Speaker Joseph G. Cannon up to the insurgency revolt in March, 1910, when the Speaker's power was curtailed by his removal from membership on the Rules Committee. The term "insurgent," as I use it, connotes a Member of the House of Representatives who opposed the tremendous power granted Speaker Cannon by the rules. Many insurgents later became known as progressives, a term which did not come into widespread use until late 1910 or early 1911; other insurgents never were identified with the progressive cause. In short, insurgency referred to the procedural matter of revising the rules of the House, and the Republican members of Congress who desired this reform favored it for a variety of reasons, some of which will be commented upon in the course of this paper.

When Norris was elected to Congress in 1902 regular Republicans throughout Nebraska had reason to rejoice. He had redeemed the Fifth Congressional District, encompassing eighteen counties in south-western Nebraska, from Populist-Democratic control. Republican politicans and officials of the Burlington railroad, whose main line ran through the district, congratulated Norris, who had been able to call upon both groups for help during the campaign.

Defeating his opponent by less than two hundred votes, Norris realized the necessity of hard work, if the district were to remain in the Republican fold. Eager to succeed in his new position, he willingly accepted the advice of Senator Charles H. Dietrich, who had taken him "under his wing" during the campaign. It was Dietrich who suggested that Norris seek membership on the Committee on Public Buildings and Grounds in the 58th Congress. The Senator thought that a Nebraskan on this committee would make the state's delegation one of the most powerful with members strategically located on key committees.[1] Norris, for his part,

[1] C. H. Dietrich to G. W. Norris, December 4, 1902. George W. Norris Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress. All manuscript citations are from this collection.

understood that membership on the Committee on Public Buildings and Grounds might insure his continued service in Congress. Through "log-rolling" he could make certain that Nebraska and his congressional district in particular would be included in every bill the committee approved for the construction of post-offices, court-houses and other federal buildings. He eagerly sought this assignment and considered himself fortunate when the newly chosen Speaker of the House placed him on the committee.[2]

Shortly after his election Norris wrote to Cannon and then in February, 1903, he had made his first trip to Washington to ask Cannon for this committee assignment. Cannon was polite and even cordial to Norris but refused to commit himself. He claimed that until the 58th Congress convened he was merely a member and not Speaker of the House.[3] When Cannon finally acceded to his request, Norris was delighted. He assumed, along with many of his friends in Nebraska, that he was in the Speaker's good graces. Indeed, throughout most of the Roosevelt years Norris would proclaim his support of both Theodore Roosevelt and Joseph G. Cannon and see nothing incongruous in that position.

Actually, it is only with the benefit of hindsight that Norris' position might appear incongruous. Roosevelt and Cannon, though not cast in the same political mold, had a begrudging respect for one another, and owing to the President's efforts they worked exceedingly well together most of the time. Cannon's advice and opinions were sought by the President and taken into consideration; on the other hand, Roosevelt's legislative program, until the very end of his presidency, rarely ran into difficulty in the House of Representatives. Important measures received the approval of the lower chamber with the precision of a well-oiled machine; the controversial Railroad Rate Bill, for example, passed the House with less than a dozen votes cast against it. The developing breach in the Republican party was not nearly so evident in the lower chamber as it was in the Senate where administrative measures frequently met powerful opposition. To George W. Norris, a very minor member of Congress and a devoted follower of Theodore Roosevelt, both the Speaker and the President seemed to function

[2] Norris to E. J. Burkett, December 9, 1902; Norris to Charles F. Manderson, December 9, 1902; Norris to Joseph G. Cannon, September 15, 1903.

[3] Norris to Joseph G. Cannon, September 15, 1903.

as members of a well-disciplined team and he was proud of his connection with it.

Furthermore, during his early years in Congress Norris had an additional reason to be grateful for his growing friendship with "Uncle Joe." In the 1904 campaign Cannon spoke on Norris' behalf in the Fifth Congresstional District. Easily re-elected, Norris expressed his appreciation to the Speaker:

> Your position is the second one in the nation, and the confidence that all have in you has made many votes for the Republican ticket all over our country, because it has been recognized that Republican success meant the retention of yourself in that high and honorable position.[4]

There is no evidence to indicate at this time that he considered the Speaker's great power a threat to representative government. If the rules of the House were arbitrary and not entirely to his liking, the fault, Norris felt, lay in the large and unwieldly size of the membership and not in the power of the Speaker. Limitations in debate he considered necessary and he also accepted without reservation the seniority system which accentuated his insignificance in legislative matters.[5]

Meanwhile, Norris was winning recognition as an able and rising member of the House. Though a partisan Republican, his partisanship was neither emotional nor extreme. On occasion he spoke and voted against party measures which he felt were opposed to the interests of his constituents. These deviations from the Republican party line did not noticeably damage his standing with the Speaker or the party organization. Indeed, at the outset of the 59th Congress, Cannon placed him on an additional committee, Labor, and Norris continued to serve on it throughout the 60th Congress. Yet it was during the 60th Congress (March, 1907, to March, 1909) that Norris began to give serious attention to the rules and procedures by which Cannon exercised his authority. Before the session was concluded he was to present a resolution designed to deprive the Speaker of some of his power.

In October, 1907, in response to an inquiry from Congressman E. A. Hayes of California, Norris for the first time committed himself to favoring a change in the House rules. Possibly influenced by the example of the President in pursuing more liberal policies, Norris did this at a time when his standing in the Republican party

---

[4] Norris to Joseph G. Cannon, November 14, 1904.
[5] Norris to Eugene Allen, June 5, 1906.

both in Nebraska and in Congress was secure and unchallenged. The Committee on Rules, he explained, should be expanded and elected by the House instead of being appointed by the Speaker, though Norris doubted whether such a change could ever be effected. The rules could best be changed at the initial party caucus of a new Congress. At this caucus, Norris observed, the new members would most likely follow the leadership of those in positions of party power. Thus any change not favored by these men would probably fail. It was the caucus system that was at the basis of the Speaker's power.[6] Though Norris later was instrumental in depriving the Speaker of his authority to choose the Rules Committee, he knew that this reform to be meaningful would have to be followed by the destruction of the party caucus.

Despite having committed himself against the power of the Speaker, Norris and other insurgents conducted no prolonged battle during the first session of the 60th Congress. The Panic of 1907 and the forthcoming national election precluded any open party strife. However, Norris courageously let it be known what he intended to do, if the opportunity ever arose. On May 16, 1908, he introduced a resolution providing that all standing committees be appointed by the Committee on Rules.[7] A new committee, consisting of 15 members selected by the House from different geographical groups, would replace the existing one. The resolution was sent to the Committee on Rules to be disposed of by its chairman, Joseph G. Cannon. It was the identical resolution that Norris presented in March, 1910, when he precipitated the historic struggle which deprived the Speaker of his membership on this Committee. Norris, in effect, on May 16, 1908, warned the Speaker to be on his guard lest he be outmanoeuvred.

Since Roosevelt would soon leave the White House and since Cannon nourished presidential ambitions, the Speaker emerged during this session as a leading conservative critic of the President's program. Members who supported Roosevelt policies now saw Speaker Cannon in another light. With the aid of critical journalists, jovial, cigar-smoking "Uncle Joe" soon emerged as the "Tyrant from Illinois" and the "Arch-foe of Insurgency."[8] Norris, in the Insurgent camp, had good reason to hope that his constituents,

---

[6] Norris to E. A. Hayes, October 9, 1907.

[7] *Congressional Record*: Sixtieth Congress, First Session, 6440.

[8] Quotes are titles of two recent studies of Cannon: Blair Bolles, *Tyrant from Illinois*, New York, 1951, William R. Gwinn, *Uncle Joe Cannon: Archfoe of Insurgency*, New York, 1957.

who recently had endorsed a comprehensive state-wide program of administrative reform, would approve his action.[9] He entered the 1908 campaign, one of the most difficult of his entire career, committed to a position from which there was no turning back—at least as long as Cannon was Speaker.

As Norris well understood, his resolution exposed him to the displeasure of the Speaker and most of the party leaders in Congress. It put him "out of the shadow of their approval" and promised to make his life and work in Washington most disagreeable. It meant too that almost all of the "favors and courtesies" extended to other Congressmen would be denied him.[10] Hereafter Norris would have to place principle above party. And his continuance in public life depended upon the ability of his constituents to understand this situation.

Though Norris was aware of the long-range implications of his position, his constituents in 1908 seemingly were satisfied. During the campaign it was widely endorsed; indeed, he had to explain why he had been friendly to the Speaker and had not opposed him earlier. He stressed that the rules and not the men were basically at fault.

The 1908 campaign, which saw Bryan and the Democrats sweep Nebraska if not the nation, was one of the meanest and most malicious in which he had ever participated. His opponent, supplied with a seemingly inexhaustible checking account, often disregarded the truth. Furthermore, the Republican organization was more of a hindrance than a help. Among other things, necessary funds were withheld until late in the campaign. Throughout September and early October Norris had remained at home subject to the call of the state organization to speak throughout Nebraska. But the call never came and much precious time was lost. Five days after the election, he finally obtained figures that revealed his reelection to Congress for a fourth term by a margin of twenty-two votes.[11]

---

[9] The Thirtieth session of the Nebraska legislature had enacted among other items a primary law, a child labor act, an anti-free pass law and other railroad regulatory measures. The state now emerged as one of the few that had taken measures, as an editorial in the *Omaha Bee,* April 7, 1907, stated, "to supplement the work of Congress under the direction of President Roosevelt to the end of relieving the people of Nebraska of railroad domination in politics."

[10] Norris to E. F. Baldwin, May 28, 1908; Norris to George Allen, June 22, 1908.

[11] Norris had 20,649 votes to 20,627 for Fred W. Ashton, his opponent.

There is no doubt that the 1908 campaign played an important role in the development of his insurgency and political independence. While Norris was manifesting his independence of party machinery in the House of Representatives, his experience in 1908 convinced him of the wisdom of conducting campaigns with a minimum of coordination with the Republican organization. It is also clear that his insurgency developed gradually and that there was no single incident that was responsible for it, though Norris and his biographers cite specific instances to the contrary.[12] In the course of my research in the *Record* and the Norris papers I have not been able to corroborate their examples, which are based largely on magazine articles written by Norris in the 1920's.[13] The fact that he represented a political "burnt-over" district which since his arrival in Nebraska in the late 1880's had suppoted all shades of opinion from respectable Republicanism to belligerent Bryanism, possibly made his position easier. But basic to the success of the role he was to enact was the personality, courage and integrity of the man himself. Unassuming, modest but straightforward, presenting facts and discussing issues sometimes for hours on end, relying on the friendship of a small band of faithful followers and without a political machine to aid him, Norris was able over a period of years to gain and hold the respect of the voters. While other candidates might indulge in personalities and add emotional fervor to the issues they raised, Norris presented reason and logic with the probity of a country judge.

Following his reelection Norris prepared to attack the rules once the second session of the 60th Congress convened on December 7, 1908. But the sudden illness of one of his daughters prevented his presence on December 11, when the insurgents, whose membership at this time fluctuated between 25 and 30, gathered in the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee Room at the call of William Peters Hepburn of Iowa, who after twenty-two years of distinguished service, had just been defeated for reelection. Hepburn performed a service similar to that of Robert M. LaFollette in the Senate: organizing the dissident Republican members to challenge the power of the party hierarchy.

---

[12] G. W. Norris, *Fighting Liberal*, New York, 1945, 93-97; Alfred Lief, *Democracy's Norris*, New York, 1939, 68, 71-72; Richard L. Neuberger and Stephen B. Kahn, *Integrity: The Life of George W. Norris*, New York, 1937, 31-33.

[13] *Collier's Weekly*, June 21, 1924; *Saturday Evening Post*, August 7, 1920.

Norris was present, however, when Congress reconvened after the Christmas recess. His plan to amend the rules was accepted by the group as the best way to make the House truly representative. Most of the insurgents at this time agreed that a change of speakers or a change of parties would not lessen the power of the Speaker, while a change in the rules would remove the source of his power and more nearly solve the problem. Norris explained: "the rule that gives the Speaker power to appoint all the standing committees of the House, which [in turn] practically control all of the legislation of the House," was the rule that was most obnoxious to those who believed that the Speaker had too much authority.[14]

Though the insurgents challenged the rules throughout this short session, they realized that any resolution to change them would be referred to the Committee on Rules, of which the Speaker was chairman and dominant member. Once the members at the beginning of a Congress approved the rules, the only way to amend or change them was to obtain the Speaker's consent, which the insurgents knew would not be forthcoming. Congressman Hepburn summed up this dilemma nicely when he said: "Oh, it is easy to get into the Committee on Rules, but by what hoist and by what petard would we get out of the Committee on Rules?"[15] This session also revealed the possibility that the insurgents, by joining with the Democrats, might swing the balance of power away from the Republican party. By threatening the Speaker in this way the insurgents hoped that they might wrest some concessions.

Cannon, aware of this possibility, hoped to split the insurgent ranks by allowing a minor amendment to the rules, which was quickly adopted as the session drew to a close. It created a "calendar Wednesday" where no business but the calling of committees would be in order. Norris denounced this as "a sop" which did not solve the problem of making the House a really "representative body instead of a one-man machine."[16]

Thus as the administration of Theodore Roosevelt came to an end, insurgency appeared as an orgnized movement which was gaining strength and national recognition. Speaker Cannon, colorful and gruff, had become in many newspapers, magazines and in the public mind, the "Iron Duke" who tyrannized the House of Representatives. While most of the insurgents criticized the rules, many

14 *Congressional Record*: Sixtieth Congress, Second Session, 817.
15 *Ibid.*, 2655.
16 *Ibid.*, 3570.

of the journalists attacked the man. By the end of 1908 they helped to make the Speaker a subject of national attention, and "Cannonism" a system that reformers sought to eradicate.[17] Though Norris continued to respect Cannon, the Speaker, pressed and harassed on all sides, by members of his own party, by the Democratic opposition, by the press and by increasing public clamor, began to utilize fully the tremendous power at his disposal.

When President Taft, as one of his first official acts, called Congress into special session less than two weeks after the previous one had adjourned, the fight to reform the rules promised to become a focus of national attention. Norris was determined to push for reform, though it would probably cost him all the standing his seniority had accumulated. Even before the special session started, parlimentary manoeuvring began over the question of adopting the rules of the previous session. Once these rules were adopted virtually all hope of modifying them during the 61st Congress would be ended. Now that Hepburn had retired to his Clarinda, Iowa, law office, insurgent strategy during this fight was determined by A. P. Gardner of Massachusetts, John M. Nelson of Wisconsin, and E. H. Madison of Kansas. But Norris led the floor fight. He claimed that the real authority in government was being exerted by the "Iron Duke" who, "crowned with the power given him by the rules, reaches out his mighty hand and forces even the Chief Executive to do his bidding." He concluded his attack with the statement, "We insurgents may have the life crushed out of us by the machine, but the cause is right, and in the end it must prevail."[18]

Norris was correct in his prediction. Nevertheless the insurgents were responsible for further concessions from Cannon, because they revealed that an effective Insurgent-Democratic alliance could now challenge the Speaker's power. The previous rules were amended to improve the functioning of the House. Hampering neither the Speaker's control of the Committee on rules nor his power to appoint standing committees, the modification came about through an arrangement by Cannon with Representative John J.

---

[17] Charles R. Atkinson, *The Committee on Rules and the Overthrow of Speaker Cannon,* New York, 1911. Chapter VI entitled "The Development of Public Sentiment Against the Speaker" presents a survey of growing press and periodical hostility. *LaFollette's Magazine* between February and the end of April, 1909, contained six articles attacking the power of the Speaker.

[18] *Congressional Record*: Sixty-First Congress, First Session, 32.

Fitzgerald and Tammany leaders in New York who presumably were representing the Standard Oil Company and other high tariff interests. According to Kenneth Hechler, the only scholar who has seriously tried to explain this incident, the Speaker promised to support a higher duty on petroleum and other items in the pending tariff bill in return for enough Democratic votes to prevent the insurgents in alliance with Champ Clark, the Democratic leader, from further amending the rules.[19]

After the rules fight, the House settled down to the urgent business of preparing a new tariff law. In the struggle over the Payne-Aldrich tariff Norris again tangled with Cannon and this time he out-manoeuvred him. He offered an amendment which reduced the duty on petroleum and its products from 25 per cent to a nominal one per cent. The amendment prevailed and then by unanimous consent petroleum and its products were placed on the free list.[20] Cannon, in committee as well as on the floor, had insisted on the 25 per cent rate, and if Kenneth Hechler's analysis is correct, Norris was responsible for Cannon's inability to keep his pledge to Fitzgerald and the twenty-two other Democrats whose votes had saved him from defeat at the outset of the Special Session. Though successful on this one point, Norris and the insurgents were able to do little more than complain of Cannon's masterful direction of the controversial tariff bill through the House. And at the end of the special session in August, 1909, the insurgents felt the power and anger of the Speaker when, without exception, they were downgraded to committees which Norris claimed were "dead and committees in name only."[21]

Actually, at this time the position of Norris and his fellow insurgents had not yet been clarified because no one knew whether William Howard Taft intended to continue the Roosevelt policies. Taft's position was clearly revealed to the insurgents when he fired Louis R. Glavis, in September, 1909, and Glifford Pinchot in January, 1910, thereby exonerating his Secretary of the Interior, Richard Ballinger. In the furor that followed Norris again tangled with and bested Cannon in a way that must have grated. In January, 1910, Norris presented an amendment providing that House members of the joint-committee to investigate the Ballinger-Pinchot controversy "ought to be elected by the House of Representatives and

19 Kenneth W. Hechler, *Insurgency*, New York, 1940, 54-59.
20 Norris, *Fighting Liberal*, 102; Hechler, *Insurgency*, 60–63.
21 Norris to Adam Breede, September 4, 1909.

not appointed by the Speaker."[22] By combining forces, Democrats and insurgents carried the resolution by three votes, thereby insuring a fuller and fairer hearing than otherwise would have been possible. At the same time Cannon was administered a stinging rebuff, his first clear defeat in the battle against the insurgents. If Cannon had not previously been aware, he now must have recognized George W. Norris as a foe whose understanding of parliamentary procedure and manoeuvuring rivaled his own. Since the Insurgent-Democratic coalition could outvote the regular Republican members, Cannon undoubtedly realized from this defeat that eternal vigilance was demanded lest he give the insurgents the opportunity to revise the rules.

In the eyes of the insurgents, President Taft had allied himself with the Speaker against the cause they had been fighting. They felt that Cannon, a long-time and bitter foe of conservation, had won the administration to his point of view. The President, they were convinced, was a traitor to the Roosevelt policies and another bulwark of the system of privilege they were attacking. Indeed, Taft's treatment of them at this time assured Norris that the insurgents were correct in their evaluation.

As the Ballinger-Pinchot controversy swirled about him, the President decided to use the patronage weapon against insurgent Republicans on the ground that they were helping to bring the Democratic party into power.[23] Taft apparently took this position upon the insistence of Cannon and other Republican leaders, and Norris was one of the first victims.

Thus by the end of January, 1910, the stage was set for the dramatic and historic battle that climaxed the insurgency revolt. Norris and his fellow insurgents, deprived of their patronage and committee standing, ignored by many of their colleagues, branded as disloyal Republicans and avowed enemies of the administration, had everything to gain and nothing to lose if only they could find a legislative lever to open a wedge in the House rules. By this time, Norris had emerged as their outstanding leader and most skillful parliamentarian. Though he found his position in Congress and his life in Washington unpleasant, under no circumstances did he intend to deviate from the path he was pursuing. Correspondence approving his actions assured him that popular support at

---

[22] *Congressional Record*: Sixty-First Congress, Second Session, 390.
[23] Norris to William Howard Taft, January 6, 1910; Hechler, *Insurgency*, 216.

the next election would not be withdrawn even if his patronage were.

With patience and fortitude Norris awaited the opportunity to wage war against the powers that Cannon and his chief lieutenants were ruthlessly exercising. He hoped this occasion would come soon. If not, he claimed he would still be satisfied with the knowledge that he had helped to sow the seeds that eventually would allow others to "reap an effective harvest for free and untrammelled representation in the House."[24] As it turned out, Norris had but a short time to wait. In March, 1910, Cannon made a parliamentary blunder that gave Norris the opportunity to introduce again his May, 1908, resolution—this time to precipitate the revolution that curtailed the power of the Speaker.

On the eve of the historic rules fight in March, 1910, Cannon and Norris symbolized the past and the future of the Republican party—one group seeking to consolidate its entrenched position and the other vying for control. Born before the Civil War Cannon had grown to maturity in the political environment of Half-Breeds and Stalwarts and had accepted Grantism, while Norris represented an important segment of the oncoming generation of national leaders. Born during or after the Civil War this generation came to political maturity when indignant criticism was being leveled against their party and when ephemeral third parties, and by 1896 even the Democrats, were demanding social change. The older generation which had first helped to preserve the Union, in the post-war period with the aid of the soldier-vote cemented the Republican alliance between business and politics. Their members were largely desirous of continuing in these established grooves, and from their ranks came the stand-patters and many of the opponents of national expansion. On the other hand, the younger generation of Republican leaders, like most of the reformers did not question the accumulation of wealth. They were more concerned with its concentration and inequitable distribution. From their ranks came the insurgents as well as a large majority of the progressives and imperialists, though it does not always follow that an individual stand-patter or progressive was a friend or foe of imperialism.

RICHARD LOWITT

Connecticut College
New London

[24] Norris to C. L. Fahnestock, January 11, 1910.

Roger Barlow: First English Traveler in the Pampas

The first eye-witness account in English of the New World was written around 1540 by an English merchant named Roger Barlow.[1] Ignored for nearly four centuries, Barlow's *A Brief Summe of Geographie*[2] describes the experiences of perhaps the first Englishman ever to set foot on the vast Pampas of the River Plate regions.

In 1526, Roger Barlow was already a well-established, prosperous merchant in Seville, Spain. Another English merchant in the same city and a good friend of Barlow's was Robert Thorne, of the famous trading family of Bristol. Allured by the possibility of reaching the Spice Islands by a shorter route than Magellan's, a number of Sevillan merchants formed a company for the purpose of making a voyage to those fabulous islands, under the command of Sebastian Cabot. Among the backers of this proposed expedition were Robert Thorne, and Roger Barlow.[3] Thorne's interest in this expedition was two-fold: first, he was, of course, interested in compounding his investment, but, second, and more important to him, he wanted certain information regarding a possible passage to the Pacific by way of the polar regions. Since, according to his calculations, that was the shortest distance between western Europe and the Spiceries, it was first necessary to ascertain whether the Pacific Ocean lay continuously open in that direction.

The man chosen by Thorne to carry out his plans of discovery was Roger Barlow. It was arranged that Barlow and another Englishman, Henry Latimer, a competent pilot, should sail with Sebastian Cabot as super-cargoes, for the purpose of learning all that

---

[1] E. G. R. Taylor, Introduction to Roger Barlow, *A Brief Summe of Geographie*, The Hakluyt Society, 2nd Ser., No. LXIX, London, 1932, xxviii. The date 1540 is confirmed by the watermarks on the manuscript.

[2] The original manuscript, which has no title, is docketed, *Geographia Barlow* in the Royal Library of the British Museum. The title here indicated was supplied by Taylor from a phrase employed by Barlow. Taylor, *Tudor Geography, 1485–1583* London, 1930, 45.

[3] Henry Harrisse, *John Cabot the Discoverer of North America, and Sebastian Cabot his Son. A Chapter of the Maritime History of England under the Tudors, 1496–1557*, London, 1896, 183-184.

the voyage could teach them. Young, serious-minded, well-educated, accustomed to seamen and the sea, and above all, a loyal Englishman, he was just the man to make a suitable leader for an English overseas discovery. On April 3, 1526, a Spanish fleet composed of three caravels and a brigantine left Seville for the Spice Islands. Barlow, himself, sailed on Cabot's flag-ship, and appears to have acted as assistant to Hernando Calderón, treasurer of the undertaking.[4]

The expedition, however, never reached its objective, due to disaster. While rounding Santa Catalina, off the present-day Río de la Plata (then called Río de Solís) the flag-ship was lost. On Santa Catalina Island, Cabot found a survivor of de Solís' expedition, one Henrique Montes, who claimed to have heard from the Indians that gold and silver were to be had by sailing up the Paraná River, for the river allegedly had its source in a sierra rich in precious metals. In February, 1527, leaving the sick and one of the larger ships at the mouth of the Uruguay, Cabot changed his objective, and with the remainder of his party sailed up the Plata and the Paraná in search of treasure.[5]

Barlow's first-hand account of what he saw on the shores of the Plata is the first of its kind in the English language. In his description of the Río de la Plata, this early traveler mentions the multitude of seals and the numerous shoals which made navigation of the estuary both difficult and hazardous. He gives a very full description of the country, its vegetation, its birds and beasts, and its people.

As the expedition progressed up the muddy Paraná, Barlow was impressed by the luxuriant vegetation, and he describes in detail the strange fauna and flora on the river's edge:

This river of parana is a marvelaus goodlie rever and a grete, for of iij hundreth leges and above that we went up in it, the narrowest place from one shore to an other was above ij or iij leges brode. This river is full of goodlie ilondes and plesant, for thei be full of trees of divers sortes and the levis of them alwais grene, and the bowis hange downe into the water and many straunge birdes brede in them. In one iland that we came to there were no maner of birdes in it but onlie white hernes, where

[4] The presence of an Englishman aboard the flagship does not seem to have elicited undue comment among the Spanish crew. According to José Toribio Medina, *El veneciano Sebastián Caboto al servicio de España*, Santiago de Chile, 1908, tomo I, 226: "His companions had Hispanicised his name and they called him Rodrigo del Barco, and more commonly, Roger Carlo or Barlo."

[5] Taylor, *Tudor Geography*, 56.

we went alande, and in less time than ij houres we killed with staves and bowes above a thousande.... And by other ilandes we passed wherein was none other birdes as we coude perceave but popyngayes and turtil doves and an other sort of smal byrdes which be no bigger of bodie then the toppe of mans thombe but they have the goodliest colored fethers that ever man might se, the colours wold chaunge in moving of them as it were chaungeable silke.[6]

At least two voyages were made up the Paraná, and the extreme nothern point reached by the expedition was probably not far from the site of the present-day city of Asunción, on the Paraguay River. Barlow, always a very keen observer, describes, in one instance, the method employed by the Indians to hunt deer:

Along the river of parana is a goodlie plaine contreie, and goodlie wood of divers kynds of trees that be alwais grene wynter and somer. Ther be many wylde beastes and a straunge facion of shepe, oystriges, and red dere, wch the indies do hunte by divers waies, but not with dogges for ther be none in the contreie but certain mastifes that we brought with us out of spayne. One maner of ther huntyng is this. They wil go together iij or iiij hundred indies wheras thei se thes beastes feding in the playn, and wil go betwen them and the mountaines and compasse them about saving one waie toward the river, and then every man setteth fier in the drie gras and when thes bestes se the fier and smoke behinde them thei leve the covert and renne toward the ryver, and the indies folowe them til thei come almost to the revers side and then thei presse upon them with ther bowes and arowes and force them to take the water, for backe ageyne thei shel have moche adoo to skape, and whem thei be in the water ther be indies redy with ther canoos and so chase them up and downe in the river and kyll them wt ther bowes and arowes.[7]

It is evident from Barlow's account, that the expedition encountered friendly, peaceful Indians, as well as the warlike Guaranís, who, he claims, practiced cannibalism:

Upon the cost of santa marie toward santsalvadore be certyne generations of indies called biguais and charnais which liveth by fyshing and huntying, and these do not ete one another. But from sent salvador up the river parana be a grete generation of indies called guaranies which be verie yll people and contynuallie make warre upon ther bordres and one ete another, and if they take ther enemie alife thei bryng him home, and if ther prisoner be not fatte he will kepe him till suche tyme as he be in good plight, and in this meane tyme thei wyl cherishe and fede him with the

---

[6] Barlow, *Brief Summe*, 160. The original spelling is maintained in the quotations of Barlow. It is interesting to note the inconsistencies in the spelling.

[7] *Ibid.*

best meates that he can get and one of his wifes shal have keping of him, and at all times that he lysteth he shal take his pleasure of her, but every night he shalbe tyed and watched for steling awaie. And every daie she wil paint him and dresse as though he ware her owne husbond and wil lede him with a corde made of coton tied about his necke from place to place, accompanied with many daunsyng and syngyng, and making as moche pleasure as thei can, and he likewise wt them, till suche tyme that thei do entende to kyll him.[8]

In March, 1528, the expedition encountered Diego García, who had been sent there by the Spanish crown, with the express purpose of exploring the Río de Solís. Thereupon, Cabot determined to establish his own priority by sending back an immediate report to Spain, requesting permission to continue his explorations, and also supplies to make it possible. The Englishman, Roger Barlow, and the treasurer, Hernando Calderón, were dispatched on this important mission to Charles V. Unfortunately, however, just as they were about to conclude the negotiations for supplies, Francisco Pizarro arrived with the news of his Peruvian discoveries, bringing with him many rich specimens of gold and silver to substantiate his claims. In view of this new development, Charles V lost interest in the Río de Solís expedition, and Sebastian Cabot received no supplies.[9]

Barlow spent the next decade in his homeland, engaged in the busy life of a prosperous merchant. The death of his friend and business associate, Robert Thorne, and the preoccupation of King Henry VIII with other matters, compelled Barlow to put aside his dreams of a passage to the Pacific. However, in 1540-1541, Barlow once more took up his project. In order to strengthen his proposal to King Henry VIII for the establishment of an all-English trade route to the Spice Islands, Barlow accompanied his documents with the treatise, *Brief Summe of Geographie*.[10] Actually, his treatise was almost a word for word translation of an earlier Spanish work by Martín Fernández de Enciso, entitled, *Suma de Geographia* (1518). A comparison of Barlow's work with that of Enciso, however, reveals that the Englishman added a lengthy account of what he, personally, had seen in the Plata basin. Since Enciso's knowledge of South America did not extend beyond Cape

[8] *Ibid.*, 156–157.
[9] Richard Biddle, *A Memoir of Sebastian Cabot; With a Review of the History of Maritime Discovery*, Philadelphia, 1831, 156.
[10] Royal MSS. 18 B. XXVIII, British Museum.

Santa María, the authenticity of this part of the work is established.[11] A further check on the validity of the addition made by Barlow is the extant letter, dated July 10, 1528, and written by one, Luis Ramírez, a crew-member of the same expedition, in which Ramírez describes essentially the same things as does Barlow.[12]

Due to the death of Henry VIII in 1547, plus the change in cosmographical thinking that had evolved during the previous twenty-five years, the plans of Thorne and Barlow were never executed. Barlow died in 1554, a disappointed man, little dreaming that he would still be remembered four hundred years later as the first English travel writer on South America.

S. Samuel Trifilo

Marquette University

[11] Taylor, Introduction, *Brief Summe of Geographie*, xi. Writes Taylor: "It is typical of the lag of English knowledge behind that of the Continent, that Roger Barlow did not feel the necessity of adding a single line to Enciso's description of Central and North America and the West Indies written in 1518." *Ibid.*, 1.

[12] *Ibid.*, xxiv. According to Harrisse, *John Cabot*, 201, *Ramírez's* letter has been published in the original Spanish by Adolfo de Varnhagen, in the *Revista de Instituto Histórico e Geográfico do Brazil Trimesal*, Río de Janeiro, XV (1852), 14–41. In 1843, Ramírez's letter was translated into French, and appeared in Ternaux-Compans, *Nouvelles Annales de Voyage*, III (1843). This French translation, undoubtedly, led Taylor to assume that Ramírez was a Frenchman.

Book Reviews

Emanuel L. Philipp—Wisconsin Stalwart. By Robert S. Maxwell. Madison, Wisconsin, The State Historical Society of Wisconsin. Pp. xvi, 272. $6.50.

The comment of the Detroit *Free Press* in 1862 regarding the anti-slavery movement—"One millstone will not crush the grain; two are always necessary"—is applicable to the contest between progressives and stalwarts not only in Wisconsin but throughout the nation. The author of this fascinating biography of Governor Philipp has written an account of Wisconsin's most intelligent stalwart as a fitting sequel to his earlier life of LaFollette. Professor Maxwell has had access to a rich store of material dealing with the life of an industrialist-politician who might very well be called the William Howard Taft of Wisconsin. The author has made an excellent use of his materials; his knowledge of the Wisconsin scene is comprehensive; and he relates the story to the trend of national affairs. It is hard to see how he could have packed more information into a relatively small volume. The author's fairness and objectivity is outstanding and in no way influenced by the fact that Cyrus L. Philipp, the son of Governor Philipp cooperated "in all phases of the project."

Emanuel L. Philipp was largely a self-made man in the tradition of Andrew Carnegie. His early life was one of hardship, but left no trace of bitterness. Philipp was quick to recognize and seize a business opportunity; a pioneer in the development of the independent refrigerator car business, he was also associated with the Milwaukee brewery interests.

In 1900, Philipp, and other stalwarts, attempted cooperation with LaFollette; the alliance was short-lived. Philipp came to resent the intemperate charges against business interests generally. He was accused of indulging in the common practice of rebating in violation of the Elkins Act. However, by a personal Appeal to the Attorney General of the United States, William H. Moody, he did obtain a clarification of the rebate provisions of the law.

An especially interesting episode is Philipp's clash with Ray Stannard Baker and S. S. McClure. Philipp resented their accusations and won a verdict in a libel suit in U.S. Circuit Court which cost McClure $15,000 plus. Whether this verdict was an important factor in the decline of muckraking is a question, as this type of journalism was already on the decline.

Philipp's role in Wisconsin politics is clearly established; he rallied the fragments of stalwart wreckage and gave to those who disliked too much progressive leadership a program which, at least to an extent, resulted in a better balance between contending forces in Wisconsin politics.

Elected governor in 1914, Philipp served (ably) through three 2-year terms. Though originally hostile to the State University and to the Legis-

lative Reference Library (like Governor Heil at a later date), Philipp was flexible and a good listener. From the standpoint of the present, possible Chapter Eleven—"Defender of Civil Rights"—stands out as a reminder that in times of stress excessive zeal can crush civil rights. Philipp was an efficient and courageous war-time governor, a champion of tolerance and civil rights. Any reader with an interest in the history of the progressive movement will certainly need to read this attractive volume.

WILLIAM A. PITKIN

Southern Illinois University

The Civil War, A Narrative. Vol. I, *Fort Sumter to Perryville.* By Shelby Foote. New York, Random House, 1958. Pp. 840. $10.

The novelist, Shelby Foote, has fallen in with the parade of writers who are capitalizing on the rising market provided by the approach of the American Civil War centennial. Most of those marching in this parade will remain as faceless as soldiers in any large formation, but not Mr. Foote. This is not just another of many volumes, but a freshly-written, lucid prose synthesis of the works of others before him.

The author is well aware that the novelist in history is always suspect. "In all respects," Mr. Foote explains, "the book is as accurate as care and hard work could make it . . . in writing a history I would no more be false to a fact dug out of a valid document than I would be false to a 'fact' dug out of my head in writing a novel. . . . Wherever the choice lay between soundness and 'color,' soundness had it every time."

The narrative opens with quick, almost hasty sketches of Jefferson Davis and Abraham Lincoln, and leads from there smoothly into the immediate background of the war. From there, Foote dextrously leads the reader from the fighting in the East to the war in the West, and back again, closing with Lincoln's message to Congress in December, 1862. His indebtedness to secondary works is quite apparent at times, and consciously or not, little bits of Bruce Catton, K.P. and T.H. Williams, Freeman, Wiley, Leech and others peer through Mr. Foote's fine prose. But he has not done his fellow authors a disservice, unless by not footnoting them, because the synthesis is a skillful one. Mr. Foote notes that he found the secondary works "invaluable," but the frame of the *Official Records* holds his colorful canvas taut. Even so, I believe still more use might have been made of original sources.

Shelby Foote tells us he accepted "the historian's standards without his paraphernalia," which apparently means the book was written as popular history, not as historian's history. It also means that Mr. Foote does not intend to document the work, and this is the chief lament. Footnotes might seem burdensome for a popular history, but either they or chapter notes should have been used to give credit where credit is due.

A bibliography of two pages is scarcely adequate for an 800 page, fact-filled account, even though there is the promise that the last volume of the projected triology will contain "a complete bibliography."

As it progresses, it becomes apparent this is a military history, and a well done one at that. Battle writing is clear and easily understandable, a fact which in itself makes the volume valuable. It is refreshing to find such an artistic blend of description and characterization sifted from the mass of fact. Occasionally an error stands out, such as those jotted down by Professor Frank E. Vandiver in his *New York Times* review. An illustration of this is Foote's statement that General John Pope defeated Little Crow, leader of the Sioux uprising in 1862, when the credit really belongs to Minnesota's Henry H. Sibley. The mistakes are few, however, and in general Mr. Foote lived up to his goal of accuracy. Since this is a military history, it would be unusual to find detailed consideration of other facets of the war, such as politics or finance. It is disappointing to find so little notice taken of logistics, for the best general or the most determined men could not long succeed without attention to that science. Also, Mr. Foote has neglected the war on the water, so far.

Outstanding characteristics of the book are the rhetoric and the attention to the fighting in the West. In spite of the shortcomings, the book will find a prominent place on any shelf of Civil War literature.

ROBERT HUHN JONES

Kent State University

Crosier on the Frontier, A Life of John Martin Henni, Archbishop of Milwaukee. By Rt. Rev. Msgr. Peter Leo Johnson. The State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison, 1959. Pp. XV-240. Illustrated, Paper. $3.95.

Monsignor Johnson may be said to have commenced preparation for this biography as professor of church history at St. Francis Seminary, Milwaukee, before World War I. That crisis drew him away briefly. During it, he served as chaplain in the armed services, but returned to his professorship shortly after peace was proclaimed. *The Salesianum,* a quarterly made possible by the priest alumni of the Seminary, preserves some record of the author's preparatory work. As editor of this periodical for more than a quarter of a century he has published many documents pertinent to Henni. However, the twenty-seven pages of citations and bibliography on which the text is built are proof that Monsignor Johnson has explored far beyond the manuscript correspondence of his biographee and his friends. Periodical literature of the pioneer era together with primary and secondary works have been drawn upon. The result is, above all, a scholarly work.

The story of Archbishop Henni's life is deeply significant and full of interest. He was a great ecclesiastical figure thrown into the turmoil of

events which boiled on the frontier. The problems of vanishing Indians, of cultural conflicts between immigrants, of nativistic Americans reviling all Europeans, of religious bigots striking blindly at the Church successively came to the surface round about the prelate. Progress and expansion, poverty and riches, venality and heroism were likewise round about him. Monsignor Johnson depicts the man of great sympathy and understanding of people who was able to mold a great Catholic diocese from this amalgam.

It is impossible even to touch upon the chapters which record how Henni accomplished what he did. However, the author's treatment of the Archbishop's influence on the German immigrant question must be singled out for commendation. It is required reading for anyone concerned with this interesting episode of American history.

The State Historical Society of Wisconsin has done a nice job of publishing and is to be commended on keeping the price low. Librarians may grumble over the fact that the paper-back binding will make additional processing necessary before the book may be put on their shelves. Nevertheless, many individuals who will want their private copies will rejoice.

RAPHAEL N. HAMILTON

Marquette University

Embarcadero, Being a Chronicle of True Sea Adventures from the Port of San Francisco. By Richard H. Dillon. Coward-McCann, New York, 1959. Pp. 313. $4.75.

Denizens of ocean-front cities, youths and elders who cast fond glances out over the seaways that brought their fathers and took away their friends, in short, people for whom the maritime atmosphere means both romance and subsistence, will find this book a delightful companion after sundown obscures the outer world and leaves them to their dreams. It is a string of yarns, unadorned by a genius such as Conrad, lacking even a central theme beyond common acquaintance with San Francisco Bay as starting point for most of the adventures. From a scholarly point of view it arrives without an index, a bibliography, or a single footnote citation. Several times the grammar is quite careless, particularly when that troublesome objective "whom" suddenly becomes the subject of a finite verb. Nevertheless, though they may label *Embarcadero* as "no contribution," few historians will put down the book before reading to the last page.

What it has is integrity. It portrays the man of the sea, especially the pacific sea from Dutch Harbor to Tahiti, though the record runs round the Horn extend the geographic rotundity. There are the bad men and the brave men, predecessors of our beatniks, and the man sailing an 18-footer from Fisherman's Wharf to New Caledonia and Melbourne, the fabulous Bernard Gilboy. Old clippers breeze through the pages like bees.

Mutinies, kidnappings, piracy and barratry recall an earlier "freedom of the seas." Omnipotent captains rule with a marlin spike. Canvas and ropes spell out their authentic functions, and hurricanes tear hulls to skeletons. Mr. Dillon restores the flavor of the old Bay of San Francisco.

W. Eugene Shiels

Xavier University, Ohio

Money, Class, and Party: An Economic Study of Civil War and Reconstruction. By Robert P. Sharkey. *The John Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science.* Seventy-seventh Series, Number Two. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1959. Pp. 346. $5.50.

In this volume, Robert P. Sharkey carries forward the process of re-examining the evidence on which the prevailing interpretation of the Civil War and Reconstruction period is based. Professor Sharkey, like his mentor, C. Vann Woodward, is unimpressed by the historical clichés that bedevil that epoch of our history. He has not been awed by his august predecessors in the field, most of whom disagree with some, or all, of his conclusions.

Professor Sharkey has demolished the impression, fostered by the controversial historiography of Reconstruction, that the Radical Republicans subscribed to a single, consistent, economic program. On the contrary, he has convincingly shown that there were at least three distinct categories of Radical opinion on fiscal questions. In the first class may be found the extreme Radicals of the Thaddeus Stevens, Ben Wade, Ben Butler stripe, who supported the greenback issues, opposed currency contraction, and advocated a high protective tariff. Their adversaries in the financial controversies were more moderate in their attitude toward the South and argued strongly for a hard-money policy of contraction. This group numbered among its leading spokesmen James G. Blaine, William P. Fessenden, Justin S. Morrill, and James A. Garfield. A third faction, which held the balance of power between the contending fiscal extremes, included George W. Julian, John A. Logan, John Sherman, and George S. Boutwell. These men were less concerned with economic principles than with political expediency. During the war and early post-war years. this latter group aided the soft-money element while it was popular to oppose the contraction policy of Johnson's Secretary of the Treasury. The return of prosperity and the election of Grant on a hard-money platform in 1868, swung them into the hard-money camp. Only after that date, Mr. Sharkey contends, could the Republicans accurately be characterized as the sound money party.

Just as his analysis of the principles of the Radicals has destroyed the monolithic conception of that faction, the author's treatment of the capitalists' role in these years reveals gaping discrepancies in a hitherto largely

unchallenged solid front. The variations among the attitudes of the bankers toward Secretary McCulloch's contraction policy are particularly striking. The author identifies and explains the differences among the interests of the metropolitan bankers of the East, the urban bankers of the West, the rural bankers, and the private bankers of the eastern cities.

A major thesis of Mr. Sharkey's book is his contention that the greenback issues of the war period were necessary, as the sponsors of the program contended. This provocative view is most cogently argued. The author holds that neither a heavier tax program nor the sale of government securities for gold at prices substantially below par would have driven or tempted sufficient amounts out of the hoards to supply the currency needs of the government and the economy. Reliance on state bank notes, he reasons, would have been even more inflationary than the "necessary" expedient, issues of fiat money.

Through these and other provocative observations, Robert P. Sharkey's book has made an important contribution, broadening and deepening our understanding of a difficult and significant period in our history.

ROBERT W. MCCLUGGAGE

Loyola University, Chicago

Notes and Comments

The University of Wisconsin Press has done a noteworthy service to historians by reprinting this past March Carl Lotus Becker, *The History of Political Parties in the Province of New York, 1760–1776,* a scholarly gem of the first decade of this century. Moreover, the new book is in two forms, with the paper cover volume listed at one dollar and ninety-five cents, easily available to the short wallets of students, and the cloth cover listed at six dollars and fifty cents. In the Foreword, Arthur M. Schlesinger, points out the place of this earliest of Becker's books in his scholarly growth and the place of Becker in the development of objective historical scholarship. Professor Schlesinger terms the work, first published in 1909, "a minor classic of historical literature," and he considers it fundamental in the historiography of the American Revolution.

Coming from the same Press is a work which all Wisconsin alumni will be pleased to read and which many educators over the country will notice. This is *Some Ferments at Wisconsin, 1901-1947; Memories and Reflections,* by G. C. Sellery, Dean of the College of Letters and Science at the University of Wisconsin, 1919-1942. Canadian-born George Clark Sellery was prominent in the History Department at Madison from 1901, and after World War I gained renown for his administrative abilities as Dean. Now in 1960, looking back over his 87 years, he presents his memories of the important events in which he participated and his reflections upon the many controversies—the Van Hise and Frank philosophies of education, "the Round Robin against La Follette," the Experimental College, academic freedom, and intercollegiate athletics, to mention a few. The book in 124 pages is lithoprinted and is listed at two dollars and fifty cents.

* * * *

A warm welcome has been given to *Arizona and the West,* a Quarterly Journal of History, published by the University of Arizona, and edited by John Alexander Carroll. The first number appeared in the Spring of 1959, in excellent format, carrying illustrations and pen sketches. The number elicited numerous comments and suggestions. These are reviewed in scintillating

editorial remarks in the Summer issue under the heading "Orchids, Cacti, and Candor." After these explanations to readers of the Journal's scope and intent, Professor Carroll dedicates the number to the memory of Herbert Eugene Bolton in an essay to which all who knew the "giant among historians" will say "Amen." Since there is some dispute about the territorial boundaries of "the West," Professor Burl Noggle in a long article starts with a definition of the limits of "the Southwest," which, he says, "almost defies definition." The article, "Anglo Observers of the Southwest Borderlands, 1825-1890: The Rise of a Concept," is the vehicle for the comprehensive bibliography on the "Southwest" section of the "West." Four other articles are followed by an all-West book review section in a novel and pleasing typesetting job and by an equally attractive section "A Roundup of Western Reading," by The Old Bookaroos, B. W. Allred, J. C. Dykes, and F. G. Renner. *Arizona and the West* is well-launched on what we hope will be a long and profitable voyage. The annual subscription is five dollars.

* * * *

Two books on the history of banking have recently come from Public Affairs Press, Washington, D.C. *The American Bankers Association, Its Past and Present,* by Wilbert M. Schneider, Professor of Economics and Business Administration and currently Academic Dean of Emmanuel Missionary College. Herein is traced a general history of banking in the United States and the prominent part played by the Association from its constitution in 1873. Three periods of growth and development of the Association are particularly marked, each covering twenty-five years: 1875-1900, 1900-1925, 1925-1950. After setting the record forth chronologically, the author gives a comprehensive account of the structure of the ABA, its objectives, its policies with respect to public finance, government in banking, its legal and legislative activities, its wartime and peacetime services. The book will appeal to men of finance and will be useful to historians. It has 275 pages with an index and sells for $5.00.

The second book, *Women in Banking, a History of the National Association of Bank Women,* by Geniveve N. Gildersleeve, is precisely what the title states. The origin, purpose, development, and achievements of the Association, with sketches of the officers are presented in a factual account based upon the minutes and records of the Association. The book is in 115 pages and is listed at 3.25.

MID-AMERICA

An Historical Review

VOLUME 42, NUMBER 3 JULY 1960

MID-AMERICA

An Historical Review

JULY 1960

VOLUME 42 NUMBER 3

CONTENTS

NEGRO COLONIZATION: THE CLIMATE OF OPINION SURROUNDING LINCOLN, 1860-1865 . . . . *Robert H. Zoellner* 131

ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF GERMAN INTERVENTION IN THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR, 1936-1939 . . . . *Eugene H. Korth, S.J.* 151

TARASCON'S DREAM OF AN AMERICAN COMMERCIAL EMPIRE IN THE WEST *Doyce B. Nunis, Jr.* 170

NEW ORLEANS COURTS UNDER MILITARY OCCUPATION, 1861-1865 . . . *Elisabeth Joan Doyle,* 185

MANAGING EDITOR

JEROME V. JACOBSEN, *Chicago*

EDITORIAL STAFF

WILLIAM STETSON MERRILL
J. MANUEL ESPINOSA
W. EUGENE SHIELS
RAPHAEL HAMILTON
PAUL KINIERY
PAUL S. LIETZ

Published quarterly by Loyola University (The Institute of Jesuit History) at 50 cents a copy. Annual subscription, $2.00; in foreign countries, $2.50.

Entered as second class matter, August 7, 1929, at the post office at Chicago, Illinois, under the Act of March 3, 1879. Additional entry as second class matter at the post office at Effingham, Illinois. Printed in the United States.

Subscription and change of address notices and all communications should be addressed to the Managing Editor at the publication and editorial offices at Loyola University, 6525 Sheridan Road, Chicago 26, Illinois.

MID-AMERICA
An Historical Review
JULY 1960
VOLUME 42 NUMBER 3

Negro Colonization: The Climate of Opinion Surrounding Lincoln, 1860-65

The actual efforts toward colonization of the Negroes, both slave and free, during Lincoln's administration, and particularly the abortive experiments in the Hispanic area (notably the short-lived colonies projected in Haiti and Chiriqui), have been adequately examined.[1] Less attention has been directed to what might be called the general atmosphere or climate of opinion in which these specific colonization attempts were made. Likewise, Lincoln's public pronouncements on the colonization issue have been subjected to close scrutiny. But public pronouncements by public figures, deliberately conceived and carefully phrased, often serve only as a veil for motives and interests which, if baldly stated, would conflict with the demands of political expediency. There may be some value then, in attempting to fill in and highlight the background that surrounds those rather meager comments on colonization which Lincoln made public. This can perhaps best be done by examining those currents of opinion which were part of the political atmosphere of Washington during his administration.

Lincoln's personal, expressed attitudes toward the colonization issue are so well known as to require only the briefest review. As

[1] In particular, see Warren A. Beck, "Lincoln and Negro Colonization in Central America," *Abraham Lincoln Quarterly*, VI (September, 1950), 162–183; N. Andrew N. Cleven, "Some Plans for Colonizing Liberated Slaves in Hispanic America," *Journal of Negro History*, XI (January, 1926), 35–50; Walter F. Fleming, "Deportation and Colonization: An Attempted Solution to the Race Problem," *Studies in Southern History and Politics*, New York, 1914; Paul J. Scheips, "Lincoln and the Chiriqui Colonization Project," *Journal of Negro History*, XXXVII (October, 1952), 418–453; Charles Harris Wesley, "Lincoln's Plan for Colonizing the Emancipated Negroes," *Journal of Negro History*, IV (January, 1919), 7–21.

early as July 16, 1852, in a speech at Springfield, Illinois, Lincoln favorably quoted Henry Clay's dictum that "There is a moral fitness in the idea of returning to Africa her children, whose ancestors have been torn from her by the ruthless hand of fraud and violence."[2] But by October, 1854, the future President had come to realize that a simple sense of "moral fitness" would not solve the Negro problem. In a speech at Peoria, Illinois, during this month he confessed that his "first impulse would be to free all the slaves, and send them to Liberia, to their own native land." But he admitted that the logistics of such an undertaking presented insuperable difficulties. And yet, he continued, neither can we keep them in the United States as "underlings." "What next? Free them, and make them politically and socially our equals? My own feelings will not admit of this, and if mine would, we know that those of the great mass of whites will not. . . . A universal feeling [of racial antipathy], whether well or ill founded, cannot safely be ignored. We cannot make them equals."[3] The only solution, he feels, is "gradual emancipation."

But by June, 1857, he had come to see that emancipation, even if gradual, would bring inevitably in its train the dread problem of racial "amalgamation," an eventuality which must be avoided at all costs. Clearly, the only solution to the problem is colonization—if not to Africa, then to someplace else. "The separation of the races," he reasoned, "is the only perfect preventive of amalgamation. . . . Such separation, if ever effected at all, must be effected by colonization."[4] This conviction of the utter and eternal social incompatibility of black and white was still deep in Lincoln's consciousness in August, 1862, when he addressed a delegation of free Negroes at the White House. He called his audience's attention to a "broader [physical] difference than exists between almost any other two races." As a result, he continued, "not a single man of your race is made the equal of a single man of ours." He went on to say that the colored race was the "basis" for the whole tragedy of the war, and concluded that "It is better for us both, therefore, to be separated."[5]

---

[2] From Clay's speech before the American Colonization Society, 1827; in Lincoln's "Eulogy on Henry Clay Delivered in the State House at Springfield, Illinois, July 16, 1852," John G. Nicolay and John Hay (eds.), *Abraham Lincoln: Complete Works, Comprising His Speeches, Letters, Papers, and Miscellaneous Writings*, 12 vols., New York, 1894, II, 176.

[3] *Ibid.*, II, 206–207.

[4] *Ibid.*, II, 337–338.

[5] *Ibid.*, VIII, 2–9.

Now, what influences stand behind these public pronouncements by Lincoln on the subject of colonization? They are of course partially understandable, in the most general terms, as products of his frontier and Border-State inheritance. More specifically, when he came to the Presidency, he found himself surrounded by men, many of whom can be safely described as colonizationists. Lincoln's Postmaster General was Montgomery Blair, who had not only been counsel for Dred Scott, but had also been instrumental in finding a lawyer to defend John Brown. Blair was, moreover, the brother of Francis Preston Blair, possibly the most outspoken promoter of Negro colonization in Washington. Caleb Smith, Lincoln's Secretary of the Interior, was an enthusiastic colonizationist, as also was Edward Jordan, Solicitor of the Treasury. A little later, Lincoln seems to have lent an attentive ear, at least for a while, to the persuasive voice of the Reverend James Mitchell, Commissioner of Emigration. Gideon Welles, himself opposed to most of the colonization projects undertaken, noted in his *Diary* for September 26, 1862, that "for months, almost from the commencement of this administration, [colonization] has been at times considered."[6]

Still, an enumeration of these specific influences, which may have had a hand in shaping Lincoln's ultimate colonization policies, gives us only a relatively superficial view of the problem, takes into account, so to speak, only the facade. What motives, if any, lay beneath and behind those terms, usually altruistic and humanitarian in tenor, in which Lincoln couched his colonization proposals? To what extent did he absorb, consciously or perhaps unconsciously, the attitudes toward colonization which were part of the air of the war-torn capitol? To attempt an answer to such questions, insofar as they may be answered, we must turn to the utterances concerning colonization of those politicians who, being less in the public eye than the President, could afford to be less altruistic, more narrowly partisan, and, particularly, more *frank* in the elucidation of their motives.

The deep-rooted fear of "amalgamation" which Lincoln betrays is echoed clearly, for example, in the House *Report on Emancipation and Colonization.* The committee observed that "Much of the objection to emancipation arises from the opposition of a

---

[6] Carl Sandburg, *Abraham Lincoln: The War Years,* 4 vols., New York, 1939, I, 151–153; *The Diary of Gideon Welles,* 3 vols., Boston, 1911, I, 150–151.

large portion of our people to the *intermixture of the races,*[7] and from the association of white with black labor." The committee called attention to the "antipathy which nature has ordained," and insisted that the Negro "cannot, and ought not to, be admitted to our social and political privileges." They concluded with a statement of belief apparently as common in the North as South: "The Committee conclude that the highest interests of the white race, whether Anglo-Saxon, Celt, or Scandanavian, require that the whole country should be held and occupied by these races alone." Later in the *Report* they are even more explicit: "The Anglo-American looks upon every acre of our present domain as intended for him and not for the negro."[8]

To bolster this belief that the territories of the United States were meant from the beginning as an exclusive preserve of the blonde Nordic, appeals were made to the authority of the Founding Fathers and the early history of the country. On June 2, 1862, the subject of recognizing the republics of Haiti and Liberia, and of accepting black representatives from these states, was under discussion on the Senate floor. Senator S. S. Cox of Ohio was asked what objection he could have to a black man as official representative to our government. "Objection? Gracious heavens! what innocency!" was his immediate retort.

> Objection to receiving a black man on an equality with a white man in this country? Every objection which instinct, race, prejudice, and institutions make. I have been taught . . . that these Commonwealths and this Union were made for white men; that this Government is a Government of white men; that the men who made it never intended, by anything they did, to place the black race upon an equality with the white. The reasons for these wise precautions . . . are climatic, ethnological, economical, and social.[9]

The House committee concurred with Senator Cox, observing that "There is no instance afforded us in history where liberated slaves, even of the same race, have lived any considerable period in harmony with their former masters when denied equality with them." Thus did history, and American history in particular, seem to point up the wisdom of mass colonization. With a vivid consciousness of the hard realities of the situation, and with an accuracy approaching clairvoyance, the House committee prophesied:

---

[7] Italics mine.

[8] House *Report on Emancipation and Colonization*, 37 Cong., 2 Sess., House Exec. Doc. No. 148, 13–14, 16 (July 16, 1862).

[9] *Cong. Globe*, 37 Cong., 2 Sess., 2502 (June 2, 1862).

It matters not how wealthy, how intelligent, or how morally meritorious the Negro may become, so long as he remains among us the recollection of the former relation of master and slave will be perpetuated by the changeless color of the Ethiop's skin, and that color will alike be perpetuated by the degrading tradition of his former bondage.[10]

All of this makes it clear that Lincoln's convictions concerning the absolute necessity of colonization were not the product of an inherent narrowness of view, nor indicative of a lack of social imagination; they were, indeed, the respectable tenets of substantial and hard-headed politicians and statesmen of the age. Nevertheless, such beliefs, held as they were by a majority both North and South, made, in the words of Senator Willey of Virginia, "the nominal boon of freedom to the Negro in this country, so long as he is to remain in this country, . . . a mockery and a delusion."[11]

That the racial issue, *as such,* was foremost in the minds of the men in government was made clear by Senator F. P. Blair of Missouri in his speech of April 11, 1862. He asserted flatly that

It was the *negro question,* and not the *slavery question* which made the rebellion. . . . If the rebellion was made by two hundred and fifty thousand slave-holders, for the sake of perpetuating slavery, then it might be a complete remedy to extirpate the institution; but if the rebellion has grown out of the abhorrence of the non-slaveholders for emancipation and amalgamation, and their dread of 'Negro equality,' how will their discontent be cured by the very measure [emancipation] the mere apprehension of which has driven them into rebellion?

Emancipation without colonization, he asserted, would merely aggravate the already existing social tensions. The cure would be more pernicious than the disease itself.[12] If there was popular acceptance of Blair's possibly partisan thesis, that it was the "negro question," and not slavery, that generated the Civil War, then the pressure for colonization as the essential concomitant of emancipation becomes considerably clearer.

All of this underscores the fact that not only Lincoln's opinions but also the general climate of opinion surrounding him pointed to colonization as the only satisfactory solution to the social and political problems generated by the inescapable doctrine of emancipation, be it immediate or gradual. In 1865, James Mitchell,

---

10 House *Report on Emancipation and Colonization,* 15.
11 *Cong. Globe,* 37 Cong., 2 Sess., 1606 (April 10, 1862).
12 *Ibid.,* 1632.

the Commissioner of Emigration, recalled that during the early part of his administration

> Mr. Lincoln thought a *world-wide necessity existed* for a combination with England on this question, and acted accordingly, believing that a union of two powers such as the United States and Great Britain could bring a third power into being for the benefit of the colored race. . . . I will never forget the fullness and emphasis of [Lincoln's] utterance, . . . when I first brought this colonization of the British colonies [Honduras and Guiana] to his notice. On asking permission to bring it to the notice of our able Secretary of State, he remarked, 'Surely! If England wants our Negroes, and will do better by them than we can, I say let her have them, and may God bless her!'

Indeed, the Reverend Mitchell's recollection of the strength of Lincoln's feelings at this period seems to be confirmed by the President's unequivocal stand for colonization in his first *Annual Message to Congress.* "On this whole proposition," he asked, "including the appropriation of money with the acquisition of territory, does not the expediency amount to absolute necessity—that without which the government cannot be perpetuated?"[13] Lincoln clearly felt late in 1861 that the failure of the colonization project could well mean the total failure of the Union.

It should be noted, however, that there were pressures working in the opposite direction—against colonization. Many thoughtful observers did not share Lincoln's confidence in the moral fitness and social efficacy of Negro deportation. Professor Fleming, in discussing the American Colonization Society, suggests that its guiding principle was that "the black race was inferior to the white and that in American society there was no place for the free blacks." As a result, he continues, the colonizationists from the very beginning were accused of "encouraging race prejudice and thus strengthening the bonds of slavery."[14] It seems reasonable to assume that these unfavorable attitudes would easily attach

---

[13] James Mitchell, *Brief on Emigration and Colonization and Report in Answer to a Resolution of the Senate,* Washington, 1865, 10; Lincoln's *Annual Message to Congress,* December 3, 1861, in Nicolay and Hay (eds.), *Lincoln: Works,* VII, 51. The Reverend Mitchell's remarks, here and elsewhere in this study, should be taken *cum grano salis.* He proved a very troublesome gadfly to both Seward and Welles, and his *Brief,* a masterful piece of salesmanship, is clearly written with a sharp eye to his own self-interest; the post of Commissioner of Emigration was a plum he was obviously struggling to keep.

[14] Walter F. Fleming, "Deportation and Colonization: An Attempted Solution to the Race Problem," *Studies in Southern History and Politics,* New York, 1914, 6.

themselves to Lincoln's public statements on the problem. At any rate, Charles Sumner succinctly stated the anti-colonizationist attitude in economic, social, and moral terms in a speech before the State Committee of Massachusetts during 1861. He placed great stress on the "intrinsic and fatal injustice" of any colonization plan. Colonization, he continued, "will deprive the country of that it needs most, which is labor. . . . It is vain to say that this is a white man's country. . . . It is a country of man. Whoever disowns any member of the human family as brother disowns God as father, and thus becomes impious as well as inhuman."[15] Frederick Douglass, too, thought Lincoln's colonization policy a serious mistake. "The colored race," he emphasized, "can never be respected anywhere till they are respected in America. The true policy of the colored American is to make himself, in every way open to him, an American citizen, bearing with proscription and insult till these things disappear."[16]

Some critics of colonization, however, saw no need to fall back upon such tenuous moral and philosophical arguments. The entire colonization proposal, they were sure, was simply impossible in any practical terms, and the sooner we gave up such visionary schemes the sooner we could deal realistically with the problems at hand. Senator J. P. Hale of New Hampshire is representative of this hard-headed school. On April 10, 1862, he thundered from the Senate floor his conviction that colonization

> is one of the most absurd ideas that ever entered into the head of man or woman. . . . Any gentleman that will take the tonnage of our national vessels, . . . and calculate the number of souls each would carry to Liberia, the number of voyages each vessel could make, and the time that would be necessary, and cipher it all out, will find that . . . the whole Navy of the United States could not carry off the annual increase. No, sir; this is a problem we have got to solve.[17]

On June 2, 1862, Senator Biddle of Pennsylvania declared that he shared with the representatives of the Border States their apprehension over the consequences of emancipation. He was sure his constituents would become properly alarmed over the emancipation measures then being agitated, were they not "lulled and put to sleep with the word 'colonization.' I say the word," he em-

---

15 *Charles Sumner, His Complete Works*, 20 vols., Boston, 1900, XII, section 3, 334.
16 Sandburg, *Lincoln: The War Years*, II, 184.
17 *Cong. Globe*, 37 Cong., 2 Sess., 1605 (April 10, 1862).

phasized, "not the thing; for no practicable and adequate scheme for it has ever been presented or devised. The word is sung to us as a sort of 'lullaby.'" Colonization, he implied, is a merely verbal edifice erected to conceal the dangers and horrors of "general, precipitate emancipation." But the astute Pennsylvania Senator refused to be fooled:

> When I see men bent on breaking down the dikes and opening the floodgates that shut out an inundation, I am not tranquillized, because some philanthropist stands by with a pint mug, promising to bail it out again. Colonization may carry off the leakage and running over; but if you suddenly let in the floods, it will prove but a 'pint mug' measure of relief.

And he concluded with inexorable logic, "If you really meant to colonize the Negroes, you should not set them free till you were ready to colonize them."[18]

Yet the sour-heads and the cynical, although they stated their suspicion and contempt in terms loud and long, failed utterly to deprive the idea of a certain fatal fascination. Moreover, on the surface at least, a spirit of altruism with regard to the welfare of the Negro seemed to prevail. This spirit was given succinct expression by Senator Lyman Trumbull; he said he would be

> glad to see the free Negroes of this country settled where they could assert all the rights and occupy the place of freemen, without any domineering race; where they would not only have civil and political rights, legal rights, but where their social rights and privileges would be upon a level with all the community with whom they associated.

The lush tropical country of Central and South America seemed just the place to put this altruistic spirit into concrete, practical terms. Senator F. P. Blair of Missouri insisted on April 11, 1862, that the failure of the Liberian experiment should in no way discourage men of humanitarian impulses from investigating the possibilities of Central and South America. "There is a vast difference," he asserted, ". . . between the idea of being colonized on our own continent, under our own flag, and being buried in Africa. It is the difference between life and death, home and banishment."[19]

Many arguments were devised to establish the "moral fitness" and general feasibility of colonization in the Hispanic area. Some argued that both Nature and the God of Nature were in favor of Caribbean or South American colonization. James Mitchell,

---

[18] *Ibid.*, 2504–2505 (June 2, 1862).
[19] *Ibid.*, 1604 (April 10, 1862); *ibid.*, 1633 (April 11, 1862).

Commissioner of Emigration, probably expressed a long-held view in 1865 when he injected Divine Wisdom into the colonization discussion. He pontificated:

> The Tropical Belt of the Old and New World, is a field interdicted by an all-wise Providence to our healthful habitation—and in equity to the tropical man it should be interdicted to our dominion, and will be when republican economy prevails therein, for then it will be ruled by the actual occupants of the soil.[20]

Senator James R. Doolittle of Wisconsin called upon the well worn but always serviceable argument-from-Nature to reinforce the intentions of Divine Providence in this respect. Colonization, he remarked,

> is in accordance with the natural laws of climate, in accordance with the difference of constitution existing between these two races; a solution to which nature itself is pointing; a solution by which the tropics are to be given to the man of the tropics, and the temperate zone to the man of the temperate zone.

He concluded that Hispanic colonization was "God's solution," and warned that "it is easier to work with Him than to work against Him, and wiser, too."[21]

Senator Blair also found the "natural law" argument too attractive to be ignored. He went a step farther by bringing statistics to the aid of intuition, attempting to establish that Negro colonization was clearly and unequivocally within the realm of divinely decreed natural law. He called attention to the fact that "The census shows . . . [the Negro population] gravitates to the tropics, so that, even under existing conditions, it is but a question of time." Moreover, he assured his auditors that this peripatetic swarm of black men, moved continually toward the Equator through the dictates of an inexorable migratory instinct, would even "free itself when it gets there, . . . so irresistible is natural law." He suggested that President Lincoln, by virtue of his activities in the cause of colonization, only proposed "to obey this natural and irresistible law and facilitate its operation." Not content with this appeal to a somewhat chimerical law of Nature, Blair indulged in the old metaphor of bleeding the feverish body: "It is the disregard of [natural law] which has created the disorder under which the body politic is now suffering. Can it be

---

[20] *Brief on Emigration and Colonization*, 10.
[21] *Cong. Globe*, 37 Cong., 2 Sess., Appendix, 99 (April 11, 1862).

doubted that the fever will abate rapidly when [Lincoln's] policy is adopted?" Blair was so certain that this law of racial segregation would operate with Newtonian inevitability, that once Lincoln's colonization plans were put into effect, he envisioned

> an outpouring of this [Negro] population like the outpouring of the Mississippi when a crevasse is opened. It is indeed so manifest that this population tends by nature to that region, that I could as soon doubt that water would seek its level when permitted to flow, as that this race would not seek its natural home when at liberty to go there.[22]

Besides God—and God's felicitous arrangement of natural law—more concrete and visible arguments were behind Lincoln's push for colonization. The foreign situation injected itself when the American foreign correspondents in Europe, particularly Carl Schurz in Madrid and Motley in Vienna, assured the President that the European nations would certainly recognize the Confederacy unless the North brought itself to a clear-cut statement of policy with regard to the emancipation of slaves. This intelligence no doubt reacted directly upon the colonization issue, since colonization and emancipation were inextricably bound up together in the eyes of Lincoln and his administration. Senator Doolittle remarked that "every man, woman, and child who comes from these [Southern] States, tells me that it is utterly impossible for them to talk of emancipation within any slave State without connecting it with the idea of colonization." Colonization, obviously, was to act as a sugar coating for the bitter pill of emancipation: "The idea, the hope of colonization," suggested Doolittle, ". . . will aid emancipation in all the Slave States." Just the day previously, Senator Willey of Virginia had warned vehemently against "by wholesale and at once, throw[ing] upon the community a great mass of this ignorant, servile, useless, dangerous, disorganizing population." If, he argued, the government perseveres in this policy of manumission, then should not "some provision . . . be made whereby they shall be removed from our midst?" The Virginia Senator pointed to the black codes being erected in such states as New Jersey, Illinois, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. These codes were actually, in his view, "constitutional interdictions against the diffusion of this population, while at the same time you [addressing the representatives of these states] want to manumit our slaves and throw them broadcast on our community." Without colonization,

---

[22] *Cong. Globe*, 37 Cong., 2 Sess., 1633 (April 11, 1862).

he threatened, and in the face of the Northern black codes, Virginia will inevitably be driven "not only to reenslave those who may be manumitted . . . but also to reenslave the sixty thousand free Negroes already there."[23] Colonization is the safety valve; the only way to keep the lid from blowing off.

In his second *Annual Message to Congress,* December 1, 1862, Lincoln himself stressed the *combination* of emancipation and colonization as the clear solution to the problem posed by Senators Doolittle and Willey. With an eye to the North's fears of a black innundation, he said that the Negroes came North only because they were fleeing from "bondage and destitution" in the South. "But if gradual emancipation and deportation be adopted, they will have neither to flee from." They will be able to remain in the South, working for wages under their old masters, "till new homes can be found for them in congenial climes and with people of their own blood and race."[24]

Both Lincoln and members of his administration appear to have had additional motives for pressing colonization, some clearly stated and others rather carefully concealed. Many saw colonization as an excellent excuse for the United States to expand her territorial dominions, as part of the developing doctrine of Manifest Destiny. At the same time, Lincoln seems to have regarded Negro deportation as one possible solution to the free white labor problem. At any rate, he combined the motives of territorial acquisition and Negro colonization when, in his 1861 *Message to Congress* he touched on the problem of acquiring territory for the Negro. He remarked that "having practiced the acquisition of territory for nearly sixty years, the question of constitutional power is no longer an open one with us." Whether by this comment Lincoln had in mind ceding the purchased territory to the colonizers, or whether he intended to establish the Negro territory as a protectorate of the United States, is not clear. Either way, territorial purchase in Haiti or Central America would be jusified since "the emigration of colored men leaves additional room for white men remaining or coming here." Colonization, as Lincoln saw it, would not materially weaken the labor market in the United States. Rather, his argument ran,

---

[23] Sandburg, *Lincoln: The War Years,* I, 574; *Cong. Globe,* 37 Cong., 2 Sess., Appendix, 98 (April 11, 1862); *ibid.,* Pt. 2, 1604–1605 (April 10, 1862).

[24] James D. Richardson (comp.), *A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents,* 10 vols., Washington, 1890–99, VII, 3342.

With deportation . . . enhanced wages to white labor is [*sic*] mathematically certain. Labor is like any other commodity in the market—increase the demand for it and you increase the price of it. Reduce the supply of black labor by colonizing the black laborer out of the country, and by precisely so much you increase the demand for and wages of white labor.[25]

Thus, Negro deportation would kill two fat birds with one neat stone: the status of the white laboring force in the United States would be measurably raised and at the same time we might acquire a useful addition to our territorial holdings.

Lincoln's comments on the labor problem, on the socio-economic advantages of colonization, and on territorial acquisition for colonization as a tempting corollary of Manifest Destiny, are, unfortunately, rather fragmentary. But these less-than-altruistic motives, which the President seems to have masked with more or less effectiveness, received frank discussion in the halls of Congress. The members of the House Committee on Emancipation and Colonization argued that in losing the black labor supply we wouldn't be sacrificing anything of great value. The Negro, these gentlemen seemed convinced, will generally do one-fifth the work of a white man: "Of the four or five millions of colored people now in the United States the net of their productive and unencumbered labor may be reduced, when subjected to the standard of numbers, to probably one-fifth of that amount." This loss of five-million-workers-divided-by-five would leave a very desirable labor-vacuum, the committee felt, which would quickly be filled up with immigrants from the over-crowded fields of Europe.[26]

Now, this was only one of the many advantages which would accrue to the United States if Negro colonization were vigorously prosecuted. Not only would colonization produce only a negligible reduction in the available labor force, but in addition the country would actually *increase* in wealth. Even a superficial observer cannot (so the House committee's argument ran) fail to notice the

---

[25] Lincoln's First *Annual Message to Congress*, December 3, 1861, in Nicolay and Hay (eds.), *Lincoln: Works*, II, 50–51; *The African Repository*, XXXVII (December, 1861), 375. That Lincoln was actively pursuing the goal of territorial acquisition seems clear by implication in a letter from Caleb Smith to Lincoln, May 16, 1862. "The constitution of New Granada," said Smith, "expressly prohibits the government . . . from transferring to any foreign power any part of their territory. . . . It is not probable that the right of sovereignty can be obtained over any of the places in which colonization has been proposed." *A Report from the Department of the Interior on the Transportation, Settlement, and Colonization of Persons of the African Race*, 39 Cong., 1 Sess., Sen. Exec. Doc. No. 55, 10 (June 15, 1866).

[26] House *Report on Emancipation and Colonization*, 16–17.

differing levels of prosperity in, for instance, Kentucky and Ohio. They are adjacent states, both lying in the magnificent and fruitful Ohio Valley. Moreover, the area of the two states is very nearly equal. One would therefore assume that Ohio and Kentucky would be equally prosperous, equally well populated. But the committee emphasized that such was not the case. "Ohio now contains 2,339,599 and Kentucky only 1,155,713 [persons]." This unfortunate disparity, they concluded, could only be explained by the presence of a large Negro population. The committee reasoned:

> If a similar comparison of the progress of any one of the old free States with any one of the old slave States be instituted, as New York with Virginia, or Massachusetts with South Carolina, it will be seen that while the slave States enjoy a superiority in almost all the natural advantages of soil, climate, mineral and forest products, the free States have by their system of free labor wrought out for themselves a superiority in almost everything that can tend to elevate a State or community in the scale of progressive civilization.

Even on a more narrow geographical scale this rule held true. The committee suggested a comparison between the northern and southern counties of Delaware. The northern counties, with their negligible slave population, had far outstripped the southern, where slave labor was extensively developed. In a word, the whole tenor of the House *Report* suggested that deportation of the Negro population might well be the magic panacea for all the economic ills of the backward states of the Union.[27]

The siren song of Manifest Destiny and imperialistic ambition runs with a bold frankness through the next argument for colonization which the House *Report* presented. The committee noted that "The very cornerstone of [British] prosperity consists in her colonial system." Now, their argument ran, the vast territories of our Southern Hemisphere could be one of the most productive areas on the surface of the earth, if they could only be populated with an intelligent people adapted to the rigors of the tropics. The committee called attention to the fact that the European powers had long been conscious of the tremendous economic potential of this area as was evident from their many (unsuccessful) attempts to colonize it. The great difficulty was that the Anglo-Saxon tended to degenerate in equatorial regions—and yet here at our very feet lay the golden opportunity to develop a colonial empire

27 *Ibid.*

to exceed even that of the British in wealth and power. Was there no way to seize the golden apple so temptingly proffered? Perhaps. The House committee merely asked one to

> imagine what would be the result of planting five millions of American Negroes, far superior in skill and intelligence to those of Cuba, in a country equal to the Queen of the Antilles, protected by our power and directed by our intelligence, and stimulated to exertion by those motives which the wants of civilization which they have acquired among us, have never failed to supply, and which are higher and more efficient than any other which can animate men.

At this point the committee waxed ecstatic at the prospect:

> If we add to this the certain result of extending our power and influence, through their instrumentality, over the millions of people who already inhabit these regions, we shall be able to form some conception of the value to our commerce which the foundation of such a colony would confer.

Beyond doubt, here was the way to convert black dross to black gold! Moreover, in furthering our ambitions the Negro would be merely paying off a just debt. The Negro, the committee felt, clearly owes what culture he possesses to the white civilization in which he has lived:

> They have been instructed in agriculture, and the mechanic arts; they have learned our language, our religion, and have become familiarized with our customs, which form the body of our law and science of government, by long contact with our people.

Best of all, the Negro freedmen would, as colonizers, be exceptionally amenable to our enlightened direction. The committee spoke approvingly of "their natural docility of temper and subordination to authority; no one should doubt their capacity to maintain a free and independent government under the guidance and patronage of our republic."[28]

To buttress these arguments, the House *Report* quoted the New York *Courier and Inquirer,* which delivered the opinion that "this negro race must necessarily take possession of the tropical regions on this continent and the islands adjacent, to which they may be transported. They will," the article continued, "expel the whites by the same law of nature which has given the black exclusive possession of corresponding latitudes in Africa." The committee quoted similar sentiments from the *New York Tribune*:

---

[28] *Ibid.*, 21–24.

Now, it is obvious that in this great body of civilized Negroes, we have, if we did but know how to use them, and were willing to do so, a most powerful and essential instrument toward extending ourselves, as it were—through all the American torrid zone.

The *Tribune,* with disarming frankness, went on to urge that we make the most of "this great instrumentality toward bringing within our grasp those vast regions upon which we have fixed such covetous glances."[29]

Senator Doolittle articulated for the benefit of the Senate the same idea which had motivated the House *Report.* He envisioned the proposed South American colony as a "support against foreign intervention," and assured his colleagues that such a colony would "feel bound to us by interest, gratitude, and friendship forever." Apparently feeling that we should cede any purchased land to the Negro colonizers, he still was sure that the colony, "Although not a part of our territorial dominion, . . . will be within our commercial dominion." The fortitious consequence would be a "practical annexation for all commercial purposes to the Government of the United States." The advantages of this arrangement were obvious: "It is," he said, "as good and better for us than if we should own the sovereignty of the territory, and be at the expense and trouble of governing it."[30]

The situation during the early years of Lincoln's administration might then be summed up in a single sentence: the motives for deportation and colonization of the Negro were many and strong. As emancipation of some sort became inevitable, so deportation and colonization of the Negro began to appear inevitable, necessary, and imperative. The most pressing question was, was it financially and physically possible to transport four or five millions of Negroes out of the country? Senator Doolittle, that erstwhile Wisconsin advocate of colonization, felt that it was. He called attention to the tremendous migrations from Great Britain and Ireland to the shores of the United States; in the ten year period from 1847 to 1856, he reported, 2,800,000 persons had successfully crossed the "stormy Atlantic." The obvious conclusion was that if they could do it, so could we for the benefit of our Negro brethren. With Senator Hale of New Hampshire playing the part of Doubting Thomas, Senator Doolittle "ciphered it out" on the Senate blackboard. He first produced figures on the annual

[29] *Ibid.,* 27–28.
[30] *Cong. Globe,* 37 Cong., 2 Sess., Appendix, 99 (April 11, 1862).

increase in Negro population in the United States, and then attempted to establish that six steamships of a large class, or "indeed one single monster like the *Great Eastern,* carrying 12,000 passengers, could carry a number of slaves equal to the annual increase in no more than eight trips to Liberia, or seven times the annual increase to some nearer point of colonization in the Southern Hemisphere of America." Assuming that we could deport at the rate of 150,000 Negroes a year, a very possible figure, then, Senator Doolittle promised, "the last remnant of the slave population would be removed by 1907." If, he continued, we should deport 350,000 slaves annually (a not impossible figure), "the removal would be complete by 1877." To make the point theoretically, Doolittle established to his own satisfaction (if not that of his auditors), that "one single trip of all the vessels of the United States would take the whole of this [present Negro] population." He asked if the illegal slavers, under the ban of piracy, and "moved by base cupidity alone," could smuggle fifty thousand slaves three thousand miles every year, "cannot a great nation, in the interests of freedom, humanity, and the glory of all mankind, colonize annually forty thousand men in the best and richest countries in the world, lying almost at its feet?" The cost might be large, but would certainly be worth it. Senator Doolittle estimated $50.00 per head, and put himself on record as willing to appropriate $50,000,000 to get the job done.[31]

It was in this climate of opinion, then, that Lincoln took concrete steps in the direction of mass Negro colonization. On August 6, 1861, Congress abolished slavery in the District of Columbia. In his first Annual Message Lincoln urged that numbers of these slaves, "thus liberated, are already dependent on the United States, and must be provided for in some way." He suggested that "steps be taken for colonizing [them] at some place or places con-

---

[31] *Ibid.,* 94-97. Senator Doolittle's estimate is probably fairly accurate. *The African Repository* claimed in July, 1866, that they had shipped a total of 11,288 slaves to Liberia; during the same period their receipts were $2,499,531.96. If we ignore overhead and roughly assume that receipts were approximately equal to expenditures, we arrive at an average cost of shipment per head of something like $216.00. Since the voyage to Haiti or Central America would be substantially shorter than that to Africa, Doolittle's figure of $50.00 probably constitutes a realistic estimate. Indeed, the United States Marshall for the City of New York estimated that the rock-bottom price for shipment to either Haiti or Chiriqui would be $25.00 per head, exclusive of medical expenses. 39 Cong., 1 Sess., Sen. Exec. Doc. No. 55, 9; also see *The African Repository,* XLII (July, 1866), 222-223.

genial to them." He thought that free Negroes, "so far as individuals may desire," should be included in this plan.[32]

On April 16, 1862, Congress appropriated $100,000 for compensated emancipation and colonization from the District.[33] At about this same time, the State Department extended recognition to both Liberia and Haiti; this new law, in which both of these countries were specifically mentioned, probably motivated this step. Difficulties began to loom up on May 9, 1862, when Caleb Smith, Secretary of the Interior, reported that Liberia, because of "the unhealthiness of the climate, as well as the great distance from this country," would probably never develop into a major colonization point. At the same time he warned Lincoln that the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty with Great Britain might prevent the United States from colonizing "any part of Central America."[34]

On July 22, 1862, Lincoln addressed the Border-State representatives, speaking, in spite of unpromising prospects, of "room in South America for colonization [which] can be obtained cheaply and in abundance."[35] Shortly after this, on July 17, 1862, the Confiscation Act was signed into law; section twelve made provision for colonization of freed slaves in "some tropical country."[36] To facilitate this measure, the day before, on July 16, $500,000 had been appropriated, in addition to the $100,000 already set aside, to be applied to the "probable passage of a confiscation bill."[37] On August 14, 1862, Lincoln urged a delegation of colored freemen to become proselytes among their own people in the cause of Hispanic colonization.[38] A little over a month later, he published the Proclamation of Emancipation, September 22, 1862. While the Proclamation itself makes no reference to colonization, the adoption of this expedient as the logical, inevitable, and imperative consequence of emancipation seems to have been generally assumed. At least James Mitchell so interpreted it three years later, in retrospect. Even if something is discounted because of Mitchell's evident personal interest in the matter, it is interesting to note that

---

[32] Nicolay and Hay (eds.), *Lincoln: Works*, VII, 49–50.

[33] John G. Nicolay and John Hay, *Abraham Lincoln: A History*, 10 vols., New York, 1890, V, 216-217; *Report on Colonization and Emancipation, Made to the Secretary of the Interior, by the Agent of Emigration*, Emigration Office of the United States, Washington, 1862, 5.

[34] 39 Cong., 1 Sess., Sen. Exec. Doc. No. 55, 78 (June 15, 1866).

[35] Nicolay and Hay (eds.), *Lincoln:Works*, VII, 272.

[36] Mitchell, *Brief on Emigration and Colonization*, 1–2.

[37] Nicolay and Hay, *Lincoln: A History*, VI, 356-357.

[38] Sandburg, *Lincoln: The War Years*, I, 575; Nicolay and Hay (eds.), *Lincoln: Works*, VIII, 1–9.

he considered the Proclamation "a colonization document, both as to *words and intention.*" Lincoln intended the Proclamation, insisted Mitchell, to be a "colonization measure of the *most solemn and binding character,* . . . An instrument 'of Providence,' in all its words and terms, against which resistance will prove madness and folly; the same mind that designed it to be an instrument of emancipation designed it equally to be an instrument of colonization —*it was intended to be so.*"[39]

On December 1, 1862, in his second Annual Message, Lincoln reached the apex of his personal efforts and public utterances on the desirability of colonization. He proposed the ultimate step, Constitutional amendment, which would permit Congress to "appropriate money and otherwise provide for colonizing free colored persons, with their own consent at any place or places without the United States."[40]

Behind this final fruitless attempt to give colonization the impressive sanction of Constitutional law was not only strong Congressional sentiment, but also a new element: pressure, in the form of tempting proposals, from abroad. Senator Mala of Ecuador, for example, offered to sell large tracts of land on the western coast of South America. Like most of the land speculators and sharpers who contacted Lincoln, he described his holdings as a veritable Garden of Eden. "The fertility of the soil," he assured the President, "is as great as that on the banks of the Nile. An acre will produce 500 pounds of cotton, . . . [and] one pound of rice will produce one hundred pounds." The Netherlands, too, inquired whether the "United States government will be disposed to cooperate . . . in the transportation of free colored laborers . . . to the Netherland colony of Surinam." Such freedmen would have to engage to labor on a plantation for a term, perhaps five years, after which they would be granted citizenship and free land of their own. Denmark called the attention of the American government to the serious labor shortage on the island of St. Croix. The Danish terms: "free transport to St. Croix for all those who engage to labor on a sugar plantation for a term of three years—the emigrants to . . . receive the same compensation for their labor, as the free rural population." No mention was made of eventual rights

[39] Mitchell, "Letter to James Harlan, Secretary of the Interior," in *Brief on Emigration and Colonization*, 1, 3.
[40] Nicolay and Hay (eds.), *Lincoln: Works*, VIII, 117.

or liberties for the freedmen.[41] The English offered to take 10,000 slaves per year for British Guiana, on terms of five year indenture. The slaves, they assured Lincoln, would be provided with "houses and land for gardens, rent free, [and] a hospital and doctor, under the inspection of the colonial government." They also suggested British Honduras, calling particular attention to the fact that in Honduras "foreigners can . . . become members of [the] colonial legislative body."[42]

Concerning the quality of these and other colonization proposals, James Mitchell complained later that while

> Several persons have at sundry times offered to make contracts . . . [they did so] on terms which, to a great extent, ignored the true interest of the emigrant. . . . [A]n undue regard to personal emolument . . . and a want of true liberality to the man of color, have been so clearly manifested, that I thought it best to decline the completion of all such contracts. . . .[43]

In consequence, only two experiments even approached final realization: these were, of course, the abortive Chiriqui and Haitian projects, whose story has already been adequately told.

The collapse of the Chiriqui negotiations, and the pitiful fiasco in Haiti, spelled the virtual end of Lincoln's attempts to deport the Negro. The champions of colonization must have watched with deep chagrin as one project after another failed, or was still-born.

While the disgruntled and half-starved Haiti colonists were being shipped back to Washington, one final attempt was made to prevent, through colonization, the dreaded "amalgamation." Senator J. H. Lane of Kansas spoke on the Senate floor February 16, 1864. His plan: colonize the freedmen in Texas. He suggested that all white regiments now on the southwestern frontier be withdrawn, and immediately replaced by colored troops. The families of these colored soldiers should be transported to Texas with the regiments, to form the nucleus of a settlement. If this colonization bill should be passed, said Lane, then "I can tell the man of color that the hour of his deliverance from the bondage of Egypt has come, and that unless he removes he is doomed to sink into a hopeless minority in the older states for all coming time." Lane saw no difficulty in financing this Texas venture; the $600,000

---

[41] *Report on Colonization and Emigration, Made to the Secretary of the Interior*, 9, 16–17, 26.

[42] 39 Cong., 1 Sess., Sen. Exec. Doc. No. 55, 8 (June 15, 1866); *Report on Colonization and Emigration, Made to the Secretary of the Interior*, 18–19.

[43] Mitchell, *Brief on Emigration and Colonization*, 13.

already appropriated for tropical colonization should simply be diverted to this new plan. The area which he had in mind was

> bounded upon the south by the Gulf of Mexico, on the east by the Colorado River, on the west by the Rio Grande, on the north by almost impassable mountains, securing [the freedmen] from the inroads of Indians. . . . In respect to location, no territory on the face of the globe is more desirable for the habitation of the black man.

He concluded with the warning that the Negro could never remain in the South and be happy.

> The nation should make a reasonable effort to secure for the millions of freed men proper homes in a habitable and desirable country on our southwestern border, where climate and country will be congenial to the wants of our people of color, and where, by acquiring an undisputed title to the soil, and an independent local organization, they may enjoy the privileges of republican civilization, and there concentrate their whole strength for mutual improvement.[44]

Senator Lane's eloquence, however, came too late; by this date the administration was, apparently, heartily sick of the whole colonization issue. The Texas colony never got beyond the talking stage. The climate of opinion had, by 1864, changed materially, and the Negro was finding at least a temporary niche in the many work-gangs needed for reconstruction and national expansion.

The motives and interests behind colonization, then, were far more complex than Lincoln's scanty utterances on the subject might lead us to believe. In many cases, the surface altruism masked a pervasive and various self-interest. It would, of course, be presumptuous to assign such motives to Lincoln where no proof exists. Nonetheless, an objective evaluation of his stand on the colonization issue cannot safely be made without a close scrutiny of the background against which he moved to solve, if he could, the "Negro problem."

ROBERT H. ZOELLNER

Colorado State University
Fort Collins

---

[44] James Henry Lane, *Vindication of the Policy of the Administration: Speech of Hon. J. H. Lane, of Kansas, in the Senate of the United States, February 16, 1864, on the Special Order, Being Senate Bill No. 45, to Set Apart a Portion of the State of Texas for the Use of Persons of African Descent*, Washington, 1864, 6, 10, 13, 14-15.

Economic Aspects of German Intervention in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939

Some twenty years ago, on March 28, 1939, one of the bloodiest civil wars in Spanish history came to an end. Although most of the issues raised by the war have long since died out, there are still several questions which merit discussion. One of these is the problem of German intervention in the struggle.

Regarding the fact of intervention there is, of course, no dispute. Nazi participation in the crisis was evident to many observers from the very first weeks of the conflict.[1] But the reasons for this participation were not equally clear. Why, precisely, did Hitler decide to intervene on the side of Franco during the war? Scholarly opinion is still divided on the question, and this very lack of unanimity makes a reappraisal of the evidence all the more important. For on the answer to that question depends in large measure an accurate understanding of Hispano-German relations during the war as well as in the critical period following the outbreak of World War II.

Most historians favor the view that military and political considerations were primarily responsible for German intervention in Spain. A glance at the map of Europe explains why this is so. Situated as it is at the gateway to the Mediterranean, with its southern extremity pointed towards Africa and its western seaboard flanking the Atlantic at four strategic points, Spain was in an excellent geographical position to serve as a base of operations for

---

1 As early as July 28, 1936, just eleven days after the beginning of hostilities, German planes appeared in Morocco to assist in transporting rebel (Nationalist) troops across the Strait of Gibraltar to the mainland. Two days later, on July 30, the first of numerous shipments of men and matériel left Germany for the Iberian Peninsula. This active military aid, which characterized much of the war, clearly indicated that the German Government was taking more than a passing interest in the outcome of the conflict. Ludwig Lore, "Intervention in Spain," *Current History,* Vol. XLV (November, 1936), 42; A. Ramos Oliveira, *Politics, Economics and Men of Modern Spain 1808–1946,* London, 1946, 588–589; Claude G. Bowers, *My Mission to Spain, Watching the Rehearsal for World War II,* New York, 1954, 259, 272. For a refutation of Bowers' charge that Germany and Italy were using the war as a means of establishing a Fascist state in Spain, see Salvador de Madariaga, *Spain, A Modern History,* New York, 1958, 481–482, and George Orwell, *Homage to Catalonia,* Boston, 1952, 48.

Germany in the event of a general European conflagration. Control of the Spanish ports of El Ferrol, Vigo, and Coruña in the north, of the Canary Islands in the south, and of the Balearic Islands in the east would enable German sea and air forces to close the Mediterranean to enemy commerce and to sever the important lines of communication between England and France and their colonial empires in Africa and the Far East. Gibraltar could be rendered doubly ineffective through a series of fortifications along the coast of Spanish Morocco and in the neighborhood of Algeciras on the European mainland, while control of the southern approaches to the Pyrenees would effect the encirclement of France towards which Hitler was striving.[2] There was solid reason for believing that a Franco victory would make such control a reality. A triumphant Nationalist government could hardly refuse to grant some concessions in return for the military aid which the rebels had received. Moreover, the Spanish battleground provided an excellent military laboratory for testing the effectiveness of new weapons and battle techniques under actual combat conditions. The result of such experimentation would be extremely useful to the Nazi High Command in the formulation of future military strategy.[3]

---

[2] Arnold J. Toynbee (ed.), *Survey of International Affairs 1937*, 2 vols. London, 1938, Vol. II, *The International Repercussions of the War in Spain (1936–1937)*, 131–132, hereafter cited as Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs 1937*, Vol. II; Sir Robert Hodgson, *Spain Resurgent*, London, 1953, 63; William E. Dodd, Jr. and Martha Dodd (eds.), *Ambassador Dodd's Diary, 1933–1938*, New York, 1940, 363–364; United States Department of State, *Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918–1945*, Series D, 4 vols., Washington, 1950, Vol. III, *Germany and the Spanish Civil War 1936–1939*, 762–763, hereafter cited as *Documents on German Foreign Policy*, Ser. D., Vol. III.

[3] While testifying before the International Military Tribunal in March, 1946, Herman Göring, former Nazi Minister of Air, explained Germany's role in Spain as follows: "When the Civil War broke out in Spain, Franco sent a call for help to Germany and asked for support, particularly in the air.... The Führer thought the matter over. I urged him to give support under all circumstances, firstly, in order to prevent the further spread of Communism in that theatre and, secondly, to test my young *Luftwaffe* at this opportunity in this or that technical respect. With the permission of the Führer, I sent a large part of my transport fleet and a number of experimental fighter units, bombers and anti-aircraft guns; and in that way I had an opportunity to ascertain, under combat conditions, whether the material was equal to the task. In order that the personnel, too, might gather a certain amount of experience, I saw to it that there was a continuous flow, that is, that new people were constantly being sent and others recalled." International Military Tribunal, *Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal*, 37 vols., Nuremberg, 1947–1949, Vol. IX, 280–281. For further evidence on this point see *Documents on German Foreign Policy*, Ser. D, Vol. III, 86, and Malcolm Muggeridge (ed.), *Ciano's Diplomatic Papers*, London, 1948, 80–81.

Furthermore, by aiding Franco, Hitler would be striking a telling blow against Communist influence in the West,[4] while at the same time strengthening the bonds of friendship with Mussolini.[5]

All of these considerations undoubtedly played a part in the formation of German policy during the war. But they fail to take into account one of the basic reasons for Hitler's support of the Nationalist cause, namely, the possibility of securing economic control of the Iberian Peninsula by exploiting Franco's need for military aid and equipment.

To understand the plausibility of the foregoing assertion, it is necessary to review briefly the economic situation in Germany on the eve of the Spanish Civil War. In 1936 the Third Reich was engaged in the development of a formidable military machine that was rapidly exhausting the domestic supplies of raw materials and threatening to defeat the whole rearmament program as well as the Nazi dreams of conquest and empire.[6] The attempt at self-sufficiency through the use of *ersatz* materials was proving a dismal failure instead of the hoped-for success. To add to the gravity of the situation, imports of essential French minerals were declining, while British competition in the Swedish ore market was increasing.[7] In the face of such developments the economic potentialities of the Iberian area took on a new significance. Spain was a country rich in strategic resources, notably coal, iron, copper, potash, and lead. Valuable deposits of zinc, mercury, sulphur, silver, and

---

4 During the diplomatic conversations held in Munich in September, 1938, Hitler assured Neville Chamberlain, the British Prime Minister, that opposition to Communism was the sole reason for Nazi intervention in Spain. *Documents on German Foreign Policy*, Ser. D, Vol. IV, *The Aftermath of Munich, October 1938–March 1939*, Washington, 1951, 289, 475. For a similar statement by Von Ribbentrop to the French Foreign Minister, Bonnet, see *ibid.*, 475.

5 See Hitler's statement to the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, in October, 1936, in Muggeridge, *Ciano's Diplomatic Papers*, 57. For French and Russian opinion regarding Germany's efforts to use the war as a means of strengthening her ties with Italy and of disrupting friendly relations between Italy and the Soviet Union see Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1936*, Vol. II, *Europe*, Washington, 1954, 502-503, and Jane Degras (ed.), *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*, 3 vols., London, 1953, Vol. III, 215.

6 In a memorandum of March 9, 1936 Hjalmar Schacht, the Reich Minister of Economics, advised Hitler that new ways of importing raw materials with which to meet the needs of the rapidly expanding German army would have to be found. "In particular," Schacht warned, "we cannot do without the necessary quantities of metals required by the Wermacht for current procurements." Office of the United States Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality, *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, 8 vols., Washington, 1946, Vol. III, 873.

7 *New York Times*, December 25, 1936, 17.

manganese were also being mined in certain localities, principally in Castile, Granada, Catalonia, and Andalusia.[8] More important still, most of these mining areas were in the hands of the insurgents. The circumstances were thus tailor-made for providing Germany with an entering wedge into the economic life of the Peninsula. Hitler needed raw materials; Franco needed guns and supplies. Why not institute a *quid pro quo* arrangement which would be mutually beneficial to both parties? Once German business had secured a foothold in Spain the process leading to consolidation and control could gradually be extended. Were Franco to object to the expansion of German interests later on, the threat of withdrawing the military aid would conceivably serve to keep him in line. In this way the Spanish war could function as a stepping stone to the attainment of Nazi hegemony in Europe.

Professional opinion, it must be admitted, is divided on the accuracy of this interpretation. Some historians and political observers suppport it; others ignore the economic factor altogether when treating of the subject, while still others relegate it to a secondary position. Thus Frederick L. Schuman stated bluntly: "Economic interests were subordinated to the military calculus, as in every militaristic regime."[9] Carlton J. H. Hayes voiced a similar opinion when he observed: "Germany and Italy had no predilection for Franco, and their primary purpose in helping him was to tip the European balance of power in their favor."[10] Arnold Toynbee, on the other hand, in comparing some of the German and Italian motives for participating in the war, noted that "Germany, being a more highly developed industrial country than Italy, had a more lively interest in securing the *economic command* over Spanish raw materials and Spanish markets."[11] Similarly, M. Yvon Delbos, the French Foreign Minister in the Blum cabinet of 1936-1937, reportedly believed that "Spanish iron, copper, lead and manganese, rather than the pursuit of glory or the desire to foster a new Fascist State, was the motive behind the German volunteer enlistments," as well as the reason for Nazi support of the Nationalist Government.[12]

---

[8] *Ibid.*, July 4, 1937, Section 4, 5.

[9] Frederick L. Schuman, *Europe on the Eve*, New York, 1939, 266. See also Koppel S. Pinson, *Modern Germany*, New York, 1959, 520.

[10] Carlton J. H. Hayes, *The United States and Spain: An Interpretation*, New York, 1951, 126.

[11] Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs 1937*, Vol. II, 186, italics added; Hodgson, *Spain Resurgent*, 69.

[12] *New York Times*, December 27, 1936, Section 1, 27.

Russian opinion seconded that of Delbos. Better than most others, the Russians were aware of the true purpose of Germany's intervention in the Spanish crisis. It was to gain control of the iron and copper ore in which the Peninsula was so rich. The Versailles Treaty had deprived Germany of her important mineral deposits in Silesia and Lorraine, and without them the Reich's gigantic industrial machine was "like an automobile without gasoline."[13] As Maxim Litvinov, the Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs, put it when referring to the reasons for Fascist aggression in Spain during a speech before the Eighteenth Assembly of the League of Nations on September 21, 1937:

> . . . we then learn, what we could never find in a single encyclopedia, that anti-Communism has also a geological meaning and signifies a yearning for tin, zinc, mercury, copper, and other minerals. When this explanation, too, proves insufficient, anti-Communism is then explained to be a thirst for profitable trade. We are told such trade may be lost if Spain becomes tinted with red.[14]

Nazi officials themselves admitted Germany's dependence on Spanish ores and confessed that the economic prosperity or ruin of the Third Reich was contingent upon the victory or defeat of the Franco forces.[15] In a speech delivered at the closing of the National Socialist Congress held in Nuremberg on September 13, 1937, Hitler revealed the underlying reasons for German opposition to Communism in Spain. After pointing out the effect which Russian expansion into western Europe would have on the balance of power, Der Führer continued:

> Of no less importance is the circumstance that a shift of power toward bolshevism would be identical with an economic development that might have catastrophic results in our closely knit European community of States. The first visible result of every bolshevist revolution is not an enhancement of production but the total destruction of prevailing economic values and economic functions in the country affected.[16]

The economic fate of Spain under Communist domination might fail to worry England, Hitler remarked, because England could

---

[13] *Ibid.*, March 20, 1937, 11.

[14] Degras, *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*, Vol. III, 258.

[15] *New York Times*, December 27, 1936, Section 1, 27. German imports of Spanish pig iron, for instance, rose from 310,540 tons in 1937 to 1,000,000 tons in 1938. Editorial in *The Living Age*, Vol. CCCLVI (April, 1939), 104.

[16] Adolf Hitler, *My New Order*. Edited with commentary by Raoul de Roussy de Sales, New York, 1941, 426.

easily shift her trade from one nation to another and from one continent to another. But for a country like Germany, which was dependent upon inter-European commerce, such a prospect would prove disastrous. Were Spain to fall under Russian control, then the tidal wave of Communism might easily sweep across the Pyrenees and engulf France, Holland, and Belgium. Such a development would spell economic ruin for Germany, Hitler argued, because the Reich was dependent upon reciprocal trade relations with those areas.[17] The economic welfare of the German State was thus a major factor in prompting the German Government to intervene actively in Spain. This conclusion is supported by evidence contained in the official archives of the German Foreign Ministry in Berlin. An examination of this evidence shows that from the very outset of the war the Hitler Government took advantage of the rebels' need of military assistance to gain an economic foothold in the Peninsula.

Within a few days after the outbreak of the Moroccan revolt, General Franco commissioned Johannes Bernhardt, a German businessman living in Morocco, and Adolf Langenheim, one of the local Nazi officials, to fly to Berlin for the purpose of securing military aid.[18] The appeal met with favor and resulted in the establishment of a German business house in Seville under the title of *Hisma, Ltda.*, a Spanish contraction for *Compañía Hispano-Marroqui de Transportes* (Spanish-Moroccan Transportation Company). By August 2, 1936 *Hisma* was already actively engaged in providing transportation for Franco's troops from Morocco to the mainland, and before long its influence was making itself felt in many other channels of Spain's commercial and economic life. A companion organization to *Hisma* was set up in Berlin to take care of the German end of transactions. The company bore the imposing name of *Rohstoffe-und-Waren-Einkaufsgesellschaft* (Company for the Purchase of Raw Materials and Supplies) which was conveniently abbreviated to *Rowak*. The two companies were supposedly to concentrate on handling raw materials only and not to include trade in other commodities. Nor were they to extend their activities into Spain's possessions outside of Europe. Both

---

[17] *Ibid.*, 427. In a speech before the *Reichstag* on January 30, 1937, Hitler said explicitly: "Germany has no interest in Spain but the cultivation of those economic relations which Mr. Eden himself describes as so important and profitable" [i.e., the mutual exchange of industrial products]. *Ibid.*, 413.

[18] *Documents on German Foreign Policy*, Ser. D, Vol. III, 1.

Hisma and *Rowak* enjoyed virtual monopolies in buying and selling. All commercial transactions between Germany and Spain had to be cleared through them. Private exporters in Germany, for instance, could not make deliveries directly to buyers in Spain. Rather they were forced to sell their goods to *Rowak* which in turn resold them to *Hisma.*[19] Both organizations received a commission from the firms involved for handling the transfer of goods. In this way the Berlin Government was assured of complete control of the Spanish trade and could use it to apply pressure on Franco as circumstances dictated.

In the course of the following year, 1937, after the successful establishment of several other Nazi firms in Spain, the individual German interests were merged into a central holding company, the *Sociedad Financiera Industrial Ltda.* (Financial Industrial Company, Ltd.).[20] It was through the agency of these three companies that Hitler and Göring hoped to obtain economic control of Spain.[21] As Franco was to discover later on, German aid came high.

On July 29, 1936, Langenheim, the Nazi official in charge of the Tetuán area in Spanish Morocco, reported to his superiors: "Our view of future German commercial . . . relations with Spain conforms fully with General Franco's desires and intentions."[22] Herr Bernhardt, the administrative head of *Hisma,* summed up the essence of this German view in a confidential report to the German Embassy in Spain. He said in part:

> The objective of our economic interest in Spain must be the deep penetration into the main sources of Spanish wealth, namely, agriculture and mining. Whereas the products of agriculture fall to the share of the German Reich more or less without effort, since the Spaniards are forced to find a market, the mining problem is of tremendous importance in every respect.[23]

In the beginning, however, the Nazis proceeded cautiously with putting their plans into effect. *Hisma* concerned itself for the time

---

[19] Secret Minute by Hermann Sabath, an official of the German Economic Policy Department, Berlin, October 16, 1936, *Documents on German Foreign Policy,* Ser. D, Vol. III, 113–114; Memorandum by Felix Benzler, Deputy Director of the same Department, Berlin, February 23, 1937, *ibid.,* 245.

[20] Secret Minute by Sabath, Berlin, October 16, 1936, *ibid.,* 113.

[21] As Commissioner of the Four Year Plan Göring had charge of foreign as well as domestic economic affairs.

[22] Telegram from the Consulate at Tetuán to the Foreign Ministry, Tangier, July 29, 1936, *Documents on German Foreign Policy,* Ser. D, Vol. III, 16.

[23] Confidential Memorandum of the German Embassy in Spain, Burgos, November 4, 1937, *ibid.,* 501.

being principally with expediting the flow of military supplies from Germany to General Franco's troops.[24] Special care was taken not to arouse the suspicions of the Spaniards as to German intentions by avoiding everything that would invest the military aid program with an air of more than ordinary business enterprise. The following incident is typical of this cautious attitude. In a report dated September 8, 1936, Herr Messerschmidt, the German representative in Spain of the Export Cartel for War Matériel, suggested to Huene, the German Minister in Portugal, that the moment was propitious for taking advantage of the pressure under which Franco was laboring to procure "pledges from him with respect to our future economic and perhaps even political influence."[25] Messerschmidt contemplated a treaty between Germany and Spain which would guarantee the delivery of certain specified raw materials to Germany "for a number of years," and which would also stipulate the amount of manufactured goods which Spain would have to buy from the Reich.[26] Although Messerschmidt was confident that Franco would agree to such a treaty, all drafts and copies of the report, together with other pertinent papers, were called in by the German Intelligence at Berlin and consigned to "an especially secret category."[27] The report may have had some influence in the formulation of later Nazi policy, but there is no evidence that it was acted upon at that time.

In spite of the German Government's desire to avoid publicity in regard to its economic machinations in Spain, disturbing rumors and reports began to appear relative to Hitler's long-range economic aims in the Civil War. The columns of the *Deutsche Informationem,* a weekly news bulletin of the German Social Democrats in Paris, reflected the growing opinion. According to the editors of this service, the German Government planned to reimburse itself for the millions of dollars' worth of military aid which it was furnishing General Franco by laying claim to Spain's iron, copper, and quicksilver mines. Furthermore, the "trained soldiers

---

[24] "After the steamships *Kamerun* and *Wigbert* [German steamers carrying war matériel] arrived in Lisbon, the material was sent on most smoothly through the agency of Herr Bernhardt (Hisma)." Secret telegram from Du Moulin, chargé d'affaires in Portugal, to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin, Lisbon, August 22, 1936, *ibid.*, 53.

[25] Messerschmidt to Huene, Lisbon, September 8, 1936, *ibid.*, 88.

[26] *Ibid.*

[27] Secret communication from the War Ministry to the Foreign Ministry, Berlin, September 21, 1936, *ibid.*, 91; Instructions from the Political Division in Berlin to the Minister in Portugal, Berlin, October 3, 1936, *ibid.*, 104.

Germany has sent to Spain are to be employed not merely as military instructors . . . but after, as Hitler hopes, they have helped Franco to victory, they are to carry out in the technical and economic field the plans of German industry, and convert Spain into a German colony."[28] In like manner a correspondent of the *London Times* wrote under date of January 8, 1937: "It has been no secret that the Germans were pushing their economic penetration into Spanish Morocco behind the smoke screen of the Spanish civil war."[29] German experts were actively engaged in reorganizing the lead mines near Melilla and the more important iron mines in the Riff territory. Most of the production of these mines was allegedly going to Germany through arrangements with the Tetuán branch of the *Hisma* corporation.[30] Large quantities of hematite ores mined in the Melilla sector were also finding their way to the factories of the Third Reich.[31]

Hitler, however, had no intention of waiting until the end of the war before expanding his economic beachhead in the Iberian Peninsula. In reviewing the extent of German economic activity in Spain since the start of the war, Sir Percival Phillips, a special correspondent for the conservative *London Daily Telegraph,* wrote from Gibraltar in February, 1937: "Hisma . . . has broadened its activities to include all kinds of import and export business which, before the revolution, was shared by the European markets."[32] The coastal shipping trade which had formerly been a virtual monopoly of three Spanish companies, the Solanazar Company of Malaga, Ybarra and Co. of Seville, and the Transmediterranea of Madrid, had already passed over into German hands on the grounds that German vessels were less subject to blockade hazards than were the Spanish ships. German firms were also profitably engaged in trading in other commodities such as olive oil, wood pulp, wool, cork, and iron ore, and were thus successfully tightening their grip on the Spanish markets.[33] The work of economic consolidation was evidently under way.

Even though *Hisma-Rowak* were enjoying "undeniable success" in their task of funneling essential raw materials into German channels and giving the Reich a predominance over all other foreign

---

[28] Quoted in *The Living Age,* Vol. CCCLI (January, 1937), 380.
[29] Quoted in the *New York Times,* January 12, 1937, 4.
[30] *Ibid.*
[31] *Ibid.,* January 17, 1937, Section 4, 4.
[32] Quoted in *The Living Age,* Vol. CCCLI (February, 1937), 474.
[33] *Ibid.,* 473–474.

competitors in the Spanish market,[34] the arrangement was not popular with either German or Spanish private firms. They protested against "excessive commissions," "unjustified claims for commissions," and the monopolistic position of *Hisma-Rowak,* and agitated for a trade clearing agreement between Germany and Spain which would allow private interests to carry on normal commercial relations independently of *Hisma-Rowak.*[35] Government officials objected that the opening up of many small avenues of trade with Spain would jeopardize the chances of obtaining essential foodstuffs and raw materials and consequently would be detrimental to the interests of the Reich. The attitude of General Franco and of the Nationalist Government subsequently proved to be the deciding factor in the controversy. Since both the General and the members of the Government favored a clearing agreement, the Germans were forced to back down on the issue and to adopt a limited clearing arrangement.[36] The limitations, however, apparently did not deprive *Hisma-Rowak* of their monopoly in the handling of essential foods and raw materials.[37]

In accordance with the Reich's pressing need for raw materials, especially minerals, *Hisma-Rowak* devoted much of their time and energy to the problem of obtaining vital mineral concessions from the Spanish Nationalist Government.[38] In a secret protocol signed

---

[34] Memorandum by Benzler, Berlin, February 23, 1937, *Documents on German Foreign Policy,* Ser. D, Vol. III, 245.

[35] Telegram from Ritter, Director of the Economic Policy Department, to the Embassy in Spain, Berlin, May 13, 1937, *ibid.,* 288; Confidential minutes of an official conference with Göring by Ritter, Berlin, March 17, 1937, *ibid.,* 253; Report by Eberhard von Stohrer, German Ambassador to Spain, on German-Spanish commercial relations. Salamanca, November 27, 1937, *ibid.,* 513; Memorandum by Benzler, Berlin, February 23, 1937, *ibid.,* 246.

[36] Telegram from Ritter to the German Embassy in Spain, Berlin, May 13, 1937, *ibid.,* 287; Ritter to the same Embassy, Berlin, May 26, 1937, *ibid.,* 296.

[37] Telegram from Faupel, Ambassador in Spain, to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin, Salamanca, May 21, 1937, *ibid.,* 293; Ritter to the German Embassy in Spain, Berlin, May 13, 1937, *ibid.,* 287.

[38] These efforts were proximately motivated by a change in the official attitude of the British Government vis-à-vis the Spanish situation, a change which was in itself the result of economic considerations. Prior to the capture of Bilbao by the Nationalists on June 19, 1937, the British had enjoyed extensive trading privileges in that region, with imports of iron ore from the area averaging as much as 100,000 tons per month. The prospect of losing this trade to the Germans caused the London Government to assume a softer attitude with respect to Franco and to institute proceedings aimed at securing an early armistice in Spain. When these negotiations broke down, London announced, in an informal fashion, its willingness to recognize the Franco regime as a belligerent power provided a British consul would be permitted to reside in Bilbao in

at Burgos on July 16, 1937, the Berlin Government declared that it was willing to "cooperate in the economic reconstruction of Spain, particularly in opening up and utilizing the mineral resources and other raw materials in Spanish sovereign territory, including the Spanish protectorate of Morocco," and proposed to supply the equipment and technical personnel necessary for such an undertaking. The Nationalist Government, for its part, agreed to

> facilitate as far as possible the establishment of Spanish companies for the opening up and economic utilization of mineral resources and other raw materials and for other economic purposes serving the general welfare, under participation of German citizens or German firms, as compatible with the general stipulation of Spanish law.[39]

Although the provisions of the Protocol in no way gave the German Government a free hand in extending its control over Spanish mines, *Hisma* seems to have engaged in an all-out effort to achieve that end. It initiated a special project called the Montaña project to coordinate all activities directed towards gaining controlling interests in the principal Spanish mining companies.[40] The Nationalist Government, however, viewed the proceedings with distinct disfavor. By a decree issued from Burgos on October 9, 1937, Franco suspended all acts involving the disposition of mining property as well as "the purchase, sale, or transfer of shares in mining companies or leases," invalidated all titles to any such property which had been acquired since the beginning of the war, and dissolved all acts contrary to the provisions of the decree.[41]

The decree was an abrupt setback for German aspirations, and one which the Berlin Government was loath to accept. *Hisma* immediately voiced its dissatisfaction with the Spanish stand on the question and insisted on absolute equality for German business in the exploitation of the mineral wealth of the country. The Spanish Government replied that such equality was impossible in

---

order to protect Britain's commercial interests there. Franco responded to these overtures by ordering his propagandists not to publish anything which was hostile to Great Britain; Faupel to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin, Salamanca, May 23, 1937, *ibid.*, 294; Von Neurath to the German Embassy in London, Berlin, July 1, 1937, *ibid.*, 387–389; Faupel to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin, Salamanca, July 9, 1937, *ibid.*, 407–408.

[39] Text of the Burgos Protocol of July 16, 1937, *ibid.*, 421–422.

[40] Sabath to the Embassy in Spain, Berlin, November 27, 1937, *ibid.*, 511–512; Memorandum on the Montaña project, Salamanca, January 26, 1938, *ibid.*, 569–571.

[41] Spanish Decree of October 9, 1937 on Mining Concessions, *ibid.*, 457.

view of the existing laws which permitted no more than twenty-five to thirty percent participation by foreign concerns in the development of Spanish mines. Although General Jordana, the spokesman for the Nationalist Government, assured the representatives of *Hisma* that the Franco decree of October 9 had not been directed specifically against Germany, he nevertheless insisted that since the decree was now in effect its terms would have to be observed in all dealings with the Reich. In any event, the matter would have to be referred to General Franco himself, Jordana claimed, before a decision could be reached. It was clear to the German representatives that the "suspicious-minded" Spaniards were hedging on the question and were trying to avoid giving a definite answer which would satisfy the German demands.[42]

The seriousness of the situation was emphasized by Herr Bernhardt, the director of *Hisma,* in a confidential report to the German Embassy in Spain dated November 4, 1937:

> It is clear to us that the Montaña project constitutes the whole aim and purpose of our assistance in Spain in the economic field.
>
> Reduced to a clear formula, it may be said that the success or failure of our efforts in Spanish mining will determine whether our assistance to Spain was successful or misplaced.[43]

Bernhardt accordingly urged that all available pressure—military, diplomatic, and cultural—be applied in order to secure a favorable solution of the problem, adding that force would have to be used in case reasonable measures failed. Since the project was of such vital importance to the economic welfare of Germany, the officials in Berlin ought to participate actively in the matter, and the advisability of bringing Italian pressure to bear on Franco should likewise be considered. The Nationalist Government in Spain must be made to understand that the Reich was engaged in an economic war which necessitated Spanish assistance in return for German military aid. Bernhardt suggested that a workable solution might be the formation of a separate Montaña-*Hisma* Company under the name of "Araelsa & Pasch" which could be administered as a trusteeship and which would function in the same capacity as the original *Hisma.* Equality of rights, however, would have to be guaranteed

---

[42] Report of Wilhelm Pasch, an employee of *Hisma,* on the Montaña project, Burgos, November 4, 1937, *ibid.,* 496–498.

[43] Extract from the report by Bernhardt on the Montaña project contained in a confidential memorandum of the German Embassy in Spain, Burgos, November 4, 1937, *ibid.,* 501.

regardless of the particular solution which might ultimately be adopted.[44]

Commissioner Göring's reaction to the new development was typical. Considering that his "unusually great personal assistance to General Franco" entitled him to make whatever demands he deemed appropriate for ensuring the Reich's "war booty" in Spain, Göring bluntly advocated sending Eberhard von Jagwitz, Under Secretary of State in the German Economics Ministry, to Salamanca immediately to "hold a pistol to General Franco's breast."[45] More temperate counsel fortunately prevailed. As von Jagwitz pointed out, Franco's improved military position made him less dependent upon Germany than formerly, and consequently a too vigorous approach might lead to a complete loss of economic advantages in Spain. Moreover, since there were indications that the Nationalist Government was carrying on economic negotiations with the United States, Great Britain, France, and Switzerland preparatory to the resumption of regular commercial relations with the outside world,[46] it was imperative to move delicately in the matter so as not to arouse Franco's hostility. It was therefore decided to approach the Generalisimo once more through the instrumentality of Stohrer, the German ambassador in Spain, in an effort to secure from him definite reassurances regarding Germany's economic future in that country. A simple denial of rumors concerning his reported transactions with the British would not, however, be sufficient; something more tangible would be expected,

---

[44] *Ibid.*, 501–503.

[45] Memorandum by Hans Georg Mackensen, State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry, Berlin, November 25, 1937, *ibid.*, 508–510.

[46] This renewed interest in Spain followed from the recognition of the Franco regime by the individual countries. As noted previously, England was especially concerned about the Spanish mining industry, much of which had been in British hands at the outbreak of the Civil War. The Río Tinto Copper Company was almost exclusively a British concern. It boasted a capital stock of approximately four million pounds in addition to stock issues of about two million pounds and reserves of one and a half million. During the war German pressure succeeded in diverting a considerable part of the production of the Río Tinto mines into German channels despite strong British opposition; *New York Times*, September 19, 1937, Section 4, 5; Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1937*, Vol. I, *General*, Washington, 1955, 227; *Documents on German Foreign Policy*, Ser. D, Vol. III, Telegram from the Chargé d'Affaires in Spain to the German Foreign Ministry, Salamanca, January 20, 1937, 230; Memorandum by Ruter, an official of the Economic Policy Department, Berlin, February, 4, 1937, 240-241; Memorandum by Sabath, Berlin, April 16, 1937, 271–272; Report of the Foreign Ministry to the Embassies in Spain and Great Britain and to the Economics Ministry, Berlin, July 22, 1937, 426–429.

namely, the approval of German mining concessions in Spain.[47] In case Franco indulged in further delaying tactics, Stohrer was to remind him of the provisions of the secret protocol of July 16, 1937, which specifically provided for German participation in the Spanish mining industry "as far as possible."[48]

Both the Nationalist Government and the Generalisimo expressed the greatest concern over expediting the matter when Stohrer approached them on the question. But they also took pains at the same time to emphasize the difficulties that made it necessary to proceed slowly in arriving at an equitable judgment: the problem was too complex to admit of a precipitate solution, the Governing Council was really only a provisional government, and matters such as this which concerned the welfare of the entire nation ought rightly to be handled by duly elected officials; moreover, the protocol of July 16 had clearly stated that concessions had to be compatible with existing Spanish laws. Consequently, a complete examination of all claims involved was first necessary to make sure that no laws were being violated. The Spanish Government regretted the slow pace of the proceedings, but since it lacked sufficient technical experts to study the case quickly nothing more could be expected.[49] The clever Spaniards were obviously giving the Germans the well-known run-around, and the Germans found it not to their liking. Franco was evidently trying to get off the Nazi hook where military necessity had put him.

The reasons prompting the German Government to insist on an early settlement of the Montaña difficulty are clear from a consideration of the official figures on mineral exports from Spain to Germany. During December, 1937, a record volume of 260,000 tons of ore had been shipped to Germany. This included 205,000 tons of iron ore, approximately 55,000 tons of pyrites, and about 152 tons of copper, tungsten, bronze, and allied minerals. Total exports for the entire year reached 2,584,000 tons, which included 1,620,000 tons of iron and 956,000 tons of pyrites.[50] The volume

[47] Letter of Mackensen to von Stohrer, Berlin, December 3, 1937, *ibid.*, 523; Memorandum by Stohrer, San Sebastián, December 21, 1937, *ibid.*, 535. Some of the concessions involved ownership ranging from forty to one hundred percent, *ibid.*, 537.

[48] Instruction from Emil Karl Wiehl, Director of the Economic Policy Department of the Foreign Ministry, to Stohrer, Berlin, December 13, 1937, *ibid.*, 526.

[49] Memorandum by Stohrer, Salamanca, December 16, 1937, *ibid.*, 527–529.

[50] Secret communication from Bernhardt to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin, Salamanca, January 21, 1938, *ibid.*, 565–566.

of minerals involved played too crucial a part in the development of the Reich's war industry to admit of lengthy delays.

Nevertheless, delay continued to be the order of the day. The German representatives kept on reiterating their demands; the Spaniards just as stubbornly continued to insist on the necessity of proceeding carefully in matters which concerned legal principles and the disposition of the nation's patrimony. Days and weeks passed during which progress was at a standstill. On one occasion José Antonio de Sangroniz, Chief of Cabinet of the Spanish Nationalist Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accused the Germans of being responsible for the stalemate because of their undue eagerness to acquire control of Spanish mines.[51] The Germans replied by arguing that they had never intended to exploit the mines without the Spanish collaboration envisioned by the protocol of July 16, 1937,[52] but their assurances left the Spaniards doubtful.

Negotiations over the Montaña controversy dragged on unchanged until March 19, 1938, when Franco suddenly ordered his Council of Ministers to settle the problem once and for all. The Council thereupon decided to replace the objectionable decree of October 9, 1937, with a new law which would provide the legal status for economic relations with all foreign powers indiscriminately, but which would at the same time leave the door open for special concessions to Germany. The Nationalist Government would reserve to itself the specific right of granting or refusing transfers of ownership in Spanish mines. Fearful lest the proposed law would seriously curtail the opportunities for German interests in Spain, Ambassador Stohrer brought renewed verbal pressure to bear in an effort to secure a revision of the law more in line with German desires. As a result of his insistent urgings two important changes were introduced into the text of the new decree: foreign concerns were to be permitted as much as forty percent participation in mining companies, and the Spanish Government was empowered to increase this share in the case of mines in which it had no official interest or which were not being exploited properly. This latter

---

[51] Memorandum of the Embassy in Spain, Salamanca, January 26, 1938, *ibid.*, 570. The Spanish Government, reasonably enough, feared a repetition of what had occurred in the case of the Río Tinto mines when, in "a combination of circumstances favorable to her," Great Britain had practically taken the mines away from Spain. Stohrer to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin, Salamanca, February 17, 1938, *ibid.*, 602.

[52] Memorandum of the Embassy in Spain, Salamanca, January 26, 1938, *ibid.*, 571.

provision was a direct concession to German interests, as General Jordana personally admitted.[53]

Except for some minor objections regarding the limitations of foreign mining rights, the law met with the approval of both Bernhardt and Stohrer since it apparently offered the Hitler Government the necessary loopholes for gaining legal control of mineral resources in the Peninsula. Stohrer noted in a report to the Foreign Ministry, dated June 10, 1938:

> But just as it will, of course, not be difficult for us to secure through dummies the 11 percent lacking for a majority of the shares whenever we have a special interest in a mine and the Government should not be inclined to make the exception provided for, so, too, it will be entirely possible for us, with reference to the choice of personnel, to insure German influence upon the commercial and particularly the technical direction.[54]

In other words, Germany had substantially obtained what she had set out to acquire from the very beginning—control of valuable mineral deposits in Spain—and she had obtained it with the legal approbation of the Franco Government.

There was still, however, one conceivable obstacle to the complete attainment of such control. The law allowed foreign capital a maximum share of only forty percent in mining enterprises. This meant that the controlling interest represented by the remaining sixty percent could readily become the property of individual Spanish firms. In order to prevent such a development from taking place, Bernhardt suggested to Suances, the Spanish Minister of Industry and Commerce, that it would be impractical to allow the big Spanish banking houses to secure control of the mines because they lacked reliable capital. The safer plan would be to permit Montaña to make the shares which it already owned available to the Government for purchase, and also to allow private Spanish interests to buy Montaña shares on the open market. Private participation in the project would have the added advantage of arousing domestic interest in the various mining companies and would keep them in close touch with the public. Suances agreed that the plan seemed feasible. Whether or not he suspected that Bernhardt hoped in this way to make it possible for Spanish agents of *Hisma* to buy up eleven or more percent of shares in the different companies and thus insure control of them for *Hisma* is not in-

---

[53] Memorandum by Stohrer, San Sebastián, June 6, 1938, *ibid.*, 680.

[54] Stohrer to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin, San Sebastián, June 10, 1938, *ibid.*, 688.

dicated. The chances are he did not. However that may be, the German authorities were prepared to have recourse to dummy buyers if necessary in order to evade the restrictive provisions of the new law.[55]

Hisma moved immediately to take advantage of the new situation. Five additional companies were established under Montaña's name with the maximum forty percent foreign capital allowed by law.[56] Since additional capital control was desirous in four out of the five cases, Bernhardt advised trying to persuade the Spanish Government to make the necessary exceptions in a special protocol. If the Government refused, then the needed majority could be acquired through dummies.[57]

Hitler's coup in Czechoslovakia gave a new twist to German-Spanish relations which had direct repercussions in the agitation for official approval of the new companies. Military aid to Spain was temporarily stopped, and Franco was faced with the unpleasant possibility of seeing the French take over the whole of Morocco in order to strengthen their colonial holdings against the outbreak of war in central Europe.[58] An actively hostile France could easily spell disaster for the Nationalist cause in Spain. Franco was worried, and the Germans knew it. Here was the opportunity they needed to press home their demands for increased capital participation in the newly-established mining companies. Future military aid to the Nationalists would be made contingent on Franco's compliance with German demands. This compliance included approval of the recently organized Mauritania S.A. Mining Company in

---

55 Memorandum by Stohrer, San Sebastián, August 11, 1938, *ibid.*, 732. Dummy buyers were a favorite device of the Germans. They had used them successfully in Tanganyika and Southwest Africa after World War I when German properties which had been in British hands during the war were put up for public auction; *New York Times*, January 8, 1939, Section 4, 5.

56 The companies were Aralar S.A., at Tolosa, with a capital stock of twenty-five million pesetas; Montañas del Sur S.A., of Seville, capital stock of twenty million pesetas; Montes de Galicia, in Orense, capital stock of sixteen million pesetas; Cía. Minera Santa Tecla S.A., in Vigo, capital stock of twelve million pesetas; and Sierra de Gredos S.A., in Salamanca, capital stock of eight million pesetas; Secret report of the German Economics Minister to the Foreign Minister, Berlin, October 18, 1938, *Documents on German Foreign Policy*, Ser. D, Vol. III, 769–771; Stohrer to the Foreign Minister, San Sebastián, November 12, 1938, *ibid.*, 789.

57 Memorandum by Stohrer, San Sebastián, August 11, 1938, *ibid.*, 731–732.

58 Secret report from Bernhardt to the German Ambassador in Spain, Salamanca, September 26, 1938, *ibid.*, 748.

Morocco, a completely German enterprise for the exploitation of Spanish mines in North Africa.[59]

The strategy worked. On November 19 the Spanish Foreign Minister informed Stohrer that the Government had decided to comply with all the German demands, to allow the free importation into Spain of five million reichmarks' worth of machinery for use in working the mines, and to permit the export of ores to Germany for a period of five years.[60] Once again Hitler had come out on top, and deliveries of war materials to Spain was resumed.

The story of German economic intervention in Spain does not end with this last capitulation of the Nationalist Government in the late autumn of 1938. Although by the close of that year the military strife was practically ended and the outlines of a new authoritarian state had begun to appear, the economic tug-of-war went on apace. It increased in intensity during World War II until it constituted one of the pivotal factors in Allied and Axis diplomacy.[61] Hitler had won the first round of the struggle by capitalizing on the military necessities of the Franco armies, and by dangling the alluring bait of continued assistance before the eyes of the insurgents in order to force them into agreements for which they had no taste. As long as the military situation remained adverse there was little the Nationalists could do but swallow their pride and give in to German demands. But once the prize of victory was within reach the atmosphere changed, and the native Spanish skill for driving a bargain began to assert itself with increasing vigor.[62]

---

[59] Secret communique from the Economic Minister to the Foreign Minister, Berlin, October 18, 1938, *ibid.*, 770; Secret report from Bernhardt to the Ambassador in Spain, Salamanca, November 2, 1938, *ibid.*, 781; Secret report from Stohrer to the Foreign Ministry, San Sebastián, November 12, 1938, *ibid.*, 788–791.

[60] Telegram from Stohrer to the Foreign Ministry, San Sebastián, November 19, 1938, *ibid.*, 795–796. "Contrary to the Spanish laws, the Nationalist Government had agreed to 75 percent German participation in three companies, and 60 percent in two companies. In addition, it had agreed that the Mauritania mining company in Tetuán be entirely released from the provisions of Spanish law concerning capital participation." Memorandum by Woermann, Under Secretary of State, Berlin, November 21, 1938, *ibid.*, 802; Secret communication from the Spanish Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in Spain, Burgos, December 19, 1938, *ibid.*, 808–809.

[61] For an excellent discussion of the important wolfram crisis see Carlton J. H. Hayes, *Wartime Mission in Spain 1942–1945*, New York, 1946, 194–238.

[62] An outstanding example of this bargaining skill occurred after the fall of France in 1940. Although Franco assured Hitler of his friendship and of his willingness to participate in the European war, he put such a

A wiser man than Hitler might well have recognized in the character of the Spanish race the Achilles heel of all dreams of conquest and power in the Iberian Peninsula. The Spanish people are a grateful people; they do not readily forget those who have befriended them. Their innate honesty automatically prompts them to repay favors received with favors of their own. But they are also a proud and independent race who love liberty and detest the very thought of foreign domination and oppression. Any attempt at outside interference in the internal affairs of their country evokes a storm of popular protest and discontent. Through their insatiable desire to gain control of the economic resources of Spain, the Germans thus unwittingly planted the seeds of their eventual defeat in the Peninsula. Spain did not become the friendly ally or benevolent neutral in World War II that Hitler hoped she would be.[63] Nor did the active aid which Germany received from Spain during the war prove very noteworthy. From a military standpoint it was insignificant;[64] from the economic and political standpoint it was overshadowed by far greater concessions to the Allies.[65] In Spain as elsewhere, Nazi greed and Nazi desire for conquest overreached itself, and the German nation lived to pay the price.

EUGENE H. KORTH, S.J.

Marquette University

---

high price tag on that participation in the form of territorial concessions and aid for his armies that rejection of the offer was a practical certainty. As Carlton Hayes pointed out: "He surely knew he was asking a much bigger price than Hitler would pay, and yet by giving fair *words* to the Führer he warded off *action* by the Germans and also by Spain, and the more he was subsequently pressed for aid, the higher he raised the price." *The United States and Spain: An Interpretation*, 148.

63 This hope was strengthened when Spain joined the Axis powers in signing the Anti-Comintern Pact in March, 1939.

64 "The most flagrant military contribution which Falangist Spain made to the cause of Fascism was the notorious Blue Division—the 'volunteers' from Iberia who, after September of 1941, were dispatched to Germany and to the eastern front to fight in the 'crusade against Bolshevism.' Officially sponsored by the Falange, with the public endorsement of the government and the special blessing of the Bishop of Madrid, the Blue Division's numbers reached a maximum in its first six months of some 17,000 or 18,000 men, and fell to a low of 3,000 to 4,000 just prior to its final withdrawal late in 1943. The military effectiveness of these men was negligible. They returned to Spain not with glory but with Russian loot and venereal disease; only as thieves and rapists had they left their mark on the Russian front." Emmet John Hughes, *Report from Spain*, New York, 1947, 235.

65 For a reliable account of Spain's difficult role in World War II see Hayes, *Wartime Mission in Spain.*

Tarascon's Dream of an American Commercial Empire in the West

In 1794, fleeing from a distraught and bleeding France, Louis Anastasius Tarascon arrived in Philadelphia seeking refuge in young America, already long a home for displaced persons.[1] Like other Frenchmen before him, notably the Huguenot refugees at the end of the 17th century, he was to find opportunity and challenge in his new homeland. And like those stalwart emigrants, he was to add his measure to its national growth.[2]

Born in Tarascon, Department of the Rhone, February 10, 1759, he came to America in the full bloom of life. Quickly, he turned his attention to mercantile interests. As an importer of silks and other goods from Germany and France, for he was gifted in the ways of trade and language, he quickly made his mark. "He was a man of great sagacity, and soon began to entertain enterprising ideas of the opening glories of the West."[3] Arriving at a time when the Jay Treaty negotiations were in progress, Tarascon would soon see the western frontier of America freed from British intimidation. The West would beckon the adventuresome and enterprising. Tarascon would respond to the lure, for he early understood the potential of embroyonic American production and world trade.

Immediately after his American arrival, he associated himself in partnership with Lewis and Victor Jeumel.[4] Their enterprise, though apparently small in scale, seized upon native manufactures as one of their stock items in trade transactions, acutely sensing

---

1 *The Magazine of History with Notes and Queries*, Extra Number, No. 148, XXXIV (1929), 233. Hereinafter cited *MHNQ*.

2 Charles W. Baird, *History of Huguenot Emigration to America*, 2 vols., New York, 1885, *passim;* Lucian J. Fosdick, *The French Blood in America*, Boston, 1906, 125 *et seq.*, details America's gains from these emigrants.

3 *History of the Ohio Fall Counties*, 2 vols., Cleveland, 1886, I, 488 a-b; Sherman Day, *Historical Collections of the State of Pennsylvania*, Philadelphia, 1843, 88.

4 Newman F. McGirr, "Tarascon of Shippingport at the Falls of the Ohio," *West Virginia History*, VII (1946), 90, records, citing from Hardie's *Philadelphia Directory*, 1794, the partnership, but under the name of Journel, located on 51 S. Second Street. In the 1797 edition, the name of Tarascon's partners are spelled Journal. Such misspelling of French names was a common American occurrence.

commercial opportunities at hand.[5] Such action was a display of foresight and astute business acumen that set Louis Tarascon apart from many of his fellow countrymen.

Early realizing the prospect of a thriving American-European trade, in 1799 he sent two of his clerks, Charles Brugiére and James Berthoud, from Pittsburgh to New Orleans to assess the possibility of forging a connecting trade link from the Ohio-Mississippi valleys to European markets. His motivation was to explore the feasibility of sending fully rigged ships, built in Pittsburgh, down the Ohio and Mississippi into the Gulf to foreign ports, creating an inland-trade empire that would reach the West Indies and the Continent.[6]

When the two clerks returned a favorable report, in conjunction with his brothers, the firm of John A. Tarascon, Brothers, James Berthoud & Co. was established.[7] In 1802, having built "a large wholesale and retail store and warehouse, a shipyard, a rigging and sail loft, an anchor smith shop, a block manufactory, and in short every thing necessary to complete vessels for sea," the firm launched its first constructed ship, the schooner *Amity,* 100 tons. Loaded with Pennsylvania flour, it was sent down the Ohio and Mississippi to the island of St. Thomas in the West Indies.[8] The following year, the *Pittsburgh,* 250 tons, was launched. With the

---

[5] Harrold E. Gillingham, "The Philadelphia Windsor Chairs and Its Journeyings," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography,* LX (1931), 301-302, who spells the name, correctly, Jeumel. In 1797 the partnership shipped twelve of these chairs to the firm of Dallest & Calier, Cadiz, on board the *John.*

[6] By 1798, Tarascon had divorced himself from the Jeumel Brothers' partnership and was engaged on his own as a merchant. His address is given in Hardie's *Philadelphia Directory,* 1798, as 204 S. Second, and in 1800 the location of his business is 211 S. Second. Cited in McGirr, "Tarascon of Shippingport," 90. Thus his sending two of his clerks to New Orleans was an independent action. Day, *Historical Collections,* 88.

[7] Whether Louis Tarascon's two brothers, John Anthony and an unnamed one, other than for initials, H. J., accompanied him to America in 1794 or followed him subsequently is not known. The formal partnership with Berthoud, due in no doubt to the pooling of capital, is noted in Hardie's *Philadelphia Directory,* 1802, as being established with an address at 217 Mulberry Street. By 1803-04, only the firm of Tarascon, Jun., James Berthoud & Co. is listed, located on 55 N. Second Street. From 1805-06, the *Philadelphia Directory* only lists L. A. Tarascon, merchant, 69 Chestnut. Cited in McGirr, "Tarascon of Shippingport," 90.

During this interval of partnership with Berthoud, the *Pittsburgh Gazette,* Jan. 8, 1802, indicates he was running a separate business as a general merchant. This leads this writer to the surmise that the partnership was a pooling of resources in ship construction and commerce, but not in individual business enterprise.

[8] Day, *Historical Collections,* 88, who gives the date, erroneously of the launching of the *Amity,* 1801. The correct date, December 23, 1802, with tonnage noted, is found in the *Pittsburgh Gazette,* Dec. 31, 1802. It

same cargo, it was sent down river to Philadelphia and on to Bordeaux. On return from the maiden voyage, it brought back a cargo of wine, brandy, and other French goods, a portion of which were transhipped to Pittsburgh by wagons at a cost of six to eight cents a pound for freight to the resident firm's warehouse.[9]

The Tarascon dream became a startling reality—mayhap, a forerunner of the St. Lawrence Seaway, a portent of things to come. In rapid succession other ships were built and sent to sea from the Pittsburgh ways: in January, 1804, the brig *Nanina,* 250 tons; March, the ship *Louisiana,* 300 tons; by May, the *Western Trader,* 400 tons, the largest of ships constructed by Tarascon & Berthoud.[10] But for all this enterprising endeavor, the firm had to face one bleak fact: these ships could

never attain any permanent place in the commerce . . . because they were one-way carriers only, because the narrowness of the rivers restricted their

---

should be observed that this was not the first ship built and launched on the Ohio. For previous evidence on this score, Charles H. Ambler, *A History of Transportation in the Ohio,* Glendale, Cal., 1932, 83, notes that the first schooner, with prior claim, was built in 1793. Another schooner, the *Polly,* was constructed in 1795. *Ibid.,* 84. Whether the *Amity* ever returned upriver to Pittsburgh is unknown; in all likelihood, no. The downstream trip from Pittsburgh to New Orleans would take a month. The return trip, a wearisome one, would hardly be suitable for any craft other than a barge or keel boat. Sailing vessels, constructed on the Ohio, were "exclusively downstream craft." Such ships were constructed "with a view to through journeys to the Atlantic coast and neighboring islands." Frank H. Dixon, "A Traffic History of the Mississippi River System," *Doc. 11, National Waterways Commission,* Washington, 1909, 10-11.

[9] Day, *Historical Collections,* 88. Again, the date of launching is incorrect. The *Pittsburgh Gazette,* Feb. 8, 1803, reports the second ship's water baptism.

[10] *Pittsburgh Gazette* notes all of these launchings. McGirr, "Tarascon of Shippingport," 92-93. Of these three ships, the *Louisiana* achieved some fame. Launched March 30, 1804, it sailed down river to the Gulf, on to Trieste, Italy, arriving April, 1805. It was sold to E. W. Tupper, Marietta, Ohio, who later renamed the vessel, *Louisiana of Marietta.* Archer B. Hulbert, "Western Ship-Building," *American Historical Review,* XXI (1915), 726-727.

Ambler, *History of Transportation in the Ohio,* opposite p. 94, reproduces William Mason's 1805 map of Pittsburgh, wherein he notes the anchorage of several ships, among them the brig *Nanina,* the schooner *Amity,* the ship *Pittsburgh,* and perhaps the *Western Trader,* although it is labeled the *Customs Trader.* Such a drafted scene would appear imaginative. True, these were Tarascon & Berthoud vessels, but one must be suspect of their return upriver. As Dixon, *A Traffic History,* 11, points out, it would be impossible for any ship more than 200 tons to get around the Falls of the Ohio. The best seasons for such navigation, if such was possible for sailing ships, would be February to June, October to December. Tonnage would definitely preclude the *Western Trader* and the *Pittsburgh;* possibly the *Amity.* McGirr, "Tarascon of Shippingport," 91-92, presents an overly optimistic view.

necessary freedom of movement, and because the irregularity of water supply and the dangers of navigation made boats of deep draft impracticable.[11]

By 1806, realization of this fact materially alter Tarascon's business interests. In that year, he and his brother John moved to Shippingport, Kentucky.

In 1803, James Berthoud had purchased from Colonel John Campbell a portion of land near Shippingport. In 1806, the Tarascons acquired the bulk of that site, at the time more commonly called the lower landing of the Falls.[12] The reason behind this move was well advertised in a pamphlet written by Louis Tarascon and Berthoud in 1806: *An Address on Trade with the Western Country.*[13]

The pamphlet urged the citizens of Philadelphia to "*take the proper measures*" to insure the continued flow of western trade east through that city. Tarascon argued that this could be achieved by first improving roads and other communications between Philadelphia and the headwaters of the Ohio at Pittsburgh, connecting other parts of Pennsylvania by roads to that river-port city. Once the roads were built, "a sufficient number of waggons" would have to be provided, "on public or private account, to run regularly, speedily, and economically between Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, and the other head waters" to complete the transportation complex.

To facilitate navigation, improvement of the portage between Presqu'isle and Le Boeuf was recommended. With such achieved, "a sufficient number of packets" then could ply "constantly and regularly, between Pittsburgh and Louisville, at the head of the rapids of the Ohio, from whence, to Shippingport . . . other packets to ply in the same manner, between Shippingport and St. Louis." The only hindrance for through traffic by river packets from Pittsburgh to St. Louis was the necessity for cutting a two-mile canal around the falls between Louisville and Shippingport. This, too, was recommended.

---

[11] Dixon, *A Traffic History*, 11.

[12] McGirr, "Tarascon of Shippingport," 94; *MHNQ*, XXXIV (1929), 223.

[13] The pamphlet was addressed to the citizens of Pennsylvania, particularly the city of Philadelphia. It was published in the latter city, 1806. Reprint. *Keepsake Number 4*, University of Kentucky Library Associates, 1957. An original copy is in Henry E. Huntington Library, San Marino, Cal.

The final feature of Tarascon's plan was pointed:

> To erect ship yards below the rapids, for the purpose of building vessels, to sail down the lower Ohio, and Mississippi, taking on their way, the produce of the inhabitants of the banks of the river; to carry the same to foreign countries, either for the account of citizens of Pennsylvania, or of citizens of the Western Country, *but always to bring back the returns to Philadelphia.*

After all, argued Tarascon, did not *"the natural channel of commercial intercourse between the western parts of the United States and foreign countries"* lie on a road from Pittsburgh to Philadelphia?[14]

In support of his proposal, Tarascon made note of his previous shipbuilding experience at Pittsburgh, which said he,

> was an error of which we have been convinced by a dear bought experience which our country will profit by. The navigation between Pittsburgh and Louisville cannot prudently be carried out, but on boats and rafts and it is below the Rapids, that vessels fit for the sea must be constructed and laded.[15]

Concluding his appeal for subscribers, for this was a business prospectus, he gave voice to one of the major concerns of the day: fear that the westward expansion of America might bring disunity. With this in mind he phrased his final argument:

> Besides, those commercial connections will produce a greater intercourse between the inhabitants of the eastern and western countries and identifying more and more their manners and customs, as well as their interest, will strengthen the bonds of friendship between them and greatly contribute to consolidate and, we hope, to perpetuate the American Union.[16]

But the conditions of international diplomacy and the timerity of Philadelphia merchants, defeated the appeal. Perhaps Tarascon's motivation in moving west, shipping from the west to the sea, was a ruse to get around the handicap of Jefferson's embargo and the darkening prospects of a military clash with the British then threatening on the horizon. When that rupture occurred, the War of 1812, what mercantile profits he had amassed through his early enterprising ways were apparently lost. Yet the dream of the future commercial greatness of America and the business potential of the West, did not die in Tarascon's thoughts. For al-

---

14 *Ibid.*, 4-6. Italics in original.
15 *Ibid.*, 12.
16 *Ibid.*, 13.

most two decades, it was to lie fallow, waiting for the right moment and circumstance to spring forward, matured, grandiose, and visionary. Like so many before and after him, Tarascon went broke in the West. Yet he clung to his dream and the hope for the future. His poverty did not stifle creative ideas.[17]

By 1820, the dream of an inland-world trade empire for western America loomed again on the horizon. John Floyd of Virginia, in 1820, under direction of the House of Representatives, was authorized as chairman of a committee to inquire into the expediency of settling and occupying the Columbia basin.[18] When Congress convened in December, 1821, another attempt was made to bring the question of Oregon into debate. Floyd again found himself appointed chairman of a new special committee of inquiry. The resulting report and recommendation was identical to the previous delivered by the committee in 1820.[19] This renewed American interest in the West was in no small measure due to the diplomatic settlements achieved in the wake of the War of 1812. A rebirth of American nationalism and future commercial greatness shone bright, stimulated by the Convention of 1818 with the British, and the Adams-Onís Treaty with Spain, 1819.[20]

The portent of the future of the West, from a commercial view, had been prophesied by John Bradbury during his western travels, 1809–1811. He saw full well the potential, writing: "The political and commercial advantages that will arise to the United States from the acquisition of Louisiana are incalculable. . . ."[21]

---

17 That the brothers fell into hard times is eloquently attested to by the fact that in 1818 the Trustees of Louisville authorized Robert Breckinridge to buy Louis Tarascon's surveyor instruments. This was probably due to Louis and John's investment in a flour mill, construction having begun in 1815, at Shippingport. The mill was six stories high and was powered by water from the Ohio Rapids. It was a total failure: it was far ahead of its time. J. Stoddard Johnston, *Memorial History of Louisville. . . ,* 2 vols., Chicago and New York, [1896?], I, 67, 72.

18 *Annals of Congress,* 16th Cong., 2nd Sess., 679. Floyd was greatly influenced by Thomas Hart Benton. Samuel F. Bemis, *John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy,* New York, 1950, 485-486. The committee report is found in *Annals of Congress,* 16th Cong., 2nd Sess., 945-959.

19 *House Report, No. 18,* 17th Cong., 1st Sess. Floyd's activities are fully discussed in George H. Ambler, *The Life and Diary of John Floyd,* Richmond, 1918, 53-74.

20 For example, see the letter from Thomas H. Benton to Governor Preston of Virginia, Nov. 14, 1819. *Benton Papers,* Missouri Historical Society. Quoted in my article, "The Sublettes of Kentucky. . . ," *The Register* of the Kentucky Historical Society, LVII (1959), 20.

21 John Bradbury, *Travels in the Interior of America in the Years 1809, 1810, 1811,* Reuben G. Thwaites, ed., *Early Western Travels,* 32 vols., Cleveland, 1906, V, 270-271.

The Tarascon brothers had understood this when the purchase of the territory was consummated in 1803, and they saw ripe commercial advantage in it: witness their move in 1806 to Shippingport. Subsequently, they were only defeated in their enterprise by circumstance, diplomacy, and time.

Another traveler, about the same time as Bradbury's excursion, was unduly pessimistic, Henry M. Brackenridge. As he saw it, the removal of "impediments to the settlements of that vast waste" of the Trans-Mississippi West, would not be "formed for centuries, if ever." His great fear lay in the West's vast distances and its lack of ties to the East.[22] Louis Tarascon appreciated this fear and saw commercial ties between East and West as the solution.

As reports on the explorations and activities of the intrepid fur trappers of Missouri became known, thanks to an active America press,[23] Louis Tarascon revived his dream of an American empire of trade. The American fur traders were apostles of American business; this Tarascon undoubtedly understood and applauded. As the fur men explored the West; as their exploits became common knowledge, he was emboldened to prescribe another plan of daring and energetic action.[24]

Under cover of a letter to Senator Richard M. Johnson of Kentucky, he phrased his proposal: "To the people of the United States, on the propriety of establishing a Waggon Roade, from the River Missouri to the River Columbia, of the Pacific Ocean."[25] It was a plea for a continental American empire built on solid economic foundations, connected by arteries of transportation.

To reinforce his petition to Congress, he published in Louisville, the same year, a detailed pamphlet explanation. This included the necessity for the construction of a canal around the Ohio Falls, a long held recommendation dating back to 1806. In his eyes, once a continuous river-road from the East to St. Louis was achieved, a wagon road west to the Columbia estuary would complete the essentials for the realization of potential American commercial greatness and national unity. He penned:

---

22 Henry M. Brackenridge, *Journal of a Voyage up the River Missouri*... [1811], *ibid.*, VI, 156, 160-162.

23 Reference to *Niles' Register*, the *Daily National Intelligencer*, and most particularly the Missouri and Kentucky newspapers, 1822-30.

24 For an excellent summary of the fur men's activities, see Carl P. Russell, "Trapper Trails to the Sisk-Ke-Dee," in *The Westerners Brand Book 1944*, Chicago, 1946, 57-79.

25 A copy of this rare broadside is in the Henry E. Huntington Library, San Marino, Cal.

Once open the road to the mouth of the Columbia River and comparatively we almost touch the coast of Asia—in forty days we may bring to the hearts of our country all those articles of luxury and use, presented to our view by the countries bordering the Pacific and Indian oceans.[26]

Coincidentally with Tarascon's proposal, demonstrable proof of the practicability of a wagon road across the plains to the Rocky Mountains and beyond was voiced in *Niles' Register,* December 4, 1824. Andrew Henry, a long time Missouri resident and experienced fur man, a partner with William Ashley in a trapping enterprise on the upper reaches of the Missouri River, returned to St. Louis with dramatic news.[27] During the course of a two year hunt in the company's preempted domain, he and his party discovered a "passage by which loaded wagons [could] reach the navigable waters of the Columbia River." The *Arkansas Gazette,* relying on the account published in the *St. Louis Enquirer,* was more explicit:

This route lies South of the one explored by Lewis and Clarke, and is inhabited by Indians friendly to us.—Doctor Floyd, a perserving and intelligent member of Congress from Virginia, has urged with much effect the propriety of forming a colony at the mouth of the Columbia; and in this age of experiment and improvement, we may expect to see the prejudices of our Eastern Brethern giving place to more enlightened views of general policy; and may look forward to the accomplishment, in a short time, of a project, which a few years past was ridiculed, as visionary.[28]

The ridicule in question was undoubtedly an oblique reference to an argument expounded in Congress that the Rocky Mountains should be considered as the natural boundary of the United States.[29] Even the staunchest exponent of American westward expansion, Senator Thomas Hart Benton, had momentarily concurred in such

---

[26] The petition is reproduced in *U.S. Senate, Exec. Doc.,* No. 108, 18th Cong., 2nd Sess., I, 3-12. *Journal of the U.S. Senate,* No. 107, 18th Cong., 2nd Sess., 31, 55, 83. Lewis A. Tarascon, "An Exposition of Some of the Reasons Why Measures Should be taken for the Construction of a Canal Round the Falls of the River Ohio . . . And for the Opening of a Waggon Road, From the River Missouri to the Navigable Waters of the River Columbia. . . ," (Louisville, 1824), 7.

[27] The partnership was formed in 1821 and was activated the following year. Hiram M. Chittenden, *The American Fur Trade of the Far West,* Reprint; 2 vols., Stanford, Cal., 1954, I, 251-252, for a sketch of Henry; Dale L. Morgan, *Jedediah Smith and the Opening of the West,* Indianapolis and New York, 1953, 26-27.

[28] Nov. 16, 1824.

[29] Voiced by Representative Albert H. Tracy, 1823. *Annals of Congress,* 17th Cong., 2nd Sess., 598.

a view.[30] Others, however, notably Francis Baylies, Representative from Massachusetts, had countered, urging that a passage through the mountainous barrier be sought so that the nation could acquire its "national boundary," the Pacific Ocean.[31] In this view, he found strong endorsement from John Floyd.[32]

Tarascon, no doubt, had some detailed knowledge of the extent of the fur traders' activity in the Far West. The defeat of Ashley and Henry's company at the hands of the Arikara Indians at the Mandan Village on the Missouri in late spring, 1823, had made national news and had embroiled Congress in a torrid debate. When the Army punitive expedition, commanded by Leavenworth, failed to avenge that defeat, even more heated words, both in Congress and the press, ensued. The *Kentucky Gazette* dutifully reported the failure of the Leavenworth expedition, and the *Louisville Public Advertiser* supported the appeal for military posts and roads to secure to the nation its rightful share in the Far Western fur trade. Tarascon's petition no doubt reflected his awareness of the fur men's activities on the far flung frontier.

But even with this unexpected report of Henry's explorations and comment, the petition fell on a dumb Congress. On December 13, 1824, Tarascon's petition for a wagon road west to the Columbia was presented to the Senate. It was tabled without debate. Under Senator Johnson's urging, December 27, the document was placed before the Committee on Roads and Canals—to no avail. On January 12, 1825, Senator Brown asked the Committee to discharge consideration of the proposal. They responded in the affirmative. A dream, for the time being, came to an abrupt end. The prophets in the wilderness were too prophetic!

Defeated by the short-sightedness of the Solons, Tarascon did not surrender his hope for a western American commercial empire. His silent and unknown allies, the stalwart fur trappers of Missouri, continued to etch graphically the soundness of his premature plan, in spite of the Congressional majority view, that wagon roads west were feasible.

In 1826 when William Ashley returned from an extensive upper Missouri basin journey, Charles Keemle, editor of the *Missouri*

---

30 Thomas H. Benton, *Abridgment of the Debates of Congress*, 16 vols, New York, 1858, VII, 50, 74-81; *Register of Debates in Congress*, 18th Cong., 2nd Sess., 712.

31 *Annals of Congress*, 17th Cong., 2nd Sess., 682-683.

32 Floyd, in a speech, Dec. 17, 1822, remarked: "The route to the mouth of the Columbia is easy, safe, and expeditious." *Ibid.*, 407.

Herald and St. Louis Advertiser, announced the results in the November 8th issue:

> The recent expedition of General Ashley to the country west of the Rocky Mountains . . . has proved, that overland expeditions in large bodies may be made to that remote region. . . *The whole route lay through a level and open country, better for carriages than any turnpike road in the United States.*

Ashley had forecast such a possibility when traveling west to the annual fur trade rendezvous in 1825. He had taken along in his trade goods and baggage train a four-pound cannon, mounted on a gun carriage, drawn by two mules, indisputedly the first wheels to travel west north of the St. Louis-Santa Fe trade route.[33]

In 1830, Tarascon found for support of his early dream an even greater endorsement. In that year, the trapper firm of Smith, Jackson and Sublette, who had bought out the Ashley-Henry concern, took "a caravan of ten wagons, drawn by five mules each, and two dearborns, drawn by one mule each" from St. Louis through the central plains region to the annual rendezvous held at the Wind River. Leaving on April 10, they arrived without mishap on July 16.[34] Wagon wheels had traversed the Great Plains—as Tarascon had proposed in 1824 without assurance that such was possible! The *Philadelphia National Gazette* informed its reading public that within "a few years, a trip to the Pacific, by way of the Rocky Mountains, will be no more of an undertaking than was a journey from the Atlantic cities to Missouri twenty years ago."[35]

After this dramatic accomplishment, striking proof of Tarascon's vision, wagon wheels became rather commonplace on the west bound trails out of St. Louis. In 1832, Bonneville took wagons with him on his two year trek. In 1834, the first Oregon bound

---

[33] Ashley to General Henry Atkinson, Dec. [?], 1825. *Ashley Papers,* Missouri Historical Society; *St. Louis Enquirer,* Mar. 11; *Philadelphia National Gazette,* Apr. 10, 1826.

[34] *Missouri Republican,* Apr. 13, 1830; Harrison C. Dale, ed., "A Fragmentary Journal of William L. Sublette," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review,* VI (1919), 99-110; John E. Sunder, *Bill Sublette,* Norman, Okla., 1959, 84-89, for full details. Official details of the venture were reported in a joint letter of the firm to Thomas H. Eaton, Secretary of War, Oct. 29, 1830. *Sublette Papers,* Missouri Historical Society; printed in *U.S. Senate, Exec. Doc.,* 20th Cong., 2nd Sess., Serial No. 181, Doc. 67. A more available copy is reproduced in Morgan, *Jedediah Smith,* Appendix A, 343-348.

[35] Nov. 26, 1830.

missionaries found wagons to be an essential ingredient for their travel comfort, as did the Whitman-Spalding party of 1836. All of these western journeys were called to the nation's attention by press reports and published narratives.[36]

Louis Tarascon undoubtedly found in them an invigorating stimulus.[37] In the twilight of his life, he responded. Writing in three pamphlets, two in 1836, one in 1837, he renewed, with eloquent vigor, his cry for the expansion of American enterprise westward.

In a pamphlet published in Louisville, March 1836, entitled,

> Republican Education, And gradual Western March of enlightened, laborious, virtuous, and happy generations, from all the present and future United States and Territories of North America, through their Rocky Mountains, to their north-west coasts on the Pacific Ocean; thence, in time, further on—the only means, not only of extending knowledge and happiness all around the whole earth, but the only one, also, of maintaining their union; nay, more, the only one of maintaining any one of their republics,

he elaborately, but forcefully, stated his view. His was the dream of an American empire built on education as a unifying link, welded by commerce. And he artfully took cognizance of the fact that the continental limits of America, as he envisioned them, belonged to the United States—although the final settlement, diplomatically, rested ten years hence from his writing.[38]

In pursuit of his utopian ideal, Tarascon traveled up the Mississippi into the Wisconsin Territory searching for a town site. There he hoped to establish a settlement that would be both a realization of his liberal democratic thoughts and his forward economic views. To this planned city he gave the name *Startspoint*. Under cover of a pamphlet, November, 1836, "L. A. Tarascon, To His Friends. . . ," he outlined his long dreamed of purpose.[39]

> [I have] Returned from a country which, ten years ago, at the beginning time of our steam navigation from St. Louis higher up on the upper Mis-

---

[36] Washington Irving, *Adventures of Captain Bonneville*, Portland, Ore., n.d., Ch. 1; Chittenden, *American Fur Trade*, I, 431, II, 647.

[37] Tarascon understood the enterprise of fur trade. In his pamphlet, written in 1824, as cited in note 26, above, he observed that a wagon road west would assure the riches of the western fur trade to the United States.

[38] The first edition of this pamphlet was published in Louisville in 1836, a second edition in New York, September, 1837. Reprinted in *MHNQ*, XXIV (1929), 188-210.

[39] The first edition of this pamphlet was published in Louisville, November, 1836; a second edition in New York, September, 1837. Text, *MHNQ*, 213-265.

sissippi, when yet almost unknown by the majority of our citizens, I had visited in search of the best site on the banks of our Western rivers, whence in conjunction with their navigation, to start the wagon-road which, for most important commercial and political motives, I had, in the year 1824, when there was not yet any thought of traversing continents on railroads, offered to Congress to, without public cost and at public profit, make from that site, through the Rocky Mountains, to our Bay of Columbia, *alias* Oregon, on our northwest coasts of the Pacific Ocean, and which, lately, by a navigation proved to be as fine and practiced by steamboats and crews as good as any other in the world, I have again visited in view of selecting the spot of land most proper for the site of *Startspoint,* the place where to begin the execution of my published plan of republican education and gradual Western march. . . .[40]

From his visionary tower, the mid-west was the heart of an American inland-empire of trade. His justification was explicit:

Its standing at the head of the uninterrupted long line of steamboat navigation of the Mississippi from the sea higher up, and its near equal distance between our shores on the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans, will make it the central point of our United States, and steam travelling through it on land between them, while steamboats will on one side ply on the Pacific, between our Bay of Columbia and eastern Asia and all the other lands round that immense Ocean; on the other, on the Atlantic, between our eastern and southern ports and western Europe and all the other lands round, and in that other great basin north of the Capes of Good Hope and Horn, will, in spite of all attempts through Spanish dominions, by making it the surest, cheapest, shortest and most pleasant of all the possible ways of intercourse between all those separate parts of the habited earth, make the whole of our United States the grand mart of the world, and that country its centre for commerce, sciences, arts and enjoyments.[41]

Then with steady intent based on his prior experience, he noted:

Was not the navigableness of the Western rivers by vessels of burden fit for sea doubted, when, in the year 1801, with full confidence, I caused to be built at the head of the Ohio on the Monongahela, the remembered ship *Pittsburgh,* of more than three hundred tons, which made the first opening of their navigation, and did not that opinion continue prevailing until the arrival of that ship at Philadelphia?

Would not, ten years ago, many of you considered as ridiculous the idea, that before long we would fly on railroads? And is it not evident now that by steamships in twelve days from Europe to North America, at our eastern ports; by steam railroads in ten, from our said ports to our Bay of Columbia, on our northwest coasts, and from it in eight, by steamships to Asia, we will be able, before many years, to perform in thirty days the voyage from Paris or London to Canton or Japan?[42]

40 *Ibid.,* 215-216.
41 *Ibid.,* 217-218.
42 *Ibid.,* 221.

As to his current state of solvency, he made no apologies.

. . . should I possess yet the grand pecuniary means that I had when, by the ships *Pittsburgh, Louisiana, Western Trader,* and other vessels, brigs and schooners, sent from the head of the Ohio to the Atlantic, and by the first big keel boats to the Missouri, I made the opening of the present immense navigation of the Western rivers and induced Eastern eyes, much more than before, to look westwardly, I would now . . . appropriate the whole of them. . . .[43]

In summation, he prophesied the American destiny.

All of the same family, but separated by seas, by lakes, by rivers, by mountains, and generally ignorants, full of prejudices and unhappy, *nature,* (and when I say nature, I mean the same unknown essence of all things, that others are calling *Theos, Deus, Dieu, God,* or any other name,) nature tends to our universal union, instruction, and happiness. To effect that beneficence, she has elected our nation for her pioneer agent; and to enable us to execute that sublime mission, she has placed us on the best and vastest field of action that does exist on earth; all that connected land, nine thousand miles round, that extends between the two grand oceans, by which to attain men in their farthest recesses and most secret inlets; and she has electrified, magnetized all our hearts and minds with those passions. It is for that grand design that, while many of us, when taking shares in steamboats, canals, and railroads, are thinking of nothing but of making money, she makes us, without telling it, cover our country with them, and she makes us travel, navigate, and pursue commerce with all parts of the earth: and it is also for it that, while many others, when looking to the far seas, are thinking only of more *whales* and *seal skins,* she makes us slowly prepare; and, I hope, soon will start for the south pole, the greatest discovery expedition that has, at any time, taken place in the world;—and greater ones yet shall we not plan and start, when our national navy yards shall be in our Bays of Oregon and Vancouver, as well as in our Atlantic ports?[44]

Indeed, a prophet in the wilderness, a dreamer of American empire!

In his last eloquent plea on this subject, a pamphlet published in 1837, Louis Tarascon gave voice to his convictions of continued American unity in this wise:

Our nation, say I, has so well succeeded that she now consists of twenty-six states and two Territories, with a population of more than fifteen millions, all linked together, not by a common tie of consanguinity—for she is a medley of men from all quarters, of all shapes and colours—but by a natural attraction of joining each other, and by an illusion, the great passion of wealth or commercial interest, and extended as far as the 43d

[43] *Ibid.,* 223.
[44] *Ibid.,* 231.

degree of north latitude on the upper Mississippi and on the Missouri, and it seems certain that before long, through the Rocky Mountains, she will be extended to the far northwest coast on the Pacific Ocean, whence, on a theatre vaster than the Atlantic one, by enlarged means of knowledge, commerce and liberality, to complete all union.[45]

His final dream was a colonial scheme for establishing settlements on the upper Mississippi in the Wisconsin Territory, or in Illinois. The reasons he put forth were both powerful and democratically appealing. It was an eloquent testament, both to his vision and sensitivity.

Not only the commerce from *Paris* to *Canton* by the shortest of ways through New York, or Rocky Mountains, and our bay of Columbia, now as previously, on motion of John Floyd in Congress, called the Oregon, on our northwest coast of the Pacific Ocean, as in 1825 announced in France by de Chateaubriand, and in New York by De Witt Clinton, or Cadwallader D. Colden, in an editorial article of the *Statesman,* a New York paper, entitled *Empires travelling west,* as soon as they had read, in my memorial published by order of the Senate of these United States, my offer of, without public cost and at public profit, making a public wagon road from the river Missouri, near the mouth of the river Kansas, through those mountains within the 42d degree of north latitude to that great bay, on or near the 46th, probably at Astoria; and while making it, of civilizing the natives or Indians on the way, not by telling them nonsense about the impossible other world after death; but by speaking them reason about this real one, to be happy while they are on it—by, according to their mode of living employing them as hundreds of provisions for the road makers, by paying them fairly for venison and skins, destroying panthers, rattle snakes, wolves, and other obnoxious animals—by employing their squaws in our cornfields and our dwelling houses, and most expressly by educating their children with ours, at establishments of equal republican education, all along the said roads; and, when so educated, and of marriageable ages, as it has been often successfully the case in wise Virginia, in unproud Canada, and among the medley of our most ancient European ancestors, all from savage nations come from Asia, mixed with Arabians, by intermarrying them.

No; not that commerce only from Paris to Canton, already spoken of, as a future marvel, but an immense one, which since '76, nay, since Columbus, perhaps eternity, the world is tending to—an universal one from all parts of the earth to unite all mankind, through the two oceans, on our central land—and a commerce for which great preparations are now effected in the following ways, from Maine to Orleans in each of our ports, all our great merchants, all our rich men, all men viewing to wealth, (and except very few, all are so viewing,) all our statesmen, all

[45] *Ibid.*, 176. This pamphlet was published by H. D. Robinson in New York, 1837.
[46] *Ibid.*, 182-184.

its inhabitants, all tools of destiny are joining their forces for formation of means concentrated in it—for them there is two sides, the eastern one, through the Atlantic Ocean; the western, through the land—though linked together, and long time to be so, because no land produces all that another does, and for many other causes, each one of those ports endeavours, by sailing, or steaming on that ocean, to have direct, and as cheap as possible, commercial intercourses with all the islands in, and all the continental markets round it—and, on the western side, by lines of steam rail-roads or distance destroyers, straight to the Wisconsin, to have also direct, and as cheap as possible, commercial intercourse with that central point and place of *rendezvous,* whence all in a body, on many rails to fly to the Oregon, the grand northwestern bay, where, by the means of innumerable electrified, or steam ships, constantly plying on the grand Pacific Ocean, to closer bind the tie of the universal commerce which is to unite all the world on our central land—commerce, nevertheless, which will cease of being and will be superseded by universal brotherhood of gifting and gifted friends, as soon as all mankind, having acquired knowledge and habit of light work, will not any more dispute for creeds nor property; but, nevertheless also, commerce which will yet last a long time, because the destruction of ignorance and drone-ism cannot be effected in a few days only.[46]

Such was the final thought of Louis Anastasius Tarascon and his dream of an American Empire in the West.[47]

DOYCE B. NUNIS, JR.

University of California
Los Angeles

---

47 As to Louis Tarascon's subsequent life, little is known. From the evidence at hand, he moved to New York. There he wrote his last pamphlet in 1839. This was an appeal for non-segregated education. After that date, advanced in years, his name does not appear again in print. McGirr, "Tarascon of Shippingport," 89.

Louis's brother, John, died in 1825. Katherine G. Healy, comp., "Calendar of Early Jefferson County, Kentucky, Wills," *Filson Historical Quarterly,* VI (1932), 296. Descendants of the family, from John, survived. *History of the Ohio Falls Cities* ..., I, 488 b; 496 k-l-m; G. Glenn Clift, comp. & ed., "Kentucky Marriages and Obituaries," *The Register* of the Kentucky Historical Society, XXXVI (1938), 321. They are looked upon, by Kentuckians, as one of their great pioneering families. Samuel M. Wilson, "Pioneer Kentucky in its Ethnological Aspect," *ibid.,* XXXI (1933), 289.

New Orleans Courts Under Military Occupation, 1861-1865

With the fall of Fort Jackson and St. Philip, the legal system of Louisiana, as it applied to New Orleans, also collapsed, and by the time Major General Benjamin F. Butler arrived in the city on May 1, 1862, to begin the military occupation of the former Confederate port, only a few of the inferior courts were open. Butler's first intention seems to have been not to interfere with the civil courts, though he did announce that all crimes involving the military would be brought to trial in the courtmartial.[1]

The disorganized state of the municipal judiciary soon forced him to take more action, however, and on May 20, his military commandant, General George F. Shepley, suspended the "several Recorders of the city . . . from the discharge of the functions of their offices. . . ." From that time forward, he directed, "all complaints for the violation of the peace and good order of the city, of its ordinances, or of the Laws of the United States" would be heard in the Provost Court where Major Joseph M. Bell presided. The District courts, which heard civil cases, had already ceased to function. Hearing of Shepley's order that one judge was to hear all cases from the six recorder's courts, the *New Orleans Commercial Bulletin* emitted a figurative whistle and expressed the opinion that Judge Bell would have a "vast amount of work on his hands."[2]

Butler may have had more than a judicial reorganization in mind in making this change, for by abolishing all the inferior civil courts, he forced the citizens of New Orleans to take all their legal complaints to courts within the Federal jurisdiction. In such courts no lawyer could practice who had not taken the oath of allegiance to the United States Government, and no suit could be brought by any persons who had not similarly indicated their loyalty to the Union. Judge Bell was indeed swamped with cases, and by October, Butler had ordered the reopening of three of the District courts. In the meantime, a large part of the legal fraternity and

---

1 See his proclamation of May 1, 1862 in *Private and Official Correspondence of Gen. Benjamin F. Butler During the Period of the Civil War*, 5 vols., Norwood, Mass., 1917.

2 *New Orleans Picayune*, May 21, 1862; *New Orleans Commercial Bulletin*, May 22, 1862.

a number of citizen plaintiffs had found it to their advantage to return to their former allegiance.[3]

The Provost Court, in one form or another, was to be a judicial landmark in New Orleans throughout the war, and its reputation was never good. Complaints about its operation soon began to be heard. In August the *Daily True Delta* charged that, in addition to taking the oath of allegiance, plaintiffs in cases heard in this court had to pay $1.00 in United States Treasury notes to institute proceedings, and fifty cents for each witness they intended to call up, all in advance. This money was to be paid to the clerk of the court, and apparently it never went any further than that.[4]

Judge Bell was soon transferred to another Butler-created tribunal—the Court of Military Commission—and another Butler appointee, a New England civilian named J. B. Kinsman, was imported to occupy the bench of the Provost Court. "The appointment to the position of Judge of the Provost Court vacillated between private citizens and officials seemingly without improvement as far as the ends of justice were concerned," noted a special commission which reported on affairs in the Department of the Gulf in 1865. Judge Kinsman's tenure was fairly short-lived, for he left the Department shortly after Butler did in December, 1862, and Judge Charles A. Peabody, sent by President Lincoln to head the new "Provisional Court," was asked by Shepley to handle the duties of the Provost Court as well.[5]

Judge Peabody often found it impossible to take care of the work of both courts, and as a result more and more of the sessions of the Provost Court were presided over by one Augustus DeB. Hughes, clerk of the court. The travesties of justice reported in this court multiplied. ". . . it is a matter of standing wonder," com-

---

[3] See *New Orleans Picayune*, May 23, 1862; *New Orleans Commercial Bulletin*, June 6, 1862; *New Orleans Bee*, October 15, 1862. Judge Bell was so overwhelmed with cases that on June 25 he published a notice that his court would no longer entertain any but suits of a "strictly criminal or military character." *Ibid.*, June 25, 1862. The recorders' courts were reconstituted by July 1.

[4] *New Orleans Daily True Delta*, August 16, 1862.

[5] Report of the Special Commission . . . , September 23, 1865 . . . , Vol. 737, Record Group 94, Records of the War Department, Adjutant General's Office, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; *New Orleans Picayune*, September 4, 1863. The Court of Military Commission also proved a lucrative operation for the Federal authorities. On June 4, 1862, Judge Bell reported to Butler that he had collected $3,827 in fines between May 9 and June 1, and that he had expended $3,731 for "incidental expenses." Report of Judge Bell, Court of Military Commission, June 4, 1862, in Benjamin F. Butler Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

mented the *Picayune* in the fall of 1863 in discussing Hughes's court, "that sober, quiet men from the economical North, who had come here to reform abuses and charm the rebellious back into loyalty, could ever screw their consciences up" to the approval of his acts. But consciences had been pricked. In May, Butler's successor, Major General N. P. Banks, was advised by his Provost Marshal General that the hours of the Provost Court—7 to 10 A.M. daily—constituted a "denial of justice," since anyone arrested after 10 A.M. each day was forced to spend the rest of the day and all night in the Parish Prison. He recommended that Banks appoint additional judges so that the court could have a later morning session and an afternoon session too; but Banks, apparently disgusted by the reports which had reached him about this court, created one of his own at the beginning of June and appointed one of his officers, Colonel Charles C. Dwight, Provost Judge.[6]

The jurisdiction of the new court was to include all cases involving violations of Federal military orders by military personnel, all civil crimes committed by military personnel, and "all other causes arising under the military jurisdiction. . . ." With so wide a range of actionable cases possible, the new court offered fully as many avenues for the enrichment of its personnel as the old one had. When Banks replaced Colonel Dwight with a civilian friend of his own, Alexander A. Atocha, in August, 1863, most of the avenues were soon being explored.[7]

Persons appearing in cases heard by the court were required to post bond in the amount of $5.00, which, commented the *Picayune,* constituted rank injustice "when we consider the number of arrests made for trifling offenses, the number of bonds which have been furnished, and the number and enormous amount of the fines imposed. . . ." Bitterly its editor continued that it was small wonder that the Provost Court "is looked upon as a fat place by its peculiar

---

[6] James G. Bowen to Banks, May 20, 1863, in Letter Press, Vol. 297, Correspondence of the Provost Marshal General, Record Group 98, Records of the War Department, Department of the Gulf, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; *New Orleans Daily True Delta,* June 6, 1863; *New Orleans Picayune,* September 2, 1863. The Hughes court was abolished in General Order No. 65, New Orleans, Letter Press Vol. 297, Correspondence of the Provost Marshal General, National Archives. See also Bowen to J. A. Hopkins, New Orleans, August 31, 1863, *ibid.*

[7] *New Orleans Daily True Delta,* June 6, 1863; Special Order No. 198, New Orleans, August 13, 1863, in Endorsement Book, Vol. 309, Correspondence of the Provost Marshal General, National Archives. Atocha, though a native Orleanian, had grown up in New York and came to New Orleans with Banks in 1862. He served for a time with the Sequestration Commission.

and well-salaried officials, and as a grinding oppression by our citizens generally."[8]

Apparently Judge Atocha mastered the revenue sources of the court very quickly, for he soon felt he could afford to keep a wife. On October 17, he imported a bride from New York and was married in a brilliant ceremony, illuminated by the presence of much Army "brass." Though he presided in cases argued by such outstanding Louisiana legalists as Christian Roselius, Atocha's legal knowledge seems to have been somewhat deficient. The Special Commission, checking into his court records in 1865, noted shockingly disparate and inequitable sentences imposed by him. And by March, 1864, other deficiencies had become apparent. Asked to submit a detailed accounting of all funds which had passed through his hands, Atocha evidently was not able to do so. In May he found it conveniently imperative to return to the North for a while. He departed in a cloud of scandal.[9]

Banks next offered the judgeship to young Colonel Henry C. Warmoth, a twenty-one-year old Missourian who was personal aide to General John A. McClernand of Illinois. For a man of his tender years, Warmoth's rise in the military service had been sufficiently spectacular as it was; the reasons which moved Banks to insist upon his accepting the Provost Court appointment are, however, still not very clear. Warmoth noted in his diary that the position had been offered to him by Bank's secretary, Captain James Tucker, during a reception at the Banks home on May 25. He had declined it because he thought the court illegal and unconstitutional and because "it was currently believed it was for the purpose of making some persons rich &... it had been so conducted as to bring those persons connected with it into disrepute."[10]

---

[8] *New Orleans Picayune*, September 2, 1863.

[9] *Ibid.*, October 20, 1863; Report of the Special Commission..., September 23, 1865..., Vol. 737, Record Group 94, Records of the War Department, Adjutant General's Office, National Archives. Murder, for example, drew variously terms of eight months, one year, and five years; larceny was punished by life imprisonment; treason, by three months' imprisonment. See also Bowen to Atocha, March 31, 1864, in Letter Press, Vol. 298, Correspondence of the Provost Marshal General, Record Group 98, *ibid.;* Henry L. Pierson to *id.*, April 19, 1864, *ibid.;* and Bowen to Clerk to the Provost Court, New Orleans, May 26, 1864, Vol. 299, *ibid.* Atocha was subsequently brought to trial on charges of corruption but was freed. See Atocha to J. Schuyler Crosby, New Orleans, May 13, 1865, in Letters Received (Civil), 1865, Box 10, *ibid.;* and J. B. Nott to Bowen [October] 21, 1864, in Letters Received (Civil), 1864, Box 5, *ibid.*

[10] Diary, VI, in Henry Clay Warmoth Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina Library, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, entry for May 25, 1864.

Banks refused to be put off, however, and a few days later, overriding Warmoth's objection that acceptance would doom him "to perpetual infamy," he persuaded him to accept the post. Warmoth entered upon his duties next day and soon was enthusiastically meting out sentences on a stern and wholesale basis. He tried thirty cases on his second day on the bench—"Some quite important ones"—and though he reported that "everybody said I did well," he described the work as a "very great strain upon the mind."[11]

Apparently it was a strain on other things as well, among them loyalty and honesty. When a ship captain who was one of his best friends was brought before him charged with allowing two demijohns of whisky to be unloaded illegally from his steamer, Warmoth fined him heavily, remarking "I know no friends in the discharge of my duty." He sentenced the keeper of a bawdy house and four of her girls to one to two months each in the workhouse, but privately offered to release them for $50.00 each. They were able to raise only $175.00 but he accepted that and let them go. A soldier accused of stealing a watch chain was sentenced to ten years in prison, and an officer who was charged with having ridden a horse to death was fined $400.00.[12]

He had little sympathy for the defendants brought before him. When Mrs. Victoria Anderson was charged with sending her fourteen-year old daughter to the military prison with a message for some prisoners who subsequently escaped, he sentenced both Mrs. Anderson and the child to prison for a year, though it was established that the mother was illiterate and had six small children at home dependent upon her care. And a German coffeehouse keeper, accused by two Negroes of receiving a couple of sacks of stolen government oats, received a similar sentence, though the oats were not found on his property.[13]

---

[11] *Ibid.*, and entries for May 31, June 2, 4, 1864; Banks to McClernand, New Orleans, May 31, 1864, in Warmoth Papers, Correspondence, January—May, 1864; Special Order No. 143, New Orleans, [June] 1, 1864, *ibid.*

[12] Warmoth Diary, VI, entry for June 8, 1864; Statement of Charles H. James, September 15, 1864, in Letters Received (Civil), 1864, Box 8, Record Group 98, Records of the War Department, National Archives; R. K. Dioss to Bowen, July 2, 1864, *ibid.*; manuscript record of the case of U.S. *vs* D. N. Ensworth, August 3, 1864, *ibid.*, Box 6. Banks termed this judgement "inequitable" and ordered it reduced.

[13] See John W. Corrigan, John Bulkley *et al.* to Hurlbut [September 28], 1864, in Letters Received (Civil), 1864, Box 5, Record Group 98, Records of the War Department, National Archives; Compendium of

Warmoth was relieved from duty on October 25, 1864, and ordered to return to his regiment. Arrived in Louisville, Kentucky, he hastily resigned his commission and hurried back to New Orleans. On January 10, 1865, he was licensed to practice law in the state of Louisiana and was soon doing so well that his name was mentioned as a candidate for appointment to the State Supreme Court. He was at the time not yet twenty-two years old.[14]

Though it was established as a military court, the Provost Court heard a large number of purely civil cases. It was not, however, the only court hearing cases of this kind. As has been pointed out, Butler found it necessary to reconstitute the District courts of three of the city's six districts in October, 1862. The juisdiction of these courts was limited to probate matters and to "any civil cases between party and party, not involving any question of political or military character." The restriction concerning cases of a political or military character meant that these courts had a relatively limited jurisdiction, for, other than successions, very few cases came to trial in New Orleans during the Civil War, that did not have a political or military character. Moreover, the stiff oath required of prospective jurors made jury trials, or even the organization of a grand jury, next to impossible. In November, Butler forbade the transfer or alienation of property by any person who had not taken the oath of allegiance, and this cut down still further the number of cases eligible for trial in the District courts.[15]

President Lincoln himself sought to remedy the lack of a system of higher courts for Federal Louisiana by creating a "Provisional Court" in October, 1862, authorized to "hear, try, and determine all causes, civil and criminal, including causes in law, equity,

---

Charges Against Burghuber and Lutz, October 21, 1864, *ibid.* The judgement was ordered set aside by Judge G. Norman Lieber, who succeeded Warmoth.

[14] Special Orders Nos. 289, 291, New Orleans, October 25, 1864, and Special Order No. 265, Louisville, Kentucky, November 16, 1864, in Warmoth Papers, Correspondence, 1865; Internal Revenue Tax Receipt, *ibid.;* T. A. Post to Warmoth, St. Louis, March 9, 1865, *ibid.*

[15] *New Orleans Bee,* October 15, 1862. Loyal Unionists Rufus K. Howell, W. Handlin, and E. Hiestand were named to the Sixth, Third, and First District Courts respectively. They also handled cases from the other three districts; *ibid.,* May 22, 1863. The oath for jurors excluded from jury service all who had "aided the rebellion" by so much as a one dollar contribution. See also General Orders No. 73, New Orleans, September 18, 1862, in *War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies,* 130, vols. Washington, D.C., 1880-1901, Series I, Volume XV, 572-573. This work is hereinafter referred to as *Official Records.*

revenue and admiralty. . . ." This court, which was to act in lieu of the Federal courts dissolved by the act of secession was to be headed by Judge Charles A. Peabody of New York. He was empowered to appoint a prosecuting attorney, marshal, and clerk for the court who like himself were to hold their appointments during the Presidential pleasure throughout the military occupation of Louisiana.[16]

Though Lincoln had declared it to be a court of record, the Provisional Court proved a source of embarrassment to the legal minds of Louisiana, most of whom regarded it as clearly unconstitutional and illegal. Undeterred by this opinion, Judge Peabody opened the doors of the court on December 31, 1862, and he acted continuously under the Presidential order until the end of the war. Judge Peabody claimed less authority than his commission vested in him, but even with this self-limitation on his jurisdiction he managed to conflict with the military authority. In March, 1863, Banks sent his Chief Quartermaster, S. B. Holabird, to Washington in the hope of getting a ruling that would clearly establish the subordinate role to be played by the Provisional Court, which he felt "ought only to adjudicate upon subjects turned over or transferred to it by the military branch of the Government." General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck answered reassuringly that "neither this court nor its officers should be permitted to interfere with or embarrass your movements," and told him that if he found it necessary, he could completely disregard the court and its officers.[17]

The Banks-dominated legislature sought to do away with the Provisional Court in 1864, arguing that the civil government had been restored and that the President had recognized the regular constitutional courts, and as a result the Administration did impose further limits on the Provisional Court's jurisdiction. "But it continued to exist," as one student has pointed out, "doubtless for the purposes for which Lincoln created it . . . rendering decisions in disputes or litigations in which foreign residents were involved or

---

16 *Official Records*, Ser. I, Vol. XV, 581.

17 Willie Malvin Caskey, *Secession and Restoration in Louisiana*, University, Louisiana, 1938, 154; *New Orleans Daily True Delta*, December 31, 1862; Banks to Holabird, New Orleans, March 27, 1863, in *Official Records*, Ser. I, Vol. XV, 694-95; Halleck to Banks, Washington, April 18, 1863, *ibid.*, 702. Banks was excessively jealous of his prerogative in the Department of the Gulf where civilian officials were concerned. See his letter of December 6, 1863, to Lincoln, and the President's reply of December 24, 1863, in Roy P. Basler (ed.), *The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln*, 9 vols., New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1953.

concerned." The Provisional Court was ultimately abolished by Congress in July, 1866.[18]

In addition to this creation of President Lincoln's, regular Federal courts were reconstituted as the occupation went on. In June, 1863, the United States District Court was reopened with elaborate ceremonies, many speeches, and a wild popping of champagne corks. United States Attorney Rufus Waples warned that the old court records were in such chaos that it would be some time before the court could go into the claims that had accumulated since 1861, but the reopening of the court was widely regarded as a significant step in the restoration of Louisiana to the Union.[19]

By November, 1863, there were so many courts in operation in New Orleans that the old Cabildo on Jackson Square could not house them all and a number of them were forced to move over into the Presbyter on the other side of St. Louis Cathedral. There is evidence that many of the same complaints made about the Provost Court could be repeated concerning these newer Federal creations, however, and the judicial situation in the city as a whole remained the object of much criticism throughout the war period.[20]

ELISABETH JOAN DOYLE

Wheeling College
West Virginia

---

18 Caskey, *Secession and Restoration in Louisiana*, 155-156.

19 *New Orleans Daily True Delta*, June 25, 1863. E. H. Durell was named presiding judge. The celebration produced one minor casualty—a champagne cork hit one of the guests in the leg.

20 *Ibid.*, November 10, 1863. The existing courts were the U. S. Provisional Court; U. S. District Court; Provost Court; First, Second, Third, and Sixth District Recorder's Courts, Fourth District Justice's Court; and Coroner's Court. See also J. R. Franklin to Banks, New Orleans, February 10, 1864, in Letters Received (Civil), 1864, Record Group 98, Records of the War Department, National Archives; J. Madison Wells to Hurlbut, New Orleans, March 14, 1865, *ibid.*, Box 11; and *New Orleans Times*, April 11, 1865.

MID-AMERICA

An Historical Review

VOLUME 42, NUMBER 4 OCTOBER 1960

MID-AMERICA

An Historical Review

OCTOBER 1960

VOLUME 42 NUMBER 4

CONTENTS

ALFRED M. LANDON AND THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN OF 1936 . . . . . *Donald R. McCoy* 195

JOHN A. LOGAN AND THE ELECTION OF 1864 IN ILLINOIS . . . . . *James P. Jones* 219

THE LOYOLA LEO XIII SYMPOSIUM . . . *Edward T. Gargan* 231

BOOK REVIEWS 244

NOTES AND COMMENTS 251

INDEX FOR VOLUME XLII 253

MANAGING EDITOR

JEROME V. JACOBSEN, *Chicago*

EDITORIAL STAFF

WILLIAM STETSON MERRILL
J. MANUEL ESPINOSA
W. EUGENE SHIELS
RAPHAEL HAMILTON
PAUL KINIERY
PAUL S. LIETZ

Published quarterly by Loyola University (The Institute of Jesuit History) at 50 cents a copy. Annual subscription, $2.00; in foreign countries, $2.50.

Entered as second class matter, August 7, 1929, at the post office at Chicago, Illinois, under the Act of March 3, 1879. Additional entry as second class matter at the post office at Effingham, Illinois. Printed in the United States.

Subscription and change of address notices and all communications should be addressed to the Managing Editor at the publication and editorial offices at Loyola University, 6525 Sheridan Road, Chicago 26, Illinois.

MID-AMERICA
An Historical Review
OCTOBER 1960
VOLUME 42 NUMBER 4

Alfred M. Landon and the Presidential Campaign of 1936

For over twenty years, jokes about Alfred Mossman Landon have been standard in the comedians' repertoire. Punch lines like "What ever became of Landon" or "Finally, they made Alf Landon look good" were heard during the 1958 Congressional election campaign. Historians have scarcely been more kind to the 1936 Presidential candidate of the Republican party. As often as not, Landon's 1936 efforts have been given as little attention as those of the Union party of that year. Yet, the Landon campaign of 1936 should not be neglected by historians. It should not be forgotten that Landon's candidacy was supported by the votes of almost 17,000,000 people. More important for historians, his campaign pointed out substantial New Deal defects and pointed up major problems afflicting Republicanism. The campaign is also of interest in that it built the basis for the revival of the Republican party despite the party's overwhelming defeat in 1936.

To understand the Landon campaign for President, attention must be given to the Kansan's background. Since 1914, when he served as a county chairman for the Bull Moose party, Landon was identified with the progressive element of Kansas politics. As such he assumed roles of leadership in Henry J. Allen's successful gubernatorial campaigns in 1918 and 1920, in William Allen White's independent anti-Ku Klux Klan bid for the governorship in 1924, and in electing Clyde M. Reed Governor in 1928. Upon Reed's victory in the 1928 Republican primary election, Landon became Republican state chairman, a position which he held until Governor Reed was defeated for renomination in 1930. At that time, the Kansas Republican party was rent by factionalism, so badly so that Democrat Harry Woodring slipped into office as Governor. Lan-

don, strengthened politically by prominence won in a mid-winter struggle against monopoly and for conservation in the oil industry, decided early in 1931 that he had the best chance of any Republican to unite his party and to win the governorship. He was able to win handily the Republican gubernatorial nomination in 1932, using successfully his progressive political ties and an effective appeal to the Republican Old Guard for party unity. After a three-way election battle with Governor Woodring and the notorious goat-gland doctor, John Brinkley, Landon was elected Governor of Kansas.

Once in office, Landon strengthened his party further by drawing together its factions. He strengthened state government by working closely not only with Kansas Republicans but with Democrats in the state and on the national level. As a result of this and his own administrative abilities, Landon maintained vital state services and provided relief, welfare and reform at least equivalent to other states in the region. These accomplishments were accompanied by balancing of the budget, reduction of popular taxes and adherence to the state constitution, a remarkable achievement for the time. Moreover, the Governor took considerable interest in regional and national problems, using a progressive approach.[1] In 1934, he won reelection by a comfortable majority of 62,000 votes, the only Republican governor in the nation returned to office that year.[2]

---

[1] As Governor of Kansas, Landon, in a series of letters had supported or urged upon the federal government diplomatic recognition of the Union of Soviet Socialistic Republics, a $1,000,000,000 loan to the U.S.S.R. to stimulate trade, better government farm credit machinery, the Civil Works Administration, the Civilian Conservation Corps, government aid for college students, utility regulation, water conservation and flood control, forest conservation, natural resources planning, drought relief, banking stabilization, and regulation of the petroleum industry. On other interesting issues, he deplored the anti-Jewish activities of the Nationalist Socialist government in Germany, and urged and supported legislative investigation of racial discrimination in Kansas state institutions; Landon to Franklin D. Roosevelt, October 26, 1933, January 16, 1934, February 11, 1934, June 2, 1934, January 7, 1935, February 19, 1935, April 19, 1935, September 16, 1935, Landon to Harry Hopkins, June 18, 1934, Landon to Elbert Thomas, April 15, 1935, Landon to Eugene Meyer, July 23, 1935, Papers of Alfred M. Landon (Kansas State Historical Society, Topeka); all letters and speech manuscripts hereinafter cited are from this collection unless otherwise noted. *The Call* (Kansas City, Missouri), March 22, 1935.

[2] See William Allen White, *What It's All About*, New York, 1936, Chapter IV, for a fairly reliable account of Landon's political background. For general accounts of Kansas politics during the Woodring and Landon administrations, see Ruth Friedrich, "The Threadbare Thirties," in John D. Bright (ed.), *Kansas: The First Century*, 2 vols., New York, 1956, II, 89-103; and William F. Zornow, *Kansas: A History of the Jayhawk State*, Norman, Oklahoma, 1957, 244-255.

Landon's election victory in 1934 marked him as one of the leaders in his party for he was successful at a time when few Republicans were successful at the polls. Although he was aware of his prominence, he disclaimed any intention to work actively toward the Republican Presidential nomination. He did not believe there was much chance that the "nomination would come as far West as Kansas."[3] Yet by spring of 1935, Kansas friends like Roy Roberts and Lacy Haynes of the *Kansas City Star,* Oscar Stauffer of the Stauffer newspapers, William Allen White, and Republican National Committee counsel John D. M. Hamilton began to discuss Landon as Presidential material. With their widespread journalistic and political contacts their words reached many listeners. The stumping of the Middle West by Richard Lloyd Jones of the *Tulsa Tribune* in behalf of his "Kansas Lincoln," and the efforts back East of William T. Mossman, Landon's uncle and an industrial public relations man, and of former Kansans like Ben Hibbs of *Country Gentleman* also helped to lay the basis for a Landon boom.[4]

Landon did not take this activity too seriously. His strategy was to do his work in Kansas, and let whatever might develop do so without any unusual effort on his part. This policy, reinforced by his successful record and his friends' efforts, brought many Republican politicians, editors and writers to Kansas to see him; others used the mail to exchange views. Governor Landon endeavored to impress upon them that the 1936 Republican nominee must be a man who could with fairness ferret out some New Deal policies that were good and make them workable by the application of "clear-cut, definite, and vigorous administrative leadership." This must be done within the framework of a "genuine budget balancing, tax reduction program," one that would eliminate waste in government and permit Americans to use their tax savings to build up personal purchasing power. The Governor felt that a continually unbalanced budget could lead to a debasement of the nation's monetary system, and very possibly to an economic disaster similar to that suffered by Germany in the 1920's. He saw the government policies directing an economy of scarcity as false

---

[3] Landon to William T. Mossman, November 24, 1934 and February 19, 1935.

[4] William Allen White to Landon, July 3, 1935, July 19, 1935, Papers of William Allen White (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress); John D. M. Hamilton to Landon, July 1, 1935, July 11, 1935, July 30, 1935; Richard Lloyd Jones to Landon, June 4, 1935; Ben Hibbs, "Governor Landon Answers," *Country Gentleman,* Philadelphia, CVI (January, 1935), 12 ff.

and unsettling in a land of abundance. America's hope was in pushing its standard of living up to the level allowed by its potential productivity. Landon stressed that these economic factors, the government's record of broken promises, and the President's practice of glossing over them, could impose unbearable strains on our system of government and on even the most hardy character attributes of our society.[5]

Landon also urged upon his contacts that the Republican nominee not be the product of a convention controlled by the old leadership, "the bitter enders," for that would drive those holding liberal and moderate views to Roosevelt. If the old leadership controlled the party, it would seek power figuratively "to hang, quarter, and shoot at sunrise." This would result in a definite swing to the left nationally. Landon asserted that the nominee should be one agreed upon by all elements of the Republican party, and agreed upon well before the meeting of the 1936 National Convention in order to allow him an opportunity to develop, unhampered by competition, his ideas, campaign techniques and political knowledge even before his formal nomination. The alternative would be to present the country in June, 1936, with a nominee who would have to unite his party, gain his seasoning, and formulate his campaign and conduct it all at the same time.[6] As the Republican party could not feasibly nominate anyone but a political newcomer, Landon's formula was sensible if the party was to make the strongest showing possible in 1936, and, of course, tailor-made for Governor Landon. Yet it was naive in view of the practices of democratic, de-centralized American politics. While the events leading to Landon's nomination for President involved no great struggle, the competition was sufficient to stimulate factionalism and keep the candidates for the nomination concerned largely with convention matters rather than the election campaign.

During the early summer of 1935, there was considerable doubt as to Landon's political ambitions. Frank Knox, the Governor's leading Middle Western competitor for national attention, thought that Landon was only seeking Senator Arthur Capper's seat should that lawmaker retire. William Allen White reported in July that the Kansas Governor was apparently hesitant about deciding to

---

[5] Landon to William T. Mossman, May 14, 1935; Landon to W. M. Kiplinger, May 14, 1935; Landon to Mossman, August 23, 1935; Landon to Mark Sullivan, April 9, 1935, October 17, 1935, November 4, 1935.

[6] Landon to Richard Lloyd Jones, July 29, 1935; Landon to Nicholas Roosevelt, June 18, 1935; Landon to William T. Mossman, July 25, 1935.

strive for the Presidential nomination in 1936.[7] Landon was hesitant, but in July and August he received considerable attention in the nation's press. He was the subject of favorable editorials in not only the Kansas, Oklahoma and Kansas City press but in newspapers across the nation. This swelling of publicity encouraged him late in August, 1935, to write his uncle that "possibly we will want to go after the first choice."[8] By fall, however, events were to make Landon a definite candidate for the Republican nomination. Eastern business and political interests, prodded mainly by the energetic John D. M. Hamilton and encouraged by the increasing editorial attention for Landon, were beginning to show real interest in the Kansas budget-balancer. Attacks by controversial public figures like Harry Hopkins seemingly revealed that Landon was a man feared by the opposition. Furthermore, William Randolph Hearst, preparing to declare for Landon, had laid plans for publicity through his newspaper and magazine chains to make the Landon family "America's First Family."[9]

While these developments were to help Landon immensely in gaining the nomination, he was well aware that they could also smother him politically. Hearst and the Eastern interests, he insisted, should come to him; he refused to commit himself to them.[10] As for opposition attacks, Landon refused to answer them or even to take a public stand on a national issue— a wise policy for a student of politics who, as he well knew, had much to learn. Other contenders for the Republican nomination, the Governor tried not to antagonize.[11] His campaign strategy throughout the fall, winter and spring of 1935-1936 was simply to create an impression as a friendly, agrarian liberal who was also a most efficient executive.[12]

---

[7] Frank Knox to Annie Knox, March 30, 1935, Papers of Frank Knox (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress); William Allen White to Herbert Hoover, July 24, 1935, White Papers.

[8] Landon to William T. Mossman, August 20, 1935.

[9] Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins—An Intimate History*, New York, 1948, 80; James T. Williams, Jr. to Landon, April 7, 1936; John Tebbel, *The Life and Good Times of William Randolph Hearst*, New York, 1952, 260.

[10] Landon to William T. Mossman, October 3, 1935; Landon to W. A. Sheaffer, March 14, 1936; Landon to George H. Sibley, March 24, 1936; Richard E. Berlin to Landon, January 13, 1936; Landon to Berlin, January 18, 1936.

[11] Governor Landon refused to oppose Senator William E. Borah in the Nebraska and Ohio primary elections, and in Iowa he had his representatives stave off a local drive for Landon delegates in order not to offend Senator Lester Dickinson; Landon to W. M. Kiplinger, March 27, 1936; Landon to Irving Stone, July 20, 1943.

[12] See Landon's few nationally publicized pre-Convention talks: "Speech by Governor Alf M. Landon of Kansas before State Chamber of Commerce of Ohio, Cleveland, Ohio, November 6, 1935," "Address at

Within the Republican party, he was exceedingly successful in this. By mail and by personal interview in Topeka, Landon was able effectively to supplement the activities of his supporters in gaining more supporters. The exchanges of views which he carried on not only yielded important information and insights for the Governor but allowed him the opportunities he so greatly needed to wrestle with the national issues. They also showed his engagingly gregarious personality to good advantage, and few of Landon's visitors remained unimpressed with his willingness to discuss issues with them and especially with his desire to hear their views.[13] Yet, the Governor did not allow himself to become attached intellectually or factionally by his visitors. This he accomplished partly by relying heavily on newspapermen and writers for ideas and political advice, in fact to such extent that he could have been called the candidate of the working press. These newsmen included almost all of his leading Kansas supporters, Raymond Gram Swing, then of the ultra-liberal *Nation,* Raymond Clapper and Eugene Meyer of the *Washington Post,* William Hard, Nicholas Roosevelt of the *New York Herald-Tribune,* Douglas Aikman, W. M. Kiplinger, Mark Sullivan, as well as divers Hearst editors, especially Richard E. Berlin and Merryle S. Rukeyser. While Landon was more cautious with some of these men than with others, it is noticeable that they represented a variety of political interests—even the Hearst men, who seemed to agree only on how splendid their employer was.

While Landon tapped visiting and corresponding politicians, writers and editors for information, he rarely committed himself on issues in writing and only in generalities, if at all, in person. This was all part of the stay at home, be yourself, appeal to all, be committed to none strategy which the Governor adopted and which his advisers endorsed. Landon had, of course, little choice concerning Presidential primary elections, because, as William Allen White wrote him, "primaries cost money. You have no money.

Topeka, January 29, 1936," "Address at Lincoln [Nebraska], February 29, 1936," and "Frankly Speaking: In Which Governor Alfred M. Landon of Kansas Is Interviewed on Questions of the Day by H. V. Kaltenborn," May 7, 1936.

[13] Anonymous typed report on Landon to William E. Borah, n.d., "Presidency/Landon" file, Papers of William E. Borah (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress); Landon to William T. Mossman, October 3, 1935; W. M. Kiplinger to Landon, December 13, 1935; Landon to Kiplinger, January 8, 1936, March 27, 1936; Nicholas Roosevelt to Landon, February 14, 1936; William Allen White to Landon, February 15, 1936; Landon to Raymond Clapper, April 1, 1936; Landon to Oscar Stauffer, November 23, 1936.

You cannot get much honest money."[14] Even in terms of a personal campaign organization, Landon had little support. The Landon for President Committee had little money. In fact, it had spent only about $100,000 by May of 1936, and the greater part of this came after Landon was established as the leading candidate for the nomination. He did not use a national press clipping service until as late as October, 1935; neither he nor the Committee employed a public relations man; in fact, the Committee had no letterheads until March, 1936.[15] To win the nomination Landon relied upon his record, personality, the enthusiasm of his friends, and his apparently favorable position in regard to the important Middle Western and farm votes. These were, however, sufficient. As Landon wrote after the 1936 elections, "I can say that I made less effort for the nomination than any nominee in our time."[16]

The Landon forces felt that they had the nomination clinched early in the spring of 1936. Their task, until the Republican National Convention met in Cleveland, Ohio, was to keep the Governor's supporters in line and to work for the adoption of an acceptable platform. Roy Roberts, Lacy Haynes, John D. M. Hamilton, and various Republican members of Congress from Kansas, especially Senator Arthur Capper, continued their effective efforts for Landon with journalists and Eastern and Middle Western politicians. Fred Seaton and George Sibley campaigned strenuously among Young Republicans, while Oscar Stauffer and Hamilton were successful in holding considerable party grass-roots and delegate support for Governor Landon with the Landon for President Committee. On the development of the platform, Charles P. Taft, served as general coordinator in the drafting of the Landon planks, and William Allen White served as the Governor's chief emmissary in contacting key Republican leaders before the Convention and also in working as the Governor's agent on the Resolutions Committee.[17] Governor Landon continued to do his part at once by serving as commander-in-chief of his forces and by impressing upon those who contacted him that the party needed unity and greater liberalism, and the nation needed moderation.

---

14 William Allen White to Landon, February 15, 1936.

15 White, *op. cit.*, 17 ff.; Landon to H. Alexander Smith, Jr., October 18, 1935, Landon to W. M. Kiplinger, March 27, 1936.

16 Landon to Leslie Edmonds, November 12, 1936.

17 White, *What It's All About*, 17-20 and 28-37; George H. Sibley to Landon, April 4, 1936; William Allen White to Landon, April 21, 1936; Walter Johnson, *William Allen White's America*, New York, 1947, 454 ff.

When the Cleveland Convention of the Republican party met in June, it was apparent that it was dominated by amateurs. Although a number of prominent Republicans were candidates for the Presidential nomination, and while former President Hoover could not be considered out of contention, it was also apparent even before the keynote address that Governor Landon had the majority sentiment with him. Therefore, the main task of the Convention was to devise a platform, one acceptable to the Landon forces and to all but the most extreme party elements. Despite William Allen White's efforts, the recommendations of the Resolutions Committee did not provide the measure of liberalism demanded by Governor Landon. The Governor therefore took the bold action of wiring his interpretation of three key platform planks to the Convention before his name was presented for balloting.[18] This telegram stated his declaration for an amendment to the Constitution authorizing state regulation of maximum hours, minimum wages and working conditions for women and children, for a currency convertible to gold when this could be done without injuring the economy, and for expanding the merit system to all government positions below the rank of Assistant Secretary.[19] These telegraphed platform amendments revealed the Kansan's concern for following what he regarded as sound middle paths, reform, flexibility and efficiency, but not centralization of power or extraordinary use of power. They also reflected his conviction that only compromise meant unity and real progress nationally. By nominating Landon—and on the first ballot, at that—the Convention in essence adopted his platform interpretations.

One issue remained to be settled at the Convention: the Vice Presidential nomination. Governor Landon had shown some interest in seeing an anti-Roosevelt Democrat named in order to encourage Democratic dissidents like Alfred E. Smith and Bainbridge Colby to support the Republican national ticket.[20] In the press of events, however, Landon and his closest advisers were unable to

---

[18] White, *What It's All About*, 21-37; Harold R. Bruce, "Presidential Campaigns," in Edward B. Logan (ed.), *The American Political Scene*, New York, 1936, 165 f.; Johnson, *William Allen White's America*, 456 f.; *New York Times*, June 12, 1936.

[19] Landon to John D. M. Hamilton, June 11, 1936.

[20] Nicholas Roosevelt to Landon, November 29, 1935, Landon to N. Roosevelt, December 5, 1935, Paul Block to Landon, March 24, 1936, April 23, 1936; William T. Mossman to Landon, May 1, 1936; Richard Lloyd Jones to Landon, June 3, 1936, June 4, 1936. Smith, Colby and other prominent Democrats supported Landon in the 1936 campaign, working mainly through an organization called the Jeffersonian Democrats; *New York Times*, July 19, 1936, October 2, 1936.

afford the idea serious consideration. His representatives at the Cleveland Convention therefore worked for Arthur H. Vandenberg with Landon's approval since the Michigan Senator was viewed as a moderate who could work well with the Governor and yet be accepted by the party conservatives. However, by the time Roy Roberts and John D. M. Hamilton had persuaded other Convention leaders to agree on Vandenberg, the Senator had indicated that he would not accept the nomination.[21] In his stead, Frank Knox, who was most acceptable to party conservatives, was given the nomination. Landon was not unhappy with this choice as he felt the Chicago publisher, an old Bull Mooser, really to be a moderate.

The biggest immediate problem facing Landon after the Convention was party organization. He believed the party's greatest handicaps to be defeatism, a paucity of effective organization, and intelligent leadership. He was critical of Hoover for delaying proper reorganization of the National Committee after his defeat in 1932. He was also unhappy with the national organization for selecting for National Committee Chairman during Roosevelt's first term a man who had never previously even been in a precinct fight. Landon did not know whether an effective Republican organization could be built in time for the fall campaign, but he was determined to try to do so.[22] The Kansan viewed the Republican National Convention as a beginning. First of all, the Convention had displayed remarkable unity in nominating both Landon and Knox on the first ballots respectively, and also in accepting with little fuss a platform which represented a marked departure from the conservative party documents from 1920 through 1932. Landon himself had shown, in wiring the Convention his platform interpretations, an element of leadership which bolstered the morale of many Republicans. The Governor was to build on these beginnings. He demanded a shake-up of the Republican National Committee staff, with the energetic John D. M. Hamilton becoming Chairman. Another step taken was to locate the headquarters of the National Committee in Chicago for the campaign. Landon's personal campaign staff was to be located in Topeka, headed by his tactful campaign manager Oscar Stauffer. Attention was given to liberalizing the National Committee's Eastern headquarters, directed by Joseph Martin, at New York. Here Frank Gannett and Agnes Meyer, representing the liberal elements of the party, served as

[21] Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr. (ed.), *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg*, Boston, 1952, xi.
[22] Landon to William T. Mossman, April 22, 1936.

watch dogs to ward off conservative domination. These moves Landon hoped would not only transfer the party organization from Eastern conservative control and onus, but give it a vitality it had heretofore lacked, in fact, a vigor which he hoped would survive the campaign regardless of the election results.[23]

In preparing the actual campaign, the emphasis was on youth and diversity of sources of advice. This was best seen in the people who were closest to Landon. His group of Kansas supporters and confidants was politically conglomerate and young. Willard Mayberry, the Governor's secretary, was 34, John D. M. Hamilton was 47, Lacy Haynes, 46, Roy Roberts, 49, and Oscar Stauffer, 50. The Governor himself was only 49. Charles P. Taft and Ralph Robey, imported as Landon's key advisers, one liberal and one moderate, were 39 and 37, respectively. Other important advisers represented a wide variety of interests and included economist Ben M. Anderson of Chase National Bank, Leonard Ayres of Cleveland Trust Company, William B. Bell of American Cyanamide, former Under Secretary of State J. Reuben Clark, Eugene and Agnes Meyer of the *Washington Post,* Roosevelt's former Comptroller General Lewis Douglas, veteran publicist William Hard, farm bloc Congressional leader Clifford Hope, former Secretary of the Treasury Ogden Mills, Gifford Pinchot, Earl H. Taylor of *Country Gentleman,* and Raymond Gram Swing.[24] Landon's Democratic supporters contacted him mainly through Colonel Henry Breckinridge and, ironically enough, the one Republican to defeat Alfred Smith for Governor of New York, Nathan L. Miller.[25]

Landon's appeal to the voters in the campaign of 1936 was conducted largely in three ways: National Committee headquarters and Campaign headquarters publicity; the pre-Convention standbys, correspondence and interviews; and speech tours. National Committee publicity efforts were generally concerned with emphasizing the key planks of the Republican platform and criticism of the Roosevelt administration. About 400,000,000 copies of some 200 different pamphlets and leaflets were distributed, as were elaborate fact books about the deficiencies of the New Deal. Na-

---

[23] Agnes Meyer to Landon, August 2, 1936; Landon to Arthur H. Vandenberg, August 3, 1936; Landon to John D. M. Hamilton, August 7, 1936; Lacy Haynes to Landon, August 30, 1936.

[24] Ogden Mills to O. Glenn Saxon, September 28, 1936; Ben M. Anderson to Saxon, October 15, 1936; Papers of Ogden Mills (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress); Landon to Karl Lamb, April 4, 1957; Jay N. Darling to Landon, October 6, 1936.

[25] E.g., Henry Breckinridge to Landon, July 27, 1936, Nathan L. Miller to Landon, September 29, 1936.

tional Committee press releases flooded the offices of press representatives in Chicago, New York and Washington, and William Hard conducted a series of hard hitting weekday broadcasts throughout the campaign aimed at explaining Landon's record, the Republican platform, and the deficiencies of the Roosevelt administration.[26] Landon's headquarters concerned itself mainly with arranging publicity for the Governor's activities and speeches, while serving as a clearing house for suggestions for National Committee headquarters and Landon. Aside from publicity, both headquarters, and the Republican Congressional campaign organization in Washington, were greatly interested in spurring the resurrection of local and state party groups in the nation. For examples, John D. M. Hamilton, as National Committee chairman, conducted an unprecedented series of extensive tours to encourage such groups, and Governor Landon took a keen interest in making contacts with state and local leaders to accomplish the same end.

For appeal to the voters, Landon personally placed greatest stock in his speeches.. While he did not write all of his own speeches, he outlined all but two, working each draft over several times to see that they were faithful to his ideas and idiom.[27] The Governor made six extensive speech tours in addition to occasional side trips. Of the twenty-six states he toured, those in the Middle West and East were most frequently visited. The South and the Northwest were by-passed and only a brief trip to California and the Southwest was made. From August 20 to election day, he spent all or part of forty-two days traveling. In themselves, Landon's speeches were meant to reflect a middle-of-the-road path, one which would be acceptable to the great majority of Republicans, to dissident Democrats, and to the public. They were designed to be as constructive as they were critical, and to look to the future rather than to defend the past. Furthermore, they were meant to be, like Landon himself, the direct antithesis to President Roosevelt—flat but sound, homely but forthright.[28]

Of the issues raised in the Landon speeches, the most important

---

[26] Also distributed by National Committee headquarters were 18,000,000 Landon and Knox portrait posters, 42,000,000 campaign buttons, 15,000,000 automobile stickers, and 4,500,000 pieces of rotogravure publicity; Ralph D. Casey, "Republican Propaganda in the 1936 Campaign," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Princeton, I (April, 1937), 34, 43.

[27] Landon to Raymond Clapper, November 10, 1936.

[28] Landon to Raymond Clapper, November 16, 1936; Landon to William E. Borah, August 3, 1936. See also James M. Burns, *Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox*, New York, 1956, 270.

was that of free enterprise versus a managed economy. As the Governor stated it:

> The present administration apparently believes that there is no future for this country. It has accepted the idea that we have reached our peak —that ahead of us is a large standing army of unemployed; that, in consequence, the government must play a greater and greater part in managing the details of our daily lives instead of confining itself to the expanding field of regulation in the public interest.
>
> The Republican party, on the other hand, utterly rejects this philosophy. It believes that America is still on the upgrade, that we can eliminate unemployment, that the government should tighten the rules governing business, but that it should not attempt to manage business. . . .

In short, as Landon later put it, under the latter policy "the government tells us what we can*not* do. Under the other, the government tells us what we *must* do."[29]

The major support of this issue included a review of the New Deal record. This review led the Governor to conclude that the Roosevelt administration had failed miserably in its search for recovery. As he pointed out, $25,000,000,000 had been spent and yet 11,000,000 Americans were still seeking real employment. Landon held this situation to be a result of the administration's inability to build the confidence necessary to spur American enterprise and initiative to create new jobs. This in turn resulted from the government's record of irresponsibility and broken promises. Governor Landon declared that the government had often promised economy, but had not come within $3,000,000,000 of balancing the budget. The government had promised to hold the line on taxes, yet fourteen laws had been passed involving new or increased tax levies. This included a doubling of the proportion of taxes borne by the little fellow. As for the future of the investment capital essential to recovery, the Kansan declared that there was no assurance that today's investments would not be destroyed tomorrow by an administration which apparently believes that "the way to real and lasting prosperity is by the spending of borrowed money" and "that the more we borrow, the easier it will be to get out of debt."[30]

Landon added a number of instances of political irresponsibility to these financial factors in his explanation of the government's failure to instill economic confidence. He observed that the great

---

[29] Landon speech, Youth Conference, Topeka, Kansas, September 18, 1936.

[30] Landon speech, Municipal Auditorium, St. Louis, Missouri, October 31, 1936.

authority initially requested and granted the government on a nonpartisan basis for the emergency had been used for party and even personal political advantage. This was seen especially in the 225 percent increase in the government's patronage list[31] and in the use of relief administration for political purposes. Even more to be deplored, the Governor contended, were the sinister political attempts to appeal to the voters on the grounds of class, race and religion, and the contempt for the Constitution often expressed by the President.[32] As injurious to building confidence in the government was the President's unwillingness in the 1936 campaign to take the people into his confidence as to his future plans. Landon emphasized that

> There can be an honest difference of opinion as to whether the proposals of the administration for one man government hold the solution of our social and economic problems, *but* there can be no difference of opinion on this: The President's theory of government should be presented frankly to the people at the polls. He has no right to ask for votes without telling the people his intentions. Frankness in government is just as vital as truth in securities.[33]

Turning to the positive side of Governor Landon's campaign, we find, as might be expected, that the program area receiving the most thorough attention was agriculture.[34] The importance of mak-

---

[31] Landon speech, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, October 27, 1936.

[32] Landon speeches, Cleveland, Ohio, October 12, 1936, Naturalized Citizenship League, New York, New York, October 29, 1936, and Madison Square Garden, New York, New York, October 29, 1936.

[33] Landon speech, Baltimore, Maryland, October 26, 1936. One of Governor Landon's major goals during the campaign was to draw out President Roosevelt as to his proposed future policies. Landon assumed that if Roosevelt answered the questions on key issues, the President would either embarrass himself by taking extreme positions or would commit himself to moderate policies. Landon felt that if President Roosevelt evaded his questions, he could not, if re-elected, claim a popular mandate for any particular policy. Roosevelt generally evaded answering Landon's questions by standing on his record. Landon's approach was best seen in his Madison Square Garden speech. The President in his next major address, as James M. Burns has observed, replied to the Republican nominee without really answering him; J. Reuben Clark to Landon, November 9, 1936; Landon to Earle Evans, March 26, 1937; Landon speech, Madison Square Garden, New York, New York, October 29, 1936; *New York Times*, November 1, 1936; Burns, *Roosevelt*, 391.

[34] President Roosevelt expected this. On one of his "non-political" tours, he called a meeting for early September, 1936, in Des Moines, of the governors of the states afflicted by the drought, including Governor Landon. Roosevelt was well prepared and hoped that the Kansan might embarrass himself on farm and conservation questions in this encounter. The Governor was, however, also well prepared. The only significant result of the meeting was that it provided a considerable amount of newspaper copy of the two major party nominees and on the drought problem. For two conflicting estimates of the Landon-Roosevelt encounter, see Burns, *Roosevelt*, 277, and Rexford G. Tugwell, *The Democratic Roosevelt: A Biography of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, Garden City, New York, 1957, 425.

ing the farmer "a good provider and a good customer" was emphasized. This was to be achieved basically by increased demand for farm products, stimulated partly by returning the unemployed to work, partly by government development of new crops and new crop uses, and partly by a program of cash benefits to operators of family-sized farms. Incidentally, such a program was designed to lower retail prices thereby benefitting the consumer.[35] The farmer would be further helped by tariff revision aimed at eliminating competitive foreign products, especially dairy and livestock commodities, from the American market. The farmer was promised aid in recapturing his former foreign markets through reciprocal trade on non-competitive products and government help in disposing of American farm products abroad. Landon also called for the elimination of most-favored-nation clauses in treaties with nations which held an international farm trade advantage over the United States, because they refused to grant us similar privileges. Of course, the cash benefit program was to aid in supporting American agricultural income while selling our surpluses on domestic and foreign markets at competitive prices.[36] The Landon farm program also promised drought relief promptly given, seed loans, a federal crop insurance program, equalization of rural and urban educational opportunities, permission to carry surplus reserves on the farm and yet receive income support benefits, and fulfillment of outstanding New Deal obligations to individual farmers.[37]

Two other important issues to farmers concerned farm home ownership and conservation. On the former, Landon promised to extend sufficient credit at reasonable rates for reliable tenant farmers to purchase farms and for refinancing of the farm homes of present owners.[38] Regarding conservation, the Governor called for a program far more aggressive than that followed by the New Deal. He indicated that a national inventory of all natural resources was first needed for proper planning. The Landon proposals included the demand for a comprehensive land use and erosion control program, but beyond that stressed the importance of an accompanying program of water conservation aimed at drought and flood control.[39]

---

35 Landon speech, Des Moines, Iowa, September 22, 1936.
36 Landon speech, Minneapolis, Minnesota, September 24, 1936.
37 Landon speech, Des Moines, Iowa, September 22, 1936.
38 Landon speeches, *Ibid.*, and Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, October 23, 1936.
39 Landon speeches, Des Moines, Iowa, September 22, 1936, Springfield, Massachusetts, September 14, 1936, and Columbus, Ohio, October 10, 1936.

A second major appeal of the Landon campaign was to workingmen and businessmen. The keynote here was that national prosperity depended upon labor getting back to real work at good wages. This in turn called for putting business to work. While the Governor's program to accomplish these things could not be easily implemented, it could be simply stated. The government, under Landon, would work to put investment and consumer capital into circulation to create the necessary demand for labor. This could be done largely by inspiring the confidence of capital and management in the government. Honesty, efficiency, budget reduction, and budget balancing were the methods to be used by government to inspire this confidence. These things could be achieved by strengthening the Bureau of the Budget and the Comptroller General, eliminating the overlapping efforts and irresponsibility of emergency agencies, implementing sound executive reorganization, and cleaning house of patronage employment and politically motivated executives.[40] To allay the suspicions of labor that only business would benefit from such a program, he emphasized the need for workingmen to be united, and government protection of the rights of labor to organize without employer interference and to peaceful picketing. Governor Landon declared that, in the interest of both business and labor, he would work for mutual understanding between them based on perfection of collective bargaining techniques and government conciliation services.[41]

The Republican candidate's programs on relief and social security were also designed to interest labor and business. He recognized that relief would have to continue while the economic adjustments necessary to provide full employment were made, but he advocated completely honest and efficient relief administration. Added to the relief program would be provisions for job training to make relief recipients more eligible for employment. The program would be administered basically by local communities and be financed by local resources with supplementary federal grants-in-aid. Landon stressed that no one in need would lack for adequate and prompt relief.[42]

As for social security, the Kansas Governor believed that it was necessary in a highly industrialized society to provide a publicly

---

40 While these themes are to be found in many of Landon's speeches, see particularly Acceptance Address, Topeka, Kansas, July 23, 1936, Chicago, Illinois, October 10, 1936, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, October 26, 1936, and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, October 27, 1936.

41 Landon speech, Newark, New Jersey, October 28, 1936.

42 Landon speech, Cleveland, Ohio, October 12, 1936.

financed pension "as a matter of social justice." Landon's plan was simple and direct. He called for replacement of the Social Security Act of 1935 with a program of federal grants-in-aid to the states to give all American citizens over age 65, not just half of them, the minimum income necessary to protect them from want. This program was to be supported by a direct and widely distributed tax certain to constitute immediately, and perhaps in the future, a smaller burden on the working population than the administration's payroll deduction plan. As for other social security measures, Landon promised effective assistance to the blind and crippled, promotion of child welfare, improvement of public health services, and encouragement of honest and practical state programs of unemployment insurance.[43]

One other Landon program must be mentioned. As with President Roosevelt, foreign policy pronouncements were given secondary consideration by Landon. Yet they were significant in terms of future developments. The Governor's central promise was to do everything possible to keep the nation out of war. This, he declared, required a positive program of world peace. World acceptance of mediation and even arbitration of international disputes based on an expansion of international law must be promoted. The nation must again encourage reduction of armaments and take the profits out of war. More significantly, Landon demanded that America help to lower world trade barriers to create the economic conditions necessary to international prosperity and the strengthening of the forces against war in other lands. America must be willing to join with the representatives of other powers to discuss world problems, and must make clear its policies of non-aggression and non-interference. To strengthen our insurance against war, we must have bi-partisan consultation on foreign policy, and build a more effective Department of State and foreign service based on merit and good morale. Should war come in the world, we must realize that isolation is impossible. Neutrality not isolation, the Governor averred, offered our best hope to avoid involvement although it must be a neutrality based on the understanding that we refuse to pledge ourselves not to go to war under any circumstances. Should we ourselves go to war, "the protection of the doughboy should be put above protection of the dollar."[44]

---

[43] Landon speeches, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, September 26, 1936, and Newark, New Jersey, October 28, 1936.

[44] Landon speeches, Charleston, West Virginia, October 30, 1936, and Indianapolis, Indiana, October 24, 1936.

One other Landon campaign issue worthy of mention actually drew on many miscellaneous issues and took strands out of the major issues. Yet, for the Governor the facets of this issue were of great moment. This potpourri issue might be referred to as civic righteousness, and it represented Landon's concern for the plight of the free man in a free society. Repeatedly he warned of the danger to individual and national character "to dole out bread for votes," or to trade our souls for prosperity.[45] Urging the necessity of keeping schools free from both federal control and from the influence of selfish private interests, he vigorously opposed the imposition of loyalty oaths on teachers when not required of others. He even defended the freedom of teachers to express and work for their political and social ideals out of school.[46] Before an American Legion convention, Governor Landon stressed the importance in a free society of maintaining labor's rights. He also deplored fomenting of racial feeling, the efforts to capitalize on intolerance of race or creed,[47] later saying that "if ever in this country there is an attempt to persecute any minority on grounds of race, religion or class, I will take my stand by the side of the minority."[48] He called for "open hearings—a court of appeals" for civil servants threatened with dismissal, and demanded that there the "accuser should face the accused."[49] The inquisitorial tactics of Congressional committees, and the employment of secrecy by executive agencies in determining policies directly affecting farmers and businessmen were condemned.[50] Most of all, Landon emphasized the need for an alert citizenry in maintaining a fair, democratic government of the people.[51] While many observers felt the Republican nominee only to be exercising his knowledge of platitudes in these statements, to him they represented facets of the most important issue of the 1936 campaign—the preservation and extension of the best in the national character.

Governor Landon's campaign speeches represented many things.

---

45 E.g., Lowell, Massachusetts, September 12, 1936.

46 Landon speech, Chautauqua, New York, August 24, 1936. Landon wrote that "The evidence of the need of this speech is the fact that I have received a large number of letters from [American] legionnaires all over the country protesting against it." Landon to W. W. Waymack, September 2, 1936.

47 Landon speech, American Legion Convention, Wichita, Kansas, September 7, 1936.

48 Landon speech, Naturalized Citizenship League, New York, New York, October 29, 1936.

49 Landon speech, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, October 27, 1936.

50 Landon speeches, Minneapolis, Minnesota, September 24, 1936, and Los Angeles, California, October 20, 1936.

51 E.g., Landon speech, Charleston, West Virginia, October 30, 1936.

Through him was voiced something of a concensus of the most rational Republican feelings, chiefly those that were sensitive to the needs of unifying and liberalizing the party so that it might achieve its avowed goal of injecting moderation in government. More directly, they were expressions of the ideas and ideals of the man himself. On the matter of the Roosevelt administration, he granted that some significant advances had been made in areas needing the intercession of the federal government. For his part, Landon believed in aid to farmers, the importance of treating labor fairly, relief to the impoverished and destitute, in social security, conservation, regulation of business, and in the comity of nations. Where he took issue was in the choice of methods used to seek solutions in these areas of need. His conclusions were that the administration had met in stopgap fashion many of the short-term problems of the nation, but had in its haste and confusion jeopardized recovery in the long run, seriously threatening the traditional individual liberties that only a framework of stable fiscal policy, efficient administration, federalism, and separation of powers could insure. As he put it, "This Administration wields the same axe which has destroyed the liberties of much of the old world—an unbalanced budget, inflation of the currency, delegation of power to the Chief Executive, destruction of local self-government."[52] The Republican nominee's fear was not that the Roosevelt government would destroy American liberties but rather that it would unwittingly establish the basis for such an event in the future. Should he succeed of election, Landon had enough confidence in his own ability and the country's good sense to achieve recovery and reform without risking the loss of America's liberties, character and dynamic qualities. Should he lose, he hoped that he would at least have rallied effective support for sounder executive policies. Landon's campaign did not, of course, carry him to victory in the election. Yet, a review of his speeches and ideas does not even largely explain why. Whether he was right or wrong in his goals or a bit of both was almost immaterial to the issue of election. The answers to the question as to why he lost are to be found elsewhere.

Landon contended that he expected to lose because with the economic improvement experienced in the country in 1936, it was unlikely the voters would vote for a change.[53] The Governor also

---

[52] Landon speech, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, October 26, 1936.

[53] Landon to Oscar Stauffer, November 23, 1936; William Allen White to Landon, July 19, 1935, White Papers; Peter Wyden, "He Shows

charged that the Republican party was afflicted with an abundance of "stuffed-shirt and blind leadership." "It is," he said, "too much to hope a candidate to correct that in the midst of a campaign." Moreover, Landon knew "the Republican party has a lot to live down." Then too, ". . . much of the ground I covered in the closing weeks of the campaign was discredited because of the Liberty League, Economy League, etc. One trouble was that I had no one [except Charles P. Taft] to pick up the progressive and moderate side of my speeches."[54]

Governor Landon might have added that three-and-a-half years of demoralization and disintegration had atrophied the functional organs of the Republican party.[55] During the 1936 campaign, it was difficult to rebuild the Republican National Committee organization and impossible to make effective political groups out of most state and local party units. Important party rifts were apparent during the campaign in at least California, Missouri, New Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania. While the National Committee experienced a remarkable revival in 1936, it still revealed some pitiful political gaps. For example, the Committee had twenty-four workers in its industrial division but only three people on its labor staff.[56] The responsibilities of the various National Committee divisions were not clearly defined and Committee publicity failed adequately to support the party's national standard-bearers.[57] Moreover, the Republican effort was fragmented because not one but several campaigns were conducted. Herbert Hoover and John D. M. Hamilton ran personalized speaking campaigns largely because Landon could not very well dismiss or even effectively discipline an ex-President or, in the middle of the campaign, a Na-

---

Them How to Lose," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, October 23, 1949. While there is no direct evidence that Landon, during the campaign, was convinced he was going to lose the election, it should be noted that the private and public polls especially followed by his campaign headquarters in Topeka clearly showed a decisive Roosevelt victory.

54 Landon to Raymond Clapper, November 16, 1936.

55 Chester C. Bolton to Ogden Mills, March 29, 1934, March 30, 1934, Mills to George H. Lorimer, November 9, 1934, Mills Papers; William T. Hutchinson, *Lowden of Illinois: The Life of Frank O. Lowden*, 2 vols., Chicago, 1957, II, 677–681; Malcolm Moos, *The Republicans: A History of Their Party*, New York, 1956, 401.

56 Fred Brinkerhoff to Landon, July 25, 1936; C. D. Hicks to William B. Bell, August 30, 1936; Henry S. Caufield to Landon, September 18, 1936; Landon to Arthur Vanderbilt, August 7, 1936; Landon to John D. M. Hamilton, November 11, 1936; Republican National Committee, *Alphabetical Directory by Departments, August 17, 1936*, Chicago, 1936.

57 Casey, "Republican Propaganda," *loc. cit.*, 27-44. Casey also argues convincingly that National Committee headquarters officials erred in not agreeing upon a few dominating issues. Instead, they launched too many appeals for the public to digest.

tional Committee chairman, whom he considered otherwise very efficient. As for Frank Knox's campaign independence, it appears that Governor Landon overestimated the Vice Presidential nominee's ability to correlate his efforts with Landon's.[58] Then too, problems of communication between campaign headquarters at Topeka, Chicago, New York, Washington, and en route with the various campaigners, complicated attempts made to achieve a relatively concerted political effort. Another significant fact was that a number of Republicans, lulled to sleep by the optimism of the *Literary Digest* polls, did little to contribute to the campaign. Also working to this end may have been the extraordinary enthusiasm early in the campaign of many leading Republicans and their later switch to pessimism.[59] Other Republicans, dismayed by the party's past, had left or were to leave the party, like the La Follette brothers and Senator George Norris. Some like Senator James Couzens remained in the party but supported President Roosevelt, while still others like Senators William E. Borah and Hiram Johnson backed none of the candidates for President. Though great efforts were made by the Republicans to commit a number of these men, they met with no success.[60]

Then there was the intentional strategy of holding Landon's speaking delivery to mediocrity to make Roosevelt appear flippant by contrast. This not only failed but stole from Landon's speeches much of their effectiveness and made him appear personally mediocre.[61] It was of course ironic that a man who used his personality to such great advantage with small groups and individuals to win the nomination could rarely project it to large groups.[62] Governor Landon's efforts were also hurt by his speaking in an idiom which was not pleasing to labor or to city dwellers. They could not eat the pioneer virtues to which he so often alluded; they could

---

58 The unhappy impact of contradictory Republican campaign statements and speeches is reflected in the reactions of Frank O. Lowden and one of his political associates in Hutchinson, *Lowden of Illinois,* 691 f.

59 See Ogden Mills to Gordon O'Neill, June 18, 1936, November 6, 1936, Mills Papers.

60 E.g., Landon to William E. Borah, August 3, 1936; William Allen White to Borah, July 7, 1936, July 20, 1936, August 1, 1936; E. A. Rumely to Borah, October 9, 1936, October 16, 1936, Borah Papers. Many of the points mentioned in this paragraph are discussed at some length in Henry O. Evjen, "The Republican Strategy in the Presidential Campaigns of 1936 and 1940," Ph. D. dissertation, Western Reserve University, 1950.

61 Landon to Frank Altschul, September 2, 1936; Moos, *The Republicans,* 399.

62 Henry Breckinridge to Landon, November 18, 1936; Grove Patterson, *I Like People: The Autobiography of Grove Patterson,* New York, 1954, 151.

not swallow the Republican party, nor digest the eulogies to economy and efficiency. Certainly, Landon suffered from the apparent inconsistencies in his own speeches. He was unable to explain satisfactorily how he could lower trade barriers and yet afford additional tariff protection for farmers; how he could maintain and possibly expand existing services, and yet balance the budget and perhaps reduce taxes; how he could effectively use state and local governments to conduct relief and social security programs.

It must be considered too that the Governor's campaign suffered from the unfounded charges and distortions of some of his opponents. Liberals and radicals charged the Kansan with being insincere, a Wall Street and Liberty League tool, an instrument of Hearst, and an encourager of Lemke, Coughlin and G. L. K. Smith. Rumors portrayed Landon as a militant prohibitionist, an anti-Semite, and saying that $1.08 per day per family was sufficient for relief subsistence. Despite his record, he was shown as being virtually the descendent of Teapot Dome oil intrigues. His vaunted Kansas record, while outstanding among agriculturally oriented states, suffered from his opponents comparing it with the endeavors made in the more wealthy and populous industrial states. His uniquely successful effort at budget balancing was sneered at by those who claimed that it resulted from federal aid.[63] Probably much of the attack on Landon stemmed from the fact that, being from a less important and remote state, he was not well known before his nomination either to the nation or even his own party.[64] This defect he was unable to correct during the campaign.

---

[63] Representative of opposition criticism of Landon are Harold L. Ickes to Amos R. E. Pinchot, mimeographed, October 19, 1936, Papers of Harold L. Ickes (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress); Earl Browder, *Democracy or Fascism: Report to the Ninth Annual Convention of the Communist Party*, New York, 1936, *passim;* Norman Thomas, *After the New Deal, What?*, New York, 1936, 3; Progressive National Committee Supporting Franklin D. Roosevelt for President, *Declaration of Principles*, New York, 1936; John W. Wells, *Meet Mr. Landon*, Topeka, 1936; Burt Comer, *Tale of a Fox*, Wichita, 1936. For other illuminating materials see the miscellany of criticism to be found in the weekly press release written by Charles Michelson and published by the Democratic National Committee, *Dispelling the Fog*, Washington; Rolla Clymer's weekly "Digest of Landon Mail Received at Jayhawk Hotel Branch [Topeka]" in the Landon Papers; "Presidency/Landon" file, Borah Papers; George H. Mayer, *The Political Career of Floyd B. Olson*, Minneapolis, 1951, 297; and Wilbur L. Cross, *Connecticut Yankee: An Autobiography*, New Haven, 1943, 344 f.

[64] William Allen White to Landon, April 21, 1936. United States Supreme Court Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, an astute observer of the national scene and a Republican, indicated in the spring of 1936 that he and others around Washington knew very little about Landon; Alpheus T. Mason, *Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law*, New York, 1956, 404 n.

Ironically, some of the Governor's most appealing organizational efforts haunted him. By striving to reduce conservative control of the party and bring in new faces, Landon, an amateur in national politics, surrounded himself too often with other amateurs. Furthermore, coming from a state with few industries and no large cities, he was handicapped in his awareness of the subtleties of labor and urban problems and tensions. Because of these things, he did not have the experienced aid and knowledge he needed and therefore found himself with too many tasks to be done.[65] In turn, because of this, he attempted to cover too many issues during the campaign with the result that many of the most significant issues did not receive the attention they deserved. This was also true of the National Committee. Then too, some of the issues, like spending and the Constitution, which received the most attention, appealed only to a very limited number of people.[66] Landon made no commitments on patronage or on policy beyond that stated in his speeches, which deprived him of opportunities to control some of the activities of extreme elements in the party.[67] Yet, by attempting in his campaign to harmonize the viewpoints of all major elements in the party, Landon dampened the enthusiasm of some of his most influential supporters. Friends like William Allen White[68] could not realize that the candidate had to try to represent the whole party, especially if he was to have a chance of creating a vigorous opposition party, to educate the party to some of the political realities of the 1930's, or to win election.

Landon and the Republicans, of course, did not lose the election merely because of their own deficiencies. The unpleasant flavor of the long depression had conditioned a majority of voters to be unreceptive to the Republican campaign efforts. Then too, the political operations of the New Deal were at least as important as Republican defects in deciding the election result. But, the New Deal should have been effective. In Franklin D. Roosevelt, it

---

65 Landon to W. M. Kiplinger, March 27, 1936; James L. Wright to Landon, August 3, 1936; Landon to Wright, August 10, 1936; Landon to William T. Mossman, August 3, 1936.

66 Walter Lippman to Malcolm W. Bingay, October 14, 1936, enclosed in Bingay to Landon, October 16, 1936; Landon to Bingay, October 24, 1936; George A. Hormel to Landon, October 24, 1936.

67 Landon to James McMullin, May 11, 1936; Landon to Karl Lamb, April 4, 1957; William Hard to William E. Borah, October 20, 1936, Borah Papers.

68 For some of White's reactions, see White to Henry J. Allen, May 8, 1936, White to Thomas J. Norton, November 11, 1936, White to George W. Norris, November 14, 1936, White Papers. See Johnson, *William Allen White's America*, 452-461 for a sympathetic analysis of White's feelings.

possessed not only a remarkably skillful political commander, but a personable candidate who could point to a well-known national record of accomplishment. His administration controlled more federal, state and local patronage, and possessed more in-office leadership than any prior political group. It had spent almost twice the public money spent by any peacetime American government, and had obligated to it through relief activities about one-sixth of the population. The Roosevelt forces were not reluctant about using all this for political purposes.[69] The Republicans, even with their grand campaign fund, could scarcely hope to combat such a political force as was constructed by the New Deal.

It should be emphasized, however, that the Landon campaign did more than just reveal Republican deficiences. Under hostile circumstances, the campaign helped to perpetuate certain ideas which have continued to receive attention in America, among them the concepts of an economy of plenty, the possibilities of new frontiers, unity of the people, efficiency, economy, state and local rights, exaltation of the Constitution, and a regulatory government rather than a managed state. Governor Landon also pointed out numerous New Deal defects, and indicated paths of action which the New Deal itself followed. During the campaign, government officials were prompted to take positive action to eliminate some of Landon's issues. Some examples of this were the President's extension of civil service regulations to postmasters, Harry Hopkins' sudden interest in dealing with the political intimidation of Works Progress Administration workers, the stepping up of the government's drought relief program, and the establishment of a committee to devise crop insurance proposals. After the campaign, the government began to show interest in developing better crop uses and cultivating foreign agricultural markets.[70] Possibly the Landon and Republican campaigns also were partly responsible for a downgrading of the planned society elements in the government, the great battle in Congress to block Roosevelt's Court Reorganization proposals, increased executive and legislative interest in efficiency, and stepped up conservation efforts. Certainly, the campaign served

---

[69] Bureau of the Census, United States Department of Commerce, *Historical Statistics of the United States, 1789–1945*, Washington, 1949, 299 ff.; Broadus Mitchell, *Depression Decade*, New York, 1947, 315.

[70] Burns, *Roosevelt*, 276; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 81, 83; Harold L. Ickes, *The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes*, 3 vols., New York, 1953-1954, I, 684; Chester C. Davis, "The Development of Agricultural Policy Since the End of the World War," in United States Department of Agriculture, *An Historical Survey of American Agriculture*, Washington, 1941, 317-323.

to publicize these issues before the government seriously wrestled with them.

Perhaps the most interesting function of the campaign was the way it marked out a road for the reconstruction of the Republican party. This the Landon forces accomplished partly by broadening the control of the party to include Middle Westerners, liberals and young bloods, and partly by initiating the rebuilding of the party's political machinery. Landon, in his speeches and personal contacts, also educated many Republicans to a recognition that such things as organized labor, government regulation of business, conservation, farm relief, and social security were realities in American life. Of course, the Landon campaigns for nomination and especially election represented only the beginning of the struggle for the intellectual and organizational reconstruction of the Republican party, a struggle which was to be carried on for many years following. Yet, in viewing his efforts it is not too fantastic to suggest that Landon not only was significant in carrying out the role of opposition candidate under most difficult circumstances but played an important part in shaping the development of his party into what within a generation would be known as Modern Republicanism.

DONALD R. McCOY

University of Kansas,
Lawrence

John A. Logan and the Election of 1864 in Illinois

From 1866 to his death twenty years later, John A. Logan was Illinois' best known Republican politician. Those who heard "Black Jack" lash Democratic opponents in his best "Bloody Shirt" style forgot that before the Civil War Logan was a Democrat. A loyal follower of Stephen A. Douglas, Logan served in the House of Representatives from 1859 to 1861 as a member of the party he later denounced as the party of treason.

Coming from Egypt, the pro-Southern section of southern Illinois, Logan favored compromise in the secession crisis. His refusal to rush to the colors immediately after Sumter led his Republican opponents to charge Logan with aiding the Confederacy. Logan did not openly support war for the Union until June, 1861, and even then he hoped for last minute compromise. After the 1861 special session of Congress, Logan decided compromise was futile and announced he would no longer "stand out against the storm."[1] In August he returned to Egypt and organized the 31st Illinois Infantry Regiment.

With his entry into the army Logan slowly abandoned his pre-war politics. Due to the absence of his comments on political issues, Logan's change was generally unknown. It was not until he returned to Illinois in July, 1863, after Vicksburg's fall, that his former constituents became aware of his altered feelings. In Illinois' 1863 election, Logan, a war Democrat, spoke for Unionist candidates and denounced all peace men, including many of his former friends whom he flayed as Copperheads. The former pro-Southern compromiser roared at a DuQuoin, Illinois, crowd, "I will tell you what sort of a peace I am for. I am not for a piece of a country."[2] He also endorsed harsh measures to suppress the rebellion and even supported the use of Negro troops.

Logan's 1863 speeches were a major break in his political career. He returned to the front in October still a Democrat, but a stanch war Democrat willing to campaign for pro-war candidates no matter what their party affiliation. Since "Black Jack" was a

---

[1] John A. Logan to Mary Logan, July 4, 1861, John A. Logan Mss., Library of Congress.

[2] John A. Logan, *Speech of General John A. Logan on Return to Illinois After the Capture of Vicksburg*, Cincinnati, 1863, 20.

potent force in Illinois politics, especially in bitterly divided Egypt, this outspoken support of most administration policies was welcomed in Washington.

As election year 1864 approached, Illinois politicians watched Logan to discern some evidence of his feelings. Would he stand by his 1863 speeches or would he return to his more moderate 1861 position? Logan commanded the 15th Corps in Sherman's Georgia campaign, and while the army moved on Atlanta the question remained unanswered. Then, on September 2 Atlanta fell and Sherman's weary troops went into camp, where Sherman's fertile mind began to ponder the next move against the rebels. Logan's thoughts, however, moved in other directions. As after Vicksburg, a lull gave him a chance to go home and parlay his military fame in the political arena.

As Sherman's legions struck deep into the heart of the Confederacy, political events of 1864 gathered momentum. Union failure to end the war in the spring and summer increased the clamor for peace and made Democratic chances of unseating Lincoln in the fall appear excellent. Furthermore, Republican politicians were not helping their own cause. Factional strife between Lincoln and the Radicals brought on Salmon P. Chase and John C. Frémont booms. Both movements gradually disappeared to be followed by a Lincoln victory in June at Baltimore. Tennessee Unionist Andrew Johnson was named Lincoln's running mate. The Baltimore platform called for a united effort to put down the rebellion and demanded abolition of slavery.

Democrats met in Chicago August 29 to choose their nominees. Both war and peace men were included in the convention and a war Democrat, General George McClellan, and a peace man, George Pendleton of Ohio, were the party's candidates. The platform was composed by the peace faction and called the war a failure. It demanded peace as soon as possible.

In Illinois, Democrats seemed to be ahead in the spring and summer. They nominated James Robinson for governor while Republicans chose Richard Oglesby. In Egypt Josh Allen was certain to receive the Democratic nomination for Congress from the 13th District, Logan's old seat. For a time the Republican candidate was in doubt, but in July Andrew J. Kuykendall, an old comrade of Logan's in the 31st Illinois and a former Democrat, won the nomination to oppose Allen. The *Illinois State Register,* Springfield's Democratic paper, greeted Kuykendall with hostility: "The miscegens of the 13th district have nominated that patriotic 'war

democrat' Kuykendall for Congress. Good Lord Kuyk, what can one man do? We don't think you'll find your 'war democracy' a very paying card in Egypt."[3]

Logan kept his eye on the political scene as he fought through Georgia. As early as March he had written his wife, "I understand that Josh Allen will soon . . . commence his canvass for Congress. I do hope that [I. N.] Haynie will run against him and beat him. He can do it and God knows it would do me good to hear of his defeat."[4] Logan said little else about politics until nominations had been made and then he struck at Allen again. "Josh Allen wrote me a letter, the infernal scroundrel, merely wanting me to write a letter to him saying that I was not for Kuykendall. I shall not answer his letter, but hope Kuykendall may beat him of which I have no hopes."[5]

In August and September, as national candidates were nominated and politics moved to stage center, Logan was deluged with political letters. Two old Democratic friends, Charles Lanphier, editor of the *State Register,* and Democratic journalist James W. Sheahan of Chicago, wanted Logan to speak for the Democrats. Lanphier asked him to campaign for four days in Springfield: "They are pressing us here, have all the money, and with the pride about 'Lincoln's home,' they will turn heaven and hell to beat us."[6] Sheahan wrote after McClellan's nomination requesting Logan's endorsement of McClellan. He asked:

> Will you refuse both [party and country] when they jointly ask your voice in this election? In God's name Dear Logan, by all your hopes for your country and yourself, let not the Democracy ask your arm and be refused. . . . That party gives us a *rational* and a *national* platform, will you refuse to give your voice in behalf of our Hon. soldier, patriot, Democrat, and Statesman, McClellan?
>
> P.S. Lincoln has gone to the devil. Illinois will give Mc[Clellan] 35,000 majority.[7]

Logan seems to have ignored these pleas entirely. Until Atlanta fell he showed no indication that he would participate in the election in any capacity.

---

[3] *Illinois State Register*, July 8, 1864.

[4] Logan to Mary Logan, March 4, 1864, Logan Mss. Haynie was a pre-war friend of Logan's who had followed Logan's change of politics. Allen had been Logan's pre-war law partner, but with the outbreak of war the two men had become estranged. Allen was Egypt's most famous Copperhead.

[5] Logan to Mary Logan, August 6, 1864, Logan Mss.

[6] Lanphier to Logan, August 7, 1864, Logan Mss.

[7] Sheahan to Logan, August 31, 1864, Logan Mss.

In September an old friend, I. N. Haynie, wrote Logan to ask his support. He regretted Logan's absence from Egyptian politics, and accurately stated the general's feelings when he wrote "I am sure that you cannot be a disinterested spectator of a field in which you were in days past so conspicuous a leader." Haynie told Logan Egyptian Democrats were nothing but peace men, but hoped at least six counties in Logan's old district might give Union majorities.[8] Three days after Haynie's report, Republican Congressman Elihu B. Washburne wrote Logan from Washington. He congratulated him on his role in Sherman's victory and turned to politics. The Chicago platform, he commented, "proclaims the experiment of war has been a failure, that you and the noble soldiers who have been fighting under you have accomplished nothing." Washburne expressed the wish that Logan might go to Illinois and campaign for Lincoln. "We want your clarion voice to echo over our state and arouse the Union and patriotic people to the salvation of the country."[9]

Washburne's appeal for Logan's support was seconded by the President shortly afterward. If Lincoln wrote Logan a personal letter the document has disappeared, but Logan wrote long after the war, "When I left on leave after the Atlanta campaign to canvass for Mr. Lincoln, I did it at the special and private request of the then president. This I kept to myself and have never made it public."[10]

The request for Logan's leave that Sherman received came from Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, no doubt with Lincoln's approval. On September 20 Sherman wrote Logan's immediate commander, General O. O. Howard, consenting to Logan's leave. He remarked caustically, "There seems a special reason why he should go home at once."[11] Though military success had made Sherman more cooperative in sending soldiers home to take part in political campaigns, he still complained "our armies vanish before our eyes and it is useless to complain because the election is more important than the war."[12] In his memoirs Sherman wrote curtly, "General . . . Logan went home to look after politics."[13] On

---

[8] Haynie to Logan, September 9, 1864, Logan Mss.
[9] Washburne to Logan, September 13, 1864, Logan Mss.
[10] Logan to William T. Sherman, February 18, 1883, Logan Mss.
[11] *Official Records of the War of the Rebellion,* Series 1, XXXIX, pt. 2, 426. (Hereafter cited as *O. R.*)
[12] William T. Sherman, *Home Letters of General Sherman,* M. A. DeWolfe Howe, ed., New York, 1909, 314.
[13] William T. Sherman, *Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman,* New York, 1875, II, 130.

September 21 Logan turned over corps command to General Peter J. Osterhaus and bade his men good-by. He shook hands with many, promising to come back. He told the corps they could "feel safe" under Osterhaus, and was loudly cheered when he boarded the train.[14]

Before Logan decided to return, both parties were claiming his support. The *Illinois State Register* advised Illinois Democrats that Generals John M. Palmer, John McClernand, Logan "and other distinguished and influential gentlemen who have not, of late, acted with the Democratic party, will give their influence to secure the election of Gen. McClellan."[15] Several days later the Republican *Illinois State Journal* questioned the *Register's* claim in light of all that had been said against Logan by Illinois peace men. The paper intimated that Logan and other war Democrats would back Lincoln.[16] Later, when they were sure of Logan's support for Lincoln, Illinois Republicans did not claim Logan had abandoned the Democrats, rather they continued to call him a "war Democrat" to win increased support from Democrats.[17]

Logan's journey northward took about a week, and when he reached Illinois, the Democrats announced his arrival with no mention of politics.[18] The *Illinois State Journal,* on the other hand, blared in a banner headline: "Gen. John A. Logan Coming Home." It claimed, "He will be enthusialtically welcomed by every loyal man in Illinois." Republicans had read of a recent Logan speech supporting Lincoln.[19]

Logan had said so little about his probable course that even his wife was not sure whom he would support. He had written nothing concerning politics except opposition to Josh Allen, but from this she felt he would stump for Lincoln. Logan's brothers thought he would come out for McClellan. In her *Reminiscences* Mary Logan tells of a bet she made with one of them. A span of mules was the prize won by Mary when her husband returned and spoke for the President. The mules were used to pull the Logans' carriage around Egypt.[20]

Logan's first public appearance was scheduled for Carbondale

---

14 Theodore Upson, *With Sherman to the Sea,* O. O. Winther, ed., Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 1943, 132.
15 *Illinois State Register,* September 6, 1864.
16 *Illinois State Journal,* September 8, 1864.
17 *Ibid.,* September 21, 1864.
18 *Illinois State Register,* September 27, 1864.
19 *Illinois State Journal,* September 24, 1864.
20 Mary Logan, *Reminiscences of a Soldier's Wife,* New York, 1913, 178.

on Saturday, October 1. Before that speech, few were certain which candidates would be beneficiaries of Logan's "clarion voice." Two days later before Logan took the stump Josh Allen wrote him from Marion. Allen spoke of Logan's "extensive influence" throughout Illinois and asked, "if compatible with your sense of duty and conviction of right," that he back McClellan. Allen assured Logan his "true friends" were Democrats. Logan's former partner did not ask support for his own candidacy, but concluded, "No one would hail with greater delight than myself the era when your relations and mine should be as of your [sic]."[21]

Logan did not reply to Allen in writing but reserved his answer for the rostrum. On October 1, dashing off a note to Republican leaders, "I will be in Springfield on the 5th of October ready for duty," he walked to Carbondale square for his first address. He had been swamped with questions since he reached the city but had parried them all. Logan looked appropriately tired when he mounted the platform on a warm fall day and looked out on familiar faces.[22]

From his first words it was evident he would not support McClellan. He delivered a tirade against "men among us who sympathize with the infamous and damnable treason." He spoke of his Democratic background but refused to "act with or support any man or set of men, no matter by what name they may be called, that are not in favor of exhausting all the men and means under the control of the Government in order to put down this accursed rebellion." His familiar voice rising to a roar, he said:

> When I find the leaders of the party I acted with, betraying the trust of the people reposed in them; when I find them repudiating the doctrine of Jackson, who was for hanging traitors to the highest tree . . . and for preserving the Union at all hazards, either with blood or without it, I am compelled to follow you no farther. I cannot go with you into the precincts of treason and disloyalty.

The crowd roared as he finished. "I will act with no party who is not in favor of my country, and must refuse my support to the nominees of the Chicago platform."[23]

After the Carbondale speech Logan boarded a train for Springfield. A ceremony complete with cannon and speeches was to have greeted the Egyptian, but a downpour of rain interfered.

---

[21] Allen to Logan, September 29, 1864, Logan Mss.
[22] Mary Logan, *Reminiscences*, 170.
[23] *Alton Telegraph*, October 7, 1864; *Carbondale New Era*, October 12, 1864.

Several hundred braved the rain to greet Logan and hear Governor Richard Yates say, "Napoleon never had a better or prouder General than John A. Logan."[24] Logan responded "I have come from the field, and feel happy . . . to see the old stars and stripes." He told the small gathering there were only two sides, patriots and traitors, and declared his determination to fight the Chicago platform.[25]

The *Illinois State Register* greeted Logan's arrival sarcastically, saying he had "reported for duty" to the abolitionists. It asked the former Democratic congressman how it felt to be supporting men who had called him "Dirty Work" in 1861. Lanphier's paper professed to be mystified by Logan's traitorous conduct to his old party.[26]

On October 5, Logan closeted himself with Republican leaders to work out a schedule of sixteen speeches. Most of these were to be in Egypt, with an occasional foray into northern Illinois.[27] The same night in Springfield, Logan delivered his second speech, almost a reiteration of the Carbondale address. He again called on Jacksonian Democrats to act as 'Old Hickory" would have acted in preserving the Union. He added, "I believe Mr. Lincoln is a devoted patriot struggling honestly to preserve this country." "He has done some things that I have not thought best," Logan continued without specifying "but that he has tried faithfully to sustain the Constitution . . . is a position . . . no man can gainsay." Of Lincoln's running mate, Logan said, "If Lincoln should die this man Johnson has brains enough to run the machine. He is a patriot, a soldier, and a statesman. . . . I am for these men whether I have a friend left in the Democratic party or not."[28] Logan was followed on the platform by Republican Senator Lyman Trumbull, who seconded Logan's statement before the audience of 8,000.[29]

The *State Register* stepped up its attack on the apostate, reiterating the 1861 Republican charge that Logan had raised troops for the South. Lanphier wrote, "John, we should be sorry to think you couldn't fight any better than you talk."[30] Then the paper implied that Logan's campaigning constituted desertion from the army. It reported the Confederate attempt to cut off Sherman's

---

24 *Illinois State Journal*, October 5, 1864.
25 *Ibid.*
26 *Illinois State Register*, October 5, 1864.
27 *Illinois State Journal*, October 6, 1864.
28 *Ibid.*, October 6, 1864.
29 *Alton Telegraph*, October 6, 1864.
30 *Illinois State Register*, October 7, 8, 1864.

line of communications, putting Union troops in grave danger. "Yet Major Generals Logan and Palmer . . . are in Illinois making speeches for Lincoln." Democrats everywhere took up the cry and Logan was condemned for playing politics when he should have been at the front.[31]

Logan left Springfield and spoke in Belleville on October 10, then moved on to Centralia and DuQuoin. At DuQuoin, scene of his 1863 address, Logan was joined by Oglesby. I. N. Haynie tried to get Yates to join the group, but the governor was unable to attend.[32] At DuQuoin Logan reminded his listeners of his earlier address, and endorsed Oglesby for governor. Logan followed Springfield Republican Shelby Cullom on October 15 at Clinton, and launched his first attack on Josh Allen. Allen, Logan claimed, had proposed dividing Illinois into two parts in 1861, the Southern part to join the Confederacy. Logan stated that he refused to join Allen's plot and "told him that he would see any man who would attempt such a project hanged as high as Haman."[33]

Logan's Egyptian speeches continued to strike at Allen. While he endorsed Lincoln and Oglesby, he worked even harder for Kuykendall. In August he was pessimistic of Kuykendall's chances, but in October his hopes soared. He wrote his wife, "I spoke yesterday to a large crowd, mostly Republicans. . . . This district [the 13th] is now safe I think."[34]

Alton, center of Egyptian Republicanism, furnished Logan's audience on October 20 and he told them he was ready to go to any length to put down the rebellion. "I am willing to subjugate, burn, and I had almost said exterminate rather than not put down this rebellion. I am in favor of taking Negroes. I have no conscientious scruples concerning slavery; but the South has violated its contract."[35] Moving into deepest Egypt, he spoke in Jonesboro, Cairo, and Benton. In Jonesboro he returned to the subject of Josh Allen:

> Now let me say a few words about this man Allen. I know him well, and a greater traitor and humbug walks not unhung. When the war first broke out, and at about the time that I returned from Congress to this

---

31 *Ibid.*, October 16, 1864.

32 Haynie to Yates, October 7, 1864, Richard Yates Mss., Illinois State Historical Library, Springfield.

33 *Missouri Democrat* (St. Louis) in *Illinois State Journal*, October 17, 1864.

34 Logan to Mary Logan, October 19, 1864, Logan Mss.

35 *Illinois State Journal*, October 21, 1864; *Alton Telegraph*, October 21, 1864.

district, in order to raise a regiment and to enter the field and service of my country, I met Josh Allen stalking about the Southern part of the State, trying to turn it over to the rebels; and he made a proposition to me to stump the district for the Confederacy to induce the Southern half of Illinois to secede with me, and I told him I'd see him in Hell first.[36]

This brought a heated denial from Allen. He proclaimed his innocence and professed astonishment at Logan's charge. "I pronounce the charge . . . said to have been made by General Logan, as unqualifiedly false—false in its conception by him, and dastardly in its repetition by the poor parasites of ill-gained power."[37]

Logan, accused by Democrats of aiding the Confederacy in 1861, echoed Allen in denying charges of treason. He wrote a note dealing with these charges to Egyptian Republican D. L. Phillips, which was printed in the *Chicago Tribune*. Logan called these allegations "false in every particular," and denied he had ever assisted any man to go South. His opponents were slandering him because he had stood by his country while they aided rebels.[38] The *Jonesboro Gazette* defended Allen and berated Logan, its former hero, calling him a "mysterious combination of buffoonary and blackguardism," and pointing to Logan's pro-Confederate attitude in 1861.[39]

The campaign, bitter all over Illinois, was especially intense in Egypt where Logan and Allen traded accusations at every opportunity, while Kuykendall was forgotten much of the time. Logan concluded most of his addresses with appeals in Kuykendall's name and bore the brunt of campaigning. Though Kuykendall spoke regularly, it was obvious that if Allen were to lose Logan would be the chief reason.

Pennsylvania, Indiana, and Ohio chose state officers in October in elections indicative of the November result. Republicans ran well in October and forecast complete victory the following month. Many troops had been furloughed at Yates' request to aid Lincoln's cause, and Logan everywhere met comrades from the Army of the Tennessee. The week before election day, Logan swung through Harrisburg, Vienna and Metropolis, then left the state for one big Union speech in Evansville, Indiana. Lincoln estimated Illinois in the McClellan column during the final week. Elihu Washburne had written of "imminent danger of losing this state,"

---

[36] *Illinois State Journal*, October 29, 1864.
[37] *Jonesboro Gazette*, November 4, 1864.
[38] Logan to D. L. Phillips in *Chicago Tribune*, October 25, 1864.
[39] *Jonesboro Gazette*, October 29, 1864.

but just before election day he wrote to a worried President, "Logan is carrying all before him in Egypt."[40]

The nation voted on November 8 and next day even Lanphier's paper admitted "the returns so far look unfavorable for the Democracy."[41] Returns soon indicated a national landslide for Lincoln, for McClellan was able to carry only Kentucky, Delaware, and New Jersey as the President amassed a 400,000 vote majority. Illinois wound up safely Republican by 30,736 votes. In addition, Oglesby beat Robinson, and eleven of the state's fourteen seats in Congress went to Republicans.[42]

Congressional and presidential races in Egypt were exciting to the end. The 13th District, always Democratic, went Republican. Kuykendall defeated Allen 11,742 to 10,759. Allen won nine counties to six for Logan's candidate, but Kuykendall won several by landslides. Johnson County, which had given Logan immense majorities as a Democrat, voted for Kuykendall 1,225 to 367, but Logan's native county, Jackson, refused to follow his lead and went to Allen.[43] Even the neighboring 12th District became Republican. There W. R. Morrison, the Democrat, was beaten by Republican Jehu Baker, for whom Logan had campaigned. The Lincoln-McClellan race in the 13th was also evidence of Logan's electioneering ability and popularity. In a district that had soundly defeated him in 1858 and 1860, Lincoln won a close race.[44]

Most were willing to credit Logan for the section's amazing political reversal. Washburne's words were echoed by the *Illinois State Journal* and the *Alton Telegraph.* The latter felt:

> The Union party is indebted in a great measure to him for the glorious result. . . . He it was that went to the field of battle and came back covered with glory, and exposed the machinations of Josh Allen. To this fact then, more than any other, this glorious triumph over Copperheadism is attributable.[45]

After the war the *Chicago Tribune* recalled "how he revolutionized Egypt in the fall of 1864."[46] In 1864 newly elected Governor Oglesby joined these voices as he thanked Logan for

---

[40] Carl Sandburg, *Abraham Lincoln, The War Years,* New York, 1939, III, 275.
[41] *Illinois State Register,* November 9, 1864.
[42] Arthur C. Cole, *The Era of the Civil War,* Springfield, Illinois, 1919, 328.
[43] *Illinois State Journal,* November 21, 1864.
[44] *Ibid.,* November 22, 1864.
[45] *Alton Telegraph,* November 18, 1864.
[46] *Chicago Tribune,* August 6, 1866.

the generous and very effective cooperation and support of your heart and tongue in the late canvass. This however, General is but a small part of the rich results of your noble efforts in behalf of the whole cause. I feel sure your bold attacks in Egypt . . . will never be forgotten nor cease to be honored by all Illinois.[47]

Election over Logan thought of his return to the army. Although he was exhausted and complained of an "inflammation in the throat," he wrote Sherman asking if he should come back at once, but Sherman, about to march to the sea, replied, "It is not possible to overtake your command. Remain at home until you recover."[48] To obtain an extended leave Logan wrote Lincoln. He asked for thirty additional days and Lincoln answered immediately granting the leave.[49] Logan spent a few days resting with his family.

Never quiet for long, he was off again in mid-November. "Black Jack" travelled to Chicago and delivered a Union speech before returning to Egypt at month's end. Logan's extended leave and his trip to northern Illinois may have been brought on by a sudden "Logan for Senator" movement. Letters written two months later indicate Logan's interest in the senatorship, but in November he stuck to an earlier vow to "eschew politics" and returned to the army before the legislature met.[50] I. N. Haynie was interested in promoting Logan's candidacy. He arranged with the editor of the Mt. Vernon, Illinois, *Unconditional Unionist* to mention Logan as Egypt's senatorial favorite, promising to send a copy of the endorsement to every paper in the state. Haynie told Logan "it is my design to stir things up hot."[51] Several other papers took up the *Unionist's* call for Logan, but the state's leading Republican organ, the *Illinois State Journal,* was not carried away.[52] The paper supported Yates for the Senate, but announced its admiration for Logan who it believed would not be a candidate.[53] Democrats, smarting under the election defeat, accused Logan of thinking more about the senatorship than the war.[54] When Yates was finally elected, Logan was on his way back to resume command. Haynie,

47 Oglesby to Logan, November 20, 1864, Logan Mss.
48 *O. R.*, Ser. 1, XLIV, 465.
49 *Ibid.*, Ser. 1, XXXIX, pt. 3, 751.
50 Logan to Mary Logan, January 20, 22, 1865, Logan Mss.
51 Haynie to Logan, November 19, 25, 1864, Logan Mss.
52 Two of Logan's supporters were the *Central Illinois Gazette* (Champaign), December 2, 1864; *Carbondale New Era in Illinois State Journal*, December 12, 1864.
53 *Illinois State Journal,* November 26, 1864.
54 *Jonesboro Gazette,* December 24, 1864.

disappointed at Logan's refusal to stay in Springfield until the legislature met, wrote Mary, "there is no question but that the Senatorship was within his grasp if he had been able to be present during the contest. All parties concede that Genl. Logan will be invincible two years hence."[55]

Logan's activity in Illinois in 1864 was significant. He supported Union candidates and opposed those he felt favored peace. His speeches rang with appeals for war support, but mentioned few other issues. Abolition and Reconstruction were almost completely ignored. It is difficult to characterize Logan as a Republican in 1864. He was obviously a Unionist, one of many pre-war Democrats who joined Republicans behind Lincoln under the Union banner. But to date Logan's conversion to Republicanism from 1864 is misleading. In his speeches and letters he did not seem to think of himself as a Republican. Logan was regarded by others as a "war Democrat," or a "Unionist," not a Republican. His activities in 1864 were a step in the direction of the Republican Party, but he was not a Republican in 1864, nor did he completely embrace the Republican program until 1866 when he was nominated by that party for Congress. He was elected, and until his death stood as a personification of conservative Republicanism. The election of 1864 was an important episode in his change of party, and his efforts for the party he later joined told heavily in its victory in a key state in one of the nation's most important elections.

JAMES P. JONES

Florida State University,
Tallahassee

[55] Haynie to Mary Logan, January 4, 1865, Logan Mss.

The Loyola Leo XIII Symposium

On March 18, Loyola University of Chicago held a symposium to honor the sesquicentennial of the birth of Leo XIII on March 2, 1810. The conference on "Leo XIII and the Modern World" brought together for the major papers scholars from six colleges and universities in the United States. These scholars were joined by the Apostolic Delegate to the United States, His Excellency, Archbishop Egidio Vagnozzi, who contributed the luncheon address on "Pope Leo XIII and the Problem of Human Liberty." Leo's appeal to the modern world was reaffirmed during the conference by the papers read and by the attendance of more than five hundred students and scholars from universities in this country and Europe.

The introductory paper was given by Edward Gargan, of Loyola University, who served as General Chairman of the Symposium. This paper surveyed contemporary press reaction in America to Leo XIII's pontificate. Leo's career was followed closely by the popular and academic press of America. This was true not only of the journals of the Catholic community, but also of the journals of Protestant scholarship. *The North American Review, The Atlantic,* and *Harper's* were typical of the popular magazines that considered his activity of great interest.

Leo XIII was admired in the press for the dignity and holiness of life he exhibited. His statements were not, however, uncritically received. The Encyclical *Aeterni Patris,* The Restoration of Christian Philosophy to Schools, issued in August of 1879, was, for example, interpreted as a step-backward by Professor Archibald Alexander, of Columbia College, in an article "Thomas Aquinas and the Encyclical Letter" published in the *Princeton Review* for January, 1880. On the other hand, *The Andover Review* of January, 1886, considered the Encyclical *Immortale Dei,* The Christian Constitution of States, a marked change in papal attitude from that represented twenty-one years earlier in the Syllabus of Errors. And with less reservation, in 1891, *The Andover Review* thought *Rerum Novarum* undeniably socialist in tone, but likely to exercise an influence "toward freedom and elevation of the working classes." The more popular journal *The Atlantic Monthly* reviewing in 1894 all of Leo's encyclicals up to that date was especially appreciative of his *Au millieu des sollicitudes,* encouraging French Catholics to support the Third Republic as a legitimate form of government.

The *Atlantic* wondered, however, whether Leo's impact on his Church would or could be reciprocated in the world at large. *Harper's* and *The North American Review* stressed in their accounts of Leo the lessening of American apprehension towards Catholics during his reign. This feeling was traced to Leo's interest in America and what was understood to be Catholic appreciation of the liberties enjoyed in the American climate and society.

American sympathy for Leo was summarized in a special article by seven representative religious leaders of Protestant, Catholic and Jewish faiths in *The North American Review* for July 25, 1903. Archbishop John Ireland of St. Paul in this collected eulogy recalled most warmly Leo's eager interest in America. "Some day," he wrote "a long chapter will be written on Leo and America—his appreciative understanding of our institutions and liberties, his genial love of the country and its people, his wise and large-minded direction to the Church in America, his friendliness of attitude, in more than one instance, towards national affairs." The brief examination of contemporary response to Leo XIII's pontificate suggested a consensus as to the issues and developments of the utmost importance in his reign. Problems such as the relationship of scholastic philosophy to modern thought, the Church's view of political and social needs, the Pope's thought as viewed in an American climate and in relationship to the growth of Christianity in its entirety were given important discussion by Leo's contemporaries. These issues have remained the significant problems for the study of Leo in our time and were the subjects of the subsequent papers.

In his paper "The Church and the World in the Nineteenth Century," Kenneth Scott Latourette, Sterling Professor Emeritus in Missions and Oriental History, Yale University, approached Leo XIII's achievement against the background of the historical forces that in the nineteenth century threatened the "very existence of Christianity" and the vital currents in the life of the Church that brought it unexpected success in this century. He saw Leo's work accomplished despite the prestige of a "secularized democracy" often antagonistic to Christianity and supported by a scientific attitude hostile to Christianity's place in the intellectual order. The Church at the outset of this century, he observed, appeared "inextricably bound to a society and political structure that was passing."

From this dark beginning, Leo's pontificate was regarded as drawing upon a renewed successful effort in the life of the Church. This renaissance was seen as taking place "first of all" because "the Papacy became a more effective center of the Catholic Church's life

than even at the apex of the Middle Ages." This development was in turn accompanied by success in many areas, among these "the revival of existing orders and congregations," whose spirit was matched by "the foreshadowing of the devotion of the laity seen in the twentieth century in Catholic Action. . . ." These developments were described as complemented by the geographic expansion of the Catholic Church accomplished through the immigration movement of the nineteenth century and the successful missionary activity also characteristic of this century.

The accomplishments of the Catholic Church and the energy so magnificently expressed in Leo's pontificate was found by Latourette to be also present in the history of the Protestant Churches in the nineteenth century. He stressed the parallel accomplishments in Protestantism exhibited in wide missionary success and in devotional progress as illustrated by Pietism and Evangelicalism. He believed that Protestant achievement in the nineteenth century historically prefaced the importance of the Ecumenical movement within Protestantism in the twentieth century. In summary, Professor Latourette thought that the success of Protestanism in the nineteenth century alongside of Catholic progress established the historical perspective from which to evaluate Leo XIII's own historical achievement.

Serving as commentator on Professor Latourette's paper, Monsignor Harry C. Koenig emphasized the use that Leo XIII made of encyclicals to guide the Church's life. He did not believe that the progress of Protestantism in the nineteenth century lessened the historical separation between Catholicism and Protestantism in the twentieth century. On the contrary, he concluded that the persistence of doctrinal differences seemed to underscore a contemporary historical situation in which "Protestants and Catholics have altogether diverse concepts of unity."

In his contribution on "Leo XIII and the Social Crisis," Monsignor Joseph N. Moody of Ladycliff College, found Marx and Leo in agreement as witnesses to the alienation and isolation of the industrial worker in Europe's economy. The pope was presented as grieved that this tragic situation almost irresistibly led the worker into the false expectation that industrial progress and wealth would satisfy his needs as a person. At the same time, Leo was aware of the temptation to the worker to choose class war as the means to his salvation. In this concern the pope, according to Monsignor Moody, separated himself from the Marxists by his refusal to consider the class struggle as historically necessary to the worker's

improvement. Through *Rerum Novarum* the pope significantly depreciated the expectation of class war, a prospect gaining wide acceptance in working class movements throughout Europe. *Rerum Novarum* was interpreted as optimistically confident that the worker's plight, essentially due to injustice, was correctable through social doctrines nourished by a passion for justice.

Monsignor Moody observed that the accent on justice was present in Catholic social thought throughout the nineteenth century and that this stress had reached considerable clarity of expression by the 1830's. The de-Christianization of European thought and internal differences between churchmen served, however, to frustrate the development of social Catholicism. Here again, it was Leo's role to offer decisive help to a minority of Catholics anxious to give life to the concepts of social Catholicism. Leo's leadership was regarded by Monsignor Moody as not entirely expected, but when offered, this leadership was indebted to the social thinkers who preceded and were contemporaries of the pope. Monsignor Moody called special attention to the recent edition of the various drafts of *Rerum Novarum* in the important volume *L'Enciclica "Rerum Novarum," Testo authentico e redazioni preparatorie dai documenti originali.* (A cura di Mons. Giovanni Antonazzi. Prefazione di S. E. Mons. Domenico Tardini. Roma, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1957.)

During the composition of *Rerum Novarum,* both liberal and conservative opinions were presented to Leo XIII until the final text was prepared with its important recognition of the rights of the working class to independent voluntary organizations, and the consequent rejection of corporative theory. In conclusion, Monsignor Moody re-emphasized the moral center of Leo's social teaching and the pope's refusal to endorse specific technical solutions to changing problems. In this, he believed, the pope could be considered as anticipating "the call of the more recent popes for the lay apostolate; for while he was insistent on the authority of the hierarchy, he saw the entire Church as responsible for the application of just principles to economic life."

Commenting on the paper, Paul Mundy, of the Sociology Department of Loyola University, acknowledged his ready agreement with the main argument of the paper. He thought, however, that sufficient attention had not been given to explaining the time lag between the social crisis of the entire nineteenth century and the leadership provided by Leo. He also asked if Monsignor Moody had not failed to recognize adequately the "ethical complaint"

implicit in Marx's doctrine. Mundy furthermore suggested that the difficulties of Leo XIII's time are not yet over and that some recognition of the perennial aspects of social distress must remain a part of any evaluation of Leo and the social crisis.

At the luncheon, His Eminence, Albert Cardinal Meyer of Chicago, read a greeting and blessing from His Holiness Pope John XXIII to all participating in and attending the sessions of the symposium. In his address on "Pope Leo XIII and the Problem of Human Liberty" the Apostolic Delegate, His Excellency, Archbishop Egidio Vagnozzi characterized Leo "as the first of the modern Popes who, completely detached from the care and trouble of temporal sovereignty, placed their position and mission at the sole service of the spiritual welfare of mankind." Reviewing the Leonine teaching on liberty the Apostolic Delegate stressed Leo's insistence that "*true* liberty" required obedience to the laws of God and to the just laws of the state. He thought that the American Declaration of Independence in deriving man's liberty from the Creator was a similar statement of the views later expressed by Leo.

The Apostolic Delegate drew attention to the difficulties involved in interpreting Leo's reassertion "with great clarity and firmness that only in the Catholic Church is to be found the full measure of religious truth and the divinely prescribed form of worship. . . ." This position, he argued, does not mean "that the Catholic Church expects the state to be intolerant of religions other than the Catholic." The Apostolic Delegate stressed that Leo XIII acknowledged the role of custom and usage in giving sanction "for each kind of religion having its place in the State.' " He proposed that Pope Pius XII developed Leo's thought "with even greater clarity" when he told a Union of Italian Catholic Jurists on December 6, 1953:

> The affirmation: religious and moral error must be impeded when it is possible, because toleration of them in itself is immoral, is not valid absolutely and unconditionally. God has not given even to human authority such an absolute and universal command in matters of faith and morality. Such a command is unknown to the common convictions of mankind, to Christian conscience, to the sources of Revelation and to the practice of the Church. . . .

In conclusion, relating the ideas of Leo XIII and liberty to the modern age and to America, the Apostolic Delegate declared:

> As far as the United States is concerned, I feel that it is a true interpretation of the feelings of the Hierarchy and of American Catholics in general to say that they are well satisfied with their Constitution and pleased with the fundamental freedom enjoyed by their Church; in fact,

they believe that this freedom is to a large extent responsible for the expansion and consolidation of the Church in this great country. Whether they remain a minority, or become a majority, I am sure that American Catholics will not jeopardize their cherished religious freedom in exchange for a privileged position.

Professor James Collins, of St. Louis University, began the afternoon session with a paper directed to "Leo XIII and the Philosophical Approach to Modernity." Leo was described as "preeminently the pope of *the open tradition in philosophy,* which joins a firm rooting in our Christian philosophical heritage with a critical yet generous response to modern thought." Insisting that Leo desired a continual philosophical commerce between Christian and modern philosophy, Collins developed three essential aspects of Leo's teaching. The first constituted his guidance on "the best way of philosophizing," the second his counsel on the method for recapturing the wisdom of St. Thomas, and the third his advice to "complete the old by the aid of the new."

Great care was taken by Collins to establish the significance of Leo's preference for speaking about "philosophizing rather than philosophy." In giving priority to the verbal form, and hence the operational nature of philosophy, Leo was interpreted as providing the maximum support for an approach to philosophy having as its goal the meeting of the personal activity of the philosopher and "the reasonable pattern of being" he seeks to penetrate. Leo could never speak solely as a philosopher, and thus it was noted that in his role "as supreme teacher of revealed truth," he emphasized that "the best way of philosophizing" presumes "obedience to the Christian faith," which as he taught "helps the understanding, and not only detracts in nowise from its dignity, but adds greatly to its nobility, keenness, and stability." Through this counsel Leo reaffirmed the relationship of faith and philosophy against a philosophical tradition that would demand their separation. Leo saw the Christian philosopher as obligated to master the classical philosophers, the Fathers, the Scholastic Doctors, especially St. Thomas, and the fruits of modern philosophical inquiry.

In interpreting Leo's praise of the wisdom of St. Thomas, Collins stressed the idea that a philosopher's Thomistic allegiance committed him to "a sustained engagement with all of the tendencies of modern philosophy." Such an engagement was viewed as implicit in Thomas's own work, his problems and methods. To illustrate the historical relationship between Thomism and modern philosophy, Collins recalled that the Catholic philosophers of the nine-

teenth century who prepared the way for the Thomistic revival were all deeply indebted to various schools of modern philosophy. As examples he cited such figures as Sanseverino, Taparelli, Liberatore, and Kleutgen. In entering into their work, the pope was seen as calling for a more precise "textual and contextual understanding of St. Thomas and the moderns," if their pioneer work was to be perfected.

Professor Collins offered as essential evidence of Leo's accent on the relationship of Christian philosophy and modern philosophy the passage in *Aeterni Patris* where the pope cautions against the misuse of tradition. This is the place where Leo warned: ". . . if anything is taken up with too great subtlety by the Scholastic doctors, or too carelessly stated—if there be anything that ill agrees with the discoveries of a later age, or, in a word, improbable in whatever way—it does not enter our mind to propose that for imitation to our age." Giving special attention to this admonition, Collins analyzed in detail the meaning to be given to Leo's caution against "too great subtlety," that which is "too carelessly stated," that which is obsolete in view of modern discoveries, and philosophical attitudes bearing an air of improbability. He argued that this fourfold warning must be understood as a positive counsel to the Christian philosopher to be ever alert to "the springs of consent" that open the mind and heart of each successive philosophical generation.

In summary, Collins observed that Leo's phrase "strengthen and complete the old by the new" represented his most precious advice to the Christian philosopher. He found this advice clearly followed by those philosophers who welcomed and were guided in their philosophizing by the encyclical *Aeterni Patris*. Here he cited the work of Cardinal Mercier, Father Marechal, Monsignor Olgiati, Father Copleston, and Maritain. These Christian philosophers were indebted in common to the wisdom of St. Thomas and joined together in a common concern to build with the best materials of the past and the present.

The Reverend Robert F. Harvanek, S.J., General Prefect of Studies, Chicago Province of the Society of Jesus, in his comments took sharp issue with Professor Collin's presentation of Leo's openness to modern philosophical concerns. He argued that Leo's emphasis was undeniably on the task of the restoration of Christian philosophy, and more specifically "the tradition of Catholic philosophy." He felt that Professor Collins had underestimated Leo's rejection of much of modern philosophy since the sixteenth century. In illustrating his position Father Harvanek suggested that New-

man's "enthusiasm" for *Aeterni Patris* was aroused because of the recall to tradition rather than from any eagerness to focus attention on modern developments. The Prefect insisted that the Christian philosophers' confidence in approaching modern thought was a poise developed after Leo. It was his view that Pius XII in *Humani Generis* had made the historically significant statements on "the Catholic scholar's relationship to non-Catholic theories and doctrines in all areas of human learning. . ."

Professor Samuel William Halperin, of the University of Chicago, followed with a paper on "Leo XIII and the Roman Question." He began with an accounting of the troublesome political legacy Pius IX left to his successor as a consequence of the loss of the papacy's temporal power. Unable to accept the conditions enacted by the Italian state in the Law of Guarantees of May, 1871, Pius IX unceasingly demanded that the temporal power be restored. This power was believed to be absolutely necessary to the independence and freedom of the Holy See. Failing to achieve the restoration of his power, Pius IX had adopted the *non expedit* of 1868 as the most effective means of unending protest against the Italian monarchy.

When Leo XIII inherited the obligations and burdens of these policies, he was, according to Halperin, a man who "never forgot that he was living in the nineteenth century and that the church's methods of combat had to be adapted to the realities of the present." From the opening days of his pontificate, it was noted, Leo exhibited moderation in searching for a solution to the Roman Question. He desired, Halperin believed, a settlement that would have transformed the existing *de facto* situation enjoyed by the pope within the Vatican enclave into a *de jure* status with its acknowledgment of sovereignty.

Though Leo XIII may have aspired to such a workable compromise, all his hopes were to be frustrated during his reign. In tracing out these difficulties, Halperin underscored the consequences for the political maturation of the Italian monarchy. When the juridical sovereignty of the Vatican could not be arranged, Leo XIII felt obliged to continue his predecessor's use of the *non expedit.* The discouragement of Catholics from participation in the political life of their country in turn deprived Italy of a vital conservative tradition necessary to the effective development of its parliamentary and constitutional life. In the absence of this tradition partisans of the left and anti-clericals enjoyed a political monopoly not entirely beneficial to the political growth of Italy. Emboldened by

their advantage, the forces of the left frequently welcomed politically opportune outbursts of anti-clericalism. Such campaigns fastened Leo XIII to the *non expedit* even though there are evidences, according to Halperin, which indicate that Leo knew in his last years that it was a failure in both theory and practice.

Halperin further demonstrated that just as the Roman Question had a profound impact on the internal political life of Italy, so did it determine much of the diplomacy of the Vatican during Leo's reign. He believed that Leo XIII gradually was convinced that he would receive no help from Germany or Austria-Hungary in solving the Roman Question and therefore adopted the policy of rapprochement towards France. The Roman Question was credited by Halperin as a major factor in forming Leo's counsel of *Ralliement* to the Catholics of the Third Republic. Reviewing the subsequent history of the Roman Question and its resolution in the Lateran Accords of 1929, Halperin observed that the final settlement was cast in a pattern already perceived by Leo. On this he concluded with the historically significant judgment:

> The role of Mussolini as a party to the Lateran Accords of 1929 shadowed them at the time of their signature. Actually, however, they responded to a profound historical need. They have survived the vicissitudes of the past many years. They should survive many more.

In her comments, Margaret M. O'Dwyer of Loyola University, praised Professor Halperin's valuable exposition of the difficulties the nineteenth century papacy and Italy experienced in resolving problems apparently amenable to solution in the twentieth century. She called attention to Father John Courtney Murray's reminder that Leo XIII regarded the attacks on the independency of the papacy as part of a wider "conspiracy" to undermine the moral prestige and mission of the Church. In addition she suggested that perhaps the stand of Pius IX and Leo XIII was a necessary preparation for the success of the present century in resolving the Roman Question. "It may be," Miss O'Dwyer proposed, "that their stand was necessary so that the future be not prejudiced."

Reverend Thomas T. McAvoy, C.S.C. of the University of Notre Dame, opened the evening session with his paper "Pope Leo XIII and America." At the outset he recalled the surprise in Europe that Catholicism flourished in the United States. This was an astonishment provoked by the accepted idea that Catholicism and democracy were incompatible. The issue of Catholicism and the American political spirit and culture was, according to Father

McAvoy, the great theme dominating the history of Leo and America. For the Church in America two great problems existed within this context. The first, was the manifold problem attending upon the Americanization of the Catholic immigrant. The issue involved not only questions of parochial and diocesan discipline, but very acutely the development of parochial education. The second task was that of fitting the Church in America more formally into the universal canonical organization and discipline.

The American Church had been, as Father McAvoy noted, relatively free of constant contact and communication with Rome. During Leo's reign the prospect of a more intimate and steady relationship between America and Rome was not eagerly accepted by American churchmen formed by the earlier experience. This hesitation was illustrated by a dramatic retelling of the stages, if not stratagems, necessary to bring the American hierarchy to accept the prospect of a permanent papal delegation to the United States. Archbishop Francisco Satolli on the eve of his announcement that he was to be the first Apostolic Delegate to America, was assured by the hierarchy, assembled in New York, that they did not wish such an office in this country.

After the establishment of the Delegation it appeared that the liberal coalition of Bishops Keane and Ireland, and Cardinal Gibbons had the greatest influence with the new Apostolic Delegate. Yet the conservative elements in the hierarchy were soon heard by the Delegate and in Rome. So successful were they that eventually they succeeded in presenting, for a time, their adversaries as opposed to parochial education, as benevolent towards secret societies, and as skirting indifferentism in their friendly relations with non-Catholic religious bodies. The controversy and tension between the members of the American hierarchy quickly tested the wisdom of Rome in bringing the Church in America more precisely within the ancient discipline and organization of the Church.

Father McAvoy presented Rome, during Leo's pontificate, as skillfully adjudicating the many differences between the hierarchy in their efforts to fit the Church within the framework of the American system. His review of Rome's many successes seemed to justify his conclusion concerning Leo and America:

> Certainly not all the problems of the Church in America were solved during his regime, but he could at the end write a letter of love and praise for his sons in the United States who were working hard to reconcile the Church

and the Age. The Church in the United States has increased in number and wealth since 1903, but the best achievements had their origin in the golden era of Pope Leo XIII.

The second evening paper "Leo XIII and Contemporary Theology," was read by the Reverend Gustave Weigel, S.J., of Woodstock College, Maryland. In agreement with those who preceded him, Father Weigel found the characteristic mark of Leo to be his readiness to adapt to new times. This receptivity to changing circumstances, it was pointed out, was arrived at after experiencing and valuing much in the old order that was to be replaced. As Professor Collins had stressed the spirit in which Leo approached the act of philosophizing, so did Father Weigel underscore the openness of spirit Leo encouraged as proper to the theologian's task. It was suggested that Catholic theology, despite the presence of fine and competent theologians enjoyed little attention from the nineteenth century until after the impact of Leo XIII.

Though "no great theologian himself," Leo, according to Father Weigel, employed a variety of means to stimulate and give a vital direction to Catholic theology. One significant means was offered through his appreciation of history. The pope evoked not only a response from the professional historian, but he also reminded the theologians of his generation of the importance of a return to the sources. "From Leo's time onward," Father Weigel observed, "Catholic theologians are deep in history and realize today more than ever that research and investigation are the very foundation of their theologizing." Accompanying the pope's desire that the sources be known was his insistence that a return to Scripture was equally necessary to the theologian. Hence Leo founded the Biblical Commission in 1902. And prior to the establishment of the Commission, he issued in 1893 the significant encyclical *Providentissimus Deus*. In this statement Leo did not, according to Father Weigel "go as far as the encyclical *Divino Afflante Spiritu* of Pius XII in 1943, but we must remember that Leo's directives were definitely path breaking."

It was further observed that Leo's encouragement of historical perspective and vigorous scriptural studies freed the theologians from timidity, if not fear, with regard to the scientific philological methods. This confidence brought the human dimensions of scriptural exegesis more intimately into the work of the theologian. At the same time the theologians within the Church were stimulated

to take up the problems raised by the study of the literary forms in which Scripture presents itself. Father Weigel believed that Leo's insistence on the primary importance of Thomistic philosophy gave the theologian a much needed metaphysical basis for his constructive work. He argued furthermore that the most significant results of Leo's counsel to the theologians was the support this theological stress gave to Leo's own pronouncements on the moral issues germaine to the political and social issues of his day. Summarizing the implications of Leo's achievements here he concluded:

> Not only did he aid theology by drawing attention to its formal structure but he also gave the theologians matter on which to work. He dealt with many themes but perhaps the most relevant of all was his doctrine on the due relations between Church and secular society in which it perforce must work. Beyond any doubt today's theology bears a heavy Leonine stamp.

The final paper was given by Raymond Schmandt of Loyola University, who also served as co-chairman of the symposium. In his paper, Retrospect and Prospects," he proposed that any assessment of Leo XIII give generous attention to the personality of the pope. Such attention, he observed, would require serious examination of Leo's thirty-two years as Bishop of Perugia. He thought it significant that biographers have in the main neglected these important years. He regretted that the symposium had not been able to consider Leo's relation with England or France, with Russia or Germany or his guidance of the Church in the Asian and African worlds. He thought, however that no historian could regret the loss of the temporal power to the papacy in the nineteenth century. Reviewing the endless trouble the papacy experienced from Carolingian times until Leo's day, Schmandt wondered if in any final balance the papal territory had not incurred as much loss of freedom for the papacy as it seemed to guarantee independence.

With regard to Leo's fundamental pronouncements in the political and social order, Schmandt asked:

> Could Leo have spoken so favorably of American democracy or French republicanism if he had been a reigning monarch, busy combatting revolutionary republicanism in his own state. Could he have written *Rerum Novarum* in the face of a Chartist Movement or a strike of Roman street sweepers or grave diggers?

In reviewing the papers of the symposium Professor Schmandt recalled their common theme of Leo's flexibility. He believed that

it was unfortunate that many American Protestants are less aware of Leo as Pope and more aware of an image of the papacy drawn from Pius IX's reign. In a last word to the symposium he observed: "It is something of a national disgrace that there has not been a biography of Leo XIII written by an American since 1903. Perhaps one of the fruits of this symposium may be such an undertaking." As a step towards that biography the papers of the Leo XIII Symposium will be published in the near future.

EDWARD T. GARGAN

Loyola University, Chicago

Book Reviews

Baroque Times in Old Mexico. By Irving A. Leonard. The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1959. Pp. xi, 260. $6.50.

Seventeenth century Hispanic America has been a generally neglected area in the vineyard of historical research. Professor Leonard notes that too often it "seems a sort of night's rest . . . between two strenuous days of history." He rightly argues that this seemingly uneventful era was a formative period of ethnic and cultural consolidation out of which the pattern of future Hispanic American history evolved.

Professor Leonard is interested in cultural and intellectual history and here on the periphery of European civilization there is a general absence of striking events and historical landmarks. The author phrases it well when he states that in this area the historian works "more in the climate of feeling of the time than among the flora and fauna of historical evidence." He has, therefore, presented a series of biographical sketches interwoven with social vignettes and literary assessments which serve to present a mosaic of seventeenth century life.

As a social and literary historian Professor Leonard has done well. We are given various bits and pieces of seventeenth century life: biographical sketches of Fray García Guerra, Archbishop-Viceroy of New Spain; Sister Juana Inés de la Cruz, nun, poetess, intellectual, the "last great lyric poet of Spain"; and Don Carlos de Siguënza y Góngora, scholar and scientist, a forerunner of the eighteenth century's devotion to the experimental method. He adds fascinating descriptions of contemporary *máscaras,* parades of persons representing historical, mythological and biblical personages. Intermixed is a wealth of historic lore and analyses of seventeenth century literary trends.

Unfortunately the work is marred by Professor Leonard's insistence that we see the seventeenth century as a progress from medieval authoritarianism still holding sway over men's minds as the century opened to a point at the end of the century where man stood on the threshold of intellectual freedom. The author's basic assumption seems to be that the seventeenth century is important only in that it precedes the Enlightenment. His evidence is carefully selected and interpreted to support his assumptions.

The picture of scholasticism is admitted by the author to be "oversimplified." It is also distorted. There is confusion over the scholastic relationship between philosophy and theology and little appreciation of the distinction between medieval scholasticism and deteriorated later forms. Surely the thought of the seventeenth century is worth being judged without the use of such tired generalizations as "the abdication of the mind to the dogmatic prescriptions of a medieval Church." Professor Leonard's argumentation thrughout is *a priori.* He is speaking to an audience of believers —believers in the experimental rationalism of the modern world. In his work he does less than justice to non-experimental truth. Indeed he does not give it a hearing.

The reader finds an assumption that seventeenth century blindness and opposition to scientific progress vitiates and destroys its theological premises.

Is it not more reasonable to assume that the error of the seventeenth century was in thinking that its theological system was dependent upon a particular scientific concept of the world? On the other hand, was it not the eighteenth century's error to assume that the new order of science had rendered traditional Christian theology invalid? It would seem that Professor Leonard views the matter through eighteenth century eyes.

EDMUND W. KEARNEY

Chicago Teachers College

Cuba. Island of Paradox. By Ruby Hart Phillips. McDowell, Oblensky, New York, 1959. Pp. 434. Illustrated, $4.95.

Searchers after an understanding of contemporary Cuba and Fidel Castro's "26th of July" movement are likely to be disappointed with this volume by a resident of Cuba since the 1920's and *New York Times* correspondent since 1937. After reading it, one senses that the journalistic vantage ground is inadequate for an analysis of a country's problems. Watching Havana street fighting, interviewing politicians, generals and ambassadors, and reporting news does not necessarily provide sufficient materials to explain the island's paradoxes. In organization the book is essentially a diary surveying Cuban politics and centering upon reminiscences about the colorful careers of Machado, Batista and finally Castro. Acquaintanceship with major political figures enables Mrs. Phillips to present a lively, frequently informative, but occasionally repetitious account disclosing otherwise obscure historical details. Still, her undocumented work does not satisfactorily explain today's Cuba for either the specialist or the novice.

Even less valuable is her advice for improving United States relations with Latin America. She rather harshly admonishes that rising anti-United States sentiment in Latin America stems from "years of vacillating, hesitant and cowardly policy . . . and failure to protect United States citizens and their property." Unless the United States "becomes impervious to the shouts of 'imperialism' in the interests of its self-defence and its own unchallengeable rights, our great American nation will find itself crippled in its efforts to hold the line against the rising influence of Soviet Russia." The United States should ensure free elections in Latin America and "should never recognize any government in Latin America which obtains power by force of arms, without regard to whether the leader is a 'dictator' or a 'liberator.' "

She gravely implies that North American liberals now urge a dangerous policy of economic aid or even outright gifts to Latin America. Admitting a need for monetary assistance, she insists it should be dispensed by the Inter-American Development Bank and only after thorough investigation. (One wonders if this is necessarily un-liberal.) Professors and writers, including Carleton Beals, R. L. Buell, A. F. Zimmerman, Ernest Gruening and Hubert Herring, stand accused of trouble-making in the 1930's by filling the heads of Latin American students and professors with ideas of

United States imperialism. To her their efforts to improve Inter-American relations were misguided and the Cultural Relations Association was a "racket."

Mrs. Phillips offers consructive criticisms for the future. Arms and ammunition should not be provided to dictators and disregard for human rights should be deplored publicly. Diplomatic representation should be improved in quality and she scores appointments based upon political reward, business experience or innocuous records in diplomatic service. To this list of suggestions could be added the need for better studies of present-day currents in Latin America.

VICTOR C. DAHL

Portland State College, Oregon

The United States to 1865. By Michael Kraus. Ann Arbor, Michigan, The University of Michigan Press. Pp. xiii, 529. $7.50.

The United States since 1865. By Foster Rhea Dulles. Ann Arbor, Michigan, The University of Michigan Press. Pp. ix, 546. $7.50.

How can anyone justify the publication of another general history of the United States? There are perhaps ten or twelve very satisfactory treatments available. I presume the justification in this case was the publication of the planned fifteen volume University of Michigan History of the Modern World, edited by Allan Nevins and Howard M. Ehrmann. Another justification may be found in the assertion made on the jacket of the book by Michael Kraus, informing us that "Every generation must write its own history, reshaping the past in the light of its own experience. The names and occasions of our history are familiar, but the vantage point is unique, and the facts assume new meaning in our time." An example of the author's meaning is found in his treatment of the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798. Writing as pronounced liberal, Dr. Kraus informs us that the legislation passed by the Federalists in 1798 "look like so much madness that they are difficult to comprehend." Considering the conditions existing in 1798, such an appraisal seems extreme indeed. Then, in comparing this earlier period with a later one, the author writes: "At a later date Senator Joseph McCarthy carried on a campaign of terrorism led by a hysterical fear of the Communist peril within the United States. Though he made a shambles of traditional American liberties he obtained the willing support of multitudes. In 1798 much of the same excitement, prejudice, and overwrought apprehension possessed large bodies of citizens (p. 292)." When one recalls that not one person went to jail because of McCarthy's investigations, one wonders just how he made such a "shambles" of American liberties. True, he did oppose the promotion in rank of an Army officer known to be a Communist, but there were quite a few other Americans who wondered at least mildly why this promotion was made.

Likewise, Dr. Kraus is a bit careless at times in giving the whole story. One gets the impression that Spain received five million dollars for Florida in 1819 from his account: "On Washington's birthday, 1819, the Spanish

minister and Secretary Adams, after protracted negotiations, signed the treaty transferring Florida to the United States for $5,000,000 (p. 377)." Actually, as I am sure the author well knows, the money mentioned was to be used by our government to satisfy the claims of Americans for depredations caused by the Indians coming north from Florida into our territory; no money went to Spain.

The volume by Dr. Dulles begins with the meeting between Grant and Lee on April 9, 1865, and ends with the announcement made on August 3, 1959, to the effect that President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev had agreed upon an exchange of visits. We recall that the Russian visited us but that the American was in due time informed that he was not wanted in Russia. Between the two events mentioned, the author presents an excellent account of recent American history. Written likewise from the liberal point of view, the author is nevertheless willing to admit, for example, that the New Deal was heavily weighted in favor of labor unions and against business and management. He seems unwilling to admit, however, that labor unions can be as great a menace to the nation as business monopolies ever were, and for the same reasons. Any monopoly is a threat to national welfare, whether operated by Mr. Patton, president of the Republic Steel Corporation or by Mr. McDonald, president of the United Steel Workers. It is admittedly too much these days to ask anyone to be conservative, but just a little less liberalism would be very welcome to many people and, incidentally, would have improved the merits of both volumes reviewed.

PAUL KINIERY

Loyola University, Chicago

Origin of the American Revolution, 1759–1766. By Bernhard Knollenberg. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1960. Pp. 486. $8.50.

This book is unique inasmuch as in the first paragraph of the introduction the author, after informing us that his book is the fruit of an effort to ascertain why the British mainland colonies in North America were on the verge of rebellion ten years before the Revolution broke out, at once reveals the conclusions his study led to. He holds that a series of provocative British Acts between 1759 and 1764 contributed to mounting colonial discontent. These Acts were: 1759, an order to the Governor of Virginia that struck at the roots of self-government; 1761, the legalizing of general writs of assistance, and an order of the Privy Council making the commissions of judges revocable at the will of the king; 1762-1763, disallowance of a Massachusetts act incorporating a missionary society among the Indians, and the efforts of the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts to introduce bishops into North America; also in 1763 the Proclamation which delimited Indian and white territory; the enforcing of the Sugar Act of 1733, and of the law against the cutting of white pines; the impressment of sailors to man the British vessels that patrolled the coast to enforce the Sugar Act; the increase of the British standing army in the colonies, and the failure

of the forces to protect the frontier at the time of Pontiac's uprising; also, neglect to give the colonists any assurance that still greater tax burdens would not be placed upon them; and finally in 1765 the passing of the Stamp Act despite the petitions and protests of colonial legislatures and influential colonists.

Before he undertakes a consideration of these various measures that proved so offensive to the colonists he raises the question whether the idea of independence was entertained before 1765. In answer he admits that such fears were expressed in England, but he contends that there is no evidence that the colonists were of this frame of mind or that their protestations of loyalty were not wholly sincere.

After an inquiry into why the island colonists and Florida did not join in the Revolution there follows an analysis of why so many Acts of this type should have been concentrated in this five year period. The explanation he finds in the confused state of British politics in the early days of the reign of George III, in the king's dislike of Pitt and distrust of Fox and his implicit confidence in Bute. Other factors were the inexperience of those who now administered colonial affairs, the ignorance alike of Ministers and Parliament of the colonial mind and temper, pressure from British constituents for easing their tax burden, and the emotional storm aroused by John Wilkes which focussed attention on him to at least partial exclusion of due consideration of measures affecting the colonies.

With all this as background and setting Knollenberg finally considers one by one the acts listed above, but not in the order in which they were given. In fact there is a lack of order, a somewhat confused and haphazard approach. The evidence he accumulates is convincing and it fully explains colonial resentment. Indeed the reader must marvel at the obtuseness of the British government to the consequences of its legislation, and he may find it difficult to absolve it of deliberate purpose to ride rough-shod over colonial rights. Certainly no real effort was made to give adequate attention to the problems or to adjust matters in a statesmanlike manner.

To avoid leaving the study hanging in the air the author adds as an epilogue a brief review of events between 1765 nad 1774 which reveals how each intervention by the British served only to arouse additional resentment till the shedding of blood at Lexington and Concord made rebellion inevitable.

This book is assuredly the best that Knollenberg has written. The tone is calm, the attitude impartial; and when uncertainty exists it is admitted. Statements are supported by a generous wealth of references to documents. In general Knollenberg sides with McIlwain as to the righteousness of the cause of the colonists. The bibliography while extensive, is limited quite properly to books actually cited in the text. But to dismiss the religious phase of the Quebec Act with the mere observation that it was 'an additional grievance' robs it of its force as a factor in precipitating the Revolution. Though he was born in Indiana Knollenberg's knowledge of the geography of Ohio is hazy—the Cuyahoga River is not in present central Ohio, neither is Sandusky in present norhwestern Ohio. But these are errors extraneous to the main subject and they do not detract from the worth of the book. While it cannot be said that this book adds any-

thing startingly new, the analysis, summaries and documentation make it a worth-while addition to the bibliography of the Revolution, helpful alike to the general reader and the scholar.

CHARLES H. METZGER, S.J.

West Baden College

Rise of the Downtrodden. By Joseph Ledit, S.J. Translated from the Mexican edition by Joseph Ledit, S.J., and Antonio Santacruz. Society of St. Paul, New York, Canfield, Derby, Detroit, 1959. Pp. 260.

This book presents the unique movement that, without arms or government backing, has brought Mexico out of near cataclysm into a rejuvenated life. The book, like the movement, pays little attention to politics, and in this way avoids the failures of historians who paint the picture of our southern neighbor as a tragi-comedy of primitive culture in the twentieth century. Here the basic Mexican question is boldly met: why did its literacy, its economy, its self-government, its disregard for the protection of fundamental rights of life and liberty, the very ownership of land, fall to such a low estate between the presidencies of Porfirio Díaz and Avila Camacho; and what has happened to reverse that sad trend and, not only stop a communistic overthrow but bring to its people a large victory in the contest over the great contemporary problem of production and social justice?

The author, a distinguished collaborator with the International Labor Office in Montreal, spent the best part of ten years in a meticulous study of both the underlying problem and its remarkable solution. To get his evidence he had to have the complete confidence of the makers of this social regeneration, and he needed the mental equipment that enables one to look beyond politics to the vital forces of a mature and determined people. His handling of his materials—and they are first-hand and full—is both judicious and objective. The final chapter, on the dissolution of the central power in the operation, shows this patience and impartiality that one demands in examinating so strange and complicated a process as is here unfolded. While his command of English yields occasionally to lapses into frenchification, and the type-setter betrayed him more than once, yet the merit of the work urges a reader to overlook superficial imperfections in following the very rewarding account of this most modern story.

Revolution in Mexico between 1913 and 1940 claimed 1,200,000 lives according to the testimony of one of its notable engineers, Candido Aguilar (p. 48). The makers of these upsets certainly followed totalitarian principles, and this course naturally called on them to make a direct and entire attack on the one force that will not yield to the totalitian party, namely religion. It was all a most negative program, loud in profession of philosophical correctness, a barren of results despite several well-meaning though futile efforts to give back to the people their land and their freedom from overbearing government. Peonage and the *hacendados,* both children of the 19th century and not relics of old Spain, added to the closing of the

extant school system, served the creation of a ruling inner circle that fattened on the continuing revolution. Labor "liders" followed the inducements offered by his circle and thus made workers' justice impossible. Bitter hatreds marked a politics that tended to be cruel rather than paternal. That amiable people lived through paroxisms of fear and betrayal in a constant state of tension and with no sight of a viable democratic regime.

Finally, after trying all manner of reconstructive or military efforts even to the 1926-1929 epoch of the "Cristeros," a group of highly intellectual and dedicated men decided on a totally new approach. Employing a secret "base" of directive planning and administration, they singled out in turn the popular resuscitation of free education, the right to work and enter labor organizations, the employers' consent to uphold and fulfill the just expectations of workingmen, and finally true private ownership of land and fair opportunity to develop the land and market the commodities without a feudal subservience to the vast network of the political ring.

Carranza rang in the opening of the Communist era. In 1943 Avila Camacho definitely closed it when he used this movement to destroy Communist power in Mexico and to support the newly enjoyed social justice. Victory, however, while large, is yet not complete. There remains the political arena. But if the movement holds to its foundations of employing fearless masses of unarmed men to undo the intrigues of the entrenched politicians, the sentiment of the country will be able to complete what is undoubtedly one of the social high moments of our century.

W. Eugene Shiels

Xavier University, Ohio

Notes and Comments

Medicine and Society in America: 1660-1860, by Richard Harrison Shryock, published this year by New York University Press, is a contribution to the history of medicine. Dr. Shryock traces the emergence of the medical profession over a period of two centuries in four very interesting lectures which he delivered in 1959 as the Anson G. Phelps Lecturer in New York University. In the first lecture, "Origins of a Medical Profession," Dr. Shryock reveals how trained physicians emerged from the groups of "healers" and brought scientific medical treatment to American society. This and the second lecture on "Medical Thought and Practice" far from being dry are replete with human interest as they tell of the progress of medical founders from Cotton Mather and Benjamin Rush to the more revolutionary medics of the 1800's. "Health and Disease, 1660-1820," the third lecture, describes the relation of public health to population growth in the early times of epidemics and numerous maladies afflicting our colonists. The state of public and private health became both the challenge and the test of the value of scientific medical training and practice. The fourth lecture, "Medicine and Society in Transition, 1820-1860," could aptly be captioned "Victorian Sentimentalism Invades Medical Practice." This transition period, rather decline of the medical profession, did not lack all progress, as the establishments of hospitals, nursing institutions, dental training, pharmaceutical education, and especially medical periodicals attest. The ample footnotes at the end of each part contain an excellent bibliography. The book should command wide attention. With index it is in 182 pages and sells for four dollars.

* * * *

Felix Alfred Plattner and Albert Lunte made and extensive automobile tour of South and Middle America in 1957 and 1958. Starting south of Buenos Aires they travelled in Argentina, lower Brazil, Paraguay, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Central America, and Mexico, taking photographs of Jesuit churches and art works in the cities and old missions. They chose particularly the wood carvings, statuary, paintings and decorations made by German Jesuit fathers and brothers in the seventeenth and eighteen centuries for the eye of their camera as well as the edifices designed and erected

by the missionaries from Germany. Early in 1960 Plattner had his photographs published excellently in book form by Herder in Basel, Freiburg, and Wien under the title: *Deutsche Meister des Barock in Südamerika im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert.* The 119 pictures are introduced by an historical account of the work of the German Jesuits in America, and after the collection of pictures each "Bild" is described with references to authorities. The book will prove a worthwhile purchase.

* * * *

Florence Sabin, Colorado Woman of the Century, by Elinor Bluemel, published in 1959 by the University of Colorado Press, is a deserved tribute to one of the nation's great physicians and scientists. It is a simple biography, sympathetically written, of the woman who spent some fifty of her eighty-two years of life making valuable contributions to medical knowledge and whose statue in Statuary Hall is Colorado's choice representation from among those of its famous citizens. Dr. Florence Sabin (1871-1953) was closely associated with the development of Johns Hopkins Medical School for the first quarter of this century and after her professorship there she became a member of the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research from 1925 to 1938. As member emeritus she continued her research until 1953. The list of her prizes, awards, and honors numbers thirty-three. The bibliography of her writings covers almost eight pages. The inspiring volume is well-printed and happily illustrated and is indexed. Its list price is $5.00.

* * * *

The Louisiana Historical Association underwent a thorough reorganization in 1958 and in January 1960 gave birth to the new historical quarterly, *Louisiana History,* published in cooperation with Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, under the editorship of Edwin Adams Davis and his associate A. Otis Hebert, Jr. In the opening article Kenneth Trist Urquhart traces the history of the organization in his "Seventy Years of the Louisiana Historical Association." Chartered in 1889 the Association moved into the new Memorial Library and Museum next to the Howard Memorial, and since then has done a notable work of gathering and preserving materials. The format of *Louisiana History* is pleasing and its 96 pages contain interesting articles, book reviews, notes and illustrations. We wish it a successful career.

INDEX

MID-AMERICA

VOLUME XLII

INDEXER'S NOTE

Names of the contributors are in small capitals; titles of articles in this volume are in quotation marks; titles of books and periodicals reviewed or mentioned are in italics. Book reviews are entered under author and title of book, and under the name of the reviewer; no entries are made for subject of the book except in the case of biographies. The following abbreviations are used: tr., translator; ed., editor; revs., reviews; revd., reviewed.

Acta Sanctorum, 39
Adams, John, and Middle Ages, 30–43
Adams-Onís treaty, 175
Aeterni Patris, of Leo XIII, 231
Aldham, Capt. W. Cornwallis, 23–24
"Alfred M. Landon and the Presidential Campaign of 1936," by DONALD R. MCCOY, 195–218
Allen, Henry J., 195
Allen, Josh, 220–228
Almodóvar, Duke of, see Malo de Luque
Alton Telegraph (Illinois), 227–228
American Catholic Quarterly Review, 71
American Protestant Association (A.P.A.), 74, 76, 79
Amity, ship, 171
Anderson, Victoria, 189
Aquinas, St. Thomas, 39, 236
Arcadians, 15
Arikara Indians, 178
Arkansas Gazette, 177
Arizona and the West, noted, 127
Ashley, Williams, 178–179
Asunción, Paraguay, 118
Atlantic Monthly, 231–232
Atocha, Alexander A., 187–188
Augustine, St., 39
Ayutla, revolution of, 21
Azcarraga y Palermo, Manuel, 88–90, 92, 96

B. A. Goldschmidt Co., 19
Ballinger, Richard, 113–114
Banks, Gen. N. P., 187–192
Baroque Times in Old Mexico, by Irving A. Leonard, revd., 244
Baylies, Rep. Francis, 178
Bell, Maj. Joseph M., 185–186
Benton, Sen. Thomas Hart, 177–178
Berthoud, James, 171
Blaine, James G., 69–70, 73–75, 78
Blair, Francis P., 133, 135, 138–140
Blair, Montgomery, 133
Bluegrass Craftsman, Being the Reminiscences of Ebenezer Hiram Stedman, Papermaker, 1808–1885, ed. by Frances L. S. Dugan and Jacqueline P. Bull, noted, 63
Bluemel, Elinor, *Florence Sabin, Colorado Woman of the Century*, noted, 252
BOOK REVIEWS, 53–59, 121–126, 244–250
Borah, Sen. William E., 214
Boston Pilot, 71
Brackenridge, Henry M., 176
Bradbury, John, 175–176
Breckinridge, Col. Henry, 204
Brinkley, John, 196
Bristow, Henry, 26
British Foreign Office, 19, 24
British Guiana, 149
British-Spanish relations, 163–164
Bryan, Wm. Jennings, 109–110
Bull Moose party, 195, 203
Burgos, Decree of, 161
Butler, Sen. Benjamin F., 185

Cabot, Sebastian, 116–120
Cairo, Ill., 226
Calderón, Fernando, 117, 119
Campbell, Col. John, 173
Canary Islands, 152
Cannon, Speaker Joseph G., 105–115
Capper, Sen. Arthur, 198, 201
Catholic Church, 15, 18, 39–40, 67–79, 231–243
"Catholicism and Presidential Elections, 1865–1900," by VINCENT P. DE SANTIS, 67–79
Catholic Review, 73

Carbondale, Ill., 223–225
Caracas Company, 97–98, 104
Charles III of Spain, 80
Chase, Salmon P., 220
Chicago, 203, 224–225, 229
Chicago Tribune, 227, 228–229
Chiriqui, colonization idea, 131, 139
Civil War, 5, 6, 9, 185–192, 219–230
Clark, Champ, 113
Clark, J. Reuben, 204
Clay, Henry, 132, 149
Clayton-Bulwer treaty, 147
Cleveland, Grover, 73–74, 78
Cleveland, Ohio, convention in, 201–203
CLOGHESSY, JAMES F., "The Philippines and the Royal Philippine Company," 80–104
Colby, Bainbridge, 202
Colfax, Schuyler, 68
Collins, James, on Leo XIII, 236–238
Columbia R., trade on, 175, 184
Committee on Emancipation and Colonization, 142–144
"Committee of Mexican Bondholders and European Intervention in 1861," by PHILLIP J. SHERIDAN, 18–29
Committee on Rules, Congress, 105–115
Comonfort, Ignacio, 21
Comyn, Tomás de, 80, 81, 83–86, 90–94, 99, 100
Coruña, 152
Country Gentleman, 197, 204
Cowley, Henry Wellesley, 28–29
Cox, Sen. S. S., 134–135
Couzens, Sen. James, 214
Crosier on the Frontier, A Life of John Martin Henni, Archbishop of Milwaukee, by Rt. Rev. Msgr. Peter Leo Johnson, revd., 123–124
Curtis, George W., 73

DAHL, VICTOR C., revs., Ruby, H. Phillips, *Cuba, Land of Paradox*, 245
Daily True Delta (Ill.), 186
Darwinism, 8, 16–17
Delane, John Thadeus, 26, 28
Delbos, M. Yvon, 154–155
Democratic party, 195–196, 202–214, 215n., 219–230
Denmark, 148
de Saligny, Dubois, 28
DE SANTIS, VINCENT P., "Catholicism and Presidential Elections, 1865–1900," 67–79
Deutsche Informationen (Paris), 158
Dietrich, Sen. Charles H., 105
Dillon, Richard H. *Embarcadero*, revd., 124
Doolittle, Sen. James R., 139–141, 145–146
Douglas, Gen. Lewis, 204
Douglas, Stephen A., 219
Douglass, Frederick, 137
DOYLE, ELISABETH JOAN, "New Orleans Courts Under Military Occupation, 1861–1865," 185–192
Dulles, Foster Rhea, *The United States Since 1865*, revd., 246
Dunlop, Capt. Hugh, 22
DuQuoin, Ill., 219, 226
Dwight, Col. Charles C., 187

"Economic Aspects of German Intervention in the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939," by EUGENE H. KORTH, S.J., 151–169
Egypt, (southern Illinois), 219–227
Ellis, John Tracy, *Guide to American Catholic History*, revd., 59
Emmanuel L. Philipp—Wisconsin Stalwart, by Robert S. Maxwell, revd., 121–122
ERNST, DOROTHY J., "Search for Fortune along the Mississippi: Pratt Letters," 44–52
Estado, see Comyn
Exposición of 1813, 94–97, 100, 101

Federalist, The, 32, 36
Fernández de Enciso, Martín, 119–120
Feudalism, 36–39
Fitzgerald, Rep. John J., 112–113
Foote, Shelby, *The Civil War, A Narrative*, Vol. I, *Fort Sumter to Perryville*, revd., 122
"Founding Fathers and the Middle Ages," by H. WAYNE MORGAN, 30–43
Fleming, Walter F., 136
Floyd, John, 175, 178
"Francis Parkman on the Nature of Man," by RICHARD A. THOMPSON, 3–13
Franco, Generalisimo Francisco, 151–169
Franklin, Benjamin, 12
Frémont, John C., 220

Gallant Pelham, American Extraordinary, by Charles G. Milham, revd., 56–57
Garcia, Diego, 119
Gardiner, C. Harvey, *Mexico 1825–1828: The Journal of Edward Thornton Tayloe*, noted, 62
Garfield, James A., 71–72
GARGAN, EDWARD T., "The Loyola Leo XIII Symposium," 231–243
Gardner, Rep. A. P., 112
German-Spanish relations, 151–169

Gibbons, James Cardinal, 78
Gildersleeve, Geniveve N., *Women in Banking*, noted, 178
Glavis, Louis R., 113
Göring, Herman, 157, 163
Grace, William R., 72
Graham, William, 27
Grant, Pres. U. S., 69
Great Eastern, ship, 146
Greece, founding fathers and, 30–43
Greeley, Horace, 68–69
Guide to American Catholic History, by John Tracy Ellis, revd., 59

Haiti, 131, 133, 141, 147, 149
Hale, Sen. J. P., 137, 145
Hallam, Henry, cited, 41–42
Halleck, Gen. Henry W., 191
Halperin, Prof. Samuel W., cited, 238–239
Hamilton, Alexander, 32–33, 35
Hamilton, John D. M., 197, 199, 201, 203, 205, 213
HAMILTON, RAPHAEL N., *revs., Crosier on the Frontier*, 123–124
Hanna, Mark, 79
Hard, William, 204, 205
Harper's Weekly, anti-Catholicism of, 68, 70–71
Harvanek, Rev. Robert F., cited, 237–238
Hayes, Carlton J. H., cited, 154
Hayes, Rep. E. A., 107
Hayes, Rutherford B., 71
Haynes, Lacy, 197, 201, 204
Haynie, I. N., 222, 226, 229
Hearst, William Randolph, 199, 215
Hechler, Kenneth, 113
Henry VIII, 119–120
Henry, Andrew, 177
Hepburn, Rep. W. P., 110–112
Hibbs, Ben, 197
Hickey, Patrick J., 73–74
Hisma (Spanish Moroccan Transportation Co.), 156–168
Historia Politica, see Malo de Luque
Hitler, Adolph, 151–169
Hoar, George Frisbie, 73
Hokah, Minn., 45, 47, 51
Holabird, S. B., 191
Holy Roman Empire, 35–37
Hoover, Herbert, 202, 213
Hopkins, Harry, 217
Hopkins, James F. and Mary W. M. Hargreaves, eds., *Papers of Henry Clay*, Vol. I, noted, 61
Howard, Gen. O. O., 222
Hughes, Augustus DeB., 186
Hughes, Paul L., *Crown and Parliament in Tudor–Stuart England*, revd., 53–54
Humani generis, of Pius XII, 238
Hume, David, cited, 40–41

Illinois, politics in, 219–230
Illinois State Journal, 223, 227–229
Illinois State Register, 220–221, 223, 225
Informe sobre las Filipinas, see Mas y Sans
Insurgency, 105–115
Ireland, Archb. John, 78–79, 232, 240
Iroquois Indians, 15–16
Iturbide, Augustín de, 18–20

JACKSON, KENNETH M., revs. C. G. Milham, *Gallant Pelham*, 56–57
JACOBSON, JEROME V., ED., Notes and Comments; revs. J. T. Ellis, *A Guide to American Catholic History*, 59
Jagor, Fedor, 93–94
James Ford Bell Collection, publications noted, 64
Jefferson, Thomas, 12, 14; on Middle Ages, 30–43
Jerome, St., 39
Jesuits, 15–16, 68
Jeumel, Lewis, 170
Jeumel, Victor, 170
John XXIII, Pope, 235
"John A. Logan and the Election of 1864 in Illinois," by JAMES P. JONES, 219–230
Johnson, Andrew, 220
Johnson, Sen. Hiram, 214
Johnson, Peter Leo, *Crosier on the Frontier, A Life of John Martin Henni, Archbishop of Milwaukee*, revd., 123–124
Johnson, Sen. Richard M., 176, 178
JONES, JAMES P., "John A. Logan and the Election of 1864 in Illinois," 219–230
Jones, Richard Lloyd, 197
JONES, ROBERT HUHN, revs. Shelby Foote, *The Civil War, A Narrative.* Vol. I, *Fort Sumter to Perryville*, 122-123
Jonesboro, Ill., 226-227
Jonesboro Gazette (Ill.), 227
Jordan, Edward, 133
Jordana, General, 162, 166
Juárez, Benito, 22-29

Kansas, 195-219
Kansas City Star, 197
KEARNEY, EDMUND W., revs. I. A. Leonard, *Baroque Times in Old Mexico*, 244
Keemle, Charles, 178-179
Kentucky Gazette, 178
KINIERY, PAUL, revs. K. P. Williams, *Lincoln Finds a General*, Vol. V, 55-56; M. Kraus, *The United States to 1865*, and F. R. Dulles, *The United States Since 1865*, 246–247

Kinsman, J. B., 186
Kiplinger, William, 200
Know-Nothing societies, 71, 73, 75
Knollenberg, Bernard, *Origin of the American Revolution, 1759–1766*, revd., 249
Koenig, Msgr. Harry C., cited, 233
KORTH, EUGENE H., "Economic Aspects of German Intervention in the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939," 151–169
Knox, Frank, 199, 203, 213
Kraus, Michael, *The United States to 1865*, revd., 246
Ku Klux Klan, 68, 195
Kuykendall, Andrew J., 220–221, 226, 227

La Follette, Sen. Robert, 214
Landon, Alfred A., 195–218
Lane, Sen. James K., 49-50
Langenheim, Adolf, 156, 157
Lanphier, Charles, 221, 225, 228
La Plata R., 117–120
Latimer, Henry, 116
Latourette, Kenneth Scott, cited, 222–223
Lawlor, S.N.D., Sr. Mary, *Alexis de Tocqueville in the Chamber of Deputies. His Views on Foreign and Colonial Policy*, revd., 55–56
Ledit, Joseph, *Rise of the Downtrodden*, revd., 249
Leo XIII, Pope, 76, 231–243
Leonard, Irving A., *Baroque Times in Old Mexico*, revd., 244
Liberia, 132, 133, 146, 147
Liberty League, 213
Lincoln, Abraham, and Negro Colonization, 131–150; 190–192; and 1864 election, 195–218
Literary Digest, 214
Litvinov, Maxim, 155
Locke, John, 6-7
Lodge, Henry Cabot, 77
Logan, John A., 219–230
Logan, Mary, 223
London Daily Telegraph, 159
London Times, 159
Louisiana, ship, 172
Louisiana, courts, 185–192
Louisiana History, noted, 252
Louisville, Ky., shipping, 173
Louisville Public Advertiser, 178
LOWITT, RICHARD, "The Making of an Insurgent," 105–115
Loyal American, 75–76
Loyola University, Chicago, symposium, 231–243

McAvoy, C.S.C., Rev. Thomas, cited, 239–241
McCaleb, Walter F., cited, 18–19
MCCOY, DONALD R., "Alfred M. Landon and the Presidential Campaign of 1936," 195–218
McClellan, Gen. George, 220–224, 227
McClernand, Gen. John A., 188, 223
MCCLUGGAGE, ROBERT W., revs. R. P. Sharkey, *Money Class, and Party*, 125–126
McDonald, Forrest, *We the People, The Economic Origins of the Constitution*, revd., 58–59
McKinley, William, 79
Madison, James, and Middle Ages, 31–43
Madison, Rep. E. H., 112
Mallet, J., 86–89, 92, 93
Malo de Luque, Eduardo, Duke of Almodóvar, 80–88, 92, 94–97, 103
Manifest Destiny, 141, 143
Manila Galleon, 83, 89, 92, 93, 100–101
Márquez, Leonardo, 24–25
Martin, Sen. Joseph, 203
Mas y Sans, Sinibaldo de, 84–85, 86–89, 96, 99
Mata, José, 27
Matthew, George B., 23–25, 27
Maxwell, Robert S., *Emanuel L. Philipp — Wisconsin Stalwart*, revd., 121–122
Mayberry, William, 204
METZGER, CHARLES H., revs. B. Knollenberg, *Origin of the American Revolution 1759–1766*, 247
Mexico, 1861 intervention, 18–29
Meyer, Albert Cardinal, cited, 235
Mignoni, Francisco B., 18–19
Milham, Charles G., *Gallant Pelham, American Extraordinary*, revd., 56–57
Mills, Ogden, 204
Milwaukee, trade, 44–47
Miramón, Gen. Miguel, 22–27
Mississippi R., shipping, 44–52, 171–173
Missouri, trade in, 47–56
Missouri Herald, 178–179
Mitchell, Rev. James, 133, 135–136, 138, 147–149
Montero y Vidal, José, 81, 92, 96
Montes, Henrique, 117
Moody, Msgr. Joseph N., cited, 233–234
MORGAN, H. WAYNE, " The Founding Fathers and the Middle Ages," 30–43
Morris, Gouverneur, 35
Morroco, Spanish, 152, 156, 158, 161, 167–168
Mossman, William T., 197
Mundy, Paul, cited, 234–235
Mussolini, Benito, 153, 154

Nanina, brig, 172
Nast, Thomas, 68–69
Nazis, 151–169
Nation, The, 200
Nebraska, see Norris, George W.
"Negro Colonization: The Climate of Opinion Surrounding Lincoln, 1860–65," by ROBERT H. ZOELLNER, 131–150
Nelson, Rep. John M., 112
Newberry Library, 94, 103
New Deal, 195, 197, 204–210, 216–217
New Orleans Commercial Bulletin, 185
"New Orleans Courts Under Military Occupation, 1861–1865," by ELIZABETH JOAN DOYLE, 185–192
New Orleans Picayune, 187
New York Courier and Enquirer, 144
New York Herald, 72
New York Herald Tribune, 200
New York Times, 72
New York Tribune, 70, 144, 145
Niles Register, 177
Norris, Sen. George W., 105–115, 214
North American Review, 231–232
NOTES & COMMENTS, 60–64, 127–128, 251–252
NUNIS, DOYCE B., "Tarascon's Dream of an American Commercial Empire in the West," 170–184

Ocampo, Melchor, 23
O'DWYER, MARGARET M.,revs. Mary Lawler, S.N.D., *Alexis de Tocqueville in the Chamber of Deputies. His Views on Foreign and Colonial Policy*, 55–56; cited on Leo XIII, 239
Oglesby, Richard, 220, 226–228
Ohio R., shipping, 171–173, 176
Oregon, trade in, 175–184
Osterhaus, Gen. Peter J., 223

Palmer, Gen. John M., 223, 226
Pampas, Argentina, 116–120
Pan, José Felipe del, 90–92, 96, 103
Papers of Henry Clay, Vol. I, *The Rising Statesman, 1797–1814*, noted, 61
Paraná, R., 117–120
Parkman, Francis, 3–17
Payne-Aldrich tariff, 113
Peabody, Charles A., 186, 19
Pendleton, George, 220
Pericles, 43
Perry, Richard L., *Sources of Our Liberties*, noted, 60
Philadelphia National Gazette, 179
Philadelphia, shipping, 173–174
Phillimore, Robert, 26
Philippine Islands, 80–104
Phillips, D. L., 227
Phillips, Ruby Hart, *Cuba, Island of Paradox*, revd., 245
Pinchot, Gifford, 113–114, 204
PITKIN, WILLIAM A., revs. R. S. Maxwell, *Emanuel L. Phillip—Wisconsin Stalwart*," 121–122
Pittsburgh, ship, 171–172, 181
Pittsburgh, shipping, 171–174
Plan General, 97–104
Plattner, Felix, *Deutsche Meister des Barock en Südamerika im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert*, noted,
Plutarch's *Lives*, 31, 43
Pradeau, Dr. Alberto F., *La Expulsión de los Jesuitas de las Provincias de Sonora, Ostimuri y Sinaloa en 1767*, noted, 61
Pratt, Albert H., letters of, edited, 44–52
Protestantism, in presidential elections, 67–79, 233, 243

REARDON, JOHN J., revs. Forrest McDonald, *We the People, The Economic Origins of the Constitution*, 58–59
Reed, Clyde M., 195
Republican party, 195–218, 219–230
Rerum Novarum of Leo XIII, 231, 234
Retana, W. E., 82, 84
Rice, Cecil Spring, 77
Roberts, Roy, 197, 201–204
Robertson, David, 25–29
Robertson, William, 40
Robey, Raph, 204
Robinson, James, 220
"Roger Barlow: First English Traveler in the Pampas," by S. SAMUEL TRIFILO, 116–120
Roman Question, 238–239
Roman Republic, 30–43
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 198, 204–217
Roosevelt, Theodore, 75–77, 106–108, 111
Root, Elihu, 72
Roselius, Christian, 188
Rowak, 156–168
Royal Philippine Co., 80–104
Russell, Lord, 25–29
Russia, 153, 155–156

St. Louis, Mo., trade, 173, 177, 179, 180
St. Louis Advertiser, 179
St. Louis Enquirer, 177
San Francisco Argonaut, 72
Sangróniz, José Antonio de, 165
Santa Fe Trail, 179
Schmandt, Raymond, cited, 242–243
Schneider, Wilbert M., *The American Bankers Association, Its Past and Present*, noted, 128

Schryrock, Richard H., *Medicine and Society in America*, 1660–1860, noted, 251
Schuman, Frederick, 154
Schurz, Carl, 140
Schurz, William Lytle, *Manila Galleon*, 92–94, 96, 101
"Search for Fortune along the Mississippi," by DOROTHY J. ERNST, 44–52
Sharkey, Robert P., *Money, Class, and Party: An Economic Study of Civil War and Reconstruction*, revd., 125–126
Shea, John Gilmary, 71–72
Sheahan, James W., 221
Shepley, Gen. George F., 185
SHERIDAN, PHILIP J., "The Committee of Mexican Bondholders and European Intervention in 1861," 18–29
Sherman, Gen. William T., 73, 220, 222, 226, 229
SHIELS, W. EUGENE, revs. R. H. Dillon, *Embarcadero, Being a Chronicle of True Sea Adventures from the Port of San Francisco*, 124–125; J. Ledit, *Rise of the Downtrodden*, 249
Shippingport, Ky., 173–174
Smith, Alfred E., 202, 204
Smith, Caleb, 133, 147
Social Security, 209–210
Sociedad, Financiera Industrial, 157
Society of Jesus, see Jesuits
Solanazar Company, 159
Sellery, George Clark, *Some Ferments at Wisconsin, 1901–1947: Memories and Reflections*, noted, 127
Spain, Nationalist, 151–169
Springfield, Ill., 220–224, 225, 229
Standard Oil Co., 113
Stanton, Edwin, 222
Stauffer, Oscar, 197, 203, 204
Sullivan, Mark, 200
Sumner, Charles, 137
Swing, Raymond G., 200

Taft, Charles P., 201, 204, 213
Taft, William H., 112–114
Tammany Hall, 68, 73, 78, 113
Tarascon, John A., 171–172, 176
"Tarascon's Dream of an American Empire in the West," by DOYCE B. NUNIS, 170–184
"The Making of an Insurgent," by RICHARD LOWITT, 105–115
"The Philippines and the Royal Philippine Company," by JAMES F. CLOGHESSY, 80–104
The London Times, 26, 29
THOMPSON, RICHARD A., "Francis Parkman on the Nature of Man," 3–17
Thorne, Robert, 116–119
Tilden, Samuel J., 71
Topeka, Kans., 203; see also Landon, Afred A.
Toynbee, Arnold, 154
Transmediterranean Co., 159
TRIFILO, S, SAMUEL, "Roger Barlow: First English Traveler in the Pampas," 116–120
TRIMBLE, WILLIAM R., revs. P. L. Hughes, *Crown and Parliament in Tudor-Stuart England*, 53
Trumbull, Sen. Lyman, 138, 225
Tucker, Capt. James, 188
Tulsa Tribune (Okla.), 197

Unconditional Unionist, 229
U.S.S.R., see Russia
United Order of Deputies, 75
United Mexican Mining Co., 20
University of Michigan Press, 127

Vagnozzi, Archb. Egidio, 231, 235–236
Vandenberg, Arthur H., 203
Vassall Morton, 4, 9, 13
Vera Cruz, 20–24, 27–29
Viana, Francisco L. de, 81, 82, 92, 93
Von Jagwitz, Eberhard, 163

Wade, Mason, 17
Warmoth, Col. H. C., 88–190
War of Reform, 21
Washburne, Rep. Elihu B., 222, 227
Washington Chronicle, 70
Washington, George, 131
Washington Post, 200, 204
Weigel, S.J., Rev. Gustave, cited, 241–242
Wells, Jr, Daniel, 44–42
Wells, Gideon, 133
Western Trader, ship 172
White, William Allen, 195–216, *passim*
Whitehead, Charles, 25–28
Willey, Sen., 135, 140
Williams, Kenneth P., *Lincoln Finds a General*, Vol. V., revd., 55–56
Wisconsin, 44–48
Woodring, Harry, 195–196

Yates, Gov. Richard, 225
Ybarra Co., 159

Zamora, Gen. Manuel G., 22
ZOELLNER, ROBERT H., "Negro Colonization: The Climate of Opinion Surrounding Lincoln, 1860–65," 131–150
Zuloaga, Gen. Felix, 22

CATHOLIC THEOLOGICAL UNION
3 0311 00147 6394

BX 940 .I342 v.42

Mid-America: an historical review.

3 0311 00147 6394